Thomson v State of Queensland (No 2)

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Thomson v State of Queensland & Anor (No 2) [2019] QSC 115

PARTIES:

STEPHEN THOMSON

(plaintiff)

v
STATE OF QUEENSLAND

(first defendant)
and
QUEENSLAND POLICE-CITIZENS YOUTH WELFARE ASSOCIATION (ACN 009 666 193)
(second defendant)

FILE NO:

BS 8331 of 2014

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Trial

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court of Queensland at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

8 May 2019

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

Written submissions

JUDGE: Applegarth J


 ORDERS:

1.    The first defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs of and incidental to the proceeding to be assessed on an indemnity basis, including those costs incurred by the plaintiff in proceeding against the second defendant, to be agreed or assessed.

2.    The plaintiff’s costs be assessed on the basis that, except insofar as they are of an unreasonable amount, the fees of two counsel should be regarded as costs necessary and proper insofar as they are limited to fees for or in preparation for trial, and otherwise be at the discretion of the assessor.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND
TERRITORY COURTS – COSTS – MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS – where the plaintiff sued successfully for injuries sustained as a consequence of working at a school farm – where the plaintiff was an employee of the second defendant and the farm was operated by the first defendant – where the liability of each defendant to the plaintiff was in dispute at trial – where the plaintiff succeeded against both defendants – where the plaintiff cannot obtain an order for costs against the second defendant due to the effect of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) – where the plaintiff seeks an order that the first defendant pay both the costs incurred in pursuing the first defendant and the costs incurred in pursuing the second defendant – whether the costs order against the first defendant in favour of the plaintiff should include the costs that the plaintiff incurred in successfully pursuing the second defendant

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND
TERRITORY COURTS – COSTS – TWO COUNSEL –
where the plaintiff seeks an order that the fees of two counsel
should be regarded as costs necessary and proper – where the first defendant submits that the claim by the plaintiff did not involve significant complex issues – where the plaintiff submits a number of relevant factors as to why the fees of two counsel should be regarded as necessary and proper – whether an order should be made concerning the costs of the two counsel engaged by the plaintiff

Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) s 316

Gould v Vaggelas (1984) 157 CLR 215, cited
Kerle v BM Alliance Coal Operations Pty Ltd & Ors (No 2) [2017] QSC 7, followed
Paskins v Hail Creek Coal Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] 2 Qd R 518; [2017] QSC 213, followed
Thomson v State of Queensland & Anor [2019] QSC 95, cited
Wiltshire v Amos [2018] QSC 224, cited

COUNSEL:

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Details
Case
[2019] QSC 115
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Thomson v State of Queensland (No 2) involved the plaintiff, who was an employee of the second defendant and had sustained injuries while working at a school farm operated by the first defendant. The plaintiff sued both defendants for damages, and the dispute centred around the costs incurred by the plaintiff in pursuing the defendants. The liability of each defendant was contested until shortly before the trial concluded. The plaintiff successfully sued both defendants, but the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) (WCRA) precluded the plaintiff from obtaining a costs order against the second defendant due to the mandatory final offer made by the plaintiff and the second defendant. The plaintiff sought an order that the first defendant pay both the costs incurred in pursuing the first defendant and the costs incurred in pursuing the second defendant.

The court was required to determine whether the costs order against the first defendant should include the costs that the plaintiff incurred in successfully pursuing the second defendant. The court considered whether the plaintiff could circumvent the effect of the WCRA by having the first defendant pay the costs incurred in pursuing the second defendant. The court found that it was reasonable for the plaintiff to pursue both defendants as the liability of each defendant was in dispute. The court cited well-established authority that if a plaintiff pursues both defendants and fails against one, the unsuccessful defendant can be ordered to pay the costs directly to the successful defendant (a Sanderson order) or the court can order that the plaintiff pay the costs of the successful defendant but recover them from the unsuccessful defendant (a Bullock order).

The court decided that it was appropriate to order the first defendant to pay the costs incurred by the plaintiff in pursuing the second defendant. The court recognised that the plaintiff's decision to pursue both defendants was reasonable, and the first defendant should bear the costs incurred by the plaintiff in pursuing the second defendant. The court also ordered that the plaintiff's costs be assessed on an indemnity basis, including the fees of two counsel, which should be regarded as costs necessary and proper insofar as they are limited to fees for or in preparation for trial, and otherwise be at the discretion of the assessor.

In summary, the court held that the first defendant should pay the costs incurred by the plaintiff in pursuing the second defendant, as well as the costs incurred in pursuing the first defendant. The court's decision was based on the reasonable decision of the plaintiff to pursue both defendants and the well-established authority on costs orders in such cases.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The first defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs of and incidental to the proceeding to be assessed on an indemnity basis, including those costs incurred by the plaintiff in proceeding against the second defendant, to be agreed or assessed.

2. The plaintiff’s costs be assessed on the basis that, except insofar as they are of an unreasonable amount, the fees of two counsel should be regarded as costs necessary and proper insofar as they are limited to fees for or in preparation for trial, and otherwise be at the discretion of the assessor.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

There is no dispute that the plaintiff is not entitled to a costs order against the second defendant. In short, his mandatory final offer to the second defendant ($700,000 clear of the WorkCover refund of $188,727.10 or a gross offer of $888,727.10) far exceeded the judgment sum against the second defendant. The offer seemingly did not take account of the fact that the second defendant was not liable for the significant claim for past and future care. Under the WCRA, a plaintiff is only entitled to costs, on the standard basis, if he or she has been awarded an amount of damages that was equal to or more than the plaintiff’s written final offer.[3] As noted, no order about costs, other than an order allowed under s 316, is to be made by the Court “in the claimant’s proceeding”.[4] As a result, there was no order for costs made as between the plaintiff and the second defendant.[3] WCRA s 316(2)(a).[4] Ibid s 316(1).Liability was contested by both defendants until after the evidence closed Each defendant denied liability, including during the course of four days of evidence. Both liability and quantum were contested. Each defendant sought contribution or indemnity from the other. Liability to the plaintiff was only admitted shortly before written submissions on both liability and quantum were due. The defendants resolved issues of indemnity and contribution, making it unnecessary and inappropriate for the Court to decide contribution and indemnity between them. Is Paskins distinguishable? In Paskins the plaintiff sued for damages for injuries sustained in the course of his employment. Two defendants were sued. Each defendant denied liability. Both were found liable. The second defendant was required to indemnify the first defendant in respect of the plaintiff’s claim. As in this case, the rights of the plaintiff to a costs order against his employer (the first defendant in the case of Paskins) were governed by the WCRA. It was accepted that he had no entitlement to a costs order against his employer, given the mandatory final offers made by the plaintiff and his employer. The plaintiff and his employer bore their own costs of the proceeding between them. The same applies here. Mr Paskins sought an order that the second defendant pay not only the costs incurred by him in pursuing the second defendant, but the costs incurred by him in pursuing his employer (the first defendant). McMeekin J posed the question of whether Mr Paskins could circumvent the effect of the WCRA by those means.[5][5] Paskins at [9]. The issue of costs was in the Court’s discretion. There was no doubt that it was reasonable for the plaintiff to take the course of pursuing both defendants. The defendants each contended that the other was liable, and the plaintiff could not take the risk of suing one and not the other. McMeekin J cited well-accepted authority that if a plaintiff pursues both defendants and fails against one and so incurs an adverse costs order, the unsuccessful defendant can be ordered to pay those costs directly to the successful defendant (a Sanderson order) or the court can order that the plaintiff pay the costs of the successful defendant but recover them from the unsuccessful defendant (a Bullock order).[6][6] See generally Gould v Vaggelas (1984) 157 CLR 215 at 230.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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