Toa Medical Electronics Co Ltd v Symix Systems Incorporated

[1996] ATMO 59

TRADE MARKS ACT 1955

DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS

Opposition by SYMIX SYSTEMS INCORPORATED to Applications Nos 540161 and 540163 in the Name of TOA MEDICAL ELECTRONICS CO LTD

As provided in the transitional provisions of Part 22 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 the provisions of the Trade Marks Act 1955 continue to govern these oppositions.  Accordingly, unless otherwise specified, any reference to the Act in this decision is a reference to the Trade Marks Act 1955.

The applications

Applications 540161 and 540163 were lodged on 15 August 1990 in the name of TOA MEDICAL ELECTRONICS CO LTD, (“Toa”), a Japanese company.  They sought the registration of the trade mark SYSMEX, as rendered below, in respect of the following goods:

540161	Class 9	Data processing apparatus and instruments, testing instruments and apparatus in this class, scientific apparatus and instruments including data printers, data processing units or data interpretation units, number displays; testing tools in this class including centrifugal dilution sets, micro pettors (pipettes), particle counters; testing consumable products in this class including disposable beakers, paper cups, sampling bottles, platelet sampling sets, cuvettes or test tubes; testing parts in this class including beaker stands, holder stands; and all other goods in this class
540163	Class 16	Paper and paper articles; data sheets; chart papers for laboratory analysis, analytical testing and medical forms; cardboard and cardboard articles; and all other goods in this class

Following examination the two applications were advertised as accepted, 540163 on 10 June 1993 and 540161 on 22 July 1993.

Grounds of opposition

Notices of opposition to both applications were lodged in accordance with s49 of the Act by SYMIX SYSTEMS INCORPORATED, a corporation of the State of Ohio, USA, (“Symix”), to 540163 on 8 December 1993 and to 540161 on 21 January 1994.  However, both notices were in identical terms and recited the following grounds of opposition:

1. the applicant was not the proprietor of the trade mark;

1. the trade mark was not distinctive nor capable of becoming distinctive of the applicant’s goods;

1. the use of the trade mark was likely to deceive or cause confusion because of its resemblance to prior registrations or pending applications in respect of the same or similar goods or services;

1. the applicant did not have an intention to use the trade mark;

1. registration of the trade mark would be contrary to the provisions of s28 of the Act;

1. in the exercise of his discretion the Registrar should refuse registration of the trade mark.

The evidence

The service of evidence in the opposition proceedings was completed on 19 March 1996 and consists of:

• Evidence in support:

• a declaration of G. Thomas Wyatt, Chief Financial Officer and Secretary of Symix, together with Annexures A-O.

• Evidence in answer:

• a declaration of Akio Suzuki, Manager of the Intellectual Property Division of Toa, with Exhibit 1;

• a declaration of Tracey Savage of Spruson & Ferguson, patent attorneys, with Exhibits A & B.

On 1 August 1996 Spruson  Ferguson, the attorneys for Toa, applied for a hearing of the matter which was set down for 15 October 1996 in Sydney.  On that day Mr Ken McInnes of Spruson & Ferguson appeared on behalf of Toa.  Mr Brett Doyle of Blake Dawson Waldren, solicitors, appeared for Symix.

Submissions

Mr Doyle said that it was apparent from the name of the applicant that its interest was in medical equipment while Symix was interested in computer goods.  It seemed therefore that the real dispute was as to the ambit of the goods claimed by Toa.  He said that Symix had used the trade mark SYMIX in respect of computer equipment while Toa’s use of the SYSMEX mark appeared to be more limited.  He submitted that Symix was entitled to claim proprietorship in terms of s40 of the Act because SYMIX and SYSMEX were substantially identical marks.  Moreover, while Symix had demonstrated use of the mark in respect of computer goods Toa had not shown any use of the mark.  He also drew my attention to a later registration by Symix, numbered 544871, of the trade mark SYMIX in respect of “Computer programs for use in manufacturing management applications”.

Mr Doyle also submitted that Toa lacked a bona fide intention to use the trade mark and on that ground also could not claim to be the proprietor of the trade mark since proprietorship consisted of the combination of the authorship of the mark together with the intention to use it: Aston v Harlee Manufacturing Company (1960) 103 CLR 391; Fuddruckers Trade Mark (1989) AIPC ¶90-596; Paintmaster Products v Lewis Berger & Sons (1925) 25 AOJP 1915.  He claimed that on the evidence there was no bona fide intention to use the mark: Mothercare United Kingdom Ltd v Penguin Books Ltd [1988] RPC 113; Dom Perignon Trade Mark (1985) AIPC ¶90-238. And this question, he argued, was to be decided on the civil standard of proof, on the balance of probabilities. In this regard also he submitted that there was no evidence as to the nature of the business conducted by Toa: Titan Manufacturing Company Pty Ltd v John Terence Coyne (1991) 22 IPR 613.

While Symix’s application for registration postdated Toa’s applications, Mr Doyle submitted that in terms of s33 of the Act the mark was not capable of registration because of prior registration, no. 529082, registered in the name of Omron Corporation, a Japanese company.  The details of that trade mark are as below:

529082 Class 9 Computers, programmable controllers, display monitors, keyboards, interface boards, peripheral interface units, linking units, memory units, storage units, power supplies and cables; computer systems including or consisting of one or more of the foregoing; parts, fittings and accessories therefor, and all other class 9 goods

Mr Doyle contended that that trade mark and the mark in suit were substantially identical or at the least deceptively similar in terms of s6 of the Act so as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion.

With reference to the objection to registration in terms of s28 of the Act Mr Doyle referred to the familiar test which may be stated as follows, paraphrasing the words of Evershed J. in Smith Hayden & Co Ltd's Application (1946) 63 RPC 97, in which he compared the tests under ss.11 and 12 of the Trade Marks Act 1938 (UK), which correspond to ss28 and 33 of the Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth):

The questions for my decision ... have been formulated, and I think accurately formulated, as follows:

(a) (Under s.28) "Having regard to the reputation acquired by the name SYMIX is the Registrar satisfied that the mark applied for, if used in a normal or fair manner in connection with any goods covered by the registration proposed, will not be reasonably likely to cause deception and confusion amongst a substantial number of persons?";

...

He referred to the evidence  as to Symix’s reputation in the mark SYMIX in connection with computer products arguing that because of that reputation the use of the mark in suit by Toa would lead to deception or confusion of a substantial number of persons.  He then referred to the question of “blameworthy conduct” and submitted that it was not required to be shown, but that if it were, it should be looked at in an inchoate or introductory way.  In this sense the conduct of Toa in adopting a trade mark which conflicted with Symix’s mark, a mark very similar both phonetically and visually, was conduct which could be characterised as blameworthy.  He said the beginning and ending of both words were common, both beginning in SY- and ending in -X.  The vowels “i” and “e” before the final “x” were also very similar in sound.  He questioned the argument that marks beginning with the letters SYS- were very common on the Register.  He claimed that the use of the mark by Toa was a “misappropriating use”: Titan Manufacturing Company Pty Ltd v John Terence Coyne (1991) 22 IPR 613.

Mr McInnes pointed to what he claimed was the distinctive script form of the SYSMEX trade mark and drew attention to the fact that it was already registered in Classes 1 and 10 for various goods connected with medical analysis and testing.

With respect to the proprietorship of the mark Mr McInnes submitted that it was not an issue since the two trade marks were not the same nor were they substantially identical.  He conceded that Symix was the proprietor of the mark SYMIX in relation to certain goods and services but could not for that reason claim also to be the proprietor of the trade mark SYSMEX.  In this connection he referred to Vertilux Pty Ltd v Vertisol De Espagna SL (1995) 31 IPR 39 and Société des Produits Nestlé SA v Strasburger Enterprises Inc (1995) 31 IPR 639. As to whether the goods associated with the two trade marks were “the same sort of thing” he referred to Re Hicks’ Trade Mark (1897) 22 VLR 636. He also maintained that there was clear evidence of Toa’s intention to use the mark. With reference to the Fuddruckers case, supra, he said that that was a unique case involving a number of parties and clear evidence of an unlikelihood of their having the capability of using the trade mark at issue in relation to the specified services.  In any case, he said, the onus was on an opponent to prove a lack of intention to use the mark applied for, which Symix had conspicuously failed to do: Aston v Harlee, supra; Kyowa Hakko Kogyo Co Ltd v Schering Corporation (1989) 17 IPR 129. He said that Toa had lodged a statement of user in accordance with the Regulations, that it had used the trade mark and intended to continue to do so. Prima facie, he argued, such a statement should be accepted unless successfully impugned by an opponent.

In relation to s33 of the Act Mr McInnes argued that there were already very many registered trade marks in the relevant Classes beginning with the letters SYS- which lessened any potential for the use of such another mark leading to deception or confusion.  He also pointed out that no objection on this ground had been raised in the course of examination of the application for registration.

The same considerations applied, he said, to the possibility of deception or confusion arising in terms of s28 of the Act.  But he submitted in any case that there was an onus on the opponent under that section to make out a case of some blameworthy conduct on the part of the applicant, and of that there was no evidence before the Registrar.  It was not for the Registrar to impute blameworthy conduct to the applicant in the absence of clear evidence .  He distinguished Titan Manufacturing Company Pty Ltd v John Terence Coyne (1991) 22 IPR 613 on the ground that that case was decided within narrow limits and concerned a well-established trade mark.

Mr Doyle replied that the special script referred to by Mr McInnes was not so very unusual and did not affect the fact that the trade mark would be referred to by the word “sysmex”.  He pointed out that the opponent’s trade mark was also represented in a special script and distinguished Société des Produits Nestlé v Strasburger Enterprises Inc (1995) 31 IPR 639 on the ground that the two marks concerned in that case, QUIX and QUIK, were different marks from those under consideration in this case. He submitted that this case had to be decided on the basis of what was on the Register and that the standard of proof to be applied in relation to the question of deception and confusion was that of the balance of probabilities and not that of beyond reasonable doubt.

With respect to the applicant’s intention to use the trade mark Mr Doyle submitted that the statement of such intention lodged by the applicant in support of its application was merely a proforma document lodged at the beginning of the registration procedure which could be challenged by an opponent and that the Registrar should assess the applicant’s capability to use the mark in accordance with the Fuddruckers case, supra.

Decision

I will deal with each of the grounds of opposition on which submissions were made at the hearing in turn.

proprietorship

Mr Doyle’s submission was that Symix was entitled to claim proprietorship of the mark in suit on the ground that it was substantially identical to its own trade mark SYMIX.  The basis of this submission is to be found in the decision in Carnival Cruise Lines v Sitmar Cruises Limited (1994) AIPC 91-049 in which Gummow J, then of the Federal Court, in considering the disputed claims to proprietorship of the marks FUNSHIP and FUN SHIP, posed the following questions:

Will substantial identity suffice? Or may questions of deceptive similarity be      considered? Or is visual identity essential?

Then, having considered a submission based on The Shell Company of Australia Limited v Rohm and Haas Company (1949) 78 CLR 601, His Honour continued:

When the decision is understood in this way, it does not supply any general authority for the proposition that in the case of disputed claims to proprietorship under the present statute anything less than substantial identity between the two marks will suffice. The phrase "substantially identical" as it appears in s62 (which is concerned with infringement) was discussed by Windeyer J in The Shell Company of Australia Limited v Esso Standard Oil (Australia) Limited (1963) 109 CLR 407 at 414. It requires a total impression of similarity to emerge from a comparison between the two marks. In a real sense a claim to proprietorship of the one extends to the other. But to go beyond this is, in my view, not possible.

...

In the present case there would, in my view, be no material distinction to be drawn between "Fun Ship" and "Funship" or between the addition of the definite article or the use of the plural. However, "Fun Ship" is for this purpose a substantially different trade mark to "Sitmar's Funship" and "Fairstar The Funship".

In Karu Pty Ltd v Robert Leon Jose (1994) 30 IPR Drummond J, while noting that the comments of Gummow J were obiter, applied them directly to the matter before him.  It is therefore established that in order for there to be an issue of proprietorship at all it is necessary that the two trade marks in question should be substantially identical.  It is not sufficient that they may be deceptively similar.  The established test for substantial identity is that stated by Windeyer J in Shell v Esso, supra.  At 414-415 Windeyer J observed:

In considering whether marks are substantially identical they should, I think, be compared side by side, their similarities and differences noted and the importance of these assessed having regard to the essential features of the registered mark and the total impression of resemblance or similarity that emerges from the comparison ...

When compared side by side the trade marks SYSMEX and SYMIX, leaving aside the differences in the styles of lettering and other features, display some obvious visual differences, to the extent that I do not think that they can be said to be substantially identical.  It follows that I must find that there is no basis for a submission that Symix is the proprietor of the trade mark SYSMEX.

intention to use

A related matter in connection with s40 is the applicant’s intention to use the trade mark sought to be registered.  This is because s40(1) of the Act provides:

Application for registration

40. (1) A person who claims to be the proprietor of a trade mark may make application           to the Registrar for the registration of that trade mark in Part A or Part B of           the Register.

Section 6 of the Act defines “trade mark” as:

except in relation to Part XI, a mark used or proposed to be used in relation to goods or services for the purpose of indicating, or so as to indicate, a connexion in the course of trade between the goods or services and a person who has the right, either as proprietor or as registered user, to use the mark, whether with or without an indication of the identity of that person;

An application for registration of a “trade mark” can therefore be defeated in terms of s40 if it can be shown that it is not used or intended to be used because it is not then a trade mark for the purposes of that section.  Furthermore, in the case of a trade mark so far unused the concept of intention to use in relation to proprietorship was explained in Aston V Harlee Manufacturing Co. (1960) 103 CLR 391 by Fullagar J, at 401

There is another element mentioned by Dixon J in the Shell Co's case*, which is stated as essential to the proprietorship of an unused trade mark.  That element is the intention of the applicant for registration to use it upon or in connexion with goods.  As to this I need only say that I do not regard his Honour as meaning that an applicant is required, in order to obtain registration, to establish affirmatively that he intends to use it.  There is nothing in the Act or the Regulations which requires him to state such an intention at the time of application, and the making of the application itself is, I think, to be regarded as prima facie evidence of intention to use.  I cannot think that the Registrar is called upon to institute an inquiry as to the intention of any applicant, and I think that, on an opposition or on a motion to expunge, the burden must rest on the opponent, or the person aggrieved, of proving the absence of intention.  Again, I do not think that "intention" in this connexion ought to be regarded as meaning an intention to use immediately or within any limited time.  A manufacturer of (say) confectionery would, I should suppose, be entitled to register three trade marks in relation to confectionery, though he intended only to use two of them and had not made up his mind as to which two he would use.  If he in fact does not use any of them for the period specified in s 72, the mark or marks may be expunged under that section.  On the other hand, a manufacturer of confectionery, who had no intention of ever manufacturing motor cars, might be held disentitled to register a mark in relation to motor cars:  the effect of In re Registered Trade Marks of John Batt & Co.+, is I think, correctly stated in the first paragraph of the headnote to the report of the case before Romer J and the Court of Appeal."

* (1949) 78 CLR 627

+ (1898) 2 Ch 432; 1899 AC 428

(The statement referred to from Batt's case reads: "A Trade Mark cannot properly be registered for goods in which the Applicant does not deal or intend to deal.")  Whether this is a case of a manufacturer of confectionery attempting to register a mark in respect of motor cars I have no means of knowing given the lack of evidence.  Nevertheless, in my opinion the opponent has not discharged the onus on it of displacing the prima facie evidence of the applicant's intention to use the mark.  Toa lodged with its application for registration a statement that it was using or intending to use its trade mark in the near future.  That may have been, as Mr Doyle contended, merely a proforma document which was open to challenge in opposition proceedings.  With that submission I entirely agree but, if so challenged, the onus is on the opponent to make its case.  In the present instance there is absolutely no evidence before me which would lead me to conclude that Toa does not intend to use, or indeed lacks the capacity to use, the trade mark which it wishes to register.  I cannot therefore find that this ground of opposition has been made out.

section 28

I accept Mr Doyle’s submission that the appropriate test to be applied is the familiar one enunciated in Smith Hayden’s Application, supra.  I must therefore have regard to the reputation acquired by Symix in its trade mark.  And I must have regard to that reputation as at the date of lodgment of the opposed application: Southern Cross Refrigerating Co v Toowoomba Foundry Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 592. Mr G. Thomas Wyatt states in his declaration that:

Use of the SYMIX trade mark upon computer software commenced in Australia with the adoption of the SYMIX trade mark worldwide by Symix Computer Systems Inc. in 1989 around the same time as the change of company name from Micro Manufacturing Systems, Inc.  Computer training and computer consulting services were first offered under the trade mark SYMIX in Australia in 1989 through Symix’s distributor and licensee.  The goods and services offered under the trade mark SYMIX are available in all states and territories of Australia.

He goes on to state that the sales of goods and services offered under the trade mark for the financial year 1989-90 amounted to a little over $1m.  Toa’s trade mark application was lodged on 15 August 1990.  The SYMIX trade mark had therefore been used in Australia a little more or less than one year as at that date.  Moreover, the advertising and promotional material exhibited to the same declaration shows that the use of the trade mark was limited to manufacturing and financial management systems.  This evidence falls far short of showing that the use of Toa’s trade mark in a normal or fair manner in connection with the goods covered by the registration proposed would be reasonably likely to cause deception and confusion amongst a substantial number of persons.

If I am wrong in the conclusion I have reached in relation to the likelihood of deception and confusion there remains the question of whether the applicant Toa has been guilty of any blameworthy conduct in the adoption and use of its trade mark.  Mr Doyle argued that this was not required to be shown but that if it was the conduct of Toa in adopting and using a trade mark visually and phonetically similar to the SYMIX mark was such conduct.  The Registrar’s practice with regard to the requirement of blameworthy conduct was set out in a practice note published in the Official Journal of 12 September 1991.

The question of “blameworthy conduct” in opposition proceedings has been considered recently in Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v Robert James Brook and Rachel Brook trading as The Cannon Watch Company (unreported, 28 August 1996) per Tamberlin J.  His Honour , after considering the judgments in New South Wales Dairy Corporation v Murray Goulburn Co-operative Company Limited (1990) 171 CLR 363, concluded that in his view the reasons for judgment delivered by members of the High Court left the matter open as to whether there was a need to find blameworthy conduct in opposition proceedings based on s28(a) as opposed to expungement proceedings. He went on to find that:

Notwithstanding the diverse opinions expressed by members of the High Court in New South Wales Dairy Corporation case, I consider that I should follow the views expressed by the Full Federal Court in that case, with the result that in the case presently before me the opponent to the application for registration is required to demonstrate “blameworthy conduct”.

The Full Federal Court in the New South Wales Dairy Corporation case , concluded that, as a matter of interpretation, s28(a) was qualified by s28(d) and that “blameworthy conduct” was one, but not the only, circumstance which could render a mark “not entitled to protection in a court of justice”. (see 86 ALR 549 per Gummow J), (24 FCR 370 Lockhart, Pincus and Von Doussa JJ).

In the instant case, Canon has not established any “blameworthy” conduct or any other matter on the part of the respondents in relation to the present application, which would disentitle the mark to protection in the courts and as a result the challenge under this provision must fail....

In the present matter, the delegate of the Registrar, when considering the s28(a) ground, relied on what was described as the “fully settled” practice of the Registrar developed from the Murray Goulburn case and dismissed the opposition on this ground because in her view there was “no hint of blameworthy action”.  See also Titan Manufacturing Company Pty Ltd v John Terence Coyne (1991) 22 IPR 613; Unidrive Pty Ltd v Dana Corporation (1995) 32 IPR 155. Cf Johnson & Johnson v Kalnin (1993) 26 IPR per Gummow J where the point was apparently not raised.

I am not prepared, in the absence of any evidence on the matter, to find that Toa has been in any way blameworthy in its conduct in adopting and using its trade mark.  Therefore the opposition in as far as it relies on s28(a) of the Act is unsuccessful.

section 33

Although Symix’s own registration postdates that of Sysmex Mr Doyle urged me to find that registration of SYSMEX should be refused because of earlier registrations in the names of third parties which he said were substantially identical or deceptively similar to one or other of those marks.  He drew attention in particular to registered trade mark no. 529082 mentioned above.  Mr McInnes, on the other hand, submitted that in view of the large number of registered trade marks with the same beginning SYS- the likelihood of deception or confusion was considerably lessened.  I have set out below a number of registered trade marks of the type referred to by Mr McInnes which are registered in respect of computer hardware and software and related goods, all in class 9.  There are also a large number of such marks registered in respect of services related to those goods.

Number	Class	Mark	Goods/Services
176110	9	SYSCOM	Patchcord programming systems, patchcords, patchboards, patchcord permanent rear boards, patchcord contact springs, patchcord programming panels, multi-aperture devices employing magnetic memory elements for use in computing and control equipment, and electrical connectors,
364263	9	SYSTIME	All goods in Class 9 including computer hardware and software.
401337	9	SYSDYNE	Computers, computer peripheral equipment, computer programs recorded in discs and magnetic tapes; and all other goods included in this class
417359	9	SYSGEN	Computers, computer peripheral equipment, parts and accessories therefor; computer programs in this class and all other goods in this class for use in association with computers.
441930	9	SYSCORP	Computer hardware, peripheral equipment for use with computers being goods included in this class, floppy discs, pre-recorded magnetic tapes
458276	9	SYS/MASTER	Computers and computer systems in this class; computer hardware, computer software and computer software packages, computer programmes contained in this class
517608	9	SYSTIMAX	All goods in this class including copper and metal wire, fiber optic cable, wire patch cords, fiber interconnection cables mounting cords, electronic and mechanical closures, electrical and fiber optic cross connects and interconnects, electrical and fiber optic connectors, plugs, jacks and connecting blocks, fiber optic couplings, copper balum connector coils, electrical and fiber optic adapters to make connections between wire and fiber optic cables, transmission electronic devices that repeat, reshape or reformat signals from data terminals and controllers, synchronous and asynchronous data units, fiber optic modems and multiplexers, electrical protection devices including protector panels and protector units used to limit high voltage lightning surges or power line faults, electrical and fiber optic cable brackets, clips and clamps
529080	9	SYSMAC MAP	Computers, programmable controllers, display monitors, keyboards, interface boards, peripheral interface units, linking units, memory units, storage units, power supplies and cables; computer systems including or consisting of one or more of the foregoing; parts, fittings and accessories therefor, and all other class 9 goods
529081	9	SYSMAC NET	ditto
529082	9	SYSMAC LINK	ditto
529083	9	SYSMAC BUS	ditto
529084	9	SYSMAC WAY	ditto
529085	9	SYSMAC ROAD	ditto
529086	9	SYSMATE	Computer programmes in class 9, including computer programmes in the form of floppy discs, and all other class 9 goods
571735	9	SYSPLEX TIMER	Computer hardware, namely, an external time reference generator, and related instruction manuals supplied therewith
609426	9	SYSTAT	Computers, computer software, computer programmes, computer peripheral devices and accompanying manuals and written materials sold as a kit
611308	9	SYSHEALTH	Computer software for determining the status of system components; all other computer and computer related products in this class, being goods included in class no. 9
617107	9	SYSMETRICS	Computers and computer software

It is clear from the above list that marks beginning with SYS-, derived from the word “system”, are extremely common in relation to computers and computer software, to the extent that that element may be said to be common to the trade in such goods.  In those circumstances much more weight must be given to the other element or elements of trade marks in respect of those goods: Mond Staffordshire Refinery Co Ltd v Harlem (1929) 41 CLR 475. The trade mark relied on by Mr Doyle as an objection to the registration of SYSMEX not only differs in the other element of the mark, -MAC, as against -MEX, but also in the addition of a second word LINK.

Another factor closely related to the above is the class of purchasers of the goods in question.  These would in all likelihood be well-educated, professional persons who would be much less likely to be deceived and who would indeed be familiar with the trade marks used in connection with the hardware and software associated with their work.  They would also most likely be a different set of persons from those who would be likely to purchase manufacturing management software systems.

distinctiveness

Mr Doyle did not pursue this issue at the hearing although it was listed as a ground of opposition.  I think I need only say that the trade mark seems perfectly qualified as an invented word without any direct reference that I can see to any characteristic or quality of the specified goods.

discretion to refuse

It was stated in the notice of opposition to the registration of this trade mark that I should exercise the Registrar’s discretion to refuse registration.  Nothing has been put before me which would lead me to find that I should exercise that discretion in the circumstances of the present case and I therefore decline to do so.

Conclusion

I have found that the opponent has failed to make out any of the grounds relied on in the notice of opposition and I therefore dismiss the opposition and direct that subject to any appeal from this decision the trade mark be registered.  I award costs to the applicant.

Michael Homann

Hearing Officer

15 November 1996