Tipping v The King - [2023] SASCA 8

Supreme Court of South Australia
(Court of Appeal: Criminal)
TIPPING v THE KING
[2023] SASCA 8
Judgment of the Court of Appeal
(The Honourable President Livesey, the Honourable Justice Bleby and the Honourable Justice David)
23 February 2023
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL - MISDIRECTION AND NON-DIRECTION
CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - MATTERS RELATING TO PROOF - PRIMA FACIE CASE OR CASE TO ANSWER - GENERALLY
CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - WARRANTS, ARREST, SEARCH, SEIZURE AND INCIDENTAL POWERS - WARRANTS - WARRANTS FOR ARREST AND DETENTION - EXECUTION
CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - WARRANTS, ARREST, SEARCH, SEIZURE AND INCIDENTAL POWERS - ARREST AND DETENTION - EFFECTING ARREST - INFORMING PERSON ARRESTED OF FACT AND REASON
Following a trial by jury, the appellant was found guilty and convicted of the offences of assault causing harm, contrary to s 20(4) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) (‘CLCA’) (Count 1) and aggravated threatening to cause harm, contrary to s 19(2) of the CLCA (Count 2). The offences were aggravated by reason of having been committed against a police officer, who the appellant knew to be a police officer acting in the course of his duties at the time of the offending.
On the prosecution case, the complainant (a police officer) attended upon an apparently abandoned vehicle. A subsequent registration and Police Information Management System (‘PIMS’) check confirmed that the vehicle belonged to the appellant and that there was an active warrant for his arrest. The complainant attended the appellant’s home and inquired about the vehicle. After conducting a further warrant check, which confirmed his earlier information, the complainant told the appellant that there was an active warrant, and that he was under arrest for that warrant. A violent altercation then took place during which the appellant committed the offences. By contrast, the appellant’s evidence was that he asked the complainant the reason for his arrest but was given no answer, that the complainant initiated the violent altercation, and that he did not act violently towards the complainant.
At the close of the prosecution case, the appellant submitted there was no case to answer with respect to the aggravating circumstances as it was a pre-requisite for a lawful arrest that the complainant inform the appellant of the reason underlying the warrant. The trial Judge rejected that submission and found that there was a case to answer.
The appellant seeks an extension of time to lodge the appeal, the notice for which was filed approximately eight months after the expiration of the 21-day limitation period.
The appellant now appeals against the conviction on the following grounds:
1.The trial Judge erred in directing the jury that ‘it is sufficient for a lawful arrest in South Australia that the arresting officer tells the person that they are being arrested on an active warrant because the warrant is the reason for the arrest’ (Ground 1).
2.The trial Judge erred in rejecting the submission that there was no case to answer on the basis that (Ground 2):
a. the decision in Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573 (‘Christie’) could be distinguished in that it related to an arrest without a warrant; and
b. in circumstances relating to an arrest under a warrant, all that is required is for an authorised police officer to inform the accused that they are being arrested on an active warrant as this is both the reason for the arrest and the power under which the arrest is being made.

Held, per the Court, granting an extension of time to lodge the appeal; permission to amend the Appeal Grounds to add Ground 2; and granting permission to appeal on Ground 2, but dismissing the appeal:
1.The trial Judge did not err in his directions as to what constitutes a lawful arrest in South Australia.
2.The trial Judge did not err in rejecting the submission that there was no case to answer. Contrary to the appellant’s contention, his Honour considered the principles enunciated in Christie by reference to the operation of s 79 of the Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) ('the Summary Offences Act'), not on the basis that those principles were confined to an arrest without a warrant.
3.The question of whether an arresting police officer conveys to the arrestee sufficient information as to the reason for his or her arrest so as to make the arrest lawful must be answered having regard to the information reasonably available to the arresting police officer at the time of the arrest.
4.In the circumstances of this case, and in executing an arrest warrant under s 79 of the Summary Offences Act, it was sufficient for the arresting police officer to inform the appellant that he was being arrested on an active warrant and he was not required to inform the appellant of the reason underlying the warrant.

Bail Act 1985 (SA) ss 13(1), 18, 18(1), 18(1)(b); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 5AA(1)(c)(i), 19(1), 19(2), 20(4); Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA) ss 20, 20(1)(a), 20(1)(c), 58, 59(1), 104(b)(i); Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2001 (NSW) s 201; Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) ss 44, 58; Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) ss 79, 79(1), 79(2); Supreme Court Criminal Rules 2014 (SA) r 104G(1), referred to.
R v Rodwell (1988) 51 SASR 548, distinguished.
Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573; Johnstone v New South Wales (2010) 202 A Crim R 422; Leachinsky v Christie & Ors [1946] KB 124; New South Wales v Delly (2007) 70 NSWLR 125; R v Addabbo (1982) 33 SASR 84; R v Bilick (1984) 36 SASR 321; R v Tipping [2019] SASCFC 41, discussed.
Abbassy v Commissioner of Metropolitan Police [1990] 1 WLR 385; Bull v Laing [1929] SASR 65; Horton v Rowbottom (1993) 61 SASR 313; Hull v Nuske (1974) 8 SASR 587; Lyberopoulous v Holden Hill Magistrates Court and Ors [1999] SASC 55; Police v Williams [2014] SASC 117; R v O’Neill (1988) 48 SASR 51; R v Parenzee (2008) 101 SASR 469; R v Stafford (1976) 13 SASR 392; Taylor v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police [2004] 1 WLR 3155; Warke v Daire (1983) 32 SASR 321, considered.

TIPPING v THE KING
[2023] SASCA 8
Court of Appeal – Criminal: Livesey P, Bleby and David JJA

THE COURT: On 11 October 2021, following a trial by jury, the appellant was found guilty and convicted of the offences of aggravated assault causing harm, contrary to s 20(4) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) (‘CLCA’) and aggravated threatening to cause harm, contrary to s 19(2) of the CLCA. The offences were aggravated by reason of having been committed against a police officer, who the appellant knew to be a police officer acting in the course of his duties at the time of the offending.[1]
[1] This is an aggravating feature pursuant to s 5AA(1)(c)(i) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA).
The appellant seeks an extension of time to lodge his appeal. The notice of appeal was filed approximately eight months after the expiration of the 21-day limitation period.
The appellant appeals against his conviction on the following grounds:
1.The trial Judge erred in directing the jury that ‘it is sufficient for a lawful arrest in South Australia that the arresting officer tells the person that they are being arrested on an active warrant because the warrant is the reason for the arrest.’ (Ground 1).
2.The trial Judge erred in rejecting the submission that there was no case to answer on the basis that (Ground 2):
a. the decision in Christie v Leachinsky[2] (‘Christie’) could be distinguished in that it related to an arrest without a warrant; and
[2] [1947] AC 573.
b. in circumstances relating to an arrest under a warrant, all that is required is for an authorised police officer to inform the accused that they are being arrested on an active warrant as this is both the reason for the arrest and the power under which the arrest is being made.
At the appeal hearing, the appellant was granted permission to amend the Appeal Grounds to add Ground 2. The question of permission to appeal with respect to Ground 2 was referred to this Court for consideration. No permission was required to appeal on Ground 1.
Procedural history
This is an appeal from a re-trial. In August 2018, at an earlier trial, the appellant was tried before a jury upon an Information charging him with the offences of aggravated assault causing harm, contrary to s 20(4) of the CLCA (Count 1), aggravated threatening life, contrary to s 19(1) of the CLCA (Count 2), and, in the alternative, aggravated threating to cause harm, contrary to s 19(2) of the CLCA (Count 3). The jury, by majority verdict, found the appellant guilty of Count 1 but were unable to reach a verdict in respect of the other counts.
In September 2018, the appellant appealed against his conviction on Count 1 (‘the first appeal’) on the basis that the trial Judge’s directions to the jury were erroneous and the verdict was unreasonable. The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and the matter remitted for retrial.[3]
[3] The earlier appeal decision is R v Tipping [2019] SASCFC 41.
On 10 March 2020, the Director of Public Prosecutions (SA) laid a fresh Information in place of the Information filed on 23 October 2017. That Information sets out the charges the subject of the re-trial (and this appeal): assault causing harm, contrary to s 20(4) of the CLCA (Count 1) and aggravated threatening to cause harm, contrary to s 19(2) of the CLCA (Count 2).
At the re-trial, the subject of this appeal, the main issues in dispute were whether Senior Constable Jelfs (‘Jelfs’) was acting lawfully in the execution of his duties as a police officer when he arrested the appellant, and whether the prosecution had proved that the appellant was not acting in self-defence and had established the aggravating circumstance of each offence.
At the close of the prosecution case, the appellant submitted that there was no case to answer with respect to the aggravating circumstance alleged in relation to both offences. It was submitted that when taking the prosecution case at its highest, and accepting that Jelfs did in fact advise the appellant that he was arresting him on an active warrant, that explanation was insufficient for a lawful arrest. The appellant submitted that Jelfs was required to inform him of the reasons underlying the warrant.
The trial Judge found that there was a case to answer. The appellant was found guilty of both counts. Approximately eight months after the guilty verdict, a notice of appeal was filed on behalf of the appellant.
Evidence at trial
On 8 July 2015, Jelfs was conducting traffic patrol duties when he was required to attend upon an apparently abandoned vehicle. He was wearing his police uniform but driving an unmarked car. A registration check of the abandoned vehicle indicated that it belonged to the appellant. The check also disclosed the appellant’s residential address. Prior to attending the address, Jelfs conducted a check on the appellant using the Police Information Management System (‘PIMS’) and was informed that the appellant had an active arrest warrant.
When Jelfs attended at the appellant’s residence to inquire about the vehicle, he knocked on the front door, which was eventually answered by the appellant. Jelfs asked him for proof of identification. The appellant produced his driver’s licence. Jelfs then contacted police communications to conduct a warrant check on the appellant’s name. In doing so, he turned down the volume of his police radio, so the appellant could not hear his conversation. Through that communication it was confirmed that there was an active warrant for the appellant’s apprehension, which specified that it was a ‘no bail warrant’.
There was no dispute at trial that the appellant was on bail for an unrelated matter, and it was a condition of his bail agreement that he report each Tuesday to the Holden Hill Police Station. That bail agreement also required the appellant to attend at the Holden Hill Magistrates Court on 7 July 2015 at 10:00am in answer to a summons. The warrant was issued by a Justice of the Peace at the Holden Hill Magistrates Court on 7 July 2015 for the appellant’s failure to appear at Court. Jelfs gave evidence that at the time of executing the warrant he did not know of the reason underlying its issue.
Jelfs gave evidence that he informed the appellant that there was an active warrant and that he was under arrest for that warrant. Jelfs said that the appellant responded by saying that he ‘didn’t want to go to gaol’ and that he had ‘just failed to sign in’ the day before. As mentioned above, that was not the underlying reason for the warrant. Then, a violent altercation ensued between Jelfs and the appellant. There was, however, a marked difference between the accounts given by Jelfs on the one hand, and the appellant on the other, as to what transpired during that physical altercation.
Jelfs gave evidence that when he attempted to handcuff the appellant, he grabbed hold of Jelfs’ vest and a physical struggle followed. Jelfs said that he then dropped the handcuffs and kicked them off the porch to stop the appellant from using them as a weapon. He said the appellant punched Jelfs in the right side of his face, knocking his glasses off. The struggle continued and the appellant punched Jelfs again. It was around this point in the altercation that Jelfs engaged the emergency button on top of his radio.
Jelfs gave evidence that he then grabbed the appellant by the jacket and attempted to throw him to the ground but in doing so, lost momentum and fell to the ground himself. He said the appellant then started punching him in the head (Count 1) and said: ‘I am going to get your gun and shoot you.’(Count 2) The appellant attempted to grab Jelfs’ pistol from his belt before kicking him. Eventually, the appellant stood up, walked to the stairs of the porch, and sat down.
A second police patrol arrived, and the appellant was arrested.
Jelfs estimated that the appellant punched him ‘maybe eight-ish times’ and kicked him at least once during the altercation.
The appellant’s version of events differed markedly from that of Jelfs. The appellant’s evidence from the first trial was tendered into evidence. His evidence at the re-trial was largely consistent with his earlier evidence. At the re-trial, the appellant said that after providing his driver’s licence, Jelfs had a conversation over the radio and then ‘pocketed’ his driver’s licence. When the appellant asked for his licence to be returned, Jelfs took hold of his arm, twisted it, and pushed him against a wall, pinning his arm behind his back. The appellant said:
I was pushed into the wall, I was pushed in with my neck quite powerfully into the wall with my head, and I had my arm pushed right up behind my back, it was my right arm, not my left arm, and he asked me to give my other arm and it was so painful as he did it quite forcefully that I knew it couldn’t be legal, I knew it was wrong …
There’s no way it could be legal. He was so excessive. He was completely – we went from having a conversation about a car to being pushed into a wall.
The appellant said that Jelfs provided no answer when he asked why he was being arrested. Rather, as he continued to resist arrest, Jelfs punched him in the back whilst holding him against the wall. He said that they both fell to the ground. The appellant denied physically assaulting or threatening Jelfs. He also denied attempting to take possession of Jelfs’ firearm.
The appellant, in his evidence, acknowledged that he was subject to a bail agreement in relation to an unrelated matter, and that he had failed to comply with his bail agreement by not signing into the police station on the previous day. However, he denied saying this to Jelfs. The appellant gave evidence that Jelfs informed him that he was under arrest, but at no point did Jelfs advise him that he was arrested on a warrant nor of the reason underlying the warrant.
The trial Judge’s ruling
Following the close of the prosecution case, the appellant made a submission to the trial Judge that there was no case to answer with respect to the aggravating circumstance alleged in Counts 1 and 2. The appellant’s submission had two limbs: first, that Jelfs did not tell the appellant the reason for his arrest; and second, and in the alternative, that the words purportedly uttered by Jelfs were insufficient for a lawful arrest because he was not informed of the underlying reason for the arrest warrant.
In his ruling, the trial Judge correctly set out the test for no case to answer, citing the well known remarks of King CJ in R v Bilick.[4]
[4] (1984) 36 SASR 321 at 337 per King CJ.
The trial Judge noted that there were a number of matters not in dispute, including: that Jelfs was, at the relevant time, a police officer; that there was an active warrant for the appellant at the time of his arrest; and the warrant was for non-appearance at the Holden Hill Magistrates Court on the previous day (7 July 2015). His Honour noted that the critical issue was whether Jelfs informed the appellant of the reason for his arrest which he referred to as the principle in Christie.
In his ruling, the trial Judge accepted that an arresting officer, in order to be acting in the course of his duties, must inform the person being arrested of the reason for the arrest, and if there is a failure to do so, then the officer acts unlawfully. His Honour also considered that the sufficiency of the reason provided by the arresting officer is a question of law to be determined by the trial Judge.
The trial Judge identified that the facts in Christie involved an arrest without warrant whereas the appellant’s arrest was purportedly made pursuant to s 79 of the Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) (‘the Summary Offences Act’). That is because Jelfs was not in possession of the warrant but reasonably believed or had a reasonable suspicion that a warrant had been issued by a justice.
The trial Judge found that:
as a matter of law, all that was required for Senior Constable Jelfs to do was to tell the accused that he was arrested on an active warrant and that this was both the reason and the power for and under which the arrest was being effected.
Accordingly, the trial Judge found there was a case to answer on the aggravating circumstance alleged in Counts 1 and 2.
After arriving at this conclusion, and in summing up, the trial Judge directed the jury about the requirements for a lawful arrest in South Australia. In relation to ‘self-defence against unlawful arrest’ his Honour said:
Turning to the first question, I need to tell you something about what amounts to a lawful arrest. It is not disputed that at the time Constable Jelfs attended at Mr Tipping’s premises there was an active warrant for the arrest of Mr Tipping. In South Australia when a warrant is issued by a court a person can be arrested without the arresting person having physical possession of the warrant. A police officer may arrest a person if they reasonably believe or reasonably suspect that there is an active warrant for a person and you will recall that Constable Jelfs says that he first came to learn of the warrant when he checked the police computer in the car and then later confirmed it on his radio. But an arrest will not be lawful unless the arresting officer tells the person being arrested the reason for which they are being arrested.
It is sufficient for a lawful arrest in South Australia that the arresting officer tells the person that they are being arrested on an active warrant because the warrant is the reason for the arrest. Constable Jelfs’ evidence was … ‘I turned back to Mr Tipping and I said “You have an active warrant and that you’re under arrest for a warrant”.’ And you will recall that he said the accused responded with … ‘He said that he just failed to sign in because his car had broken down, which he had just explained to me.’
The accused, however, said repeatedly in evidence that he was not told he was being arrested on a warrant. He says that all Constable Jelfs said was ‘You’re under arrest’. If that is all that Constable Jelfs said or if you cannot exclude as a reasonable possibility that that is all that Constable Jelfs said, then the accused would have had a belief, based on reasonable grounds, that the arrest was unlawful and he would be entitled to defend himself, subject to the third matter that I will tell you about in a moment.

The trial Judge also directed the jury in relation to the requirements for a lawful arrest in proof of the alleged aggravating circumstance of each offence. His Honour said:
Now, I have mentioned to you the evidence about Constable Jelfs being a police officer. With respect to the second element of aggravation, it is necessary for the prosecution to prove that Constable Jelfs was acting in the course of his official duty and you will recall his evidence as to the reason for him being at Mr Tipping’s house on that day. He was there to discuss the accused’s car. He was also aware, when he got out of his vehicle, that the accused had an outstanding warrant. He says that he then arrested him on that warrant and that he told him so, but on the facts of this case you will need to consider matters relevant to the concept of Jelfs being on official duty and the concept I explained to you about whether or not the arrest was lawful, because if the arrest was unlawful he wouldn’t be acting in the course of his official duties.
…
The second part of this element is the question of whether Jelfs actually told him that he was arresting him. If you cannot exclude the possibility that Mr Tipping was not told that he was being arrested on an active warrant, then the arrest would be unlawful and it would not have been an arrest in the course of Constable Jelfs’ official duties.
His Honour went on:
As you will see from the aide-memoire, the aggravating circumstances, which the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt for count 2, are the same as for count 1, and I have explained those to you a short while ago. If you are not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of all of the circumstances of aggravation, then you have to acquit him of aggravated threatening to cause harm, but if you are satisfied nonetheless of elements 1-3 beyond reasonable doubt, you would return a verdict of guilty of threatening to cause harm.
Consideration
The appellant complains by Ground 1 that the trial Judge was in error in directing the jury that it was sufficient for Jelfs to inform him that he was being arrested on an active warrant without further explanation as to the reason underlying the warrant. As to Ground 2, the appellant’s complaint has two limbs. First, the trial Judge erred in rejecting the appellant’s submission that there was no case to answer on the basis that the decision in Christie could be distinguished on its facts as relating to an arrest without a warrant. Second, the trial Judge erred in finding that for a lawful arrest to comply with the requirements of Christie, all that was required of Jelfs was that he inform the appellant he was being arrested on an active warrant.
The correctness of the applicant’s contention on Ground 2 will be largely determinative of whether the legal directions the subject of Ground 1 were erroneous. For that reason, it is convenient to deal first with Ground 2. As mentioned earlier, the appellant also sought an extension of time to lodge his appeal. That application was opposed by the respondent.
Extension of time
In considering whether to grant an extension of time this Court will usually consider the following matters: the length of the delay; the reasons for the delay; the impact upon the public interest of reopening the verdict after the lapse of time; and the merits of the proposed grounds upon which the application has been made.[5]
[5] R v Parenzee (2008) 101 SASR 469 at 482 per Doyle CJ.
A notice of appeal must be filed within 21 days of the date of a conviction, sentence, order, or decision which is the subject of the appeal.[6] The appellant was convicted on 11 October 2021. The notice of appeal in relation to this conviction was filed on 16 June 2022 and received by registry on 24 June 2022, approximately eight months after the jury returned its verdicts.
[6] Supreme Court Criminal Rules 2014 (SA) r 104G(1).
The appellant submits that the notice of appeal was not filed within the 21‑day limitation period for the following reasons:
1.The appellant was remanded in custody on 20 October 2021, when significant restrictions were in place due to the COVID-19 pandemic. This created difficulty for the appellant’s solicitors in communicating with him while he was in custody.
2.The solicitor who acted for the appellant at trial took steps to file a notice of appeal, but, at some point between 11 October 2021 and 1 March 2022, the file was transferred to another solicitor, Almeida & Associates.
3.On 1 March 2022, approximately four months after the expiration of the 21-day limitation period, the appellant contacted his current legal representative. At this point, conduct of the matter had passed through three separate legal practitioners.
4.The necessary paperwork required for the appellant’s legal representation and funding from the Legal Services Commission was not provided until 22 March 2022. Further, when the paperwork was eventually provided, it was incomplete.
5.It was submitted that a substantial amount of time was required to formulate the preliminary views necessary to obtain funding from the Legal Services Commission. Issues relating to the appellant’s funding were not resolved until 5 May 2022.
6.Around 22 March 2022, the appellant’s current solicitor received a large volume of material pertaining to this appeal, an unrelated trial, and an earlier trial which had been the subject of the first appeal.[7] It was submitted that a significant amount of time was required to sort through, collate and organise the documents relevant to this appeal.
[7] See R v Tipping [2019] SASCFC 41.
7.On 19 April 2022, a request to registry was submitted for the provision of the trial transcript which was provided on 29 April 2022.
8.On 27 May 2022, a request was made to the Director of Public Prosecutions (SA) for the provision of various exhibits that had not been provided by the appellant’s interim solicitors during the transfer of conduct over the matter. These materials were provided on 8 June 2022.
9.It was submitted that due to the complexity of the issues raised on appeal, a significant amount of time was required for the appellant’s current solicitor to review the material in relation to each of the three separate appeals and formulate legal arguments pertaining to the grounds of appeal for each of those three separate matters.
Ultimately, the appellant submits that for the reasons set out above, it is appropriate to grant an extension of time to file the notice of appeal.
It is not enough that the proposed grounds are merely arguable;[8] an extension of time should only be granted if, having regard to all the relevant circumstances, this Court is satisfied that there is a reasonable possibility of a miscarriage of justice if an extension is not granted.[9] After oral argument on appeal, it became apparent that the appellant’s complaints involve a matter of law which has not been directly considered by this Court. Having regard to the reason for the delay and the arguable merit of the point and the desirability of the Court considering the point, we are satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to grant an extension of time to lodge the notice of appeal.
[8] R v Parenzee (2008) 101 SASR 469 at 482 per Doyle CJ.
[9] R v Parenzee (2008) 101 SASR 469 at 482-3 per Doyle CJ.
Ground 2 – Finding of a case to answer
The appellant complains that in finding a case to answer, the trial Judge erred in first, distinguishing Christie on the basis that it only applies to a police officer arresting a person without a warrant; and second, in ruling as a matter of law that Jelfs’ claimed explanation to the appellant that he was being arrested on an active warrant was sufficient for a lawful arrest in terms of the extent of information required to be conveyed to him.
In support of those contentions, the appellant relies primarily on Christie and R v Tipping[10] (the earlier appeal). The appellant contends that both authorities support the proposition that a police officer arresting a person on a warrant is required to inform the arrested person of the reason underlying the warrant. The appellant submits there are two broad policy reasons for so finding. First, while a general reference to the existence of a warrant provides a person with a legal explanation for the arrest, there is insufficient information as to the ‘factual explanation’ for the arrest. Second, in the absence of any information or explanation as to the reason underlying the warrant, an arrested person is unable to give any exculpatory response and denied the ability to attempt to regain their personal freedom.
[10] [2019] SASCFC 41.
For the respondent, it is submitted the trial Judge was correct in finding that by informing the appellant that he was being arrested on a warrant, Jelfs sufficiently informed the appellant of the reason for his arrest. The respondent submits that neither Christie nor R v Tipping are authority for the proposition that a person arrested on a warrant pursuant to s 79 of the Summary Offences Act is required to be provided with information regarding the reasons underlying the warrant. The respondent contends that in the circumstances of this case, it was sufficient for Jelfs to advise the appellant that he was being arrested in relation to an active warrant, the details of which would be provided at the police station when he was presented for charging.
Apart from some specific exceptions, a police officer arresting a person without a warrant is obliged to inform that person of the fact of, and reason for, the arrest. If he does not do so, the arrest is unlawful. [11] This is commonly referred to as the rule in Christie and reflects the law in South Australia.[12]
[11] Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573; R v Tipping [2019] SASCFC 41, at [21] per Vanstone J.
[12] Hull v Nuske (1974) 8 SASR 587; R v Stafford (1976) 13 SASR 392; Warke v Daire (1983) 32 SASR 321; R v O’Neill (1988) 48 SASR 51; Horton v Rowbottom (1993) 61 SASR 313; Police v Williams [2014] SASC 117 at [237] per Peek J.
The facts of Christie concerned an arrest without a warrant. The question for determination in that matter was framed by Viscount Simon as whether:[13]
[13] Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573 at 583-4 per Viscount Simon.
when a policeman arrests X without a warrant, on reasonable suspicion that he has committed a given felony, but gives X no notice that he is arrested on suspicion of such felony, he is acting within the law.
That is, if a policeman arrests without warrant when he entertains a reasonable suspicion that the suspect has committed a felony, is he under a duty to inform the suspect of the nature of the charge, and if he does not do so, is the detention a false imprisonment?
In his speech, Viscount Simon considered that issue by reference to earlier authorities involving arrest on warrant which held there was a requirement to produce the warrant so that an arrested person knew the reason for his apprehension. In particular, Viscount Simon referred to the fact that if the arrest was authorised by magisterial warrant, or if proceedings were instituted by the issue of a summons, the warrant or summons must specify the offence.[14] Further, the warrant must be founded on information in writing and on oath and, except where a particular statute provides otherwise, the information and the warrant must particularise the offence charged;[15] and when an arrest is made on a warrant, it must in normal cases be read to the person arrested.[16] Viscount Simon referred with approval to the reasoning of Scott LJ in Leachinsky v Christie & Ors[17] (at first instance) who said:[18]
[14] Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573 at 584-5 per Viscount Simon.
[15] Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573 at 585 per Viscount Simon.
[16] Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573 at 585 per Viscount Simon.
[17] [1946] KB 124.
[18] Leachinsky v Christie [1946] KB 124 at 130 per Scott LJ.
if the law circumscribed the issue of warrants for arrest in this way it could hardly be that a policeman acting without a warrant was entitled to make an arrest without stating the charge on which the arrest was made …
Viscount Simon considered that the requirement in arrest warrant cases to inform a defendant of the reasons for arrest also applied to an arrest without a warrant.[19]
[19] Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573 at 586-7 per Viscount Simon.
Similar reasoning was applied by Lord Simonds[20] and Lord Du Parcq[21] in their separate speeches.
[20] Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573 at 591-3 per Simonds LJ.
[21] Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573 at 596-602 per du Parq LJ.
Viscount Simon summarised the general principles governing the rule requiring persons to be informed of the reasons for arrest with the following propositions:[22]
[22] Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573 at 587-8 per Viscount Simon.
1.If a policeman arrests without warrant upon reasonable suspicion of felony, or of other crime of a sort which does not require a warrant, he must in ordinary circumstances inform the person arrested of the true ground of arrest. He is not entitled to keep the reason to himself or to give a reason which is not the true reason. In other words a citizen is entitled to know on what charge or on suspicion of what crime he is seized.
2.If the citizen is not so informed but is nevertheless seized, the policeman, apart from certain exceptions, is liable for false imprisonment.
3.The requirement that the person arrested should be informed of the reason why he is seized naturally does not exist if the circumstances are such that he must know the general nature of the alleged offence for which he is detained.
4.The requirement that he should be so informed does not mean that technical or precise language need be used. The matter is a matter of substance, and turns on the elementary proposition that in this country a person is, prima facie, entitled to his freedom and is only required to submit to restraints on his freedom if he knows in substance the reason why it is claimed that this restraint should be imposed.
5.The person arrested cannot complain that he has not been supplied with the above information as and when he should be, if he himself produces the situation which makes it practically impossible to inform him.
It is apparent from the observations of Viscount Simon in Christie that the fundamental entitlement to personal liberty underpins the principles set out above. As his Lordship said: ‘… a citizen who is prima facie entitled to personal freedom should know why for the time being his personal freedom is interfered with.’[23]
[23] Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573 at 585 per Viscount Simon.
In a separate speech, Lord Simonds considered that an arrested person (with or without warrant) is entitled to know why they are being deprived of their liberty, if only in order to take reasonable steps to regain it.[24] His Lordship said that an ‘arrested man is entitled to be told what is the act for which he is arrested.’[25]
[24] Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573 at 592 per Simonds LJ.
[25] Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573 at 593 per Simonds LJ.
Lord du Parcq remarked that ‘the omission to tell a person who is arrested at, or within a reasonable time of, the arrest with what offence he is charged cannot be regarded as a mere irregularity.’[26]
[26] Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573 at 600 per du Parcq LJ.
The principles in Christie, although formulated in relation to an arrest without a warrant, apply to an arrest with warrant.[27] Thus in the present case, Jelfs was required to inform the appellant of the reason for his arrest. The question remains as to whether, if Jelfs said to the appellant that he was arresting him on an active warrant, that was sufficient to satisfy that requirement.
[27] R v Tipping [2019] SASCFC 41 at [138]-[140] per Peek J citing Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573 at 585-588 per Viscount Simon, 591-593 per Simonds LJ, 596-602 per du Parcq LJ (emphasis added); See also Johnstone v New South Wales (2010) 202 A Crim R 422 at 432-4 per Beazley JA.
In support of his contention that Jelfs was required by Christie to advise of the reasons underlying the warrant, the appellant relies on R v Tipping.[28] At the earlier appeal, the appellant complained that the trial Judge failed to direct the jury about the pre-requisites for a lawful arrest.
[28] R v Tipping [2019] SASCFC 41.
It was also a ground of appeal that the trial Judge’s directions on self-defence were inadequate because the jury were not directed on the consequence of Jelfs failing to tell the appellant the reason for his arrest and how that affected whether the appellant held a reasonable belief that Jelfs was acting unlawfully.
The appellant also complained that the verdict was unreasonable.
At the earlier appeal, there was no argument put that Jelfs’ claimed explanation to the appellant that he was arresting him on a warrant was inadequate in terms of the information that was required to be conveyed. In separate judgments both Peek J and Vanstone J proceeded on the basis that telling the appellant that there was an ‘active warrant’ was sufficient. Therefore, the question of whether Jelfs was required to advise the appellant of the reason underlying the warrant (as opposed to the fact he was being arrested on an active warrant) did not arise for consideration in the earlier appeal.
In R v Tipping, Peek J (with whom Blue J agreed) allowed the appeal on the basis that the trial Judge erred as a matter of law in not leaving to the jury the issue of whether the reason for the arrest had been communicated to the appellant.[29] The majority held that the trial judge should have expressly directed the jury that if Jelfs did not advise the appellant of the reason for his arrest he would not be acting in the lawful execution of his duties, and the aggravating circumstance would not be established. Justice Vanstone, in dissent, held that the trial Judge’s directions were sufficient in that regard.
[29] R v Tipping [2019] SASCFC 41 at [112] per Peek J.
At the earlier trial, the trial Judge took one composite verdict in relation to Count 1 for both the substantive offence and the aggravating circumstance. Justice Peek considered that ‘the giving of correct directions on the rule in Christie v Leachinsky may have had an effect upon the jury’s verdict on the substantive charge in Count 1 as well as upon the aggravating circumstances.’[30] Thus, Peek J set aside both the conviction on the substantive offence and the jury’s finding that the aggravating circumstance was proved.[31]
[30] R v Tipping [2019] SASCFC 41 at [125] per Peek J.
[31] R v Tipping [2019] SASCFC 41 at [125]-[126] per Peek J.
On the issue of self-defence, Blue J held that the trial Judge erred in not explaining to the jury that Jelfs would have been acting unlawfully if he purported to arrest the appellant without explaining that he was arresting him on a warrant.[32] Justice Blue rejected the respondent’s contention that even if the directions on self‑defence were deficient, the jury must have necessarily understood from the directions on the aggravating circumstance that the arrest would have been unlawful.[33] On that basis, Blue J set aside the conviction on the substantive offence in Count 1 and the jury’s finding that the aggravating circumstance was proved.[34]
[32] R v Tipping [2019] SASCFC 41 at [171], [186] per Blue J.
[33] R v Tipping [2019] SASCFC 41 at [171] per Blue J.
[34] R v Tipping [2019] SASCFC 41 at [196] per Blue J.
Thus, the question of whether a police officer arresting a person on a warrant under s 79 of the Summary Offences Act is required to advise the person of the reasons underlying the warrant was not considered at the earlier appeal. Contrary to the appellant’s submissions, R vTipping is not authority for the proposition that for an arrest under s 79 to be lawful, the officer is required to do so.

The appellant also relies on the authority of New South Wales v Delly[35] (‘Delly’). In that case, Ipp JA explained the rationale underlying the Christie principle as being that persons are entitled to know why they are being arrested so that they can ‘give an explanation of any misunderstanding, or to call attention to others for whom they may have been mistaken, or to give some other exculpatory reason, and to assert that further inquiries may save them from the consequences of false accusation.’[36] His Honour considered that in relation to the obligation to notify an arrested person of the reasons for the arrest, in Christie there was a difference in the words used by Viscount Simon and Du Parcq LJ on the one hand, and Simonds LJ on the other. His Honour said:[37]
[35] (2007) 70 NSWLR 125.
[36] New South Wales v Delly (2007) 70 NSWLR 125 at [9] per Ipp JA citing Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573 at 588 per Viscount Simon, 591-2 per Simonds LJ; See for example Taylor v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police [2004] 1 WLR 3155 at [21] per Clarke LJ.
[37] New South Wales v Delly (2007) 70 NSWLR 125 at [7] per Ipp JA.
There is a difference in the words used by Viscount Simon and Lord du Parcq on the one hand and Lord Simonds on the other. The former require the arrested person to be told the “charge” or the “crime” or the “offence” for which the arrest is made. The latter states that, while the arrested person must know the “reason for arrest”, the arresting police officer need not “formulate any charge at all, much less the charge which may ultimately be found in the indictment”. Lord Simonds points out that the “charge” will depend on the “view” that is taken at a later time. According to his Lordship, arrested persons are entitled to know what are the facts said to constitute the crime for which they are arrested.
In Delly, Ipp JA preferred the approach of Lord Simonds and concluded it is not necessary for an arresting officer to ‘formulate any charge at all, much less the charge which may ultimately be found in the indictment.’[38]
[38] New South Wales v Delly (2007) 70 NSWLR 125 at [5] per Ipp JA citing Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573 at 591-3 per Simonds LJ.
However, Tobias JA considered that some precision was required to satisfy the obligation to inform a person of the reason for the arrest:[39]
[39] New South Wales v Delly (2007) 70 NSWLR 125 at [63] per Tobias JA.
That reason must be sufficiently precise as to make it clear to the person arrested as to why the arrest is taking place which, in turn, requires the arrestor to notify the arrested person, at least in general terms, of the alleged offence or charge for which the arrest is being made.
(citations omitted)
That approach seemed to prefer the enunciation of the principle by Viscount Simon and Lord Du Parcq.
In a separate judgment Basten JA referred to the slightly different approaches in the other judgments of the Court and said:[40]
[40] New South Wales v Delly (2007) 70 NSWLR 125 at [102] per Basten JA.
The distinction sought to be drawn is between notification of a charge and notification of the act or conduct which forms the reason for the arrest. However, the use of explanatory language to define the parameters of the requirement should not be understood as drawing a distinction between two different categories of information. The information to be supplied by the arresting officer is his or her reason for carrying out the arrest.
The appellant also relies on Johnstone v New South Wales.[41] In that matter, the appellant had brought civil proceedings against the State of New South Wales claiming that he had been wrongfully arrested, falsely imprisoned, and assaulted by police officers. He alleged that as a result he had suffered personal injury and claimed damages. The appellant’s claim was dismissed at first instance on the basis that the arrest was held to be lawful.
[41] (2010) 202 A Crim R 422.
On appeal, one of the central issues in relation to the lawfulness of the appellant’s arrest was whether the appellant was informed by the arresting officer of the true reason for his arrest in accordance with the principles stated in Christie.[42]
[42] Those principles are now reflected in s 201 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2001 (NSW).
In her judgment, Beazley JA (with whom McColl and Young JJA agreed) emphasised that the rationale underlying the principles in Christie was equally applicable to both arrests on warrant and arrests without warrant.[43] Her Honour observed:[44]
[43] Johnstone v New South Wales (2010) 202 A Crim R 422 at [30]-[38] per Beazley JA.
[44] Johnstone v New South Wales (2010) 202 A Crim R 422 at [43] per Beazley JA.
Ipp JA’s observation that persons are entitled to know why they are being arrested, itself has an underlying rationale, namely, that a person is not to be deprived of her or his liberty without lawful cause. Indeed, a person’s liberty has been described as the most basic human right or freedom. The corollary is that “arrest is the deprivation of freedom”.
(citations omitted)
Justice Beazley considered to be correct the remarks of Basten JA in Delly that the common law requirement as to arrest does not involve drawing a distinction between two different categories of information. Her Honour said:[45]
[45] Johnstone v New South Wales (2010) 202 A Crim R 422 at [56] per Beazley JA.
What must be determined is whether what a person was told was sufficient, so as to be informed of the true reason for the arrest. What is required will depend on the particular circumstances and will range from not needing to be told anything to being told both the facts which have given the police officer cause for suspicion that an offence has been committed, as well as what the suspected offence is.
The question whether what the person was told was sufficient ‘has to be assessed objectively having regard to the information which is reasonably available to the officer.’[46]
[46] Johnstone v New South Wales (2010) 202 A Crim R 422 at [56]-[57] per Beazley JA citing Abbassy v commissioner of Metropolitan Police [1990] 1 WLR 385 at 392 per Woolf LJ.
In the present case, Jelfs was purporting to arrest the appellant on a warrant that had been issued but was not in his possession pursuant to s 79 of the Summary Offences Act. A warrant for the arrest of the appellant had been issued by a Justice of the Peace. The warrant appeared to have been issued pursuant to s 18(1)(b) of the Bail Act 1985 (SA) (‘the Bail Act’) which provides:
18—Arrest of eligible person on non-compliance with bail agreement
(1) If it appears to a court or justice that a person released on bail has contravened or failed to comply with a term or condition of a bail agreement, it may—
…
(b) if it appears necessary or desirable to do so—issue a warrant for the person’s arrest.
The appellant had entered into a bail agreement on an unrelated matter, a condition of which was to appear at the Holden Hill Magistrates Court on 7 July 2015 at 10:00am. He was alleged to have failed to do so. The warrant for his arrest was issued that day.
The warrant, in accordance with s 20 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA) (the ‘Criminal Procedure Act’) stated ‘shortly the matter of the information upon which it is founded’,[47] the name of the appellant, and ordered that he be apprehended and brought before the Magistrates Court to be further dealt with according to law. More specifically the warrant described the reason for the issue of warrant as ‘no appearance (failed to answer bail).’
[47] Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA) s 20(1)(a).
There was no suggestion at trial or on this appeal that the warrant was not valid. There was no argument put that the warrant was issued on an erroneous basis. In any event, even where the allegations made on the application for a warrant are subsequently found to be incorrect the warrant is not thereby invalid.[48]
[48] Lyberopoulos v Holden Hill Magistrates Court and Ors [1999] SASC 55.
As noted above, there was a requirement on the face of the arrest warrant that the appellant be brought as soon as practicable before the Court to answer the charges and be dealt with according to law.[49] That reflected the form of the warrant prescribed by s 20 of the Criminal Procedure Act. That direction was mandatory; there was no discretion vested in the Police Commissioner as to when the warrant was to be executed. As Wells J explained in R v Addabbo:[50]
[49] Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA) s 20(1)(c).
[50] (1982) 33 SASR 84 at 96 per Wells J.
… the warrant’s command appeared to me to contemplate that the prisoner be taken directly before a justice to be dealt with according to law. That command represented simply an implementation of para (c) of sub-s (1) of s.20. It is true that sub-section, in form, does no more than prescribe what the warrant must contain and gives, ipsissmis verbis, no direct command to those to whom warrants are addressed; but, in my opinion, the clear implication of the sub-section is that those to whom the warrant is addressed must carry out its direction according to its tenor.’
At the time of executing the warrant, Jelfs did not have the warrant in his possession. As outlined above, he had, however, been advised of its existence on two occasions. First, before attending at the premises when conducting a ‘PIMS’ check on the registered owner of the vehicle of interest. Second, after the appellant had produced his licence, Jelfs contacted police communications by radio and confirmed there was an active warrant for the appellant’s arrest.
At common law, a police officer was required to be in possession of a warrant before executing it.[51] However, s 79 of the Summary Offences Act alters the common law in that regard. It provides:
[51] R v Tipping [2019] SASCFC 41 at [23] per Vanstone J citing Bull v Laing [1929] SASR 65.
79—Arrest without warrant if warrant has been issued
(1)A police officer may, without a warrant, take into custody a person whom the officer has reasonable cause for believing or suspecting to be a person for whose apprehension or commitment a warrant has been issued by a justice.
(2) If a police officer, without a warrant, takes into custody a person whom the officer has reasonable cause for believing or suspecting to be a person for whose committal a warrant has been issued by a justice, the officer must, as soon as reasonably practicable, deliver that person into the custody of the police officer in charge of the nearest police station and must, as soon as conveniently may be, produce or cause to be produced to the person taken into custody the warrant of commitment (if any), and the person must then be dealt with as required by the warrant.
It can be seen that s 79 empowers a police officer, without a warrant, to take into custody a person in relation to whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting that a warrant has been issued by a justice. It requires the arresting officer to take the apprehended person as soon as reasonably practicable to the nearest police station where the warrant is to be produced to him.
There is no suggestion on this appeal that Jelfs did not have reasonable grounds for suspecting or believing that a warrant had been issued by a justice for the appellant’s arrest. That is not surprising given he had been advised on two occasions that there was an active warrant in the appellant’s name. Nor was it contended that Jelfs was not empowered to arrest the appellant pursuant to s 79.
On this appeal, both parties proceeded on the basis that an arresting officer having executed a warrant under s 79(1) was required to proceed in accordance with the dictates of s 79(2). That is, he was required to deliver the appellant into the custody of the police officer in charge of the nearest police station and, as soon as convenient, produce to the appellant the warrant, and then be dealt with as required by the warrant. Section 79(2) appears however to only apply to warrants of commitment.[52] It refers to a police officer, without a warrant, taking into custody a person whom the officer has reasonable cause for believing or suspecting ‘to be a person for whose committal a warrant has been issued by a justice’,[53] and producing or causing to be produced to that person ‘the warrant of commitment (if any).’[54]
[52] R v Rodwell (1988) 51 SASR 548.
[53] Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) s 79(2) (emphasis added).
[54] Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) s 79(2) (emphasis added).
There is a difference between a warrant of commitment and a warrant of apprehension.[55] A warrant of apprehension issued under ss 58 or 104(b)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act or s 18(1) of the Bail Act directs the Commissioner of Police to apprehend the defendant and bring them as soon as practicable before the Court to answer the charges and be dealt with according to law. A warrant of commitment is issued as an ancillary power to a court following a sentence of imprisonment,[56] and on an enforcement application. [57] A warrant of commitment directs the Commissioner of Police to convey the defendant to a correctional institution.
[55] Bull v Laing [1929] SASR 65 at 68-9 per Napier J.
[56] See Rule 155.1 Joint Criminal Rules 2022 (SA) and Form 145.
[57] See Rule 175.2 Joint Criminal Rules 2022 (SA) and Form 215.
In relation to the procedure following a police officer executing a warrant of apprehension, section 59(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that ‘a defendant who has been arrested under a warrant must be brought before the Magistrates Court.’[58] Similarly, section 13(1) of the Bail Act provides that a police officer must as soon as reasonably practicable deliver the arrested person to a police station and ensure the defendant understands the entitlement to bail. By contrast, if a person is arrested on a warrant of commitment, a police officer is not required to bring the arrested person before a Court, nor is there any obligation to ensure the arrested person is afforded an opportunity to apply for bail. Accordingly, the Legislature may have considered it necessary that an added safeguard be provided so that an arresting police officer is required to show an arrestee the warrant of commitment as encapsulated in s 79(2) of the Summary Offences Act.
[58] Criminal Procedure Act 1935 (SA) s 59(1).
In this matter, the police officers upon arresting the appellant proceeded on the basis that s79(2) applied to warrants of apprehension. After the appellant’s arrest, he was in fact conveyed by other police officers (not Jelfs) to the Holden Hill Police Station, where the warrant of apprehension was produced to him. In accordance with the terms of the warrant, the appellant was then brought before the Holden Hill Magistrates Court to be dealt with according to law.
The question of whether the requirements dictated by 79(2) apply to both warrants of apprehension and warrants of commitment was not the subject of argument on appeal, and does not need to be resolved for the disposition of the appeal for the reasons which follow.
The first limb of the appellant’s specific complaint in relation to Ground 2, can be dealt with shortly. Contrary to the appellant’s submissions, the trial Judge did not consider that Christie could be distinguished on the basis it did not apply to cases involving a warrant. Rather, his Honour considered that ‘[i]n the circumstances, this case was to be distinguished from Christie v Leachinsky by reason of the operation of s 79 and no more detail was required’. Accordingly, his Honour was satisfied that by reason of the operation of s 79, all that was required of Jelfs, in order to comply with the requirements of Christie, was to inform the appellant that he was being arrested pursuant to an active warrant.
In relation to the appellant’s main complaint on appeal, that the trial Judge erred in finding a case to answer, it is to be accepted that the principles enunciated in Christie apply to arrests on warrants. Accordingly, Jelfs was required to inform the appellant of the fact that he was under arrest, and the reason for his arrest. By reason of s 79, Jelfs was not required to have the warrant in his possession nor to produce the warrant. As outlined above, the Legislature in enacting s 79(1) has altered the common law by empowering a police officer, without a warrant, to take into custody a person whom the officer has reasonable cause for believing or suspecting to be a person for whose apprehension or commitment a warrant has been issued by a justice. In so providing, s 79(1) necessarily contemplates that at the time of an arrest, a police officer may not be in possession of the arrest warrant, and an arrestee will not be shown the warrant nor, by implication, will he be advised of the contents of the warrant.
Thus, section 79(1) alters the common law as to when an arresting officer is required to show an arrested person the warrant, and by implication when the arrested person is required to be notified of the reason underlying the warrant. There is a legislative safeguard provided by s 20 of the Criminal Procedure Act, and replicated on the warrant, that after executing the warrant the defendant, as soon as practicable, is to be brought before the Court to answer the charges and be dealt with according to law.
Section 79(2), at least in relation to warrants of commitment, prescribes the procedure following an arresting officer executing a warrant under s 79(1). It requires an arresting officer, as soon as reasonably practicable, to deliver the person into the custody of the police officer in charge of the nearest police station and, as soon as conveniently may be done, produce or cause the warrant to be produced to the person. Sub-section 79(2) provides a further safeguard to the operation of s 79(1) in requiring that an arrested person (at least on a warrant of commitment) be shown the warrant, which on its face will have the reason underlying the warrant, as soon as reasonably practicable after the arrest.
The policy underlying the rationale in Christie is broadly that persons are entitled to know why they are being arrested so they can give any exculpatory explanation available and so as to avoid the consequences of false accusation. That policy must be considered in the context of the specific nature of an arrest by warrant made pursuant to s 79. The warrant executed by Jelfs contained a mandatory direction to the Police Commissioner to apprehend the person named therein. A police officer having reasonable cause for believing or suspecting the arrestee to be a person for whom a warrant has been issued by a justice, must apprehend the appellant. There is no discretion vested in a police officer as to whether to execute the warrant. The arrest warrant is valid even if the allegations upon which it was based are incorrect. It follows that even if the appellant had been advised at the time of the arrest as to the reasons underlying the warrant, there was no course of action that the appellant could have undertaken to challenge the execution of the warrant.
That is not to say that there may not be occasions when it is necessary for a police officer arresting a person on a warrant under s 79 to convey to the person arrested more information than the fact he is arrested on an active warrant. What is required to satisfy the principles in Christie will always depend on the particular circumstances of the case.
For the disposition of this ground of appeal, the question remains whether what Jelfs conveyed to the appellant was sufficient to ensure that he was informed of the reason for his arrest. That needs to be assessed objectively having regard to the information reasonably available to the arresting officer. Jelfs gave evidence that he advised the appellant there was an active warrant, and that he was being arrested on that warrant. Jelfs did not have the warrant in his possession. He checked the PIM system which revealed only that there was an active warrant for which police bail was excluded. He made further inquiries with police communications to confirm the existence of the warrant. That was the only information within his knowledge at the time of the arrest.

It may be accepted that Jelfs could have made further enquiries over police communications as to the reasons underlying the warrant, however that is not to say that he would have been immediately advised of the reason the warrant issued. He was required to execute the warrant. There was no discretion vested in Jelfs as to when he was to execute the warrant after being advised of its existence and after satisfying himself that the appellant was the person named in the warrant. In those circumstances, we are satisfied that his explanation to the appellant that he was arresting him on an active warrant were sufficient and all that was necessary for a lawful arrest, in terms of the information to be conveyed to the appellant.
We would dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 1 – directions as to what constitutes a lawful arrest
In relation to Ground 1, it follows that the trial Judge was not in error in directing the jury that ‘it is sufficient for a lawful arrest in South Australia that the arresting officer tells the person that they are being arrested on an active warrant because the warrant is the reason for the arrest.’
It is important to note that the trial Judge’s directions to the jury as to a lawful arrest (in the context of self defence against unlawful arrest, and in proof of the aggravating circumstances) were more comprehensive than as set out by the appellant in this Ground of Appeal. The trial Judge explained that:
·It was not disputed that there was an active warrant in existence for the appellant at the time that Jelfs attended on the appellant.
·In South Australia when a warrant is issued by a court, a person can be arrested without the arresting officer having physical possession of the warrant.
·A police officer may arrest a person if they reasonably believe or reasonably suspect that there is an active warrant for a person.
·An arrest will not be lawful unless the arresting officer tells the person being arrested the reason for which they are being arrested.
It would have been more accurate for the trial Judge to have explained to the jury that as a matter of law, if they were satisfied of Jelfs’ evidence that he had informed the appellant that he was arresting him on an active warrant that was, in the circumstances of this case, sufficient in terms of the information to be for a lawful arrest. However, we do not consider there was any error made by the trial Judge in his directions to the jury.
We are satisfied that the trial Judge did not err in his directions as to a lawful arrest. We would dismiss Ground 1.
Orders
1. An extension of time to appeal against conviction is granted.
2.Permission to appeal on Ground 2 is granted, but the appeal is dismissed.