The State of Western Australia v Woodward [No 3]
[2023] WASC 83
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CRIMINAL
CITATION: THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA -v- WOODWARD [No 3] [2023] WASC 83
CORAM: DERRICK J
HEARD: 17 FEBRUARY 2023 & 20 MARCH 2023
DELIVERED : 20 MARCH 2023
PUBLISHED : 21 MARCH 2023
FILE NO/S: SO 15 of 2020 (formerly HRSO 6 of 2020)
BETWEEN: THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Applicant
AND
JOHN ARTHUR WOODWARD
Respondent
Catchwords:
Dangerous sexual offender - High risk serious offender - Periodic review - Whether respondent remains a high risk serious offender - Whether continuing detention order should be affirmed or rescinded - Whether community would be adequately protected if respondent released on a supervision order
Legislation:
Community Protection (Offender Reporting) Act 2004 (WA)
Dangerous Sexual Offenders Act 2006 (WA)
High Risk Serious Offenders Act 2020 (WA)
Sentence Administration Act 2003 (WA)
Result:
Continuing detention order rescinded
Supervision order made
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Applicant | : | F M Allen |
| Respondent | : | K G Robson |
Solicitors:
| Applicant | : | State Solicitor's Office (WA) |
| Respondent | : | Ken Robson |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v DAL [No 2] [2016] WASC 212
Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Decke [2009] WASC 313
Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR [2008] WASCA 187; (2008) 38 WAR 307
Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Hart [2019] WASC 4
Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Williams [2007] WASCA 206; (2007) 35 WAR 297
Garlett v The State of Western Australia [2022] HCA 30
GBT v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 40
Italiano v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 116
The State of Western Australia v ACJ [2021] WASC 219
The State of Western Australia v D'Rozario [No 3] [2021] WASC 412
The State of Western Australia v Jonsson [No 3] [2019] WASC 463
The State of Western Australia v JXK [No 3] [2023] WASC 23
The State of Western Australia v Latimer [2006] WASC 235
The State of Western Australia v Narkle [2019] WASC 404
The State of Western Australia v Newland [2018] WASC 344
The State of Western Australia v Patrick [No 4] [2020] WASC 48
The State of Western Australia v Patrick [No 5] [2022] WASC 61
The State of Western Australia v Paul Douglas Allen also known as Paul Alan Francis Deverell [No 5] [2019] WASC 359
The State of Western Australia v Rao [2019] WASC 93
The State of Western Australia v West [No 6] [2019] WASC 427
The State of Western Australia v Woodward [2021] WASC 444
The State of Western Australia v Woodward [2021] WASC 78
The State of Western Australia v ZSJ [2020] WASC 330
DERRICK J:
Introduction
On 15 June 2022 the State of Western Australia (State) applied, pursuant to s 64 of the High Risk Serious Offenders Act 2020 (WA) (Act), for the detention of John Arthur Woodward (respondent) under a continuing detention order to be reviewed as soon as practicable after 10 December 2022 (application).
The hearing of the application took place before me on 17 February 2023 and 20 March 2023. The hearing of the application was adjourned part heard on 17 February 2023 to enable further information to be obtained and provided to the court in relation to the availability of accommodation for the respondent in the community.
On 20 March 2023 I decided that the respondent remains a high risk serious offender, that the continuing detention order made in respect of the respondent should be rescinded and that a supervision order should be made in respect of the respondent. I said I would publish the reasons for my decision at a later date. These are my reasons.
Background to the application
On 8 October 2020 the State applied under the Act for a restriction order to be made in relation to the respondent (restriction order application). At the time of the making of the restriction order application the respondent was serving a total effective sentence of 10 years imprisonment imposed for a number of sexual offences. The 10-year sentence was due to expire on 13 July 2021.
On 9 March 2021 a preliminary hearing was held before Archer J pursuant to s 46(1) of the Act. Archer J found that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the court might find that the respondent is a high risk serious offender and made orders under s 46(2) of the Act including an interim detention order. Her Honour made the interim detention order having regard to the fact that the respondent would otherwise be released from custody on 13 July 2021 prior to the final determination of the restriction order application.[1]
[1] The State of Western Australia v Woodward [2021] WASC 78.
On 2 December 2021 Hall J heard the restriction order application.
On 10 December 2021 Hall J delivered his decision on the restriction order application.[2] His Honour found that the respondent was a high risk serious offender and that the risk that the respondent may commit a serious offence of a sexual nature was not able to be managed in the community under the conditions of a supervision order.[3] His Honour therefore made a continuing detention order in respect of the respondent pursuant to s 48(1)(a) of the Act (CDO).[4] His Honour summarised his reasons for deciding that it was necessary to make the CDO in the following terms:[5]
Having decided that the respondent is a high-risk serious offender it is necessary to determine whether he should be detained pursuant to a continuing detention order or released into the community pursuant to a supervision order. Before I can make a supervision order I must be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the respondent would substantially comply with the standard conditions of a supervision order and that the totality of the conditions would provide adequate protection of the community against the risk that the respondent would commit a serious offence. The respondent bears the onus of establishing that he would substantially comply with the standard conditions.
In this case, the State accepts that a supervision order would be appropriate because the risk of reoffending can be adequately managed in the community. However, that concession is subject to the availability of suitable accommodation. That conclusion is supported by the evidence of Dr Wynn Owen and Dr Yewers.
I take into account that the respondent is now aged 78 and has spent over 10 years in prison. To impose a continuing detention order on a man of the respondent's advanced years is a significant matter because it deprives him of his liberty in circumstances where his remaining life must be comparatively short and because his ability to adjust to a life in the community will be more difficult as he further ages. However, there are a number of factors that weigh against a supervision order. These include the respondent's stance of denial, the failure of past treatment, his unmet treatment needs and the lack of accommodation. I accept that the first three factors may be capable of being addressed by suitably restrictive conditions on a supervision order. However, the unavailability of suitable accommodation is a critical factor that stands in the way of release on a supervision order. It would be impossible for the respondent to substantially comply with the standard conditions of a supervision order in the absence of permanent suitable accommodation.
[2] The State of Western Australia v Woodward [2021] WASC 444 (The State of Western Australia v Woodward).
[3] The State of Western Australia v Woodward [4], [85].
[4] The State of Western Australia v Woodward [93].
[5] The State of Western Australia v Woodward [86] - [88].
In relation to the respondent's future treatment needs Hall J said the following:[6]
The significance of depriving a person of their liberty, not for something that they have done but for something that they may do, is such that the risk must be regularly reassessed. That factor also requires that every reasonable effort be made to ensure that the respondent has his treatment needs assessed and that options for release are explored, so that the chances of him being released at the next review date are optimised.
At the hearing it was apparent that the principal impediment to the respondent's release was the unavailability of suitable accommodation. One of the factors that limits the respondent's options in this regard is his advanced age. That, of course, is not a problem that will decrease in the future; indeed it emphasises the need for some degree of urgency in exploring possible options. I accept that Ms Serrano and Uniting WA have expended significant effort in this regard. However, it was apparent from the hearing that other options may be available. It was also apparent that there may be some benefit in psychological counselling, if not to reduce risk, at least in assisting the respondent to formulate viable plans for release and develop skills relevant to compliance with a supervision order.
There is a risk that once a detention order has been made the prison authorities will default to treating the respondent as if he is simply another prisoner serving a sentence. A person detained under the HRSO Act is not a prisoner and should not be treated as such. One of the reasons such a person is detained is to receive treatment. In my view, every effort should be made to ensure that the following things are done before the next review;
1)Individual psychological counselling at least fortnightly of one hour's duration with a psychologist with whom the respondent will be able to build up a rapport and who will ensure that the treatment needs identified in the reports are addressed and that the respondent's plans for release are better formulated. The psychologist should also address the possibility that the respondent has a cognitive impairment.
2)Consideration be given to an ACAT assessment for the respondent and, depending on the outcome of that assessment, accommodation options in aged care facilities be explored.
3)Consideration be given to confirming that on release the respondent would be entitled to receive an aged care pension and to providing this information to prospective accommodation providers as proof of income.
[6] The State of Western Australia v Woodward [90] - [92].
As is apparent from what I have said, the respondent has now been incarcerated since 14 July 2011 and has been detained under the provisions of the Act since 13 July 2021.
Evidence on the application
At the hearing of the application the State tendered without objection a Book of Materials comprising three volumes.[7] Volumes 1 and 2 are dated 30 November 2022. Volume 3 is dated 10 February 2023.
[7] Exhibit 1.
The Book of Materials contains a large variety of materials relating to the respondent including his criminal record, documents relating to his prior offences and reports, including the reports that were prepared for the purposes of the restriction order application. Volume 3 of the Book of Materials also contains the following reports prepared in relation to the respondent specifically for the purposes of the application:
1.A psychological report prepared by Dr Tara Yewers, Counselling Psychologist, dated 28 December 2022;[8]
2.A Treatment Progress Report prepared by Mr David Summerton, Senior Forensic Psychologist with the Department of Justice's (Department) Forensic Psychological Intervention Team (FPIT) dated 14 January 2023;[9] and
3.A High Risk Serious Offender Treatment Progress Report prepared by Ms Catherine Korda, Senior Forensic Psychologist with the Forensic Psychological Assessment Team, dated 3 February 2022.[10]
[8] Exhibit 1, vol 3, 666. Dr Yewers is a 'qualified expert' as defined in s 3 of the Act. Her report was prepared and obtained pursuant to s 67(1) of the Act in accordance with s 74 of the Act.
[9] Exhibit 1, vol 3, 686.
[10] Exhibit 1, vol 3, 692.
At the hearing of the application the State also tendered without objection the following documents:
1.A Community Supervision Assessment Report prepared by Ms Gabriela Serrano, Senior Community Corrections Officer (CCO) with the Department's Community Offender Monitoring Unit (COMU);[11]
2.An email from a law clerk employed by the applicant's solicitor to the court dated 8 March 2023 setting out the results of a Desktop Spatial Analysis undertaken by the Western Australian Police Sex Offender Registry in relation to an address (to which I refer further later in these reasons) dated 24 February 2023;[12]
3.A supplementary report prepared by Dr Yewers dated 15 March 2023;[13]
4.An email from a law clerk employed by the applicant's solicitor to the court dated 16 March 2023 setting out further information provided by Ms Aimee Goode, a senior CCO within COMU, as at 15 March 2023 in relation to the address the subject of the Desktop Spatial Analysis;[14] and
5.An email from a law clerk employed by the applicant's solicitor to the court dated 17 March 2023 also setting out further information provided by Ms Goode in relation to the address the subject of the Desktop Spatial Analysis.[15]
[11] Exhibit 2.
[12] Exhibit 3.
[13] Exhibit 4.
[14] Exhibit 5.
[15] Exhibit 6.
At the hearing of the application on 17 February 2023 Dr Yewers and Ms Serrano were called by the State to give supplementary oral evidence.
The respondent did not adduce any evidence on the application.
Dr Yewers assessed the respondent for the purposes of, and provided evidence on, the restriction order application.
Relevant statutory provisions and applicable legal principles
I turn now to dealing in more detail with the provisions of the Act by reference to which the application must be determined as well as with the legal principles that are applicable to the determination of the application.
In relation to the applicable legal principles, in The State of Western Australia v ZSJ,[16] a case in which the State made an application under div 2 of the Dangerous Sexual Offenders Act 2006 (WA) (DSO Act) but which, given the repeal of the DSO Act, fell to be decided under the provisions of the Act, Fiannaca J made the following observations (citations omitted):
As will emerge from the outline below of the statutory framework under the DSO Act and [the Act], the concepts and criteria with which the court is concerned in determining an application of this kind are substantially the same under both statutes. Although I have reached that view on the basis of the ordinary meaning of the provisions of both statutes, having regard to the context of the provisions within the statutes and the objects underlying the statutes, the construction is confirmed, in my opinion, by the second reading speech made to the Legislative Assembly in respect of the High Risk Offenders Bill 2019 by the Honourable Attorney General. The Attorney informed the House that the bill was intended to 'extend the Supreme Court's ability to make a continuing detention order or supervision order to serious violent offenders in the same manner as the provisions contained in the [DSO Act]'. He went on to say:
'In doing so, this bill fully preserves the provisions that apply in respect of dangerous sexual offenders in the [DSO Act].'
Whether or not that has been achieved remains to be seen upon analysis of the provisions. However, in my opinion, as the concepts and criteria in both statutes are substantially the same, the jurisprudence established in respect of the DSO Act remains relevant in construing and applying [the Act], with appropriate adaptation in cases involving non-sexual offences.
[16] The State of Western Australia v ZSJ [2020] WASC 330 [30] ‑ [31].
I respectfully agree with Fiannaca J's observations. In my opinion and having full regard to the recent decision of the High Court in Garlett v The State of Western Australia[17] which addressed the constitutional validity of aspects of the Act, the case law decided under the DSO Act in relation to applications for review of continuing detention orders remains (with appropriate adaptation in cases involving non-sexual offences) relevant to the determination of such applications under the provisions of the Act. Accordingly, the cases to which I will refer in dealing with the legal principles applicable to the determination of the application will include cases that have been concerned with proceedings under the DSO Act.
[17] Garlett v The State of Western Australia [2022] HCA 30 [55], [103], [104], [106].
Section 63 of the Act provides:
The purpose of this Part is to ensure that an offender's detention under a continuing detention order is regularly reviewed.[18]
[18] The respondent is an 'offender' for the purposes of the relevant provisions of the Act: Act, definition of 'offender' and 'serious offender under restriction' in s 3.
Section 64 of the Act provides for the making by the State of an application for an offender's detention under a continuing detention order to be reviewed.
Section 66 of the Act provides for the hearing by the court of an application by the State for the review of an offender's detention under a continuing detention order.
Section 68 of the Act provides:
Review of detention under continuing detention order
(1)On a review under section 66 of an offender's detention -
(a)if the court does not find that the offender remains a high risk serious offender it must rescind the continuing detention order; or
(b)if the court finds that the offender remains a high risk serious offender it must -
(i) affirm the continuing detention order; or
(ii)subject to section 29, rescind the continuing detention order and make a supervision order.
(2)In deciding whether to make an order under subsection (1)(b)(i) or (ii), the paramount consideration is to be the need to ensure the adequate protection of the community.
The definition of the term 'high risk serious offender' is contained in s 7(1) of the Act. Section 7(1) is in the following terms:
An offender is a high risk serious offender if the court dealing with an application under this Act finds that it is satisfied, by acceptable and cogent evidence and to a high degree of probability, that it is necessary to make a restriction order in relation to the offender to ensure adequate protection of the community against an unacceptable risk that the offender will commit a serious offence.
The term 'restriction order' is defined in s 3 of the Act to mean 'a continuing detention order' or 'a supervision order'. A 'continuing detention order' is 'an order that the offender be detained in custody for an indefinite term for control, care or treatment'.[19] A 'supervision order' is 'an order that the offender, when not in custody, is to be subject to stated conditions that the court considers appropriate in accordance with s 30'.[20]
[19] Act, s 3 and s 26(1).
[20] Act, s 3 and s 27(1).
As to the term 'serious offence' used in s 7(1), s 3 and s 5(1) of the Act provide that a 'serious offence' is an offence that is 'specified in Schedule 1 Division 1' of the Act, or 'is specified in Schedule 1 Division 2 and is committed in the circumstances indicated in relation to that offence in that Division'. Section 5(2) of the Act provides that an offence is a 'serious offence' if it was 'an offence under a written law that has been repealed and the offender's acts or omissions that constituted the offence under the repealed provision would constitute a serious offence' under s 5(1). Section 5(3) of the Act provides that an offence is a 'serious offence' if it is an 'attempt…to commit an offence that is a serious offence' under s 5(1)or s 5(2).[21]
[21] Any further references to a 'serious offence' or to 'serious offences' should be read as references to a serious offence or serious offences as defined in the Act.
It follows from the definition of 'high risk serious offender' contained in s 7(1) that a finding under s 68(1)(b) that an offender 'remains a high risk serious offender', that is, a finding that it remains necessary to make a restriction order in relation to the offender to ensure adequate protection of the community against an unacceptable risk that the offender will commit a serious offence, necessarily entails a finding that if the offender is not subject to a restriction order the community will not be adequately protected against an unacceptable risk that the offender will commit a serious offence.[22]
[22] The State of Western Australia v Rao [2019] WASC 93 [28] - [29]; The State of Western Australia v ZSJ [44].
If the court finds that an offender 'remains a high risk serious offender' it is not invested with a residual discretion to decline to make a restriction order.[23] In these circumstances the question for the court is whether a continuing detention order or a supervision order should be made.[24]
[23] Garlett v The State of Western Australia [72].
[24] Act, s 68(1)(b).
By reason of the definition of 'high risk serious offender' contained in s 7(1), before the court can find under s 68(1)(b) that the offender remains a high risk serious offender, it must be satisfied of the matters referred to in s 7(1) 'by acceptable and cogent evidence and to a high degree of probability'. The 'high degree of probability' standard is a higher standard than the standard of the balance of probabilities but is a lesser standard than the standard of beyond reasonable doubt. The standard is otherwise incapable of further definition.[25]
[25] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR [2008] WASCA 187; (2008) 38 WAR 307 [28]; The State of Western Australia v West [No 6] [2019] WASC 427 [24]; The State of Western Australia v ZSJ [47].
The requirement is not that the risk that the offender will commit a serious offence must be at some high percentage of probability. A risk that the offender will commit a serious offence may be less than 50% yet still be an unacceptable risk.[26] It is the necessity to make a restriction order in relation to the offender to ensure adequate protection of the community against an unacceptable risk that the offender will commit a serious offence that must be proved by acceptable and cogent evidence and to a high degree of probability.
[26] The State of Western Australia v West [No 6] [24]; The State of Western Australia v ZSJ [47].
Whether or not a risk that the offender will commit a serious offence is 'unacceptable' is a question that requires the court's judgment as to the likelihood of the offender committing the serious offence and the nature and extent of the harm that will be caused if the offender commits the serious offence.[27] Further, whether a restriction order is 'necessary' to ensure adequate protection of the community against the 'unacceptable risk' requires consideration of what would otherwise be the offender's entitlement to be at liberty, an entitlement not lightly to be denied.[28] Accordingly, the court is required to perform an evaluative exercise by considering whether, having regard to the likelihood of the offender offending and the offence likely to be committed, the risk of that offending is so unacceptable that, notwithstanding that the offender has already been punished for the offences they have committed, it is necessary in the interests of the community to ensure that they are subject to further control or detention.[29] In addition, although the requirement of an evaluation under s 7(1) depends upon the offender having been convicted of a serious offence, s 7(1) and s 68 do not envisage the possibility that a finding that an offender remains a high risk serious offender might be made to prevent the commission of a serious offence, whether of the same kind or another kind, unless the risk of further offending involves a real threat of harm to the community.[30]
[27] Italiano v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 116 [46]; The State of Western Australia v Newland [2018] WASC 344[12]; GBT v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 40[21]; The State of Western Australia v West [No 6] [22]; The State of Western Australia v ZSJ [45]; Garlett v The State of Western Australia [73], [226].
[28] Garlett v The State of Western Australia [73], [227]. As Quinlan CJ recognised in The State of Western Australia v D'Rozario [No 3] [2021] WASC 412 [21] there may be rare situations in which a court will find that it is not necessary to make a restriction order notwithstanding a finding that the offender poses an 'unacceptable risk', for example, where other external restraints (such as a post-sentence supervision order under the Sentence Administration Act 2003 (WA)) are sufficient to ensure adequate protection of the community from the risk.
[29] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Williams [2007] WASCA 206; (2007) 35 WAR 297 [63]; GBT v The State of Western Australia [21]; The State of Western Australia v West [No 6] [22]; The State of Western Australia v ZSJ [45]; Garlett v The State of Western Australia [73], [226] - [227], [279]
[30] Garlett v The State of Western Australia [84].
By reason of s 68(2), if the court finds that the offender remains a high risk serious offender it is the need to ensure 'adequate' protection of the community that is to be the paramount consideration for the court in deciding whether to affirm the continuing detention order or to make a supervision order. The use of the word 'adequate' indicates that a qualitative assessment is required. It cannot be assumed that the most assured preventative action is detention and that therefore the protection of the community will always favour such an order.[31] In this regard I respectfully adopt the following statements of Beech J (as his Honour then was) in Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v DAL [No 2] which, although made in relation to review proceedings under the DSO Act, are equally applicable to the operation of s 7(1) and s 68(2) of the Act:[32]
In choosing between an indefinite detention order or a supervision order, the fact that the paramount consideration is the need to ensure the adequate protection of the community does not exclude other considerations. The use of the word 'adequate' indicates that a qualitative assessment is required. In considering whether a supervision order would adequately protect the community, account must be taken of conditions which can be placed on a supervision order so as to ensure the adequate protection of the community, the rehabilitation of the respondent and his care and treatment. The [DSO Act] does not require that there be no risk of reoffending. Such a requirement could never be met and would mean no person to whom the [DSO Act] applies would ever be released. The question is whether the risk is reduced to a reasonably acceptable level that ensures adequate protection of the community. That requires a weighing of the nature and degree of risk in the context of methods for the management and reduction of that risk. If, after considering all the evidence, the court is left in doubt as to whether the conditions of a supervision order would adequately protect the community, because the paramount consideration is the need to ensure the adequate protection of the community, the court must expressly decline to rescind the continuing detention order.
[31] Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Williams [63] ‑ [64]; Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Decke [2009] WASC 312 [14]; The State of Western Australia v Newland [21]; The State of Western Australia v West [No 6] [26]; The State of Western Australia v ZSJ [51]; Garlett v The State of Western Australia [106].
[32] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v DAL [No 2] [2016] WASC 212 [33]. Also adopted in The State of Western Australia v Narkle [2019] WASC 404 [13] and The State of Western Australia v West [No 6] [26].
The scheme of the Act requires that the court do no more than is necessary to achieve an adequate degree of protection to the community.[33]
[33] The State of Western Australia v Latimer [2006] WASC 235 [24]; The State of Western Australia v Patrick [No 5] [2022] WASC 61 [56]; Garlett v The State of Western Australia [85], [229] - [230].
Section 7(2) of the Act provides that the State 'has the onus of satisfying the court as required by subsection (1)'.
Section 7(3) of the Act specifies the matters that the court must have regard to in deciding if an offender is a high risk serious offender for the purposes of s 7(1). The matters specified are substantially identical to the matters that the court was, by s 7(3) of the DSO Act, required to have regard to in deciding whether a person was a 'serious danger to the community' within the meaning of the DSO Act. The matters are as follows:
(a)any report prepared under section 74 for the hearing of the application and the extent to which the offender cooperated in the examination required by that section;
(b)any other medical, psychiatric, psychological, or other assessment relating to the offender;
(c)information indicating whether or not the offender has a propensity to commit serious offences in the future;
(d)whether or not there is any pattern of offending behaviour by the offender;
(e)any efforts by the offender to address the cause or causes of the offender's offending behaviour, including whether the offender has participated in any rehabilitation programme;
(f)whether or not the offender's participation in any rehabilitation programme has had a positive effect on the offender;
(g)the offender's antecedents and criminal record;
(h)the risk that, if the offender were not subject to a restriction order, the offender would commit a serious offence;
(i)the need to protect members of the community from that risk;
(j)any other relevant matter.
Although s 7(3)(g) provides that a court must have regard to the offender's criminal record in deciding whether the person is a high risk serious offender, the mere fact that a person has committed previous offences does not necessarily mean that there is an unacceptable risk that they will commit a serious offence in the future if they are not subject to a continuing detention order or a supervision order. The relevance of a prior criminal record depends on the nature of the offences committed, the number of them and the period of time over which they have been committed. Nonetheless, past behaviour is often a good indicator of future conduct.
By s 68(1)(b)(ii) of the Act, the power of the court to rescind the continuing detention order and make a supervision order is expressed to be subject to s 29. Section 29 relevantly provides:
(1)A court cannot make, affirm or amend a supervision order in relation to an offender unless it is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the offender will substantially comply with the standard conditions of the order as made, affirmed or amended.
(2)The onus of proof as to the matter described in subsection (1) is on the offender.
The term 'standard conditions' in relation to a supervision order is defined in s 3 of the Act to mean a condition that under s 30(2) of the Act must be included in the order. Section 30(2) of the Act specifies seven conditions that must be included in any supervision order.
Therefore, the effect of s 29(1) and s 29(2) of the Act is that the offender must satisfy the court on the balance of probabilities that they will substantially comply with the standard conditions set out in s 30(2) of the Act before the court can make a supervision order in relation to them.[34]
[34] Garlett v The State of Western Australia [102], [231].
For the court to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the offender will substantially comply with the standard conditions of the supervision order, it must be satisfied that the offender will comply with the standard conditions in a manner and to an extent that is consistent with, and will enable the attainment of, the general objects of a supervision order and the Act, specifically the adequate protection of the community from the unacceptable risk of the respondent committing a serious offence.[35] Further, in determining if it is satisfied that the offender will substantially comply with each standard condition of the supervision order, the court must have regard not only to the constraints that will be imposed upon the offender by the other standard conditions, but also to the constraints that will be imposed upon the offender by all the other 'non-standard' conditions of the supervision order.[36]
[35] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Hart [2019] WASC 4 [52]; The State of Western Australia v West [No 6] [29]; The State of Western Australia v ZSJ [56] ‑ [58]; The State of Western Australia v Patrick [No 4] [2020] WASC 48 [109]-[111].
[36] The State of Western Australia v ACJ [2021] WASC 219 [416]; Garlett v The State of Western Australia [103] - [104], [233].
As to the purpose of a review hearing under the Act, the following statements made by Hall J in The State of Western Australia v Paul Douglas Allen also known as Paul Alan Francis Deverell [No 5][37] in relation to the review process provided for under the DSO Act are apposite (footnotes omitted):
The clear intention of the review process is to allow for the possibility of a change of circumstances. Detention under the DSO Act is not a punishment for past offending, rather it is a protective mechanism designed to prevent the risk of future serious sexual offending from being realised. If circumstances change such that the risk of reoffending reduces or can be better managed in the community, then the continuing need for detention must be considered.
The risk of reoffending may change over time. It may be affected by age, health or the successful completion of treatment. The availability of new technology or resources in the community may also affect whether the risk of reoffending can be managed on a supervision order.
The justification for making a detention order is the existence of an unacceptable risk of serious sexual offending that cannot be adequately controlled by conditional release. However, detention also serves the purpose of allowing treatment and care in a secure environment: s 17 DSO Act. This confirms an obligation on the part of the prison authorities to facilitate change by offering programs and access to counselling.
If the risk changes or resources improve to enable more efficacious conditions then the need for detention may dissipate. In these circumstances continuing detention may be unjust.
The review process is intended to ensure that detention only continues where necessary. It mitigates the otherwise potentially draconian effect of imprisoning people for crimes that they have not committed. Reviews are not, therefore, merely a welfare check, rather they are an exercise of judicial power to affirm, vary or rescind a detention order. Continuing detention should not be ordered unless that course is justified by the circumstances existing at the time of the review. The court should choose the order that is least invasive of the person's right to be at liberty, whilst ensuring an adequate degree of protection of the community.
[37] The State of Western Australia v Paul Douglas Allen also known as Paul Alan Francis Deverell [No 5] [2019] WASC 359 [7] ‑ [11].
Matters specified in s 7(3) of the Act
As I have indicated, in deciding if the respondent remains a high risk serious offender I must have regard to the matters specified in s 7(3) of the Act. I therefore turn to addressing the matters specified in s 7(3) of the Act.
The respondent's personal circumstances and antecedents - s 7(3)(g)[38]
[38] This section of my reasons substantially reproduces what was written by Hall J in The State of Western Australia v Woodward [41] - [49] updated to take account of the contents of the psychological report prepared by Dr Yewers (exhibit 1, vol 3, 666, par 16 - 22) and the Community Supervision Assessment Report prepared by Ms Serrano (exhibit 2, 8 - 9).
The respondent is 80 years old.
The respondent is the eldest of three children born to his parents. The respondent's younger brother died from Whooping Cough when he was 2 years old. The respondent was 6 years old at the time of his brother's death.
When the respondent was 8 years old his father died from a cardiac arrest. After his father's death the respondent's mother was overcome by grief and became an alcoholic. At this time the respondent's maternal grandfather came to live with the family and provided financial support. The respondent's grandfather was a significant and positive male figure in his life.
The respondent has denied that his mother was ever physically or emotionally abusive towards him. However, there are indications that she neglected the physical and emotional needs of her children.
When the respondent was 14 years old his younger sister was removed from the family home by child welfare authorities due to neglect of her welfare. The respondent does not have any contact with his sister. He is unsure if she is still alive.
The respondent reports that when he was 10 years old he was the victim of sexual abuse perpetrated by a male adult who would visit his home on some weekends to drink with his mother. He reports that the abuse occurred over a period of several weeks and was initially comprised of touching and fondling but culminated in an act of anal penetration. He reports that he told his grandfather what had occurred and that he believes that his grandfather confronted the perpetrator which resulted in the abuse ceasing. He reports that he was undisturbed by the non-penetrative abuse but that the act of penetration was distressing and had an effect on him. He reports that it was only when he was about 17 years old that he was able to comprehend more fully what had occurred.
The respondent attended school until he was 14 years old. He enjoyed school and had better than average grades. He left school in order to find work to support his family.
The respondent's first job was as a clerk. He also attended night school with the intention of completing his high school certificate.
In 1959 when the respondent was aged 17 his grandfather passed away. Soon after this the respondent joined the army.
In 1965 the respondent's mother was diagnosed with cancer. At this time the respondent was still in the army and was living in Queensland. He took leave and returned to Western Australia to care for his mother. His mother passed away in 1972.
After returning to Western Australia the respondent obtained work at the Swan Brewery, initially as a labourer and later as a trades assistant. He remained working at the brewery until 1978 when he had a heart attack. His heart attack rendered him unable to work and he obtained a disability support pension.
In 1982 the respondent commenced a business delivering newspapers and leaflets. He continued to perform this work until he was imprisoned in 1995.
On his release from prison in 1999 the respondent resumed his delivery work and also started a courier business.
In 2004 the respondent was again imprisoned.
On his release in 2005 the respondent resumed his courier business. He employed a number of other drivers until he was imprisoned in 2011.
The respondent has expressed an intention to attempt to restart his courier business if he is released from custody. However, given his age and apparent lack of resources the prospects of him being able to do so are remote.
In 1970 the respondent married a woman who had two teenage children from an earlier marriage. The respondent reports that the marriage was a good one. He reports that his sexual relationship with his wife was good until he had heart problems and began experiencing difficulty with arousal.
The respondent's marriage ultimately came to an end in 2000. The respondent does not have any contact with his ex-wife.
The respondent has minimal support in the community. He has one friend, DF, who he calls fortnightly. DF is supportive of the respondent but is unable to provide him with any significant tangible support.
The respondent reports that he has other friends that he has lost touch with but with whom he will attempt to re-establish contact if he is released from custody.
The respondent has indicated that he hopes to resume a romantic relationship with a woman who resides in the Philippines. DF is married to this woman's daughter.
Given his age the respondent is eligible for the Aged Pension.
The respondent's history of offending - s 7(3)(g)[39]
[39] This section of my reasons substantially reproduces what was written by Hall J in The State of Western Australia v Woodward [6], [28] - [39].
The respondent has a history of sexual offending against children. He committed his first sexual offences in 1985 when he was 43 years old. He committed his most recent sexual offences in 2009. He committed a total of 22 sexual offences against male and female children during this this period.
It is the respondent's sexual offending against children that has resulted in him being detained under the Act.
Offences committed between 1985 - 1991
In 1995 the respondent was convicted of seven offences of aggravated sexual assault and two offences of indecent dealing with a female under the age of 13. He was convicted of some of the offences on his pleas of guilty. He was convicted of the remaining offences after trial. All the offences are serious offences within the meaning of the Act.
The respondent committed the offences between 1985 and 1991. The victim of the offences was his step-granddaughter (that is, the granddaughter of his then wife). The victim was aged between 5 and 11 years old at the time of the offending.
The victim would regularly come to stay with her grandmother and the respondent. Over the relevant period the respondent digitally penetrated the victim's vagina, partially penetrated her vagina with his penis, rubbed his penis against her vagina, and rubbed her vagina with his hand.
The respondent attempted to induce the victim to engage in the sexual conduct by offering to pay her $100 for intercourse and, on another occasion, by offering to buy her a Super Nintendo. The respondent told the victim that she would not be believed if she told anyone what was occurring and that if she did she would no longer be able to see her grandmother.
The nine offences of which the respondent was convicted were representative of a more extensive course of sexual offending against the victim.
On 26 April 1995 the respondent was sentenced to a total of 6 years and 46 weeks imprisonment for the offences. The sentencing judge would have sentenced the respondent to a total of 7 years imprisonment for the offences but reduced the sentence to 6 years and 46 weeks imprisonment to take account of the time that the respondent had already spent in custody for the offences. The respondent was made eligible for parole.
Offences committed in 1992 - 1993
On 13 August 2004 the respondent was convicted on his pleas of guilty of four offences of indecently dealing with a child under the age of 13 and three offences of sexually penetrating a child under 13. All the offences are serious offences within the meaning of the Act.
The respondent committed the offences in 1992 and 1993 against his four year old step-grandson. The conduct the subject of the offences involved the respondent, on four separate occasions, sucking and/or fondling the victim's penis. The respondent groomed or induced the victim to comply by, for example, offering him an icy pole to come and lie down with him. On one occasion the offending occurred in the presence of the victim's 6-year-old brother.
The offences of which the respondent was convicted were representative of an ongoing course of sexual offending against the victim. Indeed, when he was interviewed by the police the respondent stated that he had fondled the victim's penis on at least 20 to 30 occasions over a period of seven to 12 months whenever the opportunity arose while he was babysitting the victim.
On 8 October 2004 he was sentenced to a total sentence of two years imprisonment for the offences. He was made eligible for parole.
Offence committed in 1993
In March 1994 the respondent was convicted of an offence of wilful exposure. The victim of the offence was a 7-year-old female who was unknown to the respondent. The respondent was delivering pamphlets on his motorbike and rode past the victim who was playing. As he rode past the victim the respondent pulled his shorts aside and exposed his penis. The victim summoned her father and both observed the respondent to again ride past exposing himself in the same manner.
On 2 March 1994 the respondent was fined $200 for the offence.
The offence is not a serious offence within the meaning of the Act.
Offences committed in October 2009 - November 2009
In 2011 the respondent was convicted after trial by judge alone of one offence of indecently dealing with a child under the age of 13 and one offence of sexual penetrating a child under the age of 13. Both offences are serious offences within the meaning of the Act.
The victim of the offences was a 5-year-old girl who was living next door to the respondent with her family. From time to time the victim would visit the respondent's house.
On one occasion in October or November 2009 the respondent took the victim to a bedroom in his house and laid her on the bed. He then removed the victim's underpants and his own jeans and underpants. He lay on top of the victim and put his penis against her vagina. He then moved down and performed oral sex on the victim by putting his tongue in her vagina and licking it. The respondent told the child not to tell her mother.
At the time of committing the offences the respondent was 66 years old.
On 14 July 2011 the respondent was sentenced to a total of 4 years and 8 months imprisonment for the offences. In sentencing the respondent for the offences the judge found that the offences were not isolated occurrences and that there were other occasions where the respondent had engaged in licking the victim's vagina.
Offences committed between June 2009 and November 2009
In December 2012 the respondent was convicted after trial of two offences of sexually penetrating a child under the age of 13 years and one offence of inciting a child under the age of 13 years to do an indecent act. All three offences are serious offences within the meaning of the Act.
The respondent committed the offences on two occasions between June 2009 and November 2009. The victim of the three offences was the same 5-year-old girl who was the victim of the above referred to offences for which the respondent was sentenced on 14 July 2011.
On the first occasion the victim went to the respondent's house and was sitting on a couch in the lounge room watching television when the respondent picked her up and took her to his bedroom where he placed her on the bed. He pulled the victim's dress up, pulled down her underwear and placed his penis in her anus. The respondent then took the victim into the lounge room and placed her on the couch. He laid on top of the child and put his penis in her anus again.
On the second occasion of offending the respondent asked the victim to lick his penis. She refused to do so.
On 6 December 2012 the respondent was sentenced to a total term of 5 years and 4 months imprisonment for the offences. The sentence was ordered to be served cumulatively on the sentence of 4 years and 8 months imprisonment imposed for the earlier offences, making a total effective sentence of 10 years imprisonment for all of the offending against the one victim.
Efforts by offender to address causes of offending behaviour including participation in rehabilitation programmes - s 7(3)(e) and s 7(3)(f)
The respondent has over the years undertaken numerous prison and community based intervention programmes targeting his offending behaviour.[40] His participation in these programmes has not stopped him from offending.
[40] Proposed High Risk Serious Offender Management Plan prepared by Dr Dylan Galloghly dated 28 June 2021 (exhibit 1, vol 2, 578, par 18); Community Sex Offender Treatment Completion Report dated 7 May 2006 (exhibit 1, vol 3, 663); High Risk Serious Offender Report prepared by Dr Ewers dated 24 June 2021 (exhibit 1, vol 2, 589, par 53 - 58).
More recently the respondent has engaged in individual psychological counselling with Mr Summerton.[41]
Sexual Assault in Families Programme - 1995
[41] FPIT Treatment Progress Report prepared by Mr Summerton (exhibit 1, vol 3, 686); Community Supervision Assessment Report prepared by Ms Serrano (exhibit 2, 2).
In 1995 the respondent, prior to his incarceration in that year for the offences for which he was sentenced on 26 April 1995, completed a 12-month intensive Sexual Assault in Families Programme. He also completed six months of counselling for his own sexual abuse.
Intensive Sex Offender Treatment Programme - 1997
In 1997 the respondent completed an Intensive Sex Offender Treatment Programme (ISOTP) while in custody. The programme ran for approximately eight months. The respondent did not make any significant treatment gains from his participation in the programme. He received warnings for disclosing and then recanting sexual offending against children. He did not take responsibility for his offending and maintained a 'victim' stance. He was deemed not to have demonstrated sufficient behavioural or attitudinal changes to reduce his risk rating. At the conclusion of the programme he was regarded as being at risk of reoffending.
ISOTP - 1999
In 1999 the respondent completed a second ISOTP while in custody. The programme ran for approximately nine months. During the programme the respondent continued to minimise and deny his deviant behaviour. He demonstrated poor interpersonal skills. Nonetheless, he was considered to have successfully completed the programme given that he had demonstrated an awareness of the factors associated with his offending.
Community based Sex Offender Treatment Programme - 1999
Later in 1999 the respondent attended a community based Sex Offender Treatment Programme (SOTP) as a condition of his parole. The programme was due to run from 15 July 1999 to 2 December 1999. The respondent attended the programme until 26 November 1999 when his parole order expired. He stopped attending the programme once his parole order expired despite having previously asserted that he would continue to attend the programme after the expiry of his parole.
Medium Intensity SOTP - 2005
In 2005 the respondent completed a medium intensity Sex Offender Treatment Programme (60 sessions over 3 months) while in custody serving his term of imprisonment for the offences of which he was convicted on 13 August 2004. The respondent was assessed as having been a motivated participant who engaged in the programme to a high level. The programme completion report indicates that the respondent was able to demonstrate insight into his offending, or more specifically, into the following matters: having cognitive distortions; having deviant fantasies about his victims and other children in the community; being aroused by thinking about sexual abuse and his own experiences of sexual abuse; understanding his own need for arousal, affection and closeness; his use of grooming behaviours; and understanding of predisposing factors such as feeling rejected, alone, frustrated and having no sexual outlet. The respondent also reportedly demonstrated a good understanding of 'step off' behaviours such as not having unsupervised contact with children under 16 years old, avoiding physical contact with children, developing more age appropriate interests and social networks, monitoring his thoughts and challenging distortions when necessary. The respondent was considered to have successfully completed the programme, although the facilitators identified several matters relevant to his risk of recidivism, including that he had expressed a continued sexual interest in children and continued to minimise the severity of his 'fondling' type offences.
Community based Sex Offender Maintenance Programme - 2005
Following his release on parole on 8 August 2005 the respondent, during the period November 2005 to May 2006, completed a community based Sex Offender Maintenance Programme. From the commencement of the programme the respondent demonstrated some confusion as to the requirement for maintenance stating on numerous occasions that his offending was 14 years ago and that he had completed his treatment. His position in this respect was challenged and the programme facilitators noted some shift in his attitude to being in the group. The respondent subsequently used the group to raise issues in relation to his re-socialisation and a charge that had been laid against him as a result of his failure to abide by his reporting conditions under the Community Protection (Offender Reporting) Act 2004 (WA). In this context the respondent continued to externalise responsibility for the circumstances that gave rise to the charge.
By the time that the respondent had completed the programme the programme facilitators formed the view that the respondent had managed his resocialisation into the community reasonably well. The facilitators assessed the respondent as being at a medium-high risk of committing further sexual offences against children.
Think First Cognitive Skills Programme - 2015
In 2015 the respondent completed a 30 session Think First Cognitive Skills Programme which focused on problem solving and approached offending as a problem to be solved. Although the respondent participated appropriately in the programme he continued to deny the commission of his most recent offences against his 5-year-old neighbour. Accordingly, these offences were not addressed during the programme. The respondent, did, however, discuss his sexual offending against his step-grandchildren. By the end of the programme the facilitators formed the view that the respondent had made gains in the areas of victim perspective taking and insight into his previous offending. Outstanding concerns were the respondent's lack of insight into his most recent offences. The respondent continued to attribute his convictions for these offences to the desire of the victim's mother for revenge and the victim having been previously sexually assaulted.
Sex Offending Deniers' Programme - 2017
In 2017, the respondent completed a Sex Offending Deniers' Programme. This programme targets individuals who categorically deny committing sexual offences. The programme is not intended to change the circumstances of denial, but rather to minimise the risk of recidivism and address the same treatment targets as mainstream sexual offending programmes.
The respondent made only limited treatment gains from his participation in the programme. He expressed the view that he knew all of his triggers and high risk situations and did not need to discuss them further. He declined to revisit criminogenic treatment needs around deviant sexual interests in children. He was observed to externalise blame and demonstrate poor problem solving. He failed to identify that he was a risk to children. He claimed that children had the capacity to consent to sex with an adult and that sexual intercourse was acceptable if it was not forceful. He disclosed some basic risk management strategies around avoiding contact with children and abiding by Australian National Child Offender Register conditions. His risk management plan was encumbered by his ongoing assertions that he was not a risk to children. His limited treatment gains included a recognition that it was his responsibility to ensure that he had no contact with children and an acknowledgment that he had difficulty setting boundaries around having contact with children. The programme facilitators formed the view that the respondent had ongoing treatment needs in the areas of deviant sexual interests and emotional identification with children, the formation of age appropriate relationships, relationship skills, avoidant coping and problem solving.
Individual psychological counselling - 2022
In March 2022 the respondent was referred by his senior CCO to the FPIT for individual psychological counselling.
In May 2022 the respondent commenced individual psychological counselling with Mr Summerton. The respondent has attended 10 counselling sessions with Mr Summerton.
During the early counselling sessions the respondent engaged in a pointedly practiced or automated fashion. He often interacted in a self‑contained manner whereby he appeared impervious to what was being referred to or asked of him. He seemed intent on verbalising prepared scripts relevant to his functioning and particularly in relation to his offending.
The respondent's mode of interaction was routinely addressed with the aim of fostering more meaningful dialogues. The respondent was encouraged by Mr Summerton to ask questions and he was consistently invited to offer his understanding of what had been communicated to or asked of him. With sustained challenging of his automated speech patterns the respondent gradually became relatively more authentic and spontaneous in his expression (this included visible emotionality and a more self-critical stance seemingly underpinned by shame). Nonetheless the respondent often resorted to well-worn scripts in addressing various aspects of his functioning.
In Mr Summerton's view there is evidence of rigidity and concreteness to the respondent's thinking style and there is a childlike quality to his interpersonal demeanour. In Mr Summerton's view the respondent's difficulties with comprehension are likely the function of different variables such as personality, interpersonal style and his reported hearing deficits as opposed to any obvious cognitive deficit.
Mr Summerton did not immediately agree on treatment goals with the respondent due to aspects of the respondent's presentation including his broad denial of his offending and his assertions that he posed no risk of reoffending. With sustained discussion Mr Summerton eventually agreed with the respondent that there was little to be gained by addressing the circumstances of the respondent's offending as continually referenced by the respondent. It was ultimately agreed that the focus of the counselling sessions would be on the development of appropriate self-management strategies to assist the respondent to manage perceived risk, to integrate into the community and to appropriately comply with likely supervision order conditions.
The respondent expressed motivation to engage in counselling despite his defensive structure. He addressed various aspects of his sexual offending without prompting but largely in the form of rehearsed versions of his behaviour and other aspects of his life that he considered relevant to his offending.
In his sessions with Mr Summerton the respondent initially acknowledged a bare minimum in terms of the sexual behaviour relevant to his offending and the underlying motivation for the sexual contact he had with his various victims. He portrayed his early indecent exposure offence as entirely inadvertent and maintained a stance of categorical denial of his most recent offending. He acknowledged some sexual contact with his step-grandchildren but significantly minimised the behaviour describing it as unintentional, based on ignorance and involving no level of sexual motivation on his part. He also engaged in marked externalisation by focussing on the behaviour of the children and others in their lives. He attempted to distance himself from responsibility and implied that certain offences were either concocted or embellished for secondary gain by others (compensation). Similarly, he attempted to paint circumstances whereby his offending would have been impossible given the constant presence of his then wife.
In addressing aspects of his offending the respondent conceded a degree of sexual motivation. However, in follow up sessions he spontaneously reverted to default minimising type comments such as, 'I was just drying her'.
In approaching risk management issues it was necessary for Mr Summerton to overcome the respondent's stated position that he represented no risk to children. The respondent's lack of appreciation for the risk that he poses was evident to Mr Summerton in his identification of potentially problematic scenarios and how he would manage them.
In general terms the respondent was able to identify the need to avoid situations where children might congregate and to regulate his attendance in public settings such as shopping centres. Mr Summerton addressed with the respondent the need for him to entirely avoid engagement with children. The respondent accepted that this was the case. However, in Mr Summerton's view the need for the respondent to avoid engagement with children will require regular monitoring and reinforcement in the future.
The respondent impressed Mr Summerton as having unrealistic expectations about his likely life circumstances following release and how these might interface with conditions of a supervision order. In Mr Summerton's view the respondent's unrealistic expectations are demonstrated by his stated goals of recommencing his previously operated courier business and developing a relationship with a woman who remains living in the Philippines with whom he has not had any contact for many years.
The respondent told Mr Summerton that he has experienced some form of sexual dysfunction for decades from around the period of his offences. He claimed that he had no sexual interest or arousal for many years prior to his most recent entry into prison.
According to Mr Summerton the respondent will continue to attend counselling until the determination of the review of his continuing detention with the emphasis being on release plans and continued development of risk management strategies.
In Mr Summerton's view the respondent is not an individual 'with robust reflective capacity and consequently any insight focus is unlikely to yield much'. According to Mr Summerton, although the respondent has a somewhat unrealistic appreciation of how any supervision order conditions might impinge on his day-to-day life, he has by and large been open to input and to tempering his expectations accordingly. In Mr Summerton's view the respondent will require regular reinforcement regarding appropriate risk management strategies given that these are relatively unlikely to be self-generated.
If the respondent is released on a supervision order he will continue to attend counselling with Mr Summerton with the focus being on adjustment and risk management.
If the CDO is not rescinded counselling with the respondent will be suspended given that in Mr Summerton's view there is little of substance that remains to be addressed in view of his limitations with respect to psychological mindedness and associated downplaying of his sexual behaviour.
Reports prepared under s 74 and extent to which respondent cooperated in examination - s 7(3)(a)
Dr Yewers' evidence
Report dated 28 December 2022[42]
[42] Exhibit 1, vol 3, 666.
Dr Yewers' report reveals the following.
Dr Yewers interviewed and assessed the respondent on 3 November 2022.
The respondent was polite and cooperative throughout the assessment process. He responded to all Dr Yewers' questions. However, he had a propensity to be tangential and to provide irrelevant information, particularly in relation to his past offending which necessitated reorienting to the topic of discussion.
In relation to his past offending, the respondent expressed similar views to those that he had expressed to Dr Yewers' when she assessed him for the restriction order application.
The respondent told Dr Yewers that the offences that he committed against his step-granddaughter and step-grandson were his fault and that if he had known that his actions were criminal he would not have engaged in the conduct. He stated that he felt ashamed about his offending and that 'even though it wasn't spiteful or horrific, it was wrong'. He denied that he committed the offences for sexual motivation.
The respondent denied categorically committing the offences against his five year old neighbour.
The respondent conveyed to Dr Yewers that he had a positive relationship with Mr Summerton. He described Mr Summerton as polite and genuine. He added that Mr Summerton 'makes good points'.
The respondent told Dr Yewers that he had not delved into his past in any depth with Mr Summerton. He stated that their sessions had focussed on how he would handle the conditions of a supervision order if released, including management of potential contact with children which he summarised as 'no looking and no smiling'.
The respondent stated to Dr Yewers that he was not a paedophile and that he is not at risk of future offending. However, he remarked that he needs to demonstrate that he is not a risk. He stated that he does not want to ever return to prison. He stated that he intends to avoid associating with children and noted that he has no reason to have contact with them. He provided numerous scenarios of incidental contact with children and explained how he plans to manage such situations.
The respondent told Dr Yewers that he is responsible for his actions and decisions. He stated that he cannot allow friends to give permission for him to be in the vicinity of children. He asserted that in such a situation it would be his responsibility to ensure that he left. He stated that he plans to ensure that he is always in company.
The respondent informed Dr Yewers that if he is released on a supervision order he will comply with the condition of the order. He stated that he needed to prove that he is not a risk and that he would do this by complying with a supervision order and by being open and honest. The respondent indicated his awareness that a supervision order would contain conditions prohibiting him from having contact with children and restricting his attendance at certain locations. He expressed some concern about coping with the quantity of possible conditions. Nevertheless, he said that he would clarify conditions that he did not understand and that if he had any problems he would try and reach a compromise.
The respondent stated that he would be 'happy' to continue psychological treatment if he is released into the community so that he knows that he is 'on the right track' and so that any problems that he 'may of overlooked' can be highlighted. Dr Yewers notes in this context that when she assessed the respondent for the restriction order application his view on psychological intervention was one of ambivalence.
It is evident to Dr Yewers that the respondent justifies and rationalises his offending by maintaining the cognitive distortion that he held at the time that she assessed him for the restriction order application. He continues to deny ever having a sexual interest in children. In Dr Yewers' opinion, the longevity of these cognitive distortions indicates that the bulk of the respondent's views are unlikely to shift substantively.
In Dr Yewers' view the respondent's engagement in psychological treatment with Mr Summerton has been positive. She considers that the respondent appears to have developed a sound relationship with Mr Summerton and that treatment has been delivered to him in a manner that promotes his engagement and learning. The treatment style has been 'present-or-future focussed, concrete [and] rehearsal based' and does not pursue insight or depth of understanding.
In Dr Yewers' assessment the respondent's release plans continue to be non-specific and quite vague. He appears to have a low awareness of the practicalities of restarting his business and has very limited social support.
In Dr Yewers' view, while the respondent appears willing to comply with the conditions of a supervision order his current capacity to self-manage is limited with the result that he will require continued oversight.
Dr Yewers undertook an assessment of the risk of the respondent committing any further sexual offences. In undertaking this assessment she made use of two assessment tools, the Static-99R and the Risk for Sexual Violence Protocol (RSVP).
The Static-99R measures the risk of reoffending based on known historical risk factors. The respondent's Static-99R score was five. This score places him in the 'Risk Level IVa category (Above Average Risk)' for being charged with, and convicted of, another sexual offence. The respondent's score was unchanged from the score that he obtained when Dr Yewers used the Static-99R to assess his risk of reoffending for the purposes of the restriction order application.
The respondent's Static-99R score of five equates to a five year sexual recidivism rate of between 18% and 25%. This means that out of 100 sexual offenders in the 'high risk/high need group', within which the respondent falls, between 18 and 25 would be charged with, or convicted of, a new sexual offence after five years in the community. Conversely, between 75 and 82 would not be charged with, or convicted of, a new sexual offence during the same period.
The rate of sexual offending for individuals in Level IVa is roughly equivalent to twice the average rate of reoffending for the overall population of individuals convicted of sexually motivated offences. The prognosis includes a significant reduction of reoffending with some individuals in Level IVa transitioning down to Level III (Average Risk) within a year or two 'after a sufficient dosage of treatment or positive life changes'.
The RSVP is a risk assessment tool that applies a structured professional judgment approach to the assessment and management of sexual violence risk. It is a clinical judgment framework that requires consideration of a number of separate factors or domains.
In making use of the RSVP Dr Yewers identified a number of risk factors that are present and relevant to both the respondent's risk of committing further sexual offences and the management of his risk. The factors include the following: chronicity of sexual violence; diversity of sexual violence; escalation of sexual violence; psychological coercion in sexual violence; extreme minimisation or denial of sexual violence (a failure to accept responsibility for acts of sexual violence and the consequences of those acts); attitudes that support or condone sexual violence; problems with self-awareness; problems with stress or coping; sexual deviance; problems with intimate and non-intimate relationships; problems with planning; and problems with treatment.
The respondent's risk as measured by the RSVP reveals that there has been little change in his risk of reoffending since the hearing of the restriction order application. In Dr Yewers' view the risk factors highlighted by the RSVP represent areas requiring monitoring, management and possibly treatment.
It is, in Dr Yewers' view, of significance that the respondent has engaged in psychological treatment during the past year. Although this does not change the presence or relevance of the RSVP risk factor 'Problems with Treatment' for the respondent, it is a positive development. The respondent is likely to continue to have responsivity challenges but has reportedly made some progress within his capacity to his benefit.
In Dr Yewers' opinion the most probable risk scenario for the respondent is that he will reoffend in a similar manner to his earlier offences. She considers that his offending 'is likely to be motivated by seeking to meet his emotional needs through children, a desire for intimacy and companionship that he is not able to achieve via age-appropriate relationships, and/or in the context of an enduring sexual interest in children'. She considers that if the respondent reoffends the offences are unlikely to be opportunistic and will most likely occur by him establishing a relationship with a child through proximity or via an association with the child's care givers. She considers that grooming behaviours may entail attention, fostering special relationships and gift giving. She considers that grooming behaviours may also involve earning the trust of care givers.
Dr Yewers is of the opinion that any further offences of the respondent could range from fondling/touching to penetration. She considers that if the respondent starts to reoffend the offending is likely to occur at the frequency at which he has access to the victim until his behaviour is detected.
Dr Yewers makes the point that the likelihood of the identified offending scenario occurring is contingent on the respondent avoiding contact with children. She notes that the likelihood of such reoffending occurring may be moderated if the respondent is able to achieve a satisfying intimate adult relationship. However, she considers that regardless of this possibility the respondent should not develop relationships with children.
Based on her assessment of the respondent, it is Dr Yewers' opinion that the respondent continues to present with a high risk of committing a serious offence if he is not subject to a restriction order.
In Dr Yewers' opinion if the respondent is released on a supervision order the order should be for a period of three years. In her opinion this time frame acknowledges that individuals with a similar static risk to the respondent can transition to average risk after a year or two with sufficient treatment or positive life changes.
Dr Yewers recommends that if the respondent is released on a supervision order any conditions imposed by the court should take into account the following matters:
1.The respondent should continue individual psychological treatment targeting relevant risk factors and self-management of risk. He has limited capacity for insight and self-awareness and this is unlikely to change;
2.Due to the respondent's lack of insight into his offending and his view that he is not at risk or reoffending, external monitoring is critical. His relationships should be scrutinised for potential contact with children which is likely to occur via his association with adults; and
3.The respondent should be supported to develop friendships and meaningful and constructive activities.
Oral evidence
In her oral evidence Dr Yewers maintained the material views and opinions expressed by her in her report. Dr Yewers also gave supplementary evidence as follows.[43]
[43] ts 79 - 85, 17 February 2023.
In her view there has not been any substantive change to the respondent's risk level since she reviewed him for the purposes of the restriction order application. The respondent has, however, made some progress in terms of engaging in individual counselling which is a positive. The individual counselling has been beneficial because it has focussed on risk management. Adopting this approach has enhanced the respondent's responsivity.
In her view, any further offending of the respondent would most likely occur in the context of him developing a relationship with a child. It is unlikely that he will engage in opportunistic offending. The development of relationships with children is the respondent's main risk factor. Therefore, managing the respondent's contact and relationships with children will be of importance if he is released on a supervision order.
In her opinion, if the respondent has suitable accommodation his risk will be able to be managed in the community on a supervision order. She thinks that given the respondent's presentation relying on him to develop awareness is not realistic. Accordingly, the external restrictions that will be imposed on the respondent by a supervision order, and the external monitoring of the respondent that will occur under a supervision order, are going to be important in his management. She does not consider that the respondent is going to make significant gains from therapy beyond becoming more aware of things he needs to do, such as to avoid children.
She has reviewed the supervision order conditions proposed by Ms Serrano for the court's consideration.
She does not support the inclusion in a supervision order of curfew conditions. The respondent does not have any risk relating to being out at night. This is not a risk factor for him. She acknowledges that sometimes a curfew is put in place so that individuals who have been released from prison have a sense of stability while they are developing their routines. However, she does not see an obvious need for the use of a curfew in this way in relation to the respondent. In her view, given the respondent's age he is unlikely to be 'out aimlessly' or doing anything risk related at night.
She does not support the inclusion in a supervision order of a condition requiring the respondent to undertake any medication regime as directed by his CCO in consultation with a medical practitioner. There is nothing relating to the respondent's risk that requires him to take medication.
She accepts that a condition requiring the respondent to maintain a daily diary of his associations is appropriate. The respondent's risk lies in the formation of relationships. This is something that needs to be monitored through the supervision process. She thinks requiring the respondent to maintain a daily diary of who he is associating with has the potential to assist in the monitoring of the formation by him of relationships. She thinks that a diary that focuses on the respondent's movements is of less relevance because his movements will be tracked via GPS.
She does not support the inclusion in a supervision order of a condition requiring the respondent to provide to his CCO an account of his projected daily movements and to obtain from his CCO prior approval of his projected movements. The respondent's risk relates to him forming relationships. The other proposed supervision order conditions provide for discussion around who the respondent is associating with and who is he is forming relationships with. She thinks that this is sufficient. She thinks that a projected daily movements condition has the potential to be very restrictive on the ability of the respondent 'to kind of live a normal life'. In her view the 'benefits need to be balanced…against the effect that [the condition] will have on [the respondent] establishing himself'.
She is aware of the accommodation in which it is proposed that the respondent will reside if he is released on a supervision order. The respondent's contact with children at the proposed accommodation will need to be managed. She has been informed that children do not visit the proposed accommodation. If this is correct, she considers that the respondent's risk while living in the proposed accommodation will be manageable.
She has been informed that there is another high risk serious offender that lives in the proposed accommodation. She has a general awareness of the background of this high risk serious offender. She understands the concerns surrounding the fact that another high risk serious offender lives in the proposed accommodation to be that the respondent may associate with the offender, discuss his offences with the offender and collaborate with the offender to offend. However, from speaking to the respondent she thinks that it is unlikely that he would openly discuss his offences with another person or collaborate with another person to offend. She does not consider that this is a likely scenario. Further, she cannot think of any other risk concern arising from the fact that another high risk serious offender lives in the proposed accommodation. In summary, she thinks that the respondent's risk can be managed under the conditions of a supervision order if he is required to live in the proposed accommodation.
Supplementary report dated 15 March 2023[44]
[44] Exhibit 4.
Dr Yewers provided her supplementary report at my direction to address the additional information that had been provided to the court following the first day of the hearing of the application (at which she gave her above oral evidence) in relation to the proposed accommodation for the respondent. The additional information consisted of the desktop spatial analysis, the results of which were set out in the above referred to email from the law clerk employed by the applicant's solicitor dated 8 March 2023,[45] and the information provided by Ms Goode from COMU as at 15 March 2023 as set out in the above referred to email from the law clerk employed by the applicant's solicitor dated 16 March 2023.[46]
[45] Exhibit 3.
[46] Exhibit 5.
If the respondent is released on a supervision order he will continue to engage in counselling with Mr Summerton. The respondent is motivated to continue to do so. Thus the respondent's attitude to psychological counselling has changed significantly since the hearing of the restriction order application. At the time of the hearing of the restriction order application the respondent's attitude towards psychological counselling was, according to Dr Yewers, ambivalent.
The respondent's ongoing engagement with Mr Summerton is, as has been acknowledged by Mr Summerton, Ms Korda and Dr Yewers, unlikely to result in him developing any great insight or depth of understanding into his past offending behaviour and the risk that he poses to young children. Nonetheless, the respondent's ongoing engagement with Mr Summerton will still be important from a risk management perspective. The engagement will assist the respondent to adjust to life in the community under the conditions of a supervision order after having spent such a long time in prison. The engagement will facilitate the early identification, monitoring and addressing of any factors (including any behaviour of the respondent) that could potentially lead to an elevation in the respondent's risk of reoffending. The engagement will also facilitate the repeated rehearsing with the respondent of strategies to deal with risk situations that he may be confronted with while he is in the community.
The respondent, if he is released on a supervision order, will be subject to a high level of control and supervision. The conditions proposed for my consideration by Ms Serrano are stringent and extensive. They do (subject to some observations I will make shortly) directly address the respondent's risk factors as disclosed by the evidence to which I have referred. The conditions are such that they will, in my opinion, enable those responsible for supervising, monitoring and managing the respondent to detect at an early stage if there are any signs of him engaging in behaviour, including the grooming type behaviour referred to by Dr Yewers, that may signal an increase in the risk of him reoffending. More specifically, I am satisfied that there are adequate safeguards contained in the proposed conditions to ensure that if the respondent begins to attempt to make contact with children and/or to develop relationships with children or with persons who are in regular contact with children or responsible for the care of children, this will be quickly picked up on and dealt with by those responsible for his supervision, monitoring and management in the community with the result that he will not be able to proceed to further offending. The conditions will also, in my opinion, enable those responsible for supervising, monitoring and managing the respondent to facilitate his reintegration into the community.
The respondent has indicated a willingness to comply with the proposed conditions of a supervision order. There is nothing to suggest from his behaviour while in prison that he is unlikely to do so. He has expressed a motivation to demonstrate that he is able to live in the community without offending.
Dr Yewers is of the opinion that the respondent's risk of committing a sexual offence against a young child that is a serious offence can be managed in the community under a supervision order containing most of the 50 proposed conditions. This expression of expert opinion is obviously not determinative of the question whether the respondent should be released into the community on a supervision order, this being a question that it is ultimately my responsibility alone to determine. Nonetheless, Dr Yewers' expert opinion evidence on this point is obviously deserving of some weight.[61]
[61] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR [62].
Ultimately, taking into account the matters to which I have referred in the preceding 10 paragraphs, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that if the respondent is released on a supervision order containing most of the conditions proposed for the court's consideration by Ms Serrano he will substantially comply with the standard conditions of a supervision order specified in s 30(2) of the Act. That is, I am satisfied that the respondent will comply with the standard conditions in a manner and to an extent that will ensure the adequate protection of the community from the unacceptable risk of him committing a serious offence.
I am also, in light of the matters to which I have referred, satisfied that the need to ensure adequate protection of the community can be met by releasing the respondent on a supervision order containing most of the conditions proposed by Ms Serrano. I am satisfied that the proposed conditions are sufficiently extensive and stringent to enable the adequate management of the risk that the respondent currently presents to the community.
I have referred to the supervision order containing most of the conditions proposed by Ms Serrano for the court's consideration. In my opinion, when one bears in mind that a supervision order should only contain those conditions, in addition to the standard conditions, that are necessary to achieve the purposes specified in s 30(5) of the Act, there are a small number of the proposed conditions that do not need to be, and should not be, included in any supervision order made in relation to the respondent.
The Act provides that the purpose of a curfew condition is to allow for the movements of an offender subject to a supervision order to be restricted 'during periods when there is a risk of the offender committing a serious offence'.[62] As Dr Yewers pointed out, being out at night is not a risk factor for the respondent. There is nothing to suggest that the respondent's risk of committing serious offences at night is any greater than his risk of committing offences during the day such that the COMU should have the ability to require him to stay at home during night time hours (or for that matter during any periods of the day). More specifically, there is nothing to suggest that the respondent is more likely to attempt to make contact with and/or form relationships with children during night-time hours. Further, and again as Dr Yewers in effect observed, it would seem unlikely that a man of the respondent's age is going to be roaming the streets late at night or in the early morning hours engaging in risk related behaviour. In these circumstances, consistently with the evidence given by Dr Yewers, I am not persuaded that the proposed curfew conditions (proposed conditions 27 - 29) do need to be included in a supervision order to ensure that the community is adequately protected from the respondent. I note in this respect that the State does not actively press for the inclusion in any supervision order of the proposed curfew conditions.
[62] Act, s 32(2).
The respondent does not take any medication relevant to his risk of reoffending. In these circumstances, and again consistently with evidence given by Dr Yewers, I do not see any need for proposed condition 31 to be included in any supervision order made in relation to the respondent.
I turn to proposed condition 36 that would require the respondent to provide to his CCO an account of his projected daily movements and to obtain prior approval of his projected movements. When I take account of all the other conditions proposed by Ms Serrano that will enable those responsible for the monitoring and supervision of the respondent to monitor his movements and to control where he can go and who he is permitted to associate with, I am not, consistently with the evidence given by Dr Yewers, satisfied that in the particular circumstances of the respondent's case it is necessary to impose the additional burden of proposed condition 36 to ensure adequate protection of the community. In addition, like Dr Yewers I consider that the inclusion of the proposed condition in the supervision order is likely to hinder the ability of the respondent to live something approaching a 'normal' life in the community. This will not be in the long term interests of the community from a risk management perspective. Finally, I note in this context that the State does not actively press for the inclusion of the condition in any supervision order made in relation to the respondent.
I turn now to proposed condition 34 and to the concerns raised by the SOMU in relation to whether a mere brief acknowledgment by bodily gesture by the respondent of one of the convicted sex offenders who currently lives in the proposed residence would amount to the respondent associating with the other offender in contravention of the proposed condition.
The word 'associate' as used in condition 34 should be given its ordinary meaning. To 'associate' with a person is to be involved with the person or to be connected with the person or to have frequent dealings with the person. Accordingly, a mere passing acknowledgement by the respondent of one of the other convicted sex offenders living in the proposed residence, whether by bodily gesture or verbally, would clearly not amount to him associating with the other offender.
As is apparent from what I have said in the previous paragraph, there is nothing complicated or ambiguous about the meaning of the word 'associate' as used in proposed condition 34. It does not require any further elaboration or definition. More specifically, it is not, in my view, necessary to insert into proposed condition 34 a definition of the word 'associate' in order to enable the SOMU and the police to decide if the condition is being contravened.
For the reasons I have stated the supervision order that I will make will not contain proposed conditions 27 - 29, 31 and 36. It will, however, contain the remaining 45 conditions proposed by Ms Serrano.
In relation to the period of the supervision order Dr Yewers' evidence is, as I have already indicated, that any order should be for a period of 3 years. Dr Yewers explained her reasons for holding this view. I accept the evidence of Dr Yewers on this issue. I am therefore satisfied that the supervision order should be for a period of 3 years.
In relation to the commencement date of the supervision order, during her submissions on 20 March 2023 counsel for the State informed me that the COMU's instructions to her are that it is practically feasible for the order to be implemented within a lesser period than 21 days. Counsel informed me that the COMU's position is that the order can be implemented by 27 March 2023.
On the basis of the information provided to me by counsel I am satisfied that it is practically feasible for the supervision order to be implemented by 27 March 2023, that is, earlier than 21 days from the date of the making of the order. Accordingly, pursuant to s 27(3) of the Act the supervision order will come into operation on 27 March 2023.
Suppression order
During the hearing of the application the State applied for an order suppressing the publication of the name and address of the proposed residence. The application for the suppression order was made, in essence, on the ground that if I found that the respondent remained a high risk serious offender but could be released on a supervision order containing a condition requiring him to live at the proposed residence, disclosure of the name and address of the proposed residence might expose the respondent, staff from the Department required to attend the proposed address and others living at the proposed address to vigilante action. It was submitted that if this did occur it would be likely that the proposed address would not be able to continue to be used to house the respondent with the result, given the current absence of other viable accommodation options for him, that the supervision order would become unviable.
A suppression order should only be made if the making of the order is really necessary to secure the proper administration of justice in proceedings before the court. There must be some material before the court upon which the court can reasonably reach the conclusion that it is necessary to make the order prohibiting publication.[63]
[63] The State of Western Australia v Jonsson [No 3] [2019] WASC 463 [147].
As a general proposition it can be accepted that members of the community have a legitimate interest in being aware of the identity and presence of offenders in their community. However, this interest must be balanced against the potential subversion of the viability of a supervision order.[64]
[64] The State of Western Australia v Jonsson [No 3] [148] - [149]; The State of Western Australia v JXK [No 3] [2023] WASC 23 [184].
I formed the view that it was not, given the respondent's offending history, difficult to see how the publication of his residential address, if he was released on a supervision order, could lead to the outcomes identified by the State. I was also conscious of the lack of other viable accommodation options for the respondent. I therefore decided that it was necessary to make an order suppressing the publication of the name and address of the proposed residence. I considered that the making of such an order was necessary to ensure the viability of any supervision order in the event that I ultimately decided that the respondent could be released on such an order.
Order
For the reasons I have stated I rescind the CDO and make a supervision order in respect of the respondent pursuant to s 68(1)(b)(ii) of the Act containing the proposed conditions set out in Annexure A other than proposed conditions 27 - 29, 31 and 36. The period of the supervision order will be 3 years.
ANNEXURE A
STANDARD CONDITIONS REQUIRED BY THE ACT
Report to a Community Corrections Officer at the East Perth Adult Community Corrections Centre, 30 Moore Street East Perth, within 48 hours of being issued this order and advise the officer of your current name and address;
Report to and receive visits from, a Community Corrections Officer as directed by the Court;
Notify a Community Corrections Officer of every change of the person's name, place of residence, or place of employment at least 2 business days before the change happens;
Be under the supervision of a Community Corrections Officer, which includes, comply with any reasonable direction of the officer (including a direction for the purposes of section 31 or 32);
Not leave, or stay out of, the State of Western Australia without the permission of a Community Corrections Officer;
Not commit a serious offence during the period of the Order;
Be subject to electronic monitoring under section 31;
ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS
Residence
Take up residence at [proposed residence] and spend each night at that address or at a different address only if such different address is approved in advance by a Community Corrections Officer (CCO) assigned to you;
Reporting to a CCO and supervision by a CCO
Report to a CCO at your approved release address within normal business hours on the day of release from custody under this order;
Be under the supervision of a CCO and comply with the lawful orders and directions of a CCO;
Report to, and receive visits from, a CCO at times and at places as directed by the CCO, such arrangements having regard to any employment commitments of you;
Not commence or change paid or unpaid employment, education, training or volunteer work without the prior approval of the CCO;
Attendance at programs or treatment
Consult and engage with any psychiatrist, psychologist, mentor, support service and/or support person nominated by a CCO, as directed by a CCO;
Comply with the requirements of all programs designed to address your offending behaviour and/or risk of serious re-offending, as directed by a CCO;
Reporting to WA Police
Report to the Officer-in-Charge of the Serious Offender Management Squad (SOMS) at the Hatch Building, 144 Stirling Street, PERTH WA 6000 within 48 hours of your release from custody, and thereafter report to and receive visits from Police at times and at locations as directed by the Officer-in-Charge of the SOMS or his/her delegate;
Comply with all obligations imposed on you pursuant to the Community Protection (Offender Reporting) Act 2004;
If requested, permit Police Officers to enter and search your residence for the purpose of monitoring your compliance with your obligations under this order and seize anything they deem required to monitor your compliance under this order;
When requested, advise Police of the names of all of your internet service providers, all mobile or landline telephone services used by you and all internet user names or identities used by you;
Disclosure/Exchange of Information
Agree to the exchange of information between persons and agencies involved in the implementation and supervision of this order, including confidential information;
Allow the CCO, WA Police, or other person or agencies approved by the CCO, to interview any associates or potential associates and, where appropriate, to disclose to them confidential information including your offending history;
Restrictions on contact with Victims
Have no contact, directly or indirectly, with the victims of your current offending, unless such contact is conducted in accordance with agreements made through, or approved by, the Victim-Offender Mediation Unit of the Department of Justice;
Unless contact with victims is permitted pursuant to the previous condition, you must immediately physically withdraw from any situation or immediate location in which contact is made with any victim of your offending (including being in the immediate presence of any victim), without engaging in conversation with any victim whether by word or gesture, and must avert your gaze from such victims at all times;
Not breach any provision of, or commit any offence under, the Restraining Orders Act 1997;
Criminal conduct
Not commit any other criminal offence where the maximum penalty for which includes imprisonment, and which involves either violence, threats of violence, or the possession of weapons or offensive instruments;
Not commit an offence under s202, s203, s204 or s557K Criminal Code 1913 (WA);
Not commit any offence under the Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Enforcement Act 1996;
Curfew
Be subject to a curfew, pursuant to section 32 of the High Risk Serious Offenders Act 2020, such that you are to remain at and not leave your approved address as directed by a CCO from time to time;
When subject to a curfew under this order, present yourself for inspection at the front door or front yard of your approved address, or speak on the telephone, to any CCO or Police Officer or their agent monitoring you compliance with the curfew;
When subject to a curfew under this order, you must ensure that all those people present in the residence, who may answer the telephone or door, are aware as to your obligations and request their assistance to comply with your obligations by alerting you to such attempts to contact you by persons monitoring your compliance with the curfew;
Medications/Mental Health
Attend any medical practitioner, psychologist, psychiatrist or counsellor as directed by the supervising CCO;
Undertake any medication regime as directed by the CCO in consultation with a medical practitioner(s) and comply with all testing to monitor your compliance with that treatment as directed by a CCO;
Permit any medical practitioner, psychologist, psychiatrist or counsellor to disclose details of medical treatment and opinions relating to your level of risk of reoffending and compliance with treatment to the Department of Corrective Services;
To engage with mental health services and to obey the instructions of the treating psychiatrist with regard to treatment and medication;
Prevention of high-risk situations
Not associate with any person known by you to have committed a sexual offence, unless such association is authorised in advance by the CCO;
Maintain a daily diary of your movements, activities and associations if and as directed by the CCO and present this diary to the CCO and Police Officer upon request;
Provide a verbal or written account of your projected daily movements to your CCO and obtain prior approval of your projected movements, as and when directed by your CCO; with the exception of the following circumstances:
a.to obtain urgent medical or dental treatment for yourself,
b.for the purpose of averting or minimising a serious risk of death or injury to the respondent or another person,
c.to obey an order issued under a written law (such as a summons) requiring your presence elsewhere, and
d.at the direction of a CCO or Police Officer;
Have no contact with any child under the age of 18 years, whether such contact is in person, in writing, by telephone or by electronic means, unless:
a.the contact is authorised in advance by the CCO and such contact is supervised at all times by an adult approved in advance by the CCO;
b.:the contact is necessary to complete a commercial transaction and limited to the minimum contact required to complete the transaction, and another adult is present
('Contact' under this condition and the following two conditions means any form of interaction or communication whether by word, gesture, expression or touch and whether in person, in writing, by telephonic or electronic means, but does not include the bare minimum of interaction or communication necessary between an adult and child to promptly and civilly terminate any inadvertent or uninvited interaction or communication);
Where any unsupervised contact with a child under the age of 18 years is initiated by the child, unless the contact is permitted under the condition immediately above, you must withdraw immediately from the presence of the child;
Provide details of any contact with a child under the age of 18 years both to your CCO and to the Police on the next occasion you report to that person or agency;
Report at your next contact with your CCO, the formation of any friendship, domestic, romantic, sexual or otherwise intimate relationship by you with any person;
Report at your next contact with your CCO and Police any association or relationship by you with a person who has a child, grandchild, or children under the age of 18 years in their care either full time or part time;
Not form any domestic relationship with a person who has a child, or children, grandchild or grandchildren under the age of 18 years in their care either full time or part time, without prior approval of a CCO;
Not conduct computer searches for, nor collect or access, or be in possession of, in either electronic or permanent form, images of children, including drawings or sketches, whether indecent or not; with the exception of images of your immediate family that are not indecent images, if approved in advance by a CCO. Possession of such images depicting a child or children on items such as on household items, may be authorised by a CCO;
As directed by your CCO, make full disclosure regarding your past offending and the current order to anyone with whom you commence a friendship, domestic, romantic, sexual or otherwise intimate relationship, which disclosure can be confirmed by a CCO or a Police Officer;
Have no contact with, membership of or affiliation with clubs, associations or groups where membership includes children, unless approved in advance by a CCO; and to cease/cancel such memberships if directed to do so by a CCO or Police Officer;
Advise a CCO of every computer, telecommunication and/or electronic device capable of storing digital data or information, possessed or used by you, whether or not it is capable of being connected to the internet, and the location of that device;
Not allow any person other than a CCO or WA Police access to any computer, telecommunication and/or electronic device referred to in condition 47, without prior approval of the CCO;
Enable device locking or password access of your computer, telecommunication and/or electronic devices; Not provide or disclose such passwords or other means used to access any computer, telecommunications and/or electronic device referred to in condition 47, or any online accounts, to any person other than a CCO or Police Officer;
Upon request, permit a CCO or WA Police at any location nominated by them, to access any computer, telecommunication and/or device capable of storing digital data, for the purpose of ascertaining your computer, telecommunication and/or electronic device related activities, and provide to the CCO or WA Police upon request any passwords or any other means used to unlock or access the device; Should any other entity be required to access a device for instances such as technical advice, approval must be sought in advance from a CCO;
Not delete or otherwise remove and/or disguise, or cause or allow to be removed and/or disguised, any data including but not limited to calls, Short Message Service (SMS), search histories or logs capable of identifying your activities on that computer, telecommunication and/or electronic device, whether or not the device is capable of connecting to the internet, without the approval in advance by a CCO or WA Police.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
JP
Research Associate to the Honourable Justice Derrick
21 MARCH 2023
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