Todd and Child Support Registrar (Child support)
[2017] AATA 273
•2 March 2017
Todd and Child Support Registrar (Child support) [2017] AATA 273 (2 March 2017)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number: 2017/0544
Re:Andrew Todd
APPLICANT
AndChild Support Registrar
RESPONDENT
Decision
Tribunal:Member D K Grigg
Date:2 March 2017
Place:Brisbane
The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.
.........................[Sgd]...............................................
Member D K Grigg
Catchwords
CHILD SUPPORT – Departure Prohibition Order in force -– non-compliance with payment obligations - Departure Authorisation Certificate refused - decision under review affirmed
Legislation
Child Support (Registration and Collection Act) 1988 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases
Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577
Hneidi and Others v Minister For Immigration And Citizenship (2010) 265 ALR 292
Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634
Whittaker v Child Support Registrar [2010] FCA 43
Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298
Singh v Minister for Immigration ad Citizenship (2012) 199 FCR 404
O’Neill and Child Support Registrar [2010] AATA 545
Askew v Child Support Registrar [2014] AATA 354
Wetzell and Child Support Registrar [2015] AATA 607Secondary Materials
Child Support Guide – Version 4.22 – Released 6 February 2017
REASONS FOR DECISION
Member D K Grigg
2 March 2017
INTRODUCTION
Mr Todd owes $128,929.18 in respect of registered maintenance liabilities under section 30 and section 67 of the Child Support (Registration and Collection Act) 1988 (“the Act”).[1] The outstanding sum includes penalties of $30,876.37 incurred due to Mr Todd’s non-compliance with his payment obligations.[2]
[1] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T17, page 83, Certificate under s 116(2) of the Child Support (Registration and Collection
Act) 1988 dated 7 February 2017.
[2] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T16, pages 76-82, Transaction statement – 06.01.2003 to 03.02.2017; T17, page 83,
Certificate under s 116(2) of the Child Support (Registration and Collection Act) 1988 dated 7 February 2017.
Pursuant to section 72D of the Act the Child Support Registrar issued a departure prohibition order (“DPO”) on 20 April 2011 because Mr Todd had:[3]
(a)a child support liability;
(b)not made satisfactory arrangements to discharge the entire liability; and
(c)persistently and without reasonable grounds failed to pay child support debts.
[3] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T8, pages 47-48, Letter – issue of Departure Prohibition Order dated 20 April 2011; T9,
page 49, Departure Prohibition Order dated 20 April 2011.
The DPO is still in force.
On 24 January 2017 Mr Todd applied for a Departure Authorisation Certificate (“DAC”) pursuant to section 72K of the Act requesting permission to travel to Papua New Guinea between 31 January 2017 and 3 March 2017, to source employment contracts in the gold mining industry.[4] Mr Todd is not currently employed.[5] Mr Todd’s application for a DAC was refused.[6]
[4] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T15, page 74, Delegate Refusal of DAC request dated 27 January 2017.
[5]Exhibit 1, T Documents, T14, pages 68-73, Submission regarding Departure Authorization Certificate request dated 24 January 2017.
[6] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T15, page 74, Delegate Refusal of DAC request dated 27 January 2017.
For the reasons set out below I have affirmed the decision under review.
Claim History
Mr Todd lodged an application for review with the Child Support Registrar.[7] The Child Support Registrar rejected Mr Todd’s claim on 28 January 2017 finding that:[8]
(a)it is unlikely that Mr Todd would return to Australia within an appropriate period;
(b)it is unlikely that the DPO issued against Mr Todd will be revoked within an appropriate period;
(c)Mr Todd has not provided the required security for his return to Australia;
(d)humanitarian grounds have not been established; and
(e)refusing to issue Mr Todd the DAC was not detrimental to Australia's interests.
[7] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T15, page 55, Letter from AAT to Department advising of appeal dated 26 April 2016.
[8] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T2, pages 8-9, Decision of Child Support Registrar dated 28 January 2017.
dated 4 July 2016.
Pursuant to section 72T of the Act, on 30 January 2017 Mr Todd sought a review of the Child Support Registrar’s decision by this Tribunal.[9]
[9] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T1, pages 1-7, Application for Review dated 30 January 2017.
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
The issues for determination are whether or not a DAC should be issued to Mr Todd under section 72L of the Act.
LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENTS
Pursuant to the section 30(1) of the Act:
(1) If a registrable maintenance liability is registered under this Act, amounts payable under the child support assessment, court order, maintenance agreement, maintenance order or maintenance assessment under which the liability arises are debts due to the Commonwealth by the payer in accordance with the particulars of the liability entered in the Child Support Register.
Any child support debt which remains unpaid after the time when it became due and payable attracts a penalty, calculated under sections 67(1) or 67(1AA) of the Act, and is a debt due to the Commonwealth.[10]
[10] Section 67(2) of the Act.
DPOs prohibit a person from departing from Australia for a foreign country and can be made if:
(a) the person has a child support liability; and
(b) the person has not made arrangements satisfactory to the Registrar for the child support liability to be wholly discharged; and
(c) the Registrar is satisfied that the person has persistently and without reasonable grounds failed to pay:
(i) child support debts arising from a registrable maintenance liability under section 17; or
(ii) a child support debt arising from a registrable maintenance liability under section 17A; or
(iii) one or more child support debts arising from a registrable overseas maintenance liability under subsection 18A(1), paragraph 18A(3)(a) or subsection 18A(4) (insofar as subsection 18A(4) relates to subsection 18A(1) or paragraph 18A(3)(a)); and
(d) the Registrar believes on reasonable grounds that it is desirable to make the order for the purpose of ensuring that the person does not depart from Australia for a foreign country without:
(i) wholly discharging the child support liability; or
(ii) making arrangements satisfactory to the Registrar for the child support liability to be wholly discharged.
(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(c), the Registrar must have regard to the following matters:
(a) the capacity of the person concerned to pay the debt or debts;
(b) the number of occasions on which action has been taken to recover the debt or debts, and the outcome of the recovery action;
(c) if subparagraph (1)(c)(i) applies — the number of occasions on which the debts mentioned in that subparagraph had not been paid on or before the day on which they became due and payable;
(d) if subparagraph (1)(c)(ii) applies — the length of time for which the debt mentioned in that subparagraph has remained unpaid after the day on which it became due and payable;
(da) if subparagraph (1)(c)(iii) applies:
(i) the length of time for which the debts mentioned in that subparagraph have remained unpaid after the day on which they became due and payable; and
(ii) the number of occasions on which the debts mentioned in that subparagraph had not been paid on or before the day on which they became due and payable;
(e) such other matters as the Registrar considers appropriate.
In Whittaker v Child Support Registrar [2010] FCA 43[11] Lindgren J explained the purpose of DPOs within the context of the principles of the Act as follows:
[250] It will be recalled that the principal objects of the Collection Act are, inter alia, to ensure that children receive from their parents the financial support that the parents are liable to provide, and that periodic amounts payable by parents towards the maintenance of their children are paid on a regular and timely basis: s 3(1)(a) and (b) of the Collection Act. The connection between a departure from Australia of the parent liable and discharge of his or her child support liability is obvious: enforcement of the obligation to pay is likely to be more difficult if the person liable is out of Australia.
[291]… Generally speaking, the terms of s 72D(1) show that a DPO is intended to “ensure” that a person does not depart from Australia without either wholly discharging his or her child support liability or making arrangements satisfactory to the Registrar for its discharge. While a DPO is not security in a proprietary sense, it is security in a broader sense of a procedure designed to prevent recovery being frustrated. (my emphasis)
[11] Upheld on appeal, Whittaker v Child Support Registrar [2010] FCAFA 112.
As referred to earlier, a DPO against Mr Todd is currently in force. Mr Todd’s appeal in 2012 against the DPO to the Federal Magistrates Court[12] was unsuccessful.[13] Further, Mr Todd has still not complied with the costs orders relating to the appeal.[14]
[12] Now known as the Federal Circuit Court.
[13] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T11, pages 53-63, Court Orders (Judgment) dated 8 March 2012.
[14] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T12, pages 64-65, Court Orders (Costs) dated 20 April 2012; T16, pages 76-82,
Transaction statement – 06.01.2003 to 03.02.2017.
WHEN WILL A DAC BE ISSUED?
When a DPO is in force a person may still be issued a DAC in limited, prescribed circumstances. The circumstances that must be satisfied before a DAC will be issued are set out in section 72L which provides:
(2) The Registrar must issue the departure authorisation certificate if the Registrar is satisfied:
(a) that, if the certificate is issued:
(i) it is likely that the person will depart from Australia and return to Australia within a period that the Registrar considers appropriate; and
(ii) it is likely that, within a period that the Registrar considers appropriate, the Registrar will be required by subsection 72I(1) to revoke the departure prohibition order in respect of the person; and
(b) that it is not necessary for the person to give security under section 72M for the person's return to Australia.
(3) If the Registrar is not satisfied as mentioned in subsection (2), the Registrar must nevertheless issue the departure authorisation certificate if:
(a) the person has given security under section 72M for the person's return to Australia; or
(b) if the person is unable to give such security, the Registrar is satisfied:
(i) that the certificate should be issued on humanitarian grounds; or
(ii) that refusing to issue the certificate will be detrimental to Australia's interests.
SHOULD A DAC BE ISSUED UNDER SECTION 72l(2) or 72L(3)?
Section 72L(2)
In order to satisfy the requirements in section 72L(2), the Registrar must be satisfied that the following conditions are met:
(a)that Mr Todd will depart from Australia and return to Australia within a period that the Registrar considers appropriate; and
(b)that, within a period that the Registrar considers appropriate, the Registrar will be required by subsection 72I(1) to revoke the departure prohibition order in respect of the person; and
(c)it is not necessary for Mr Todd to give security under section 72M for his return to Australia.
The Respondent submitted, and Mr Todd agreed before me, that it was necessary in this instance for Mr Todd to provide security under section 72M for his return to Australia.
Given that Mr Todd’s child support liability is substantial and he has not proposed any payment plan for reducing the debt or made any child support payments since 2009,[15] I find that it is necessary in this instance for Mr Todd to provide security under section 72M for his return to Australia. Therefore, section 72L(2) does not apply and instead section 72L(3) needs to be considered.
[15]Exhibit 1, T Documents, T14, pages 68-73, Submission regarding Departure Authorization Certificate request dated 24 January 2017.
Section 72L(3)
In circumstances where the Registrar is not satisfied that section 72L(2) applies, the Registrar must nevertheless issue a DAC under section 72L(3) if:
(a)the person has given security under section 72M for the person's return to Australia; or
(b)if the person is unable to give such security, the Registrar is satisfied:
(i)that the certificate should be issued on humanitarian grounds; or
(ii)that refusing to issue the certificate will be detrimental to Australia's interests.
Mr Todd did not submit that he was unable to provide security. Mr Todd also acknowledged that he was not submitting that a DAC should be issued on humanitarian grounds or that refusing to issue the DAC would be detrimental to Australia's interests. Therefore, only section 72L(3)(a) needs to be considered.
Mr Todd submits he has made an offer to provide security of $20,000 under section 72M for his return to Australia and that therefore a DAC should be issued.
Section 72M provides:
(1) A person may give such security as the Registrar considers appropriate by bond, deposit or any other means, for the person's return to Australia by such day as is agreed by the person and the Registrar and is specified in the departure authorisation certificate. (my emphasis)
The security given must be “appropriate”. The Respondent referred the Tribunal to the Child Support Guide.The Tribunal is not bound to apply the Guide but it may, and it should, apply it in exercising its discretion unless it is unlawful or “tends to produce an unjust decision”.[16]
[16] Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634, at 645.
Chapter 5.2.11 of the Guide relates to DPOs and DACs (T4, p31) and provides the following in relation to security provided for a DAC:
DAC issued where security provided
.. a DAC must still be issued when the child support debtor has given appropriate security, under section 72M, for their return to Australia (section 72L(3)(a)). Security can be given by a bond or a deposit or by other means. If the debtor does not return by the agreed date, the security will be forfeited to the Commonwealth of Australia. It cannot be applied against the outstanding child support debt.
The Registrar will only accept a security that:
· is in a form that is readily convertible to cash e.g. bank cheque;
· is offered by the debtor rather than third parties on the debtor's behalf;
· is generally not significantly less in value than the amount of the debt owing.
Note: security arising from a loan obtained by a child support debtor from a financial institution or a third party is not considered to be a payment from a third party.
If a child support debtor is able to give appropriate security, the use of those funds to reduce the child support debt is preferred to their use as a security. Wholly discharging the debt or making a satisfactory arrangement to discharge the debt and meet any ongoing child support liability will generally result in a DPO being revoked (section 721). Where the debt is in dispute and a person is taking steps to resolve this dispute, offering security could be an appropriate alternative.
(my emphasis)
Brennan J explained the relevance of an adopted policy to decision-making in Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634 at 640:[17]
Decision-making is facilitated by the guidance given by an adopted policy, and the integrity of decision-making in particular cases is the better assured if decisions can be tested against such a policy. By diminishing the importance of individual predilection, an adopted policy can diminish the inconsistencies which might otherwise appear in a series of decisions, and enhance the sense of satisfaction with the fairness and continuity of the administrative process.
[17] See also Singh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 199 FCR 404.
The Full Federal Court in Hneidi and Others v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 265 ALR 292 set out the four propositions which emerge from Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577 (“Drake”) when considering the entitlement of an administrative decision-maker to take into account a statement of governmental policy:
[41]…The first is that the decision-maker is entitled, in the absence of specifically defined criteria for the exercise of the discretion, to take into account “government policy”. Thus, where the tribunal is not under a statutory duty to regard itself as bound by the policy, it is entitled to treat the policy as a relevant consideration.
[42] Second, in the absence of a specific statutory provision (which would no doubt be unusual) the tribunal is not entitled to abdicate its function of determining whether the decision under review was, on the material before the tribunal, the correct or preferable one, to a more passive function of determining whether the decision conformed to the relevant policy.
[43] Third, it is not desirable to frame a general statement of the part which government policy should ordinarily play in the determinations of the tribunal. That is a matter for the tribunal to determine in the context of the particular case, informed by considerations of the desirability of consistency of administrative decisions but balanced against the ideal of justice in the individual case.
[44] Fourth, the borderline between cases in which the tribunal has abdicated its functions to those of an unthinking application of “government or ministerial policy” to the facts may sometimes be blurred. But where the tribunal considers that the correct or preferable decision results from the application of such a policy, it should make it clear that:
… it has considered the propriety of the particular policy and expressly indicates the considerations which have led it to that conclusion.
In Drake, Brennan J (as President of the AAT) noted that:
(a)“An argument against the policy itself or against its application in the particular case will be considered, but cogent reasons will have to be shown against its application”.[18]
(b)“The Tribunal’s duty is to make the correct or preferable decision in each case on the material before it, and the Tribunal is at liberty to adopt whatever policy it chooses, or no policy at all, in fulfilling its statutory function”.[19]
(c)Further, consistency with comparable cases and decisions is “[o]ne of the factors to be considered in arriving at the preferable decision… and one of the most useful aids in achieving consistency is a guiding policy”.[20]
[18] Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634 at 645.
[19] Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634 at 642.
[20] Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634 at 643.
Mr Todd said that the security could be given in cash or by way of bank cheque. No details of who is providing the $20,000 to him was proffered by Mr Todd. Despite being asked for details, he never provided any.
Given that $20,000 is significantly less that the debt owed, Mr Todd was questioned as to whether or not he could provide more than $20,000. Mr Todd said he could not but he provided the Tribunal with no information or evidence regarding his financial circumstances. The Respondent submits that an adverse inference[21] can be drawn from Mr Todd’s failure to provide full and frank disclosure of all relevant financial matters. I agree.
[21] Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298
The Respondent submits that a DAC should not be issued because the Tribunal ought not to be satisfied that the Applicant will return to Australia within an appropriate period if the DAC issues for the reasons identified in the submission to the delegate. In particular (see Registrar’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions, at paragraph 42):
(a)Mr Todd has provided no evidence of the terms of any actual or proposed employment;
(b)Papua New Guinea is a reciprocating jurisdiction pursuant to Schedule 2 of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Regulations 1988, however should the Applicant fail to return to Australia the Department would be unable to make or continue a child support assessment in the absence of a court order under the Family Law Act 1975;
(c)Mr Todd’s child support liability is substantial and he has failed to take any action to address any deficiency he alleges in respect of his child support assessments despite being informed of his options in this respect; and
(d)Mr Todd has refused to pay any of his child support debt prior to his proposed departure.
Mr Todd was questioned at some length about his need to travel Papua Guinea.
Mr Todd did not provide any details of:
(a)the proposed employer in PNG;
(a)the nature of the potential contract arrangements; or
(b)the names of anyone he would be meeting with.
Mr Todd says he cannot provide this information for legal reasons. I am unaware of any legal reason why this information could not have been provided to the Tribunal.
Mr Todd said his work skills were moving dirt in dangerous places “without getting killed”. I asked why he needed to be in PNG for 30 days if, as he said, he was going to look at employment contracts and assess safety concerns. Mr Todd responded by saying that he had to spend time going into the jungle/remote areas, he had to talk to village chiefs and negotiate with them so that the mining company was able to work at certain sites. This sounds more like what someone would do when they already had a contract in place. Mr Todd denied he was already being paid by anyone. However, in my opinion, it is very unusual to be “clearing the way” for a company to commence mining in an area when you are not contracted to them. In any event, even if what Mr Todd says is correct, there is simply no evidence to corroborate it.
Even if there were employment opportunities for Mr Todd in PNG, it does not explain why he has not found work in Australia. Mr Todd said he chose not to work once the DPO was made because he thought, in essence, why should he – he knew that any income he earned would need to be applied to reducing the child support debt owed. Mr Todd still disagrees with the child support assessment amount. However, it is not a requirement for this Tribunal to undertake an assessment of whether or not the child support assessment has been made correctly.[22]
[22] O'Neill and Child Support Registrar [2010] AATA 545 and Askew v Child Support Registrar [2014] AATA 354, at
[29].
Later in the hearing Mr Todd said he chose not to work in order to be a full-time carer of his step-daughter. This was a decision made by Mr Todd even though he had child support obligations to his other children. Mr Todd said he could not find work where he lived because it was a remote area and he and his wife only had one car. He is now suggesting he find work overseas in PNG.
I find that the amount of security being offered by Mr Todd is too low and not “appropriate” in the circumstances. In considering what is an “appropriate” amount of security, the surrounding circumstances need to be considered.[23]
[23] Wetzell and Child Support Registrar [2005] AATA 607 at [17].
The Respondent referred me to other Tribunal decisions where it has been held that, in considering all the surrounding circumstances where an Applicant has not complied with child support obligations, the security should not be substantially less than the amount of the child support liability.[24] This is consistent with the Guide.
[24] Exhibit 2, Registrar’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions, para [33] dated 14 February 2017 referring to
Valve and Child Support Agency [2009] AATA 927, at [18] and Askew v Child Support Registrar [2014] AATA 354,
at [21].
Mr Todd has only offered an amount of $20,000 as security which is approximately 15% of the total debt owed. As referred to earlier this debt already included penalties for overdue payments. I note also that the last child support payment made by Mr Todd 7 years ago was a payment of only $151.00 on 14 January 2009.[25]
[25]Exhibit 1, T Documents, T14, pages 68-73, Submission regarding Departure Authorization Certificate request dated 24 January 2017.
Mr Todd says there is no need for concern regarding whether or not he will return because he is married and has a family in Australia. However, the extent of the debt owed, the limited evidence regarding the proposed trip to PNG, the total lack of evidence of Mr Todd’s financial circumstances, the lack of any adequate explanation for why he has not paid any child support or made any attempt to reduce the debt owed since 2009 are causes for concern, and add to the completely unsatisfactory nature of his argument.
Mr Todd submitted that staff of the Minister for Human Services had informed him that $20,000 security was sufficient for the purpose of issuing a DAC. The Respondent informed the Tribunal that it had no knowledge of any representation or agreement of this kind. In support of his submission, subsequent to the hearing, Mr Todd provided a copy of an email, dated 1 December 2016, received from Mr Donald Bundesen, Senior Advisor to Senator Pauline Hanson. That email informed Mr Todd that a letter of advice had been sent to him by the Department of Human Resources outlining that he could either:
(i)…apply for a departure Authorization Certificate noting your advice you could post security of $20,000.00 together an undertaking to pay back past owing child support payments; or
(ii)…refer the matter to the AAT to have the Departure Prohibition Order overturned.
The Respondent submits that:[26]
(a)the email from Mr Bundesen does not reflect the letter from the Department to Mr Todd dated 4 July 2016;[27] and
(b)the Minister is not authorised under the Act to make decisions about DACs as this power vests exclusively with the Registrar or his delegate.
[26] Registrar’s Further Submissions dated 23 February 2017, at paras 5-6.
[27] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T13, pages 66-67, Letter – Departmental response to Ministerial complaint.
The letter from the Department to Mr Todd dated 4 July 2016 addresses Mr Todd’s concern about the Department’s decision to refuse a child support agreement. It does not address the issues raised in Mr Bundesen’s email and is 6 months prior to that email. Mr Bundesen’s email dated 1 December 2016 refers to discussions with the Minister’s staff “yesterday”, i.e. 30 November 2016. The Respondent acknowledges that meeting took place but says no Departmental staff were in attendance.[28]
[28] Registrar’s Further Submissions dated 23 February 2017, at para 7.
Mr Todd had several telephone conversations with Departmental Liaison Officers prior and subsequent to receiving the email from Mr Bundesen. The notes of those communications in January 2017 confirm that:[29]
(a)Mr Todd was advised that:
(i)appropriate security would be an amount equivalent to the total of his child support arrears;
(ii)he needs to enter into a satisfactory payment arrangement to address the outstanding liability;
(iii)$20,000 is unlikely to be considered reasonable security given the size of the arrears;
(b)Mr Todd made no payment offer; and
(c)Mr Todd continues to disagree with the liability.
[29] Exhibit 1, T Documents, T19, pages 158-160, Communications Notes January 2017.
Mr Todd did not dispute the contents of those conversations. I note that there is no mention in those conversations of Mr Todd having reached any agreement with the Department.
This email from Mr Bundesen does not confirm that an agreement had been reached between Mr Todd and the Department, it merely outlines Mr Todd’s options. Further, even if it did constitute an agreement to issue a DAC, one of the conditions was that Mr Todd provide an undertaking to pay back past owing child support payments which he has not done.
Further, I accept the submission of the Respondent that the Minister is not authorised under the Act to make decisions about DACs. The power to make DPOs or to issue DACs vests exclusively with the Registrar or his delegate under sections 72D, 72L and 15. Contrary to the Migration Act 1958 (Cth),[30] no power is given to the Minister under the Act to intervene.
[30] See sections 351, 417 and 501J.
a DAC should not BE ISSUED UNDER SECTION 72l(3)
For the reasons outlined above, to permit Mr Todd to leave the country having provided only $20,000 security in these circumstances is inappropriate, contrary to the objects of the Act, contrary to the Guide and inconsistent with previous decisions of this Tribunal.
Mr Todd does not meet the criteria in subsection 72L(3)(a).
CONCLUSION
Mr Todd’s appeal fails.
The decision under review is affirmed.
I certify that the preceding 50 (fifty) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Member D K Grigg
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Associate
Dated: 2 March 2017
Date of hearing: 15 February 2017 Date final submissions received: 22 February 2017 Applicant: In person Solicitors for the Respondent: Department of Human Services
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