Thornton v DPP - [2009] ACAT 40

ACT CIVIL & ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

THORNTON v THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (Administrative Review) [2009] ACAT 40

AT 79 of 2008

Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW– FREEDOM OF INFORMATION – Internal working documents – exemption based on documents prepared for the purposes of the deliberative processes of an agency
Documents concerning operations of agencies – exemption based on substantial adverse effect on the proper and efficient conduct of the operations of agency – whether disclosure of documents of agency in the public interest
Documents affecting personal privacy - request for access to information of potential witnesses and staff members of agencies - whether disclosure would be unreasonable disclosure of personal information
Legal Professional Privilege - whether the Office of Director of Public Prosecutions may stand in a legal professional relationship to the Australian Federal Police - whether communication was prepared for the dominant purpose of providing legal advice or of use in legal proceedings – whether privilege lost by abuse of statutory power and failure to act in good faith – whether privilege has been waived.
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1989 Pt 4, s 37
ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 ss 9, 22B, 68
Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) ss 36, 40, 41, 42
Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT)
Victims of Crime Act 1994 (ACT)

Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1990 (ACT) s 5
ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (Transitional Provisions) Regulations 2009 s6

Wallace & the Director of Public Prosecutions [2003] AATA 119
Osland v Secretary, Department of Justice (2008) 234 CLR 275, [2008] HCA 37
Waterford v Dept of Treasury (No 2) (1984) 1 AAR 1
Harris v ABC (1983) 50 ALR 551
Re Chandra v MIEA [1984] AATA 437
Colakovski v ATC (1991) 100 ALR 111
Saunders & Australian Federal Police [2001] AATA 1006
Re Sullivan and Department of Industry, Science and Technology (1997) 49 ALD 743
Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49
R v Dainer, Ex parte Pullen (1988) 78 ACTR 25
Grofam v ANZ (1993) 117 ALR 669
Attorney General (NT) v Kearney [1985] 158 CLR 500
Bullivant v Attorney-General (Vict.) [[1901] AC
O'Rourke v Darbishire [1920] AC 581
Mid Density Developments Pty Ltd v Rockdale Municipal Council (1993) 116 ALR 460
Prince & Secretary, Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs [1997] AATA 115
Mann v Carnell (1999) 168 ALR 86
A-G (NT) v Maurice (1986) 69 ALR 31

Tribunal: Professor P Spender Presidential Member
Mr G Lunney Member

Date of Orders: 23 October 2009
Date of Reasons for Decision: 23 October 2009

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY )

CIVIL & ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL ) AT 79 of 2008

BETWEEN:

WARREN JEFFREY
THORNTON
Applicant

AND:

THE DIRECTOR OF
PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
Respondent

Tribunal:Professor P Spender Presidential Member
Mr G Lunney Member

Date: 23 October 2009

ORDER

The Tribunal orders that the decision under review be confirmed.

……………………………….
Professor P Spender
Presidential Member

REASONS FOR DECISION

Background

The background to the application is that Mr Warren Jeffrey Thornton (‘the applicant’) was injured during an altercation at a café or restaurant in Manuka in Canberra on 11 October 2006. As well as the applicant, another man (‘the defendant’) was involved. Shortly after the altercation, the police arrived, and conducted investigations into the incident. Although the restaurant was full, and the defendant was with a group, statements were only taken from the applicant, the defendant and employees of the restaurant. The defendant said that he had acted in self-defence.
Months after the event, a summons was issued against the defendant for common assault. The defendant attended a case management hearing on 7 June 2007. At this hearing he indicated that his version of events was supported by members of his party who were willing to speak to investigators and give evidence if necessary. At the return date of the summons on 19 April 2007, the defendant was charged with another offence: assault occasioning actual bodily harm.
After statements from two of the defendant’s witnesses became available, no evidence was offered on the charges, and the prosecution was discontinued.
The defendant sought assistance from the Victims of Crime Co-ordinator who sought information from the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (‘ODPP ’) about the case on 29 October 2007. Mr Refshauge, the Director of Public Prosecutions (‘the Director’) at that time, replied on 8 November 2007, and his letter in reply is available to the Tribunal. In this letter Mr Refshauge explained the decision not to proceed with the prosecution.

The Freedom of Information Application

The applicant applied on 24 February 2008 under Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) (‘the FOI Act’) for ‘all documentation (either paper or digitally based) relating to the case referred to by the DPP as … CC2007/3755, 2233’.
Pursuant to this request, 43 documents were identified as falling within the applicant’s request. Of these 21 were released in full, 15 were released with deletions and 7 documents were determined to be exempt from release. The decision to release some documents and claim exemption for others was communicated by the ODPP to the applicant by letter on 7 April 2008.
On 21 April 2008, the applicant sought internal review of that decision, and a review was conducted, resulting in a letter being sent by the ODPP to the applicant on 29 May 2008 confirming and explaining the earlier decision.
After the applicant complained to the ACT Ombudsman, the Acting Director of Public Prosecutions decided to release one document which had previously been exempted from release. The applicant was advised of this decision by a letter dated 5 September 2008 and now seeks review of the decision of the Director under the FOI Act to classify the remaining 6 documents as fully exempt from disclosure and the 15 documents that were released with deletions as partially exempt from disclosure.

The ACAT Application

The applicant filed an Application for Review of Decision with the then Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘AAT’) on 2 October 2008. It sought review of ‘refusal to supply certain information’ under the FOI Act.
The review was originally sought under Part 4 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1989 (‘the AAT Act’) (now repealed) but by virtue of s 6 of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (Transitional Provisions) Regulations 2009 and because a hearing of the matter by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘the AAT’) had not commenced prior to 14 February 2009, it is deemed to be an application for review by the ACT Administrative and Civil Tribunal (‘ACAT’). In effect it is an application for review under s 9 of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (‘the ACAT Act’).

The Hearing

The matter proceeded to hearing on 14 and 15 May 2009. The Tribunal had before it the documents that were prepared pursuant to s 37 of the AAT Act (‘the T Documents’). There is no equivalent provision in the ACAT Act but the T Documents can be regarded as meeting the requirements of s 22B of the ACAT Act. It also had before Statements of Facts and Contentions submitted by the applicant and the respondent as well as the Statement of Michael Chilcott dated 17 February 2009. The applicant subpoenaed Mr Michael Chilcott and Mr Alyn Doig of the ODPP and Constable Andre Webster of the Australian Federal Police (‘AFP’) to give evidence. All three answered the subpoena and the applicant questioned Mr Chilcott and Constable Webster and Mr Doig made himself available for questioning during the hearing.

The Respondent’s Contentions

The respondent originally identified three exemption categories under the FOI Act which applied to documents falling within the scope of the applicant’s request:

12.1.documents affecting the operation of the agency, s 40(1)(d);
12.2.documents affecting personal privacy, s 41(1); and,
12.3.documents subject to legal professional privilege, s 42(1).

In the respondent’s Facts and Contentions filed in the current proceedings an additional ground was added: documents of a type covered by s 36 of the FOI Act. This section exempts certain internal working documents.
The respondent has prepared a document headed ‘Schedule of Documents to which Claims of Exemption/Deletion Relate’ (‘the Schedule’). The references to the exempted documents in the Schedule will be followed in these reasons for decision.

The Applicant’s Contentions

The applicant made arguments about specific statutory provisions and put forward general arguments to support his contention that the documents are not exempt. The applicant’s specific arguments will be dealt with under the relevant heading relating to each provision hereunder.
The applicant made several general arguments about the public interest requiring transparency of process and public access to information about the operation of the justice system. He argued that respondent had failed to take account of other legislation and policy instruments that informed the decision to exempt documents, namely the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT), the Victims of Crime Act 1994 (ACT) and the Statement of Commitment to Witnesses and Victims of Crime by all Staff of the ODPP. He also argued that the information that had been deleted from the partially released documents was either well known or required disclosure.

Consideration of the Issues

It is to be noted that the respondent to the application is the Director. In the Tribunal’s view, the Director is the proper respondent (Wallace & the Director of Public Prosecutions [2003] AATA 119 at [3]-[12]) and this point was not in contention in the hearing. As acknowledged in Mr Chilcott’s Statement dated 17 February 2009, the ODPP was established by the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1990 (ACT) (‘the DPP Act’) as the independent prosecuting authority of and for the Australian Capital Territory. The ODPP comprises of the Director and the staff of the ODPP. The principal role of the ODPP is to determine whether or not to continue or initiate the prosecution of matters referred by the AFP or regulatory agencies of the ACT. Pursuant to s 5 of the DPP Act the Director controls the ODPP.
In the analysis that follows, the issues will be grouped by reference to the exemption categories under the FOI Act, which in the respondent contentions, applied to documents falling within the scope of the applicant’s request.
Consistent with the approach required by the High Court in Osland v Secretary, Department of Justice (2008) 234 CLR 275, [2008] HCA 37 (particularly at [57] and [128]) the Tribunal inspected all of the documents which were subject to claims of exemption or deletion.

Section 36 - Internal Working Documents

Section 36 exempts documents that are internal working documents and disclosure would be contrary to the public interest. The relevant parts of the section state as follows:
Internal working documents
(1) Subject to this section, a document is an exempt document if its disclosure under this Act—
(a) would disclose matter in the nature of, or relating to, opinion, advice or recommendation obtained, prepared or recorded, or consultation or deliberation that has taken place, in the course of, or for the purposes of, the deliberative processes involved in the functions of an agency or Minister or of the Territory; and
(b) would be contrary to the public interest.
In the respondent’s Summary of Submissions, it is stated that the documents in respect of which this exemption is claimed record part of the considerations and consultations that led to an officer’s decision to discontinue a criminal proceeding. The documents were created after the decision for purposes of consultation with senior officers about how to deal with the matter thereafter and to evaluate how it had been managed up to that point. The documents therefore record the ODPP's ‘thinking process’ or deliberative processes: Waterford v Dept of Treasury (No 2) (1984) 1 AAR 1; Harris v ABC (1983) 50 ALR 551 at 560.
The Tribunal has examined the documents in question, described as folios 30-32, and folio 112, and agrees with the description of them given by the respondent and concludes that the documents record the ODPP’s ‘thinking’ or deliberative processes.
The applicant’s arguments about the operation of the public interest test in s 36(1)(b) are considered below.

Section 40(1)(d) – Documents Concerning the Operations of Agencies

This subparagraph creates an exemption for documents the disclosure of which would or could reasonably be expected to have a substantial adverse effect on the proper and efficient conduct of the operations of an agency, unless disclosure would be in the public interest. The relevant portions of s 40 are set out below.
Documents concerning certain operations of agencies
(1) Subject to subsection (2), a document is an exempt document if its disclosure under this Act would, or could reasonably be expected to—
…
(d) have a substantial adverse effect on the proper and efficient conduct of the operations of an agency … .
(2) This section does not apply to a document the disclosure of matter in which under this Act would, on balance, be in the public interest.
The documents in respect of which this claim for exemption is made are the same internal memos referred to under the discussion of the s 36 exemption.
The Tribunal has already determined that these documents are exempt pursuant to s 36 of the FOI Act. The relevant documents contain shortened descriptions of the process by which a decision had been made. These shortened descriptions were furnished to allow a junior officer to seek direction from more senior officers. Such shortened descriptions may be contrasted with a full and particular description of the decision making process which would probably occur in the expectation of public release. Such shortened descriptions promote the efficient conduct of the operations of the agency. Public examination of all levels of a decision making process would lead to unnecessary prolixity and for that reason would not be in the public interest. The Director’s letter of 8 November 2007 gives the official description of the reasons for decision.
The Tribunal consequently finds that disclosure of these internal memos could reasonably be expected to have a substantial adverse effect on the proper and efficient conduct of the operations of the ODPP. The relevant memos therefore fall within the s 40(1)(d) exemption and do not contain a matter the disclosure of which would, on balance, be in the public interest under s 40(2).
The applicant’s arguments about the operation of the public interest test in s 40(2) are considered below.

Public Interest

In Harris v ABC (1983) 50 ALR 551 at 561, Beaumont J discussed the concept of the ‘public interest’ as follows:
In evaluating where the public interest ultimately lies … it is necessary to weigh the public interest in citizens being informed of the processes of their government and its agencies on the one hand against the public interest in the proper working of government and its agencies on the other.
The applicant submits that there is a suspicion of abuse of power by the authors of the documents that the respondent claims are subject to the exemptions under sections 36 and 40(1)(d) and suggests that this forms a basis for denying exemption to the documents. This argument proceeds on the basis that disclosure of the documents would not be contrary to the public interest as an element of the exemption under s 36(1)((b) and would invoke the proviso in 40(2) which requires that the exemption under that section does not apply if the disclosure would, on balance, be in the public interest.
The applicant argued that the public interest in this matter could be considered to be:
a.   public confidence in the proper operation of the justice system;
b.   public confidence that those that administer the justice system do so in good faith;
c.   public confidence that those who are granted special powers and privileges to enforce and administer the law respect and uphold the law.
The respondent submitted that it is not in the public interest that these internal documents are published for three reasons.
a) Publication would impair the decision-making process of the ODPP by
i. inhibiting the recording of critical opinion about the conduct or processes of relevant persons or agencies for the purposes of ODPP's internal evaluation and consultation, or
ii. by requiring the use of additional resources to add explanatory material so that such documents would be suitable for publication.
b) It would be unfair to publish critical evaluations by a single junior officer of the ODPP (intended for internal use only) of matters such as the police investigation and the credibility of witnesses without the opportunity being given to persons or agencies affected to respond to the material: Harris v ABC (1983) 50 ALR 551 at 563.
c) The Director has publicly recorded his views at length about the conduct of the matter in question in official correspondence (at T Documents 27-32). It is not in the public interest to publish the views of junior ODPP officers about the same matter.
The Tribunal inspected the relevant documents and can identify no evidence to support a suspicion of abuse of power, let alone an inference of the same. Similarly there is no evidence of a lack of good faith on the part of the officers of ODPP. Hence, the applicant’s arguments about the requisite ‘public interest’ for sections 36(1)(b) and 40(2) cannot be sustained. Conversely there is a significant public interest in ensuring the uninhibited formation of views about current cases in the ODPP, including views about police investigation and the credibility of witnesses. Moreover, in the Tribunal’s view, the existence of the information contained in the Director’s letter of 8 November 2007 results in it not being in the public interest to disclose documents prepared by a junior officer which precede that letter. In this case the Director has given a lengthy summary of the circumstances of the case, and the reasons for discontinuing the prosecution of the alleged assailant.
In those circumstances in which the Director has given a full account of the reasons for the decision made, the Tribunal considers that disclosure of two internal memos descriptive of considerations leading to the decision being made and seeking direction from senior officers would be contrary to the public interest.
Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that disclosure of the documents pursuant to s36(1)(b) would be contrary to the public interest. Similarly none of the documents involve matters which would, on balance, require disclosure in the public interest under s 40(2).

Section 41 – Documents Affecting Personal Privacy

This section exempts documents which would involve the unreasonable disclosure of personal information about any person.
A number of documents are involved in this claim for exemption. In practice, in each case the claim for exemption is not in respect of the whole document. Personal details have been blacked out in the copies of documents that have been supplied to the applicant. The information that has been deleted includes dates of birth, occupations, private phone numbers, direct work phone numbers, private addresses and email addresses.
The personal information of non-staff persons who have dealings with the AFP and ODPP is blacked out because this material may expose them to unwanted contact or communication. The details of staff members of AFP and DPP are deleted to minimise exposure of staff to unsolicited contact by members of the public.
Ordinarily, the disclosure of this information would serve no public interest and this point was made by the respondent in submissions, relying on Re Chandra v MIEA [1984] AATA 437 at [51] ff and Colakovski v ATC (1991) 100 ALR 111 at 123.

During the course of the hearing, the applicant conceded that it was appropriate to have blacked out this information. However, the applicant submitted that because one of the witnesses had described himself by his official title, personal material that had been blacked out in an email sent by him should not be exempt. The email was sent through a government email address.
After inspection of the relevant documents, the Tribunal concludes that the description of the author by his official title was not improper or even unusual. Therefore this information falls within the general exemption for personal details under s 41.
The Tribunal is satisfied that the blacking out process exempts personal information relating to persons involved in the investigation, and is satisfied that disclosure of that private information would be unreasonable pursuant to s 41.

Section 42(1) – Legal Professional Privilege

This section exempts documents which would be privileged from production in legal proceedings on the ground of legal professional privilege.
In determining the ambit of this category of exempt documents, the Tribunal should apply the common law test for determining the applicability of legal professional privilege: Saunders & Australian Federal Police [2001] AATA 1006 at [20], citing Re Sullivan and Department of Industry, Science and Technology (1997) 49 ALD 743 at 754.
The common law test is whether the relevant communication was made, or the relevant document was prepared, for the dominant purpose of a lawyer providing legal advice or assistance, or of use in legal proceedings: Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49.
This claim for exemption relates to documents 2, 3, 7, folios 43-44 of document 8, and document 13. They are emails described in the Schedule consisting of communications between the ODPP and the AFP regarding the prosecution.
It is well established by authorities that the ODPP may stand in a legal professional relationship to the AFP (Wallace & DPP [2003] AATA 119, R v Dainer, Ex parte Pullen (1988) 78 ACTR 25). It will be a question of fact whether that relationship exists to cover a particular communication.
In the present matter, court proceedings were commenced by ‘Summons to the Defendant Upon Information’. The supporting Information was sworn on 21 March 2007. It is not clear when this was served on the defendant named, but it was returnable before the ACT Magistrates Court on 19 April 2007.
There is a further document headed ‘Bench Information/Charge’ which indicates that the defendant named in the Summons mentioned before appeared before the court on 19 April 2007, and was then charged with another offence related to the previous Summons.
An endorsement on the Charge Sheet indicates that there was to be a Case Management Hearing on 7 June 2007. It appears from other documents before the Tribunal that on that date the defendant was self represented and indicated to the prosecutor from the ODPP that he had a number of witnesses.
This resulted in further investigations and ultimately a decision by the ODPP to offer no evidence in relation to the Summons and the Charge.
The Tribunal has had access to the documents which are the subject of the exemption claimed. The description of them contained in the Schedule is accurate.
These documents originated at two different but significant stages of the prosecution of the defendant: the first in April 2007 when the defendant was about to appear in response to the Summons and a new charge was being prepared; the second in June when consideration of new evidence was underway leading to consideration of not proceeding with the prosecution.
The applicant contended that legal professional privilege did not arise between the AFP and ODPP because, inter alia, the ODPP was not entitled to give legal advice based on the authority of Grofam v ANZ (1993) 117 ALR 669. Conversely, the respondent submitted that the relevant documents were all created for use in connection with a legal proceeding begun earlier by the laying of a charge of assault (later upgraded to assault occasioning actual bodily harm), and contain confidential communications between the ODPP and staff of its client, the AFP. Further, some or all cases the communications were made for the purpose also of seeking or giving legal advice about the proceeding.
It is quite clear that at all relevant times, the ODPP and the AFP stood in a legal professional relationship, and that the communications contained in the documents subject of the claim were made within the confines of that relationship. The case relied upon by the applicant – Grofam v ANZ (1993) 117 ALR 669 – is distinguishable because in the current case the relevant authority, the AFP, was already a party to a proceeding begun earlier by the laying of a charge of assault.
For the reasons given above, the Tribunal rejects the contention put by the respondent that legal professional privilege did not arise.
The applicant also submits that legal professional privilege was lost due to illegality, relying on principles stated in the High Court decision of Attorney General (NT) v Kearney [1985] 158 CLR 500. He refers to a statement by Gibbs CJ at page 515 in which his Honour refers to the loss of privilege to communications made to further an illegal purpose or to further a deliberate abuse of statutory power. Gibbs CJ states as follows:
In my opinion the present case comes within the principle which forms the basis of the rule that denies privilege to communications made to further an illegal purpose. It would be contrary to the public interest which the privilege is designed to secure - the better administration of justice - to allow it to be used to protect communications made to further a deliberate abuse of statutory power and by that abuse to prevent others from exercising their rights under the law.
The applicant asserts that certain officers of the ODPP deliberately abused the statutory power delegated to them by the respondent and failed to act in good faith.
The respondent notes the further comments of Gibbs CJ at page 516:
The privilege is of course not displaced by making a mere charge of crime or fraud or, as in the present case, a charge that powers have been exercised for an ulterior purpose. This was made clear in Bullivant v Attorney-General (Vict.) [[1901] AC, at pp 201, 203, 205.] and in O'Rourke v Darbishire [1920] AC 581, at pp 604, 613-614, 622-623, 632-633] . As Viscount Finlay said in the latter case [[1920] AC, at p 604], "there must be something to give colour to the charge".
As stated above, the applicant asserts that certain officers of the ODPP abused the statutory power delegated to them and failed to act in good faith and/or behaved negligently in the conduct of the case.
The applicant relies upon ‘honest ineptitude’ as a test to apply in determining the lack of good faith applied by the Full Federal Court in Mid Density Developments Pty Ltd v Rockdale Municipal Council (1993) 116 ALR 460. The applicant also argued that the statutory context of the exercise of power is critical, citing Prince & Secretary, Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs [1997] AATA 115 at [70]. The Tribunal agrees that the statutory context of a good faith test is critical and finds that the Mid Density Developments case is distinguishable because in that case the defendant council argued an express statutory defence of good faith under the relevant New South Wales legislation. The case is not authority for a general allegation of lack of good faith or abuse of statutory power.
The gist of this aspect of the applicant’s claim seems to be that the ODPP officer handling the case abused her powers in discontinuing the matter. The Tribunal agrees with the respondent’s submission that this claim has no substance. The officer had received apparently reliable information that there were several witnesses who would provide a defence but whom the AFP had not yet contacted. The decision to discontinue was open to that officer, and there is no evidence of inappropriate conduct amounting to abuse of power or a failure of good faith or honest ineptitude.
The Tribunal is therefore of the view that there is ‘nothing to give colour to the charge’ (in the words of Viscount Finlay in O'Rourke v Darbishire) which would result in the loss of legal professional privilege.
Finally, the applicant submits that legal professional privilege has been waived by the disclosure of relevant material Mann v Carnell (1999) 168 ALR 86; A-G (NT) v Maurice (1986) 69 ALR 31. The applicant contends that an officer of the ODPP provided a copy of the privileged information to the defendant and a potential witness. An analysis of the sequence of the emails set out in the relevant documents (Document 8, folios 41-45) provides no indication that the information was sent to any third party as alleged.
In summary, the Tribunal considers that the exemption for legal professional privilege under s 42 of the FOI Act is properly established.

Generally

In his challenge to the decisions made, the applicant has put forward a number of arguments to support his contention that documents are not exempt. These have included assertions that there has been abuse of statutory power, lack of good faith, perversion of the course of justice, breach of the Human Rights Act and Victims of Crime Act, and criminal negligence. At the hearing, these arguments were made by way of general comment rather than by way of comprehensive analysis.
The investigation and subsequent prosecution following on from the events that occurred on 11 October 2006 did not go ahead altogether smoothly, as appears from the Director’s letter of 8 November 2007. It is perhaps understandable that the applicant would be somewhat aggrieved by the decision to conclude the prosecution at an advanced stage. However, the Tribunal is satisfied that there is nothing in the conduct of either the AFP or the ODPP that could be categorised in the terms suggested by the applicant and thus be relevant to the issues that arise under the FOI Act.

Conclusion

The Tribunal upholds the exemptions claimed and in accordance with s 68(3) of the ACAT Act, orders that the decision be confirmed.

………………………………..
Professor P Spender
Presidential Member

PUBLICATION DETAILS

TO BE PUBLISHED

To be completed by Tribunal Staff

PART A FILE NO: AT 08/79

APPLICANT: THORNTON

RESPONDENT: THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

COUNSEL APPEARING: APPLICANT:

RESPONDENT: DR D R JARVIS

SOLICITORS: APPLICANT:

RESPONDENT: MS L HANN

OTHER: APPLICANT: SELF

RESPONDENT:
TRIBUNAL MEMBER/S: PROF P SPENDER       PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER
MR G LUNNEY       MEMBER

DATE/S OF HEARING: 14 MAY 2009 PLACE: CANBERRA

DATE/S OF DECISION: 23 OCTOBER 2009 PLACE: CANBERRA

PART B

RECOMMENDATION:

FULL REPORT ( ) CASE NOTE ( ) UNREPORTED DECISION ( )

COMMENTS: