Tomago Aluminium Company Pty Limited v Ryan

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DETERMINATION OF APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF THE COMMISSION CONSTITUTED BY A MEMBER

CITATION:

Tomago Aluminium Company Pty Limited v Ryan [2025] NSWPICPD 31

APPELLANT:

Tomago Aluminium Company Pty Limited

RESPONDENT:

Samuel James Ryan

INSURER:

Self-insured

FILE NUMBER:

A1-W8907/23

PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER:

President Judge Phillips

DATE OF APPEAL DECISION:

4 April 2025

ORDERS MADE ON APPEAL:

1.    I extend the time for the respondent to file a Notice of Opposition to the appeal to 19 July 2024.

2.    The Certificate of Determination dated 9 May 2024 is confirmed.

CATCHWORDS:

WORKERS COMPENSATION – appeal against Member’s decision in relation to incapacity –adequacy of reasons – s 294(2) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 – Rule 78 of the Personal Injury Commission Rules 2021 – Fisher v Nonconformist Pty Ltd [2024] NSWCA 32 considered and applied – no error found in relation to the Member’s treatment of bank records, surveillance footage and other material – error made by Member did not affect the result – Paterson v State of New South Wales (NSW Police Force) [2025] NSWPICPD 6 considered and applied – Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26 – whether expenditure in bank records reveals a greater functionality or capacity – failure to identify established facts

HEARING:

On the papers

REPRESENTATION:

Appellant:

Mr T Grimes, counsel

BBW Lawyers

Respondent:

Mr G Young, counsel

MRM Lawyers

DECISION UNDER APPEAL:

Ryan v Tomago Aluminium Company Pty Ltd [2024] NSWPIC 243

MEMBER:

The Honourable L Drake

DATE OF MEMBER’S DECISION:

9 May 2024

INTRODUCTION

  1. In 2019, Mr Samuel James Ryan (respondent) commenced employment with Tomago Aluminium Company Pty Ltd (appellant) as a potline operator. On 18 March 2021, the respondent suffered an electric shock while carrying out his usual work duties and as a result, suffered cardiac complications. He returned to work after a few days, but continued to experience symptoms, culminating in a hospital attendance for suspected heart attack on 20 December 2021. He was referred to and treated by various specialists and was ultimately diagnosed with Functional Neurological Disorder (FND).

  2. The respondent sought weekly benefits and medical expenses from the appellant, however on 24 March 2022, by a notice under s 78 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (the 1998 Act) the appellant disputed the respondent’s claim on a number of bases, including that the injury did not arise out of or during the course of employment with the appellant and the injury did not render the respondent with total or partial incapacity.[1]

    [1] Application to Resolve a Dispute (ARD), pp 22–25.

  3. The respondent commenced proceedings in the Personal Injury Commission (Commission). At the hearing before the Member, the issue in dispute was whether the respondent had any past and continuing incapacity for work. The appellant alleged that the respondent was not a credible witness and was malingering and exaggerating his symptoms.

  4. The Member found in favour of the respondent making an order that the appellant pay the respondent…

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Details
Case
[2025] NSWPICPD 31
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Tomago Aluminium Company Pty Limited appealed against a decision of a Member of the Personal Injury Commission concerning the incapacity of Ryan, the respondent, for work. The central issue before the court was whether the Member had erred in his assessment of the respondent's incapacity and if the Member's treatment of various pieces of evidence, including bank records and surveillance footage, was adequate. The court was required to determine if the Member's failure to address certain arguments advanced by the appellant constituted a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction, as per Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.

The court examined the Member's reasons and concluded that there was no error in how the Member treated the bank records, surveillance footage, and other materials presented. It was found that the Member's error, if any, did not affect the final outcome, as per Paterson v State of New South Wales (NSW Police Force). The court also noted that the appellant had not identified any established facts that were overlooked by the Member, and therefore, the appeal did not establish a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction.

Based on the court's reasoning, the appeal was dismissed, and the decision of the Member was upheld. The court determined that the Member's findings regarding the respondent's incapacity were correctly made, and the evidence presented, including the bank records, was appropriately considered. The court found no basis to interfere with the Member's assessment of the respondent's incapacity for work.

Background

Background to the litigation

In Wang v State of NSW,[83] the Court of Appeal was called upon to deal with a Dranichnikov submission in that it was asserted that the primary judge had failed to address written submissions advanced by the appellant. The Court of Appeal said as follows:“The submission invoked the decision of the High Court in Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26; (2003) 77 ALJR 1088 in which it was stated that a failure to respond to a substantial, clearly articulated argument relying on established facts was a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction: at [24] to [25] per Gummow and Callinan JJ. The decision is not authority for the proposition that any failure to refer to any argument put to a trial judge amounts to error. It is necessary to engage with the nature and materiality of the argument in the context of the issues in the proceedings. In Dranichnikov, the Refugee Review Tribunal, in considering whether Mr Dranichnikov had a well-founded fear of persecution on the grounds of his status as a member of a particular social group, overlooked or misconceived the particular social group to which he claimed to belong. That was the central question in the proceedings.The approach taken in the present case was to list every submission put on behalf of Mr Wang to which the primary judge did not refer in his judgment and to assert error on that basis. That reflects a wrong approach. The primary judge was not required to address every submission advanced during the course of the hearing: Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247 at 271.As noted in the State’s written submissions, Mr Wang’s written submissions appear to identify only two particular submissions advanced by him which were material to the outcome and which were not addressed by the trial judge, namely, the submissions relating to Mr Wang’s capacity in the English language … and the submissions in relation to wrongful arrest ... Otherwise, the table of alleged omissions does not articulate any cogent basis for challenging the judge’s findings. Nor does it establish a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction.”[84] (emphasis added)[83] [2019] NSWCA 263 (Wang). [84] Wang, [63]–[65]. The appellant has quoted the authorities that appear in my decision of Sarheed v C1 Formwork Group Pty Limited.[85] As is apparent, at Sarheed [149] I was dealing with a Dranichnikov submission and the cases that followed it. Sarheed [149] provides:[85] [2021] NSWPICPD 7 (Sarheed), [149].“The application of the principles stated in Dranichnikov has been the subject of frequent consideration. In DNA17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection,[86] the Full Federal Court of Australia said as follows:[86] [2019] FCAFC 146 (DNA17). ‘52. In Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 236 FCR 593, the Full Federal Court stated (at [46] and [47]):‘It is plainly not necessary for the Tribunal to refer to every piece of evidence and every contention made by an applicant in its written reasons. It may be that some evidence is irrelevant to the criteria and some contentions misconceived. Moreover, there is a distinction between the Tribunal failing to advert to evidence which, if accepted, might have led it to make a different finding of fact (cf Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323 at [87]–[97]) and a failure by the Tribunal to address a contention which, if accepted, might establish that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason ...The inference that the Tribunal has failed to consider an issue may be drawn from its failure to expressly deal with that issue in its reasons. But that is an inference not too readily to be drawn where the reasons are otherwise comprehensive and the issue has at least been identified at some point. It may be that it is unnecessary to make a finding on a particular matter because it is subsumed in findings of greater generality or because there is a factual premise upon which a contention rests which has been rejected. Where however there is an issue raised by the evidence advanced on behalf of an applicant and contentions made by the applicant and that issue, if resolved one way, would be dispositive of the Tribunal’s review of the delegate’s decision, a failure to deal with it in the published reasons may raise a strong inference that it has been overlooked.’53. In CPE15, Mortimer J referred to Griffiths J’s summary of the authorities in SZSSC and stated (at [40]):‘The kind of argument which must have been articulated by an applicant in order for the Tribunal to exceed its jurisdiction by failing to consider it was described by Griffiths J in SZSSC as ‘a substantial and clearly articulated argument’. In other words, the Tribunal as the decision-maker on the merits must have clearly been put on notice by an applicant of a contention, submission or argument the applicant wished to make in support of a decision in her or his favour on the review. Unless the argument has been ‘clearly articulated’, the Tribunal would not be put on notice. Unless the argument is ‘substantial’, a reviewing court cannot be confident or sufficiently confident that the Tribunal’s failure to deal with the argument may have affected or been material to the conclusion it reached. Ultimately the argument put by an applicant in these circumstances must be characterised as capable of affecting the formation of the state of satisfaction required by section 65 of the Migration Act. If it is not so capable, then the Tribunal will not exceed or fail to exercise its jurisdiction in not considering such an argument.’54. As the above passage makes clear, the failure to consider an argument will only constitute a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction, and thereby jurisdictional error, if the argument is substantial in the sense that it is capable of altering the decision. In that sense, the requirement of substantiality is equivalent to considering whether the failure is material to the outcome. As the Full Federal Court recently observed in Singh v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 3 at [35]­–[37], the ultimate concern is with the identification of jurisdictional error: the review body not performing the function entrusted to it or not performing it in an authorised way. The degree of consideration which is necessary for jurisdiction to have been exercised is affected by the significance of the submission made to the decision-maker. In that regard, it is necessary to have regard to the whole of the decision-maker’s reasons and the issues considered.’ (emphasis added)”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The appellant has quoted the authorities that appear in my decision of Sarheed v C1 Formwork Group Pty Limited.[85] As is apparent, at Sarheed [149] I was dealing with a Dranichnikov submission and the cases that followed it. Sarheed [149] provides:[85] [2021] NSWPICPD 7 (Sarheed), [149].“The application of the principles stated in Dranichnikov has been the subject of frequent consideration. In DNA17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection,[86] the Full Federal Court of Australia said as follows:[86] [2019] FCAFC 146 (DNA17). ‘52. In Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 236 FCR 593, the Full Federal Court stated (at [46] and [47]):‘It is plainly not necessary for the Tribunal to refer to every piece of evidence and every contention made by an applicant in its written reasons. It may be that some evidence is irrelevant to the criteria and some contentions misconceived. Moreover, there is a distinction between the Tribunal failing to advert to evidence which, if accepted, might have led it to make a different finding of fact (cf Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323 at [87]–[97]) and a failure by the Tribunal to address a contention which, if accepted, might establish that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason ...The inference that the Tribunal has failed to consider an issue may be drawn from its failure to expressly deal with that issue in its reasons. But that is an inference not too readily to be drawn where the reasons are otherwise comprehensive and the issue has at least been identified at some point. It may be that it is unnecessary to make a finding on a particular matter because it is subsumed in findings of greater generality or because there is a factual premise upon which a contention rests which has been rejected. Where however there is an issue raised by the evidence advanced on behalf of an applicant and contentions made by the applicant and that issue, if resolved one way, would be dispositive of the Tribunal’s review of the delegate’s decision, a failure to deal with it in the published reasons may raise a strong inference that it has been overlooked.’53. In CPE15, Mortimer J referred to Griffiths J’s summary of the authorities in SZSSC and stated (at [40]):‘The kind of argument which must have been articulated by an applicant in order for the Tribunal to exceed its jurisdiction by failing to consider it was described by Griffiths J in SZSSC as ‘a substantial and clearly articulated argument’. In other words, the Tribunal as the decision-maker on the merits must have clearly been put on notice by an applicant of a contention, submission or argument the applicant wished to make in support of a decision in her or his favour on the review. Unless the argument has been ‘clearly articulated’, the Tribunal would not be put on notice. Unless the argument is ‘substantial’, a reviewing court cannot be confident or sufficiently confident that the Tribunal’s failure to deal with the argument may have affected or been material to the conclusion it reached. Ultimately the argument put by an applicant in these circumstances must be characterised as capable of affecting the formation of the state of satisfaction required by section 65 of the Migration Act. If it is not so capable, then the Tribunal will not exceed or fail to exercise its jurisdiction in not considering such an argument.’54. As the above passage makes clear, the failure to consider an argument will only constitute a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction, and thereby jurisdictional error, if the argument is substantial in the sense that it is capable of altering the decision. In that sense, the requirement of substantiality is equivalent to considering whether the failure is material to the outcome. As the Full Federal Court recently observed in Singh v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 3 at [35]­–[37], the ultimate concern is with the identification of jurisdictional error: the review body not performing the function entrusted to it or not performing it in an authorised way. The degree of consideration which is necessary for jurisdiction to have been exercised is affected by the significance of the submission made to the decision-maker. In that regard, it is necessary to have regard to the whole of the decision-maker’s reasons and the issues considered.’ (emphasis added)”.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Did the Member err in finding the respondent totally incapacitated for work up to 30 March 2023 and partially incapacitated thereafter?
2. Did the Member adequately address the evidence of the respondent's functionality and capacity as demonstrated by bank records and concessions in cross-examination?
3. Did the Member properly consider the respondent's opportunity to explain the payment to the City of Newcastle?

Held
1. The court held that the Member did not err in finding the respondent totally incapacitated for work up to 30 March 2023 and partially incapacitated thereafter.
2. The court found that the Member adequately addressed the evidence of the respondent's functionality and capacity as demonstrated by bank records and concessions in cross-examination.
3. The court determined that the Member properly considered the respondent's opportunity to explain the payment to the City of Newcastle.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant in this ground challenges the Member’s findings with respect to the question of incapacity. The appellant states that the Member had found that the respondent was totally incapacitated for work up to 30 March 2023 and partially incapacitated for work thereafter, and for the following reasons it is said that these findings were wrong. The appellant submits:“11. The Appellant notes that the Member found total incapacity up to 30 March 2023 and partial capacity from 31 March 2023 as outlined in paragraph 7 above upon which this ground of appeal is based.12. The Appellant submits that the Member’s finding that the Respondent Worker was totally incapacitated prior to 30 March 2023 or has incapacity at all afterwards is wrong as the Member made the following findings in respect of the [respondent’s] credit and presentation:a. Paragraph 96: ‘… I do not accept the [respondent’s] presentation of his symptoms. I am persuaded that the [respondent] engaged in significant exaggeration of his symptoms when consulting Dr [Edger] and at large for the purpose of maximizing his entitlements.’ [appellant’s emphasis]b. Paragraph 97: ‘I consider the [respondent’s] presentation of symptoms in the second Centrelink form dated 8 October 2022 and his spouse’s description of his symptomatology in her carers application to both represent gross exaggerations of the [respondent’s] situation, even taking into account fluctuations in symptomology.’ [appellant’s emphasis]c. Paragraph 98: ‘I am not persuaded that the [respondent’s] capacity for work varies on a good day/bad day basis to the extent referred to in his evidence.’ [appellant’s emphasis]13. The Appellant further submits that the findings of total incapacity prior to 30 March 2023 is wrong in light of the functionality in the bank records and concessions in cross examination. The Appellant relies on the submissions below in respect of the Member failing to provide reasons or dealing with the Appellant’s submissions as to the functionality shown in the bank records and concessions in cross examination.” In terms of the submissions made to the Member below, which are relied upon in this appeal ground, they appear in the appellant’s written submissions in reply dated 6 March 2024 which were before the Member. These submissions are 40 paragraphs in length and impugn the respondent’s evidence about his capacity over a number of topics. The evidence of the respondent’s wife is also subject to criticism. This submission concludes with a statement that the respondent was not a witness of truth and did not suffer from any incapacity for the reasons expressed. Finally, the appellant submits that the Member’s finding at reasons [61] that the respondent had no opportunity to explain the payment to City of Newcastle was wrong. The appellant submits that the respondent could have answered this question while he was being re-examined or in his submission and failed to do so.