The State of Western Australia v Narrier

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CRIMINAL

CITATION:   THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA -v- NARRIER [2014] WASC 111

CORAM:   SIMMONDS J

HEARD:   12 MARCH 2014

DELIVERED          :   12 MARCH 2014

FILE NO/S:   INS 212 of 2013

BETWEEN:   THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Applicant

AND

GREGSON JAMES NARRIER
Respondent

Catchwords:

Criminal law and procedure - Application for leave to adduce propensity evidence for trial for stealing, armed robbery and attempted armed robbery - Offending on previous day of lesser seriousness with same co-offender

Evidence law - Admissibility of propensity evidence - Applicable principles

Legislation:

Criminal Code (WA), s 74A, s 378, s 392, s 444, s 552
Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 31A
Weapons Act 1999 (WA), s 8, s 10

Result:

Leave to adduce evidence granted

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant:     Ms D Mattock

Respondent:     Mr D C Rice

Solicitors:

Applicant:     Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Respondent:     Griffiths Rice & Co

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Dair v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 72

Daniels v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 213

Di Lena v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 162

Donaldson v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 196

KRM v The Queen [2001] HCA 11; (2001) 206 CLR 221

Preston v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 64

SIMMONDS J: 

Introduction

  1. These are fuller reasons for the decision for which I gave shorter oral reasons at the conclusion of the hearing of the present application.  I indicated when I gave that decision that such fuller reasons would be provided.

  2. The present application is by the state for leave to lead certain evidence at an upcoming trial on indictment.  It was evidence of a prior violent incident on the day before the incident the subject of the indictment.

  3. The application was confirmed at a status conference on 23 January 2014 at which the hearing of the present application was initially listed.

  4. The trial is listed to run for three days, commencing 14 April 2014 concluding on the 17 April.  At the status conference on 23 January 2014, before Hall J, counsel for the defence, who I understood was the same counsel as before me for the hearing of the present application, confirmed those dates were still suitable.

  5. The present application was opposed.

  6. I determined I would grant the application.

The present proceedings

  1. By the indictment the respondent faces three charges.

  2. Count 1 is that, on 18 June 2013 at Morley, contrary to Criminal Code (WA) (Code) s 378, the accused stole vehicle keys the property of Verity Grace Bignell.

  3. Count 2 is that, on the same day at the same place, contrary to Code s 392 read with s 552, the accused stole from Kristin Jade Broadhurst, with violence, a mobile phone which was her property; and that he was armed with an offensive weapon, namely, a screwdriver; and that he was in company with another.

  4. I note it was confirmed to me at the hearing that…

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Details
Case
[2014] WASC 111
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The State of Western Australia brought proceedings against Narrier in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, alleging he had committed various serious offences, including stealing, armed robbery, and attempted armed robbery. The prosecution sought leave to adduce propensity evidence relating to an incident of lesser seriousness that occurred the day before the alleged offences, where Narrier was accompanied by the same co-offender. The court was tasked with determining whether the propensity evidence could be admitted under the provisions of the Evidence Act.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the propensity evidence, which related to a previous incident with the same co-offender, met the criteria for admissibility under s 31A of the Evidence Act. The court had to assess if the evidence had significant probative value and whether the probative value, compared to the risk of an unfair trial, was such that fair-minded members of the public would consider the public interest in adducing relevant evidence of guilt to have priority over the risk of an unfair trial. The court also needed to consider whether the evidence was relevant and of significant probative value, and whether the risk of an unfair trial outweighed the probative value of the evidence.

The court held that the determination to admit propensity evidence under s 31A is a matter of law, not discretion. If the evidence has significant probative value and fair-minded people would think the public interest in adducing relevant evidence of guilt must have priority over the risk of an unfair trial, the evidence must be admitted. The court also noted that the definition of propensity evidence under s 31A is extraordinarily wide and includes not only similar fact evidence but also evidence of the character or reputation of the accused. The evidence must be relevant and of significant probative value, and the court must assess the risk of an unfair trial. The court found that the propensity evidence met the criteria for admissibility under s 31A.

The court granted leave for the prosecution to adduce the propensity evidence, as it had significant probative value and fair-minded members of the public would think the public interest in adducing relevant evidence of guilt had priority over the risk of an unfair trial. The court also noted that a standard propensity warning was not required as the evidence was admissible under s 31A. However, the court advised that a warning should be given if necessary to avoid a risk of a miscarriage of justice.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Evidence Act s 31A is as follows:31A.Propensity and relationship evidence(1)In this section -propensity evidence means -(a)similar fact evidence or other evidence of the conduct of the accused person; or(b)evidence of the character or reputation of the accused person or of a tendency that the accused person has or had;relationship evidence means evidence of the attitude or conduct of the accused person towards another person, or a class of persons, over a period of time.(2)Propensity evidence or relationship evidence is admissible in proceedings for an offence if the court considers -(a)that the evidence would, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced, have significant probative value; and(b)that the probative value of the evidence compared to the degree of risk of an unfair trial, is such that fair minded people would think that the public interest in adducing all relevant evidence of guilt must have priority over the risk of an unfair trial.(3)In considering the probative value of evidence for the purposes of subsection (2) it is not open to the court to have regard to the possibility that the evidence may be the result of collusion, concoction or suggestion. On what I consider to be the principal authorities on the application of these provisions I take the following propositions to be established:1.A determination by a trial judge to admit evidence under Evidence Act s 31A(2) is one of law, not of discretion. If the trial judge concludes that the evidence has significant probative value, and that fair minded people, comparing its probative value to the risk of an unfair trial, would think the public interest in producing relevant evidence of guilt must have priority over the risk of an unfair trial, then he or she is bound to admit it. See Di Lena v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 162 [60] (Roberts‑Smith JA, Wheeler & Pullin JJA agreeing).2.The definition of propensity evidence in Evidence Act s 31A(1) is extraordinarily wide, going beyond what the common law understood by that category of evidence and embracing not just similar fact evidence, but also evidence of the character or reputation of the accused or of a tendency that he or she has or had, as well as 'other evidence of the conduct of the accused person'. See Preston v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 64 [36] (Mazza JA, Martin CJ & Buss JA agreeing); see also Di Lena [52] (Roberts‑Smith JA). The evidence does not need to fall within the category of similar evidence, let alone strikingly similar evidence. See Donaldson v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 196 [120] ‑ [122] (Roberts‑Smith JA, Wheeler JA agreeing). I note Miller AJA also agreed with Roberts‑Smith JA on the question of s 31A: see [185].3.The evidence in question must be relevant before it can be admitted into evidence. This means it must be such as could rationally affect, directly or indirectly, the assessment of the probability of the existence of fact in issue in the proceeding. See Dair v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 72 [60] (Steytler P), which I note was quoted in Daniels v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 213 [47] (Buss JA, Martin CJ & Mazza JA agreeing).4.The evidence in question must also be of significant probative value, meaning it must be such as could rationally effect the assessment of the probability of the relevant facts and issues to a significant extent: ie, more is required than mere relevance but less than a substantial degree of relevance. It is a probative value which is important or of consequence. Significance of the probative value of the tendency evidence must depend on the nature of the facts in issue to which it is relevant and the significance or importance which that evidence may have an establishing the fact. See Dair [61] (Steytler P), quoted in Daniels [47] (Buss JA, Martin CJ & Mazza JA agreeing).5.Evidence Act s 31A(2)(b) requires the court to assess the degree of risk of unfairness at trial that will be occasioned by the admission of the evidence in question, the court having already found under s 31A(2)(a) that the evidence has significant probative value. See Dair [62] (Steytler P), as described in Daniels [50] (Buss JA).6.The risk of an unfair trial includes the risk that a jury might uncritically overvalue the probative effect of the evidence and conclude that an accused must have committed the offence charged simply because he or she has committed other offences, or has done, or his reputation to doing, other discreditable things, rather than confining the use of the evidence to a process of dispassionate, logical reasoning. See Donaldson [127] (Roberts‑Smith JA).7.The risk of an unfair trial also includes the risk that the jury will condemn the accused not because he is believed guilty of the present charge but because he has escaped punishment for other offences, that is, the reception of the evidence might result in a bias being formed against the accused which would taint the jury's decision. See Dair [63] (Steytler P).8.The risk of an unfair trial also includes the risk that the jury might become confused or distracted as it concentrated on resolving whether an accused actually committed the similar acts. See Dair [63] (Steytler P).9.When assessing the risk of an unfair trial for the purposes of Evidence Act s 31A(2)(b) the court will take into account any directions that might be given to the jury in an attempt to overcome the prejudice, and their likely effect on the jury. See Dair [64] (Steytler P), as described in Daniels [50] (Buss JA).10.However, it is important to bear in mind in respect of the matter of directions that, when propensity evidence is admissible as such, because it meets the requirements for the admission of evidence of that kind, a standard propensity warning will not be required. See Dair [64] (Steytler P). See also Daniels [94] (Buss JA), referring to Dair [64] among other authorities, and explaining that by 'standard propensity warning' is meant 'a warning of the kind described by McHugh J in KRM v The Queen [2001] HCA 11; (2001) 206 CLR 221 [2] ‑ [3]; and explaining also that the reason a standard propensity warning is not required is that 'the very purpose of the evidence is to prove that the accused is the type of person who is likely to have committed the offence or offences charged'.11.At the same time, when evidence is admissible under Evidence Act s 31A, but on the basis it was relationship evidence, a warning should be given if it is necessary, in the circumstances of the particular case, to avoid a perceptible risk of a miscarriage of justice. See Daniels [95] (Buss JA).12.Having identified the probative value of the evidence, and the degree of risk of an unfair trial, the court must make the comparison referred to in Evidence Act s 31A(2)(b): that comparison requires an assessment to be made whether fair‑minded people would think that the interests of justice require the admission of the evidence despite the risk; and for that purpose fair‑minded people are to be regarded as reasonable members of the general public who are not lawyers and who have informed themselves of at least the most basic considerations relevant to arriving at their conclusion founded on a fair understanding of all the relevant circumstances. See Dair [66] ‑ [67] (Steytler P), referred to in Daniels [50] (Buss JA).

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established