Thelian and Comcare (Compensation) [2015] AATA 943 (7 December 2015)
Division
GENERAL DIVISION
File Number(s)
2014/3554
Re
Richard Thelian
APPLICANT
And
Comcare
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal Deputy President J W Constance
Date 7 December 2015 Place Sydney The reviewable decision, being the decision of Comcare made 29 April 2014 denying liability to compensate Mr Thelian for back and abdominal pain, mental state (anxiety), sleep disturbance and kidney stone, is affirmed.
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J W Constance
Deputy PresidentCATCHWORDS
COMPENSATION - injury - disease - ailment - whether the disease was contributed to, to a significant degree, by his employment – whether aggravation of disease contributed to, to a significant degree, by his employment – decision affirmed.
LEGISLATION
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) ss 4(1), 5A(1), 5B, 14(1)
CASES
Comcare v Paul Mooi [1996] FCA 1587
REASONS FOR DECISION
Deputy President J W Constance
7 December 2015
A. INTRODUCTION
In September 2013 Mr Thelian made a claim in accordance with the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) in respect of injuries which he claimed he suffered during 7 September 2013 (the day of the 2013 Federal election) and the early hours of the following morning. At that time he was working for the Australian Electoral Commission.
By a decision made on 29 April 2014 Comcare denied liability to compensate him. Mr Thelian has applied to the Tribunal to review the decision.
For the reasons which follow the decision under review will be affirmed.
B. BACKGROUND
Mr Thelian is 49 years old.
In 2011 Mr Thelian was diagnosed as suffering rheumatoid arthritis. He has not been employed since 2011, apart from his employment on 7 and 8 September 2013.
From 7am on 7 September 2013 until 1.30 am the following day, Mr Thelian was employed by the Australian Electoral Commission as a polling assistant. His duties included setting up the polling booth in a hall at Fairfield West Public School, marking off the names of voters, distributing ballot papers and counting votes at the conclusion of polling.
On 17 September 2013 Mr Thelian completed a claim for workers’ compensation.[1] He claimed that he had suffered the following injuries whilst employed by the Commission:
·“acute mid to lower back pain;
·abdominal pain;
·mental state/ anxiety;
·small kidney stone detected (CT scan);
·not sleeping nights – pass out during day 1 – 3 hours.” [2]
[1] Exhibit R1 p.23.
[2] Exhibit R1 p.26.
Mr Thelian claimed that his whole body had been affected by dehydration, but he did not seek compensation for this as a separate injury. He relied on his suffering dehydration as causing, or aggravating, the development of a kidney stone (renal calculus).
C. RELEVANT LEGISLATION
Subsection 14(1) of the Act provides:
Subject to this Part, Comcare is liable to pay compensation in accordance with this Act in respect of an injury suffered by an employee if the injury results in death, incapacity for work, or impairment.
In subsection 5A(1) injury is defined to mean:
(a)
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- Case
- [2015] AATA 943
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court's reasoning was based on the evidence provided by medical experts, particularly Professor Dickson and Professor McGill. The court found that Mr Thelian's muscle soreness was a result of unaccustomed physical activity, which was consistent with the evidence of elevated creatine kinase levels. However, the court was not satisfied that Mr Thelian's employment had made a significant contribution to the development of the kidney stone. The court also noted that the evidence regarding the abdominal pain was insufficient to draw any firm conclusions. The court affirmed the decision of Comcare, which had denied liability to compensate Mr Thelian for the claimed injuries. The decision highlights the importance of the "significant degree" test in determining compensability and the need for clear evidence linking the employment to the alleged injuries.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In March 2015 Mr Brown was informed by the Deputy Principal of the School that the chairs used in the School Hall were of adult size and in good condition and were the same chairs used on polling day in 2013. This information was confirmed by Ms Wooley, the Officer in Charge of the polling place on 7 September 2013.F. CONSIDERATIONF.1 Acute mid to lower back pain and abdominal pain There is very little evidence as to the nature and/or cause of the abdominal pain which Mr Thelian says he suffered during his employment by the Commission. However, based on the evidence of Dr Griffin and Dr Knight I am satisfied that this pain experienced by Mr Thelian radiated from his back. On this basis I intend to deal with the abdominal pain as part of the claim for an injury to the back.Has Mr Thelian suffered an “injury” within the meaning of the Act? I am satisfied that Mr Thelian suffered muscle soreness as a result of his prolonged and unaccustomed activity whilst employed by the Commission. I base this finding on the opinions of Professor Dickson and Professor McGill. As to the duration of this condition I prefer the opinion of Professor McGill that the effects of the work performed by Mr Thelian would have resolved within one week. This is consistent with the expectation of Professor Dickson expressed in his report of 9 September 2013. I accept Professor McGill’s explanation that the spike in Mr Thelian's CK level was a usual consequence of unaccustomed exercise. A condition of muscle soreness resulting from activity is clearly not a “disease” as defined in section 5B of the Act. It remains to consider whether it is “an injury (other than a disease” within the meaning of subsection 5A(1). Many of the judgements and decisions dealing with the definition of “injury” in section 5A and earlier provisions of the Act and other workers’ compensation legislation, are concerned with the distinction between what is often referred to as an “injury simpliciter” and a “disease”. However the Full Court of the Federal Court considered the former in Australian Postal Corporation v Burch[18].[18] (1998) 85 FCR 264. The Court said:“As to the second argument, counsel for the appellant accepted that an injury in the ordinary sense did not necessarily require something external to the body. Such a concession was obviously correct. In Kavanagh v The Commonwealth (1960) 103 CLR 547 at 553 Dixon CJ said a rupture of the gullet was an “injury by accident”. Such an episode was “… a sudden destruction of tissue by force or pressure. It is true that the force or pressure was not exerted from without the body, but that I think makes no difference nor does it make any difference if it occurred, as it may have done, as a consequence of another organ of the body, namely the stomach, responding to a virus infection.”However the appellant’s counsel in the present case argued that there could not be an injury in this sense without some “rupture” or “breaking” of some tissue. Here, counsel said, there was merely an occlusion, that is to say a blocking. However the fact that cases such Kavanagh have accepted that an incident involving an internal rupture or breaking was an injury does not mean that, as a matter of law, rupture or breaking is an essential prerequisite to a finding of injury (in the ordinary sense) of an internal nature. In Accident Compensation Commission v McIntosh [1991] 2 VR 253 there is an extensive discussion of the concept of accident (in the ordinary sense) by Murphy J, a judge of great experience in workers’ compensation. In a judgment in which Crockett and Cummins JJ concurred his Honour said (at 263):“Long before the inclusion of these references to ‘disease’ in the definition of ‘injury’ [in the New South Wales legislation considered in O’Neill v Lumbey (1987) 11 NSWLR 640], claims for coronary occlusions, cerebral haemorrhage, ruptured aneurysms, aorta, oesophagus etc. had commonly been made and had succeeded if occurring during a protected period, on the basis that they were ‘injury by accident’, being clearly a physical injury – and accidental – being unexpected by the worker at the time that they occurred: cf. Clover, Clayton & Co. Ltd. v. Hughes [1910] A.C. 242.””[19][19] At pp.268-269.