THOMPKINS v SOUTH AUSTRALIAN HEALTH COMMISSION
[2001] SASC 147
Miscellaneous Appeal
MARTIN J. On 21 May 1998, the South Australian Health Commission (“the Commission”) made a Prohibition Order (“the Order”) prohibiting the applicant from supplying, administering, prescribing or having possession of certain prescription drugs. The Order was served upon the applicant with a letter of 28 May 1998. On 25 January 2001 the applicant filed a notice of appeal and an application seeking an order that the time for filing the notice of appeal be extended. The parties agreed that I should initially determine the application for an extension of time and the question as to the nature of the appeal.
The applicant is a legally qualified medical practitioner. In 1998 he was employed as a psychiatrist at the Glenside Hospital and he also practised as a general practitioner. He now practises as a psychiatrist.
From July to September 1997, correspondence was exchanged between the applicant and the Commission concerning a request by the applicant for authority to supply a drug of dependence on an extended basis to a particular patient, Mr A. In a letter dated 29 July 1997, the Commission declined to consider the request and raised a number of issues concerning the applicant’s practice in connection with prescribing particular drugs. Specific reference was made to s 57 of the Controlled Substances Act 1984 (“the Act”) and the possibility that treatment outside certain guidelines could be considered “irresponsible” and result in the Commission exercising its power under s 57 to withdraw the applicant’s “prescribing privileges”. The correspondence that followed can reasonably be described as a debate concerning the needs of the particular patient and policies in respect of prescribing drugs of dependence. In addition, since 1995 correspondence has been exchanged between the Commission and the applicant in connection with the prescription of drugs for other patients.
Mr Geoffrey Anderson is a Senior Pharmacist employed in the Drugs of Dependence Unit within the Department of Human Services. On 16 May 1985, pursuant to s 50 of the Act Mr Anderson was appointed an authorised officer for the purposes of Part 7 of the Act. On 5 September 1997, together with another authorised officer, Mr Anderson attended at the applicant’s surgery. He was in possession of a warrant issued pursuant to s 52 of the Act. Mr Anderson and the other officer seized patient notes relating to seven patients, but not notes relating to the patient that had been the subject of the correspondence to which I have referred. According to the affidavit of Mr Anderson he did not seize the notes relating to that particular patient because he was advised that the notes were not at the surgery.
On 13 November 1997, the Commission wrote to the applicant advising him that the Commission had received an allegation concerning a number of prescriptions written by him for a patient, Ms B. Reference was made to previous correspondence warning the applicant of the Commission’s concerns that his prescribing or supply of…
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- Case
- [2001] SASC 147
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In summary, the court determined that the appeal is an appeal de novo and refused the applicant's application for an extension of time to appeal. The applicant had not provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay in filing the notice of appeal and had failed to demonstrate that he has an arguable case on appeal. The applicant had deliberately chosen not to seek to appeal at an earlier time, in the face of an apparently compelling case for a prohibition order.
Background
Background to the litigation
The applicant provided several explanations for the delay in filing the notice of appeal. He argued that while defending criminal charges related to his prescribing practices, his solicitors advised him that appealing the Order would lack utility until the charges were resolved. The applicant also argued that he negotiated with the Commission to revoke the Order and that he did not appeal while negotiations were ongoing. However, the applicant did not explain the significant delay from June 2000 until he filed the notice of appeal in January 2001.
The court found that while the applicant had a reasonable explanation for the delay until July 1999, he had not provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay from July 1999 until June 2000 when negotiations ceased. There was also no explanation for the delay from June 2000 until January 2001 when the notice of appeal was filed. Given the lengthy delay and the apparently compelling case for the Prohibition Order, the applicant had failed to demonstrate that he had an arguable case on appeal. The application for an extension of time was therefore refused.
The matter before the court is an appeal brought by the applicant, a legally qualified medical practitioner, against a Prohibition Order made by the South Australian Health Commission. The Commission made the Order on 21 May 1998, prohibiting the applicant from supplying, administering, prescribing, or possessing certain prescription drugs. The applicant filed a notice of appeal and an application for an extension of time on 25 January 2001. The court must initially determine the application for an extension of time and the nature of the appeal. The applicant's appeal is based on the grounds that the Commission failed to afford procedural fairness and that the appeal is an appeal in the strict sense rather than an appeal de novo. The court examines the procedural history of the matter, including correspondence between the applicant and the Commission, the seizure of patient notes, and the eventual issuance of the Prohibition Order. The applicant has not provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay in filing the notice of appeal, and the court finds that the applicant has not demonstrated an arguable case on appeal. The application for an extension of time is refused.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Did the applicant provide a reasonable explanation for the delay in filing the notice of appeal?
2. Was there prejudice to the respondent due to the delay in filing the notice of appeal?
3. Does the applicant have an arguable case on appeal?
4. What is the nature of the appeal: an appeal strictly so called, an appeal by way of rehearing, or an appeal de novo?
5. If the appeal is an appeal de novo, what is the impact of the delay on the respondent's ability to present a defence?
Held
1. The court concluded that the applicant provided a reasonable explanation for the delay in filing the notice of appeal from May 1998 to July 1999. However, the applicant made a conscious decision not to appeal while negotiations were in progress from July 1999 until June 2000, and there was no satisfactory explanation for that delay. The delay from June until December 2000 also lacked an explanation.
2. The court concluded that while the prejudice to the respondent is not as significant as it would be for a private litigant, there is still prejudice due to the delay, particularly as the respondent will be required to call oral evidence.
3. The court concluded that the applicant did not have an arguable case on appeal as there was no material provided to suggest that the applicant had any prospects of succeeding on appeal.
4. The court concluded that the nature of the appeal is an appeal de novo, meaning the appeal court hears the matter afresh.
5. The court concluded that on an appeal de novo, the impact of the delay on the respondent's ability to present a defence is significant, as the respondent will be required to call oral evidence which may be disadvantaged by the delay.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: MARTIN J
The court's reasoning in this case was based on several major issues. Firstly, the court considered whether the applicant provided a reasonable explanation for the delay in filing the notice of appeal. The applicant argued that he was in the process of defending a large number of criminal charges that alleged breaches of s 33 of the Act, and that seeking to appeal against the Order lacked utility until those charges were finalised. The court found that the applicant did not act unreasonably in accepting the advice from his solicitors that instituting an appeal while the criminal charges were pending lacked utility.
Secondly, the court considered whether there was prejudice to the respondent due to the delay in filing the notice of appeal. The court found that the delay did cause some prejudice to the respondent, as it was likely that Mr Anderson and the experts who gave opinions relied on by the Commission would be required to give oral evidence and would be placed at a disadvantage.
Thirdly, the court considered whether the applicant had an arguable case on appeal. The court found that the applicant had not put forward any material that amounted to a denial of the allegations made against him, and there was nothing to suggest that the memorandum did not accurately reflect the expert opinions relied upon by the Commission.
Fourthly, the court considered the nature of the appeal. The court found that the appeal was an appeal de novo, meaning that the appeal court hears the matter afresh and all the evidence is given afresh unless the parties agree to the material used before the original body being used on the appeal.
Finally, the court considered the impact of the delay on the respondent's ability to present a defence in an appeal de novo. The court found that the impact of the delay was not as significant as it would have been if the respondent was a private litigant with a specific interest in the judgment, but it was still a factor to be considered in granting an extension of time.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that when considering an application for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal, the court must consider the length of the delay, the explanation for the delay, any prejudice suffered by the other party, and whether there is an arguable case on appeal. The court found that the applicant had not provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay, and had not demonstrated that he had an arguable case on appeal. The court also found that the appeal was an appeal de novo, meaning that the appeal court hears the matter afresh and all the evidence is given afresh unless the parties agree to the material used before the original body being used on the appeal.
The court followed prior authority in considering the nature of the appeal, and distinguished itself from prior authority in finding that the appeal was an appeal de novo. The court departed from prior authority in finding that the impact of the delay on the respondent's ability to present a defence was not as significant as it would have been if the respondent was a private litigant with a specific interest in the judgment.