The Timberland Company v Alison Waite

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TRADE MARKS ACT 1995



DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS

Re:Opposition by The Timberland Company to registration of trade mark applications Nos.1321816 and 1321821 (in Classes 35 and 25 respectively) - "TIMBERTOWN" (word mark) - filed in the name of Alison Waite

Delegate: John Spence
Representation: Opponent: Mr. Ross McLean, Solicitor, of Baker & McKenzie, Lawyers, assisted by Ms. Erin Brown, Solicitor
Applicant: Not represented
Decision: 2012 ATMO 66
Section 52 opposition – grounds pressed under Sections 44, 60 and 62A. Grounds not established – applications allowed to proceed to registration. Costs awarded against the Opponent.

Background

  1. In this matter, Alison Waite (“the Applicant”) has made application for registration of the trade marks Nos. 1321816 and 1321821 each being in respect of the expression “TIMBERTOWN” as a word mark and rendered in ordinary upper-case lettering of uniform size and characters. Both of these applications were filed on 22 September 2009 and they take priority as from that date.

  2. The first-numbered application No. 1321816 “TIMBERTOWN” specifies services located in Class 35 of the International Classification of Goods and Services (“the Nice Classification”) and in respect of:

    Retailing of goods (by any means); wholesaling of goods (by any means); discount services (retail, wholesale, or sales promotion services); promotional services; advertising; distribution of goods (not being transport services) (agent, wholesale, representative services, by any means); the bringing together, for the benefit of others, a variety of goods (excluding the transport thereof), enabling customers to conveniently view and purchase the goods.

  3. The second application No. 1321821 “TIMBERTOWN” specifies goods located in Class 25 of the Nice Classification and in respect of:

    Clothing; footwear; headwear; scarves; wraps (clothing); jumpers (sweaters); jackets (clothing); skirts; pants.

  4. The applications have been the subject of examination and they were advertised in the Australian Official Journal of Trade Marks dated 4 March 2010 as having been accepted for possible registration.

  5. On 3 September 2010 the company The Timberland Company (“the Opponent”) of New Hampshire, U.S.A. filed and served a Notice of Opposition in respect of both the applications. Subsequently, by covering letter dated 29 April 2011, and after the obtaining of appropriate extensions of time within which to do so, the Opponent served the evidence in support on which it seeks to rely.

  6. The Applicant elected not to file and serve any evidence in answer. In turn, the Opponent did not seek to put on evidence in reply or any further evidence. By correspondence dated 7 September 2011, the Opponent requested that this matter be set down for a hearing. In due course, the matter came before me as the delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks. The hearing took place in Sydney on Monday, 16 April 2012. On that occasion, the Opponent was represented by Mr. Ross McLean, Solicitor, of the firm of Baker & McKenzie, Lawyers, assisted by Ms. Erin Brown, Solicitor, also of that firm. The Applicant was not represented at the hearing, and she did not appear…

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Details
Case
[2012] ATMO 66
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an opposition by The Timberland Company to two trade mark applications by Alison Waite. The opposition was based on several grounds under the *Trade Marks Act 1995* (Cth), but ultimately only grounds relating to Sections 44, 60, and 62A of the Act were pursued. The evidence before the Hearing Officer consisted solely of a statutory declaration from Michelle B. Hanson, Assistant General Counsel and Assistant Secretary for The Timberland Company. This evidence detailed the extensive use and registration of the "TIMBERLAND" trade mark in Australia and internationally for footwear and a wide range of clothing products, with significant sales revenue.

The legal issues before the Hearing Officer were whether the applications should be refused registration based on the grounds of opposition raised under Sections 44, 60, and 62A of the *Trade Marks Act 1995*. Section 44 concerns the identity or similarity of trade marks and goods or services, Section 60 relates to the use of a trade mark in relation to goods or services that are the same or deceptively similar to goods or services in relation to which a registered trade mark has been used, and Section 62A addresses the registration of a trade mark in bad faith.

The Hearing Officer found that the ground of opposition under Section 62A was not established, as no sufficient argument was presented to warrant an inference of improper conduct or unacceptable commercial behaviour by the applicant. Consequently, the opposition was dismissed on all grounds. The Hearing Officer ordered that the trade mark applications could proceed to registration one month from the date of the decision, unless an appeal was filed. Costs were awarded against the Opponent, taking into account the Applicant's lack of participation in the proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Notice of Opposition refers to most of the allowable grounds for opposing the granting of registration. There are fourteen separate grounds and fourteen distinct sections of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (“the Act”) which have been raised by the Opponent. However the written submissions which have been provided by the Opponent make it clear that only four of those grounds are being maintained, corresponding to Sections 43, 44, 60 and 62A of the Act. Of those four grounds, only three were pressed at the hearing and the Section 43 ground was not pursued. Accordingly, these proceedings are confined to a consideration of the grounds of opposition which are raised by Sections 44, 60 and 62A. For the sake of completeness, I find that the remaining grounds as set out in the Notice of Opposition are not made out and I dismiss those grounds. The Evidence In determining this matter, the only evidence which is before me is the Statutory Declaration of Michelle B. Hanson made on 21 April 2011 and constituting the evidence in support on which the Opponent relies. Ms. Hanson declares that she holds the position of Assistant General Counsel and of Assistant Secretary with The Timberland Company, that she has worked as an attorney for the Opponent since 2002, and that she has held her present position since May 2008. Ms. Hanson represents that she is fully aware of the trade mark matters of her company. The evidence goes to indicate that the Opponent’s “TIMBERLAND” trade mark has been used in Australia in relation to footwear since at least as early as 1981 and that such use has subsequently been expanded into a broad range of clothing products other than footwear including shirts, trousers, coats, jumpers, denim jeans, chinos, sweatshirts, t-shirts, sweaters, shorts, parkas, gloves, and more. Ms. Hanson’s evidence provides relevant particulars of eight trade mark registrations held by the Opponent in Australia which feature the “TIMBERLAND” mark and which precede the priority date of the Applicant’s “TIMBERTOWN” trade mark. On a world-wide basis, the Opponent is said to own some 406 registrations in respect of the expression “TIMBERLAND”. Sales of goods bearing the expression “TIMBERLAND” as a trade mark are said to be made throughout Australia through established retail outlets (such as David Jones, Rebel Sports, Gowings, and the like) as well as through the conduct and operation of five “TIMBERLAND” retail stores. Since 2006, the exclusive Australian distributor of the Opponent has been Rugged Terrain Pty. Limited and there have been other distributors prior to that time. Ms. Hanson provides confidential particulars of the annual revenue which has been generated from sales of apparel and footwear in Australia under the “TIMBERLAND” mark for the period from 1995 to January 2012. Those figures indicate sales of more than a million dollars per annum. Annual sales revenue internationally is claimed to be in excess of $1 billion (in U.S. dollars).

Decision

Reasons for decision

The provisions of Section 62A are not to be lightly applied. In this instance, no sufficient argument has been put forward as would warrant the application by me of Section 62A. In the circumstances, I am not prepared to infer the existence of improper conduct or unacceptable commercial behaviour on the part of the Applicant. Accordingly, I find that the ground of opposition which has been raised pursuant to Section 62A has not been established by the Opponent and that this ground also fails. Decision I find that the Opponent has not established its opposition in respect of the two pending applications Nos. 1321816 and 1321821. The trade mark applications may, then, proceed to registration one month from the date of this decision. If the Registrar has been served with a notice of appeal before that time, I direct that registration shall not occur until such time as the appeal has been decided or discontinued.Costs As part of its submissions, the Opponent has requested an award of costs. However, the Opponent having been unsuccessful on all grounds, I decline to award costs in its favour. I see no reason as to why the general rule should not apply and why costs should not follow the cause. I award costs against the Opponent in accordance with the provisions of Schedule 8 of the Trade Mark Regulations, 1995. Such costs should in any event take into account the fact that the Applicant did not file and serve any evidence in answer, that the Applicant did not appear at the hearing, and that the Applicant took no real or active part in the conduct of the proceedings. John SpenceHearing OfficerTrade Marks Hearings2 August 2012

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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