Tofilau, Marks, Hill & Clarke v The Queen

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[2007] HCATrans 204

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Melbourne  No M144 of 2006

B e t w e e n -

LEMALUOFUIFATU ALIPAPA TOFILAU

Appellant

and

THE QUEEN

Respondent

Office of the Registry
  Melbourne  No M145 of 2006

B e t w e e n -

MATTHEW JOSEPH MARKS

Appellant

and

THE QUEEN

Respondent

Office of the Registry
  Melbourne  No M146 of 2006

B e t w e e n -

SHANE JOHN HILL

Appellant

and

THE QUEEN

Respondent

Office of the Registry
  Melbourne  No M147 of 2006

B e t w e e n -

MALCOLM JOSEPH THOMAS CLARKE

Appellant

and

THE QUEEN

Respondent

GLEESON CJ
GUMMOW J
KIRBY J
HAYNE J
CALLINAN J
HEYDON J
CRENNAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 17 MAY 2007, AT 10.17 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

__________________

GLEESON CJ:   I think you were part heard, Mr Coghlan.  Is that right?

MR COGHLAN:   I was, your Honour.  I had been dealing with the proposition really of basal voluntariness at the time we adjourned and the question had been raised by the Court of what the attitude was in civil cases, contract cases, particularly as it related to the question of duress.  We referred to some articles in the Law Quarterly Review.  That had arisen in the context that your Honour the Chief Justice had raised directly the question of how do we judge the overbearing of the will?  Are we dealing with that as a philosophical or psychological proposition?  Very difficult for judges to decide. 

It seems true, at least in dealing with the notion of duress in the law of contract, that the courts have moved and stayed away from the proposition of the overbearing of the will, based largely on the notion, but not completely, that because in result the contract would only be voidable, that seems to not reasonably fit with the notion that it was a contract entered into with the will being overborne for, if that had been established, you would have ordinarily regarded a contract as being void or it ought to be void rather than voidable.

In truth, it is submitted that it is analogous with very close to the inducement proposition that relates to the law of voluntariness; inducement held out presumption of involuntariness, the test being almost entirely objective, avoiding the notion contained in basal voluntariness of needing to enter into the mind of any particular confessionalist as to what operation duress, threats and other matters might have had on them to decide the question of basal voluntariness.

GLEESON CJ:   Yes.  Your very use of the word “mind”, which is an expression that comes very comfortably to a lawyer, would be regarded by a psychiatrist as extraordinarily old fashioned, and by a philosopher.

MR COGHLAN:   Entirely, your Honour.

HAYNE J:   These things were looked at by Justice Windeyer in Ryan 121 CLR, particularly at 244, which is a Code case about voluntary act…

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Details
Case
[2007] HCATrans 204
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Tofilau, Marks, Hill, and Clarke against their convictions for murder. The appellants were convicted following a trial in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, and their appeals to the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales were dismissed. The central dispute concerned the admissibility of certain evidence and the fairness of the trial process.

The High Court was required to determine whether the trial judge erred in admitting evidence obtained from the appellants, specifically statements made by them to police. This involved considering whether the statements were made voluntarily and whether their admission would have been unfairly prejudicial to the appellants, thereby outweighing their probative value. A further issue was whether the cumulative effect of certain alleged errors during the trial, including directions to the jury and the admission of evidence, rendered the trial unfair and necessitated a new trial.

The Court, in a joint judgment, analysed the principles governing the admissibility of confessions and the discretion of a trial judge to exclude evidence under s 137 of the *Evidence Act 1995* (NSW). It was held that the trial judge had correctly applied these principles in admitting the statements, finding them to be voluntary and not unfairly prejudicial. The Court also found that while some directions to the jury could have been clearer, they did not, when considered with the other aspects of the trial, amount to a miscarriage of justice. The cumulative effect of the matters raised by the appellants did not, in the Court's view, demonstrate that the verdicts were unsafe or unsatisfactory.

The appeals were accordingly dismissed.

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