Thompson v Cavalier King Charles Spaniel Rescue (Qld) Inc

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Thompson v Cavalier King Charles Spaniel Rescue (Qld) Inc [2020] QCA 2

PARTIES:

JAMES BOYD THOMPSON
(appellant)
v
CAVALIER KING CHARLES SPANIEL RESCUE (QLD) INC
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 12173 of 2018
SC No 9148 of 2013

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane – Unreported, 12 October 2018 (Dalton J)

DELIVERED ON:

31 January 2020

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

6 June 2019

JUDGES:

Fraser and Philippides JJA and Ryan J

ORDER:

Appeal dismissed with costs.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – COSTS – TAXATION AND OTHER FORMS OF ASSESSMENT – APPEAL, REVIEW OR REFERENCE – where the primary judge refused an application for a declaration that the appellant was not served with a costs statement on behalf of the first defendant, and refused to set aside a default costs assessment and for the consequent order for costs made by the registrar – where the costs assessment was made on the indemnity basis – where the appellant alleges that the respondent’s solicitor’s affidavit contained various formal defects – whether the appellant’s objections to the costs statement had merit – whether the respondent’s solicitor’s affidavit contained formal defects

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 668, r 703, r 706, r 708, r 709, r 710, r 740

Amos v Monsour Legal Costs Pty Ltd [2008] 1 Qd R 304; [2007] QCA 235, considered
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40, followed
Lee v Abedian [2017] QSC 22, distinguished

COUNSEL:

The appellant appeared on his own behalf
C D Templeton for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

The appellant appeared on his own behalf
ACLG Lawyers for the respondent

  1. FRASER JA:  I agree with the reasons for judgment of Philippides JA and the orders proposed by her Honour.

  2. PHILIPPIDES JA:  The appellant, Mr Thompson, appeals against a decision of the primary judge, Dalton J, made on 12 October 2018 in which her Honour refused his application for a declaration that he was not served with a costs statement on behalf of the first defendant, Cavalier King Charles Spaniel Rescue (Qld) Inc, and refused to set aside orders of the registrar made on 16 August 2018 ordering a costs assessment, as well as the registrar’s orders of 21 September 2018 for judgment for those costs to be paid when they were assessed.  The primary judge also refused an application to have the costs assessment itself, which the appellant alleged contained errors, set aside.

  3. The appellant’s appeal against that decision raised three principal grounds.  The first ground, that service of the costs statement was not effected on 23 July 2018 when it was sent to the appellant’s email address, was dismissed with ex tempore reasons given upon the hearing of submissions as to that ground.

  4. The remaining two grounds are that, at a minimum, one or more of the applicant’s objections in his amended notice of objections is meritorious…

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Details
Case
[2020] QCA 2
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Thompson v Cavalier King Charles Spaniel Rescue (Qld) Inc is an appeal against the dismissal of an application to set aside a default costs assessment and the consequential order for costs made by the registrar. The appellant, Mr Thompson, initiated proceedings against the respondent, Cavalier King Charles Spaniel Rescue (Qld) Inc, and other defendants. The primary judge dismissed Mr Thompson's application to set aside the costs assessment and ordered him to pay the respondent's costs of $5,951. This decision is now under appeal.

The legal issues before the court were whether Mr Thompson's objections to the respondent's costs statement had merit and whether the affidavit of Nathaniel Delaney, the respondent's solicitor, contained formal defects. The court had to consider the objections raised by Mr Thompson to the costs statement and the affidavit provided by the respondent's solicitor. The primary judge found that none of Mr Thompson's objections were meritorious and dismissed the application, ordering Mr Thompson to pay the respondent's costs.

The court found that Mr Thompson's objections to the costs statement lacked merit and did not provide a valid basis for setting aside the costs assessment. The objections raised by Mr Thompson were general, querulous, and unlikely to result in a significant reduction in the costs statement. The court also noted that the respondent's solicitor's affidavit did not contain any formal defects that would invalidate the costs assessment. The court held that the objections were baseless and the primary judge's decision to dismiss the application was correct.

The appeal was dismissed with costs. The court found no error in the primary judge's decision and upheld the orders made by the primary judge.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The remaining two grounds are that, at a minimum, one or more of the applicant’s objections in his amended notice of objections is meritorious (ground 2) and that the affidavit of Nathaniel Delaney dated 11 October 2018 was non-compliant, contained false information and was only given to the appellant 15 minutes before the application was heard (ground 3).Background By claim filed 27 September 2013, the appellant commenced proceedings as plaintiff against seven defendants, the respondent to this appeal being the first defendant. On 12 February 2016, Mullins J ordered, inter alia, that various paragraphs of the plaintiff’s statement of claim be struck out and that the plaintiff pay the costs of the first and sixth defendants of the application filed on 27 January 2016 on the indemnity basis.[1][1]AB2 at 146-148. On 14 August 2018, the respondent filed an application for a costs assessment to be completed pursuant to r 710 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (the UCPR) and that Mr Raymond Bull be appointed as the costs assessor.[2] A costs statement[3] and an affidavit of Mr Delaney affirmed 14 August 2018 in which he deposed to, inter alia, neither his client nor his firm’s office having received a notice of objection from the appellant, was also filed.[4] On 16 August 2018, the registrar ordered that a costs assessment be completed and that Mr Bull be appointed to assess the costs under r 708 of the UCPR.[5] The appellant served objections to the costs statement on the respondent on 17 August 2018.[6] The costs statement was in the sum of $28,483.97 (comprising $28,475.22 for professional fees and $8.75 for outlays). On 18 September 2018, Mr Bull filed a costs assessor’s certificate, having assessed costs in the sum of $26,377.32 (comprising $25,669.57 for professional fees and $707.75 for disbursements).[7] On 21 September 2018, a deputy registrar made a registrar’s order for costs in the sum of $26,377.32, consequent upon the assessor’s certificate.[8][2]AB2 at 414.[3]AB2 at 416.[4]AB 2 at 443.[5]AB2 at 542.[6]AB2 at 18.[7]AB2 at 601.[8]AB2 at 603. On 28 September 2018, the appellant filed an application[9] pursuant to r 709 of the UCPR seeking, inter alia, that the following orders be set aside:·the registrar’s order of 16 August 2018;·the costs assessor’s decision filed 18 September 2018; and·the registrar’s order for costs made on 21 September 2018.[9]AB1 at 15. An amended version of the objections were served on the respondent on 9 October 2018. On 12 October 2018, Dalton J dismissed the appellant’s application and ordered that he pay the respondent’s costs in the sum of $5,951.[10] That decision is the subject of this appeal.[10]AB1 at 10. The appeal lies to this Court pursuant to s 62(1)(a) of the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 and, by r 765(2) of the UCPR, is brought by way of an appeal and requires an error in the House v The King[11] sense to be demonstrated.[11](1936) 55 CLR 499.Rule 709 and r 703 of the UCPR

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Rule 703(3) deals with costs assessment on the indemnity basis, as occurred in this case. It provides that when assessing costs on the indemnity basis, a costs assessor must allow all costs reasonably incurred and of a reasonable amount, having regard to the scale of fees prescribed for the Court, any costs agreement between the party to whom the costs are payable and the party’s solicitor, and charges ordinarily payable by a client to a solicitor for the work.The decision of the primary judge The issues before the primary judge mirrored those before this Court. Having rejected that the appellant was not served with the respondent’s costs statement on 23 July 2018, the primary judge turned to the question of whether or not the orders of 16 August 2018 and 21 September 2018 ought to be set aside as follows:[12][12]AB1 at 13.“There are two rules, rule 668 and rule 709. I think 709 is the more specific rule and I will address it in terms. I will just note that under both rules the Court is given a discretion. The facts material to both rules are the same and my decision would not be any different under rule 668.… I turn to look at the substance of the objection to costs statement because in deciding whether or not to set aside the default assessment and give Mr Thompson an opportunity to put his points before the costs assessor, an assessment of the merits of those points must, of course, be very relevant.Since the 17th of August 2018, Mr Thompson has, in fact, delivered a second version of the objection to costs statement. It is marked up with underlining so that one can see it is the original version but with some fairly substantial amendments. That second version was served on the first defendant with this application on the 9th of October 2018. It is that second version which I have looked at in deciding whether or not there are meritorious matters raised in the objection to costs statement.In my view, there are not meritorious matters raised in it. Many of the complaints or almost [sic] of the complaints, are very general in their nature. They are querulous in their nature, and they are, in my view, very unlikely to cause any costs assessor acting reasonably to make any significant reduction in the costs statement which the first defendant relies upon.The solicitor appearing for the first defendant said that the objection to costs statement does not comply with the rules, and that is right in the sense it does not comply with the form 61 version 1 document. Of itself, non-compliance with a form, especially by somebody acting in person, is not something which would greatly trouble me, but I think when the non-compliance is analysed, it really is a result of the nature of the objections which are taken and which I have already described.The form to be filled in requires the party objecting to a costs item to say in relation to each item what the proposed reduction is, and at the foot of the notice of objection to - essentially do the mathematics to show the total proposed deduction. When the sort of complaints Mr Thompson has made are analysed, they – they are not the kind of complaints that would allow somebody to fill in those parts of the form which Mr Thompson has ignored.So looking then at the relief sought in the application, I will refuse to make the orders sought at paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 primarily because I do not think that the objection to the costs statement contains anything meritorious and anything likely to succeed in reducing the costs statement which was prepared by the first defendant. It follows that I would not make any order in terms of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the application.I make an order that the plaintiff pay the first defendant’s costs in the sum of $5951.”Ground 2 - objections to the costs statement

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Objection 9 likewise lacks merit. It concerns the first respondent being charged for the preparatory work undertaken by ACLG Lawyers set out from approximately Items 1 to 50 of the costs statement. It is premised on the erroneous assumption that solicitors cannot necessarily commence acting for a party before a notice of change of solicitor is filed and they officially take over carriage of a matter by notice, and that such work cannot be billable.Objections 33, 34 and 34(b) – charges for preparation of submissions Objections 33, 34 and 34(b) are also baseless. They object to being charged a total of $1,671.20 for the preparation and production of the respondent’s outline of submissions for the hearing of the application. The appellant submitted that Practice Direction 6 of 2004 provided that no charge was to be made for the preparation of an outline. These objections all stem from a misconception on the part of the appellant as to the effect of Practice Direction 6 of 2004. As the respondent submitted, it is not correct to say that the practice direction prohibits charging for an outline, rather, it only prohibits charging for preparing a file index search, list of material and completion of an appearance slip.Objection 45 – charges for collecting and examining orders on 12 February 2016 Objection 45 concerns the costs of collecting a copy of the sealed orders of Mullins J dated 12 February and then examining those orders on 16 February 2016. The appellant’s objection is based on the erroneous understanding that the orders of Mullins J (in respect of which the indemnity costs were ordered) were delivered on 22 February 2016. However, those orders were in fact dated and sealed on 12 February 2016.[18] It was therefore possible for the orders to be collected and examined on 16 February 2016 and the time it took to do that to be properly charged for. [19] The complaint is of a spurious nature.[18]AB2 at 146.[19]AB2 at 437.Objection 35 – charges for callover attendance Objection 35 is that the costs statement did not apportion the fee for attendance at the callover on 4 February 2016.[20] The charge is for $49.10.[21] The appellant submits that the callover attended concerned two applications for the proceeding and that he had already paid the costs for one (apparently as part of the fixed costs order to be paid). The amount in question, it was submitted, ought to therefore be halved to $24.55, a trivial amount given the deduction made by the assessor.[20]As is required by sch 1 item 15 UCPR.[21]Schedule 1 item 15 UCPR.Objections 13, 20, 21, 23, 27, 36, 37, 38 and 39 – unreasonable charges Objections 13, 20, 21, 23, 27, 36, 37, 38 and 39 are to what the appellant submits to be unreasonable charges as described in Lee. It is to be observed that, unlike the present case, Lee concerned costs ordered on the standard basis, not the indemnity basis and related to the engagement of counsel. As mentioned already, it is not of assistance. The charges in this case have not been demonstrated to be unreasonable.Objection 46 – costs for care and conduct