Thompson and Secretary, Department of Education, Science and Training and Anor
[2007] AATA 1801
•25 September 2007
Administrative Appeals Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2007] AATA 1801
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No Q200600844
GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION ) Re
DIANE THOMPSON
Applicant
And
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TRAINING
First respondent
And LYLE FRISKE
Second respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Dr KS Levy, RFD, Senior Member Date25 September 2007
PlaceBrisbane
Decision The Tribunal affirms the decision under review, and confirms the confidentiality orders under s 64(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 and s 35(2)(c) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975. The documents relating to the confidentiality orders should now be returned to the first respondent. .................[Sgd].............................
Senior Member
CATCHWORDS
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION – access to documents – three documents declared to be exempt documents – whether the documents are exempt on personal privacy grounds – whether release of the documents would have a substantial adverse effect on the operations of an agency – whether the documents are exempt on the grounds of legal professional privilege – whether the documents are exempt because they relate to business affairs – consideration of exemption on grounds of fear for safety – decision affirmed
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) ss 3, 4, 11, 37, 40, 41, 42, 43, 64
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 35, 37
Subramanian and Refugee Review Tribunal (1997) 44 ALD 435
Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corporation (1991) 23 ALD 1
Re Cook and Comcare (1996) 23 AAR 19
Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298
Centrelink v Dykstra [2002] FCA 1442
Robinson v Director General, Department of Health [2002] NSWADT 222
Re Associated Minerals Consolidated Ltd and Secretary, Department of Transport and Communications (1990) 19 ALD 634
Waterford v The Commonwealth (1986) 163 CLR 54
Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674
Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49
REASONS FOR DECISION
25 September 2007 Dr KS Levy, RFD, Senior Member Introduction
1. This is an application by Diane Thompson for review of a decision that determined three (3) documents were exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 1982.
2. The applicant is a former employee of Murrays Coaches. The first respondent undertook an investigation in relation to complaints that Murrays Coaches had obtained Commonwealth incentive payments from the first respondent when some of the employees were not qualified for an apprenticeship or traineeship. There were allegations also of alleged criminal behaviour in relation to the second respondent, Mr Friske. The first respondent conducted formal investigations, including an interview with the second respondent. A brief of evidence was forwarded to the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions to ascertain if criminal charges should be laid against any person, including the second respondent. The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions considered there was insufficient information to obtain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt, against Mr Friske.
3. Ms Thompson sought access to documents under the Freedom of Information Act 1982.As a result of that application, a decision-maker and affirmed by internal review, resulted in 237 pages being released to Ms Thompson. These folios comprised 22 documents which were released in full and 19 documents released with some information deleted. There were also three documents held to be wholly exempt. These are the subject of the present application for review.
4. Ms Thompson was self-represented at the hearing. The first respondent was represented by Mr T Brennan of Counsel and the second respondent was represented by Mr A.A.J. Horneman-Wren of Counsel.
Issues
5. The question for the Tribunal is whether the following documents are exempt from access under the Freedom of Information Act 1982:
(i)Transcript of interview with Mr Lyle Friske (folios P156 to P203) (Document Group 1);
(ii)Cover sheet and summary tables of witness statements in the brief of evidence provided by the first respondent to the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) (folio P204 to P216) (Document Group 2);
(iii)The letter from CDPP to first respondent (folio P217 to P219) (Document Group 3).
Evidence
6.The Tribunal was supplied with a number of items of documentary evidence:
Exhibit 1 – the section 37 documents (the T documents) filed under the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975
Exhibit 2 – TA documents
Exhibit 3 – Affidavit of Linda Jane White
Exhibit 4 – Affidavit of William Edward Sheppard
Exhibit 5 – Affidavit of Jane Margaret Bentley
7. Counsel for the first respondent also submitted that the documents which are the subject of appeal in this matter should be the subject of a confidentiality order. I made a preliminary examination of the three documents provided by Counsel and was satisfied that a preliminary confidentiality order should be made under s 64(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982, and I ordered accordingly. In addition, I directed that publication of the content of those documents should remain confidential to the Tribunal and should be prohibited to all persons other than the first respondent, the Tribunal and the Tribunal’s staff at least until the hearing was concluded and any further order made. The latter order was made under s 35(2)(c) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975.
8. Ms Thompson informed the Tribunal that she believed she was entitled to get access to the information as employees were “still intimidated”, and that it would be in the public interest for employees to understand the background information and the previous complaints made.
9. Mr Brennan provided an outline to the Tribunal of the regulatory scheme involved in the creation of apprenticeships, the responsibilities between the Commonwealth and the States and the relationship between employers and apprentices or trainees. Essentially, apprenticeships are a form of contract of employment between an employer and an employee, which agrees to provide a level of training to the employee, and which will be recognised nationally as a vocational education and training qualification. The formal contractual arrangements are regulated by authorities in each State and Territory.
10. The scheme overall involves the Commonwealth Department of Education, Science and Training (DEST) as that department has the responsibility for providing support services to employers and employees under this scheme. In 2006, there were 77,653 employers involved in the scheme and in excess of 400,000 apprentices or trainees. Under this scheme employers are entitled to certain financial incentives as a way of inducing them to offer training and employment opportunities to persons qualified under the scheme. In the 2006/2007 year, the Commonwealth budget for the scheme was $615M.
11. Counsel advised that in relation to the application under review, the first respondent has a National Investigations Unit (NIU) for investigating complaints in cases of suspected fraud. A complaint was made by persons formerly employed by Murrays Coaches which claimed that their training contracts were modified to bring them within the bounds of this scheme, and that subsequently their employment was terminated. The investigation by the Department centred around allegations of fraudulent acquisition of Commonwealth monies when some employees were not qualified under the scheme to be apprentices. It was suggested that the second respondent, as a senior manager with Murrays Coaches, was involved in encouraging the making of false statements and in certifying contracts for a number of employees.
12. The NIU conducted a detailed investigation. On conclusion of that investigation, a brief of evidence was provided to the CDPP in Brisbane, with a request to advise on whether any staff of Murrays Coaches should be prosecuted. The CDPP concluded that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt, that any person could be successfully prosecuted.
13. Submissions by Counsel were that the documents in question should be exempt under one or more of the following sections s 41 (Personal Privacy); s 40(1)(d) (Substantial Adverse Effect on the Operations of an Agency); and s 42 (Legal Professional Privilege), and possibly s 43 (Business Affairs) under the Freedom of Information Act 1982.
Consideration
14. In arriving at a decision in relation to the application, I have taken account of the statutory provisions and the relevant case law which are applicable to the circumstances and the documentary evidence. I have also taken into account the submissions of the applicant and Counsel for both the Secretary DEST and Mr Friske.
Legislation
15.The following statutory provisions are relevant:
“3 Object
(1) The object of this Act is to extend as far as possible the right of the Australian community to access to information in the possession of the Government of the Commonwealth by:
(a) ….
(b) creating a general right of access to information in documentary form in the possession of Ministers, departments and public authorities, limited only by exceptions and exemptions necessary for the protection of essential public interests and the private and business affairs of persons in respect of whom information is collected and held by departments and public authorities; and
(c) creating a right to bring about the amendment of records containing personal information that is incomplete, incorrect, out of date or misleading.
(2) It is the intention of the Parliament that the provisions of this Act shall be interpreted so as to further the object set out in subsection (1) and that any discretions conferred by this Act shall be exercised as far as possible so as to facilitate and promote, promptly and at the lowest reasonable cost, the disclosure of information.
4 Interpretation
(1) In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears:
"agency" means a Department, a prescribed authority or an eligible case manager.
"applicant" means a person who has made a request.
"Department" means a Department of the Australian Public Service that corresponds to a Department of State of the Commonwealth but does not include the branch of the Australian Public Service comprising the transitional staff as defined by section 3 of the A.C.T. Self-Government (Consequential Provisions) Act 1988 .
"document" includes:
(a) any of, or any part of any of, the following things:
(i) any paper or other material on which there is writing;
(ii) a map, plan, drawing or photograph;
(iii) any paper or other material on which there are marks, figures, symbols or perforations having a meaning for persons qualified to interpret them;
(iv) any article or material from which sounds, images or writings are capable of being reproduced with or without the aid of any other article or device;
(v) any article on which information has been stored or recorded, either mechanically or electronically;
(vi) any other record of information; or
(b) any copy, reproduction or duplicate of such a thing; or
(c) any part of such a copy, reproduction or duplicate;
but does not include:
(d) library material maintained for reference purposes; or
(e) Cabinet notebooks.
"document of an agency" or document of the agency means a document in the possession of an agency, or in the possession of the agency concerned, as the case requires, whether created in the agency or received in the agency.
"exempt document" means:
(a) a document which, by virtue of a provision of Part IV, is an exempt document;
(b) a document in respect of which, by virtue of section 7, an agency is exempt from the operation of this Act; or
(c) an official document of a Minister that contains some matter that does not relate to the affairs of an agency or of a Department of State.
"exempt matter" means matter the inclusion of which in a document causes the document to be an exempt document.
"personal information" means information or an opinion (including information forming part of a database), whether true or not, and whether recorded in a material form or not, about an individual whose identity is apparent, or can reasonably be ascertained, from the information or opinion.
11 Right of access
(1) Subject to this Act, every person has a legally enforceable right to obtain access in accordance with this Act to:
(a) a document of an agency, other than an exempt document; or
(b) an official document of a Minister, other than an exempt document. (2) Subject to this Act, a person's right of access is not affected by:
(a) any reasons the person gives for seeking access; or
(b) the agency's or Minister's belief as to what are his or her reasons for seeking access.
37 Documents affecting enforcement of law and protection of public safety
(1)A document is an exempt document if its disclosure under this Act would, or could reasonably be expected to:
….
(c) endanger the life or physical safety of any person.
40 Documents concerning certain operations of agencies
(1) Subject to subsection (2), a document is an exempt document if its disclosure under this Act would, or could reasonably be expected to:
….
(d) have a substantial adverse effect on the proper and efficient conduct of the operations of an agency
41 Documents affecting personal privacy
(1) A document is an exempt document if its disclosure under this Act would involve the unreasonable disclosure of personal information about any person (including a deceased person).
42 Documents subject to legal professional privilege
(1) A document is an exempt document if it is of such a nature that it would be privileged from production in legal proceedings on the ground of legal professional privilege.
(2) A document of the kind referred to in subsection 9(1) is not an exempt document by virtue of subsection (1) of this section by reason only of the inclusion in the document of matter that is used or to be used for the purpose of the making of decisions or recommendations referred to in subsection 9(1).
43 Documents relating to business affairs etc.
(1) A document is an exempt document if its disclosure under this Act would disclose:
(a) trade secrets;
(b) any other information having a commercial value that would be, or could reasonably be expected to be, destroyed or diminished if the information were disclosed; or
(c) information (other than trade secrets or information to which paragraph (b) applies) concerning a person in respect of his or her business or professional affairs or concerning the business, commercial or financial affairs of an organization or undertaking, being information:
(i) the disclosure of which would, or could reasonably be expected to, unreasonably affect that person adversely in respect of his or her lawful business or professional affairs or that organization or undertaking in respect of its lawful business, commercial or financial affairs; or
(ii) the disclosure of which under this Act could reasonably be expected to prejudice the future supply of information to the Commonwealth or an agency for the purpose of the administration of a law of the Commonwealth or of a Territory or the administration of matters administered by an agency.”
16. At the outset, Counsel for DEST acknowledged the entitlement of the applicant to not only raise a complaint in the first instance but also to seek access to documents under the Freedom of Information Act 1982. Indeed, that right of access is clearly set out in s 11 and it is not to be affected by any reason for seeking access, either expressed by an applicant or perceived by an agency or Minister.
Application of the Law to the Claims for Exemption
DOCUMENT GROUP 1 – TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW
17. The assessment of this claim for exemption is outlined below. The respondent relies upon s 41 (Personal Privacy), s 40(1)(d) (Substantial Adverse Effect on the Operations of an Agency), and s 43 (Business Affairs), of the Freedom of Information Act 1982.
SECTION 41 – PERSONAL INFORMATION
18. Mr Brennan referred to Subramanian and Refugee Review Tribunal (1997) 44 ALD 435, a case involving public sector employment and the interpretation of “personal information”. It noted the term “personal information” was included in an amendment to the Act in 1991 to replace the term “personal affairs”. That latter term had been considered by Lockhart J in Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corporation (1991) 23 ALD 1 as referring to “…..information which concerns or affects the person as an individual whether it is known to other persons or not …..”
19. In Subramanian (supra), McMahon DP held that the term “personal information” was included in the Act to emphasise that the purpose of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 was to deal with “… disclosure of government documents and not documents relating to the individual as such”. But he also referred, with approval, to Re Cook and Comcare(1996) 23 AAR 19 at 27, where Senior Member Beddoe said that generally, a public official’s working environment must be public knowledge. Senior Member Beddoe also referred to Colakovski (supra) where Lockhart J said “[w]hat is ‘unreasonable’ disclosure of information for the purposes of section 41(1) must have, at its core, public interest considerations.”
20. Mr Brennan referred in his submissions to Colakovski more widely. In part, he referred to Lockhart J’s comment at page 9 where he said the exemptions necessary for protection under s 41(1) were themselves public interest considerations and that “….it is not in the public interest that the personal or business or professional affairs of persons are necessarily to be disclosed on applications for access to documents. The exemption from disclosure of such information is not to protect private rights, rather it is in furtherance of the public interest that information of this kind is excepted from the general right of public access provided the other conditions mentioned in ss 41 and 43 are satisfied. An examination of the other provisions in Part IV of the Act concerning exempt documents confirms this approach.”
21. Mr Brennan further submitted that it would be wrong to release the requested information about Mr Friske as:
(i)That the statutory provision referred to public sector employment, unlike Mr Friske’s employment in a private company.
(ii)The information provided by Mr Friske was done so voluntarily and on the basis that it would be kept in confidence.
(iii)Any matter of relevance to government is, at most, indirect.
(iv)There is a strong public interest in enabling the conduct of investigations into possible criminal offences to be conducted in private.
(v)DEST had and has, a system to ensure proper accountability in cases where decisions are made to not proceed with a prosecution.
(vi)Mr Friske objects to the release of the information.
(vii)Mr Friske says the release of documents would cause him to fear for his personal safety.
22. Those submissions are also made separately by Mr Horneman-Wren, Counsel for Mr Friske.
23. I agree with the submissions made above, although I would put some qualifications on support of sub-paragraphs (v) and (vii) above, which I consider below.
24. In relation to sub-paragraph (v) of the previous paragraph, that is that DEST has a system to ensure proper accountability in cases which might not proceed with a prosecution, I find there was no evidence, or at least not sufficient evidence to attest to the assertion made about the effectiveness of the Department’s system. I do not wish to imply that there is not such a system, as there was the appearance that there was a formal and systematised approach to investigations. However, I merely conclude that there was no specific evidence by which I could be satisfied of that submission. Even if there was such a system in operation, I am not satisfied that it would justify an exemption on the basis of “personal information” under s 41(1).
25. I am of the opinion, however, that the exemption under that provision is substantiated, for the following reasons:
(i)I am satisfied that the section 41(1) is intended essentially, to cover government documents. The assertion by Counsel that they are of relevance only indirectly (see sub paragraph (iii) above) has merit. The fact that these documents were created by DEST and/or CDPP must indicate that they are documents of a government agency, given that they are both funded agencies of government, albeit with statutory independence. However, the documents also have the character of relating to an individual. I think the character of these documents, particularly created by an agency of such importance as the CDPP, must relate more directly to an individual’s personal affairs in the context of the interview about possible criminal charges.
(ii)The fact that the CDPP decided that there was not sufficient evidence to proceed against any person according to the criminal standard of proof required, also, provides justification for an exemption under s 41(1). This is because:
(a)To not do so may tend to defame any persons named in the documents in the eyes of others when the true reasons and circumstances of why he was interviewed, but no subsequent action was taken, would not be likely to be fully understood by many people. That would create a real and appreciable risk for Mr Friske, and for which no reason was offered for its justification in the public interest.
(b)Mr Friske is entitled to a presumption of innocence unless the CDPP decides to proceed to prosecution.
FEAR FOR SAFETY
26. It has been argued by Counsel for DEST and Counsel for Mr Friske, that Mr Friske’s claim of fear for his own safety is a ground to justify exemption on the basis of personal information. I cannot find a sufficiently relevant link between this claim and s 41(1).
27. However, this is a serious matter and one which may have fallen for consideration under the specific exemption provisions in s 37(1)(c) of the Act. That sub-section is concerned with possible risks to life and safety of any person in connection with law enforcement. This is so, even though no person gave evidence other than the applicant, who was also cross-examined. In some respects, this may detract from the weight of this evidence for the respondent’s case under the rule in Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298, but I took account also that the applicant was self-represented in assessing that weight. Equally, there was no evidence to contradict the claim made by Counsel.
28. The Federal Court held the test to be applied for the application of this section is whether the release of the documents would (or could reasonably be expected to) endanger the life or physical safety of any person. The test requires “…a judgment to be made as to whether it is reasonable as distinct from something that is irrational, absurd or ridiculous, to expect that …there could be a risk of harm to the life or physical safety of another person” (Centrelink v Dykstra [2002] FCA 1442 at [24]). However, no submission was made in that regard in the present case. Consequently, in light of the only submission made about fear for safety and the test in Dykstra above, I cannot find in favour of either respondent in respect of the claim of fear for safety.
SECTION 40(1)(d) – SUBSTANTIAL ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE OPERATION OF AN AGENCY
29. It was submitted that if the documents sought were released, then there would be an increased risk that employers and their senior staff might not be willing to participate in offering apprenticeships. It was also submitted that there would be a reluctance to participate in interviews conducted by the NIU of DEST. It was argued that this would have a substantial adverse effect on the operations of DEST (Robinson v Director-General, Department of Health [2002] NSWADT 222; and Re Associated Minerals Consolidated Ltd and Secretary, Department of Transport and Communications (1990)19 ALD 634).
30. It seems logical that if there was a basis to question the security over sensitive information provided to that Department, then employers and their senior staff as well as employees may be circumspect about participating in the apprenticeship scheme and/or the monitoring role which the Department provides in safeguarding the efficacy of the system, including the use of public funds. I therefore accept the submission made that there may be some consequential effects for the Department if this information was released. I therefore uphold the claim for exemption under s 40(1)(d).
SECTION 43 – BUSINESS AFFAIRS
31. It was argued that if s 41 application was not successful, then I should find that the information should be exempt under s 43.
32. Little more than that was submitted. On that basis, I can find insufficient justification to uphold an exemption under s 43, and I so find.
DOCUMENT GROUP 2 – COVER SHEET AND SUMMARY OF WITNESSES
33. This application is based on s 41 (Personal Privacy); s 40(1)(d) (Substantial Adverse Effect on the Operations of an Agency); and s 42 (Legal Professional Privilege).
34. I have dealt with the legal basis of claims under s 41 and s 40(1)(d) in connection with the first document being challenged for exemption. For the reasons given there, I find that the folios involved in the second claim for exemption are also exempt. There may also be some personal risk for Mr Friske and/or other persons in the documents in question, should they be released. As I have found for document group one, there is therefore also a potential source of exemption under s 37(1)(c) of the Act, but no determination is made under that sub-section.
LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE
35. The other ground of application in relation to these documents is Legal Professional Privilege. These documents were provided by the respondent to the CDPP. Section 42(1) would exempt these documents if they would be exempt on the ground of legal professional privilege.
36. Legal professional privilege, at common law, is based on the desire to promote frankness and freedom of communication between a lawyer and his or her client. It is intended to cover situations where a client seeks a legal adviser to give legal advice; and also where preparatory work is done for use in actual litigation or contemplated litigation, whether civil or criminal. Privilege generally will cover both oral conversations as well as documents, provided they are fairly referable to the relationship between the lawyer and client, and provided also that it is done in the ordinary course of the professional employment of the lawyer. In Waterford v The Commonwealth (1986) 163 CLR 54 the High Court held that legal professional privilege extends to communications passing between government departments and their in-house lawyers. From the evidence available, it is not clear whether in-house lawyers have also been involved, but external lawyers, such as the independent office of the CDPP, could ordinarily be expected to fall within the scope of the application of legal professional privilege to relevant documents. One might reasonably consider whether that concept extends “in-house” lawyers to “within Government” lawyers, where the Government is the Crown in the right of a State, Territory or the Commonwealth. I think that extension could be successfully argued.
37. For some time, the test to be applied was that privilege could not be claimed unless the giving of legal advice, or the preparation of litigation, was the “sole purpose” for which a document was created (Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674). However, more recently the High Court overturned that test and held that the test at common law is now whether or not the legal advice etc was the “dominant purpose” for which the document was created (Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49).
38. Applying the dominant purpose test to the evidence in this case, shows that the purpose for creating these documents was for the purpose of seeking legal advice with the ultimate aim of seeking prosecution action if the evidence was justified. In my opinion, the evidence here satisfies the dominant purpose test. It also involves communications between a client department and Department lawyers, and Government lawyers who serve the Commonwealth Government in a specialised area of law (eg CDPP). In addition, there is no evidence to demonstrate that the privilege has either been waived or inadvertently disclosed. Accordingly, the documents are entitled to legal professional privilege. Therefore, the documents are entitled to an exemption under s 42 of the Act.
DOCUMENT GROUP 3 – LETTER FROM CDPP TO FIRST RESPONDENT
39. The claim for exemption for the folios covered in the third group of documents are based on s 40(1)(d) ((Substantial Adverse Effect on the Operations of an Agency); and s 42 (Legal Professional Privilege).
SECTION 40(1)(d) – SUBSTANTIAL ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE OPERATION OF AN AGENCY
40. The law in relation to this provision has been outlined above. The claim in respect of these documents relates to potential adverse effects on both DEST and CDPP.
41. The submissions essentially rely on the contention that release of such documents would show to employees of relevant organisations that they could not rely on DEST’s assurances that information supplied voluntarily will remain confidential. Such persons may then be subjected to intimidation, have their personal safety affected and/or have their employment placed in jeopardy.
42. It was also submitted in relation to CDPP, that it would affect the willingness of lawyers employed by CDPP to provide frank and candid written advice which would be detrimental to the efficient operations of CDPP in the carrying out of its statutory functions. The affidavit provided by Ms Bentley (Exhibit 5) emphasises those points. Counsel’s submissions also highlight that a consequence of that disadvantage would be greater inefficiency and elongation of work processes by the NIU of DEST, particularly in relation to its communications with CDPP. These submissions about the likely substantial adverse effect on operations to both DEST and CDPP if these documents were released, provide a compelling argument. I agree with the submissions made and find that the third document is also exempt.
SECTION 42 – LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE
43. In relation to the claim under s 42 (Legal Professional Privilege) these have been outlined in relation to the second document above. As the letter over which exemption is claimed was prepared as part of the process of assessing information supplied by the NIU to CDPP, the dominant purpose test is satisfied in relation to that document also.
Decision
44. In summary therefore, I find that there is justification for regarding the three documents as being exempt from release under the Act as follows:
Document Group 1 – Exempt under s 41(1) and s 40(1)(d) of FOI Act
Document Group 2 – Exempt under s 41(1), s 40(1)(d) and s 42
Document Group 3 – Exempt under s 40(1)(d) and s 42
45. In the circumstances therefore I affirm the decision under review. I also confirm the confidentiality orders under s 64(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 and s 35(2)(c) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, and determine that these documents should now be returned to the first respondent.
I certify that the 45 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Dr KS Levy, RFD, Senior Member
Signed: .....................................................................................
F. Kamst, Legal Research OfficerDate/s of Hearing 31 July 2007
Date of Decision 25 September 2007
Applicant Ms D Thompson, unrepresented
Counsel for First Respondent Mr T Brennan
Counsel for Second Respondent Mr AAJ Horneman-Wren
Solicitor for Second Respondent Blake Dawson Waldron
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