The State of Western Australia v Coates

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CRIMINAL

CITATION:   THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA -v- COATES [2007] WASC 307

CORAM:   BLAXELL J

HEARD:   2 - 4, 8 - 12, 15 - 19, 22 - 26, 29 - 31 OCTOBER & 12 ­ 16 NOVEMBER 2007

DELIVERED          :   19 DECEMBER 2007

FILE NO/S:   INS 171 of 1999

BETWEEN:   THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

State

AND

MARTIN GRAEME COATES
Accused

Catchwords:

Criminal law and procedure - Trial by judge alone - Indictment alleging wilful murder - Prosecution case dependent upon accomplice's evidence - Limited corroboration of accomplice by direct evidence - Extent of corroboration which arises by way of inference from circumstantial evidence

Criminal law and procedure - Admissibility of hearsay statement made by alleged co­offender in furtherance of common unlawful purpose

Criminal law and procedure - Whether a 'Jones v Dunkel' inference arises from prosecution's failure to adduce evidence which may have contradicted its principal witness

Legislation:

Criminal Code (WA), s 7

Result:

Verdict of guilty of wilful murder

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

State:     Mr S E Stone & Ms A J Burrows

Accused:     Mr L M Levy & Ms A L Capper

Solicitors:

State:     Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Accused:     Legal Aid (WA)

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Ahern v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 87

Baskerville [1916] 2 KB 658

Borg v R [1972] WAR 194

Doney v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 207

Dyers v The Queen (2002) 210 CLR 285

Edwards (1993) 178 CLR 193

Galluzzo (1986) 23 A Crim R 211

Humphry v The Queen [2003] WASCA 53

Johns v The Queen (1980) 143 CLR 108

Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298

Ling (1982) 6 A Crim R 429

Nanette [1982] VR 81

Punevski v The Queen [2000] WASCA 71

R v Demirian [1989] VR 97

R v GEC (2001) 3 VR 334

Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378

RPS v The Queen (1999 ‑ 2000) 199 CLR 620

Thorne (1977) 66 Cr App R 6

Tripodi v The Queen (1961) 104 CLR 1

Ward v The Queen (1997) WAR 68

Introduction................................................................................................................................ 5
An overview of the prosecution case.......................................................................................... 5
The defence case....................................................................................................................... 11
The general principles of law that apply.................................................................................. 12
Rulings on particular legal issues that have arisen during the trial.......................................... 20

  1. Admissibility of hearsay statements made in furtherance of the alleged crime........... 20

  2. Whether an adverse inference arises from the prosecution's failure to call certain evidence         21

  3. The admissibility of the video record of interview of Mr X........................................ 24

Background circumstances that are largely common ground.................................................. 25
Evidence as to the alleged incident at Gnangara Pine Plantation............................................ 27
The evidence of Mr X............................................................................................................... 28
Evidence from witnesses associated with Coates, Hoy or Nicholls......................................... 39
The evidence of motel staff...................................................................................................... 41
The medical evidence............................................................................................................... 44
The toxicological evidence....................................................................................................... 47
Other forensic evidence............................................................................................................ 50
Records of telephone calls on 22 and 23 August 1998............................................................ 51
The intercepted telephone call on 25 September 1998............................................................. 54
The arrest and interview of…

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Details
Case
[2007] WASC 307
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The State of Western Australia brought a case against Coates in the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The case involved an indictment for wilful murder, and the prosecution's case relied heavily on the testimony of an accomplice. The case raised issues concerning the extent of corroboration required for the accomplice's evidence, particularly whether circumstantial evidence could provide sufficient corroboration. Additionally, the case examined the admissibility of hearsay statements made by alleged co*offenders in furtherance of a common unlawful purpose. The court also considered whether an adverse inference could be drawn under the principle established in Jones v Dunkel when the prosecution failed to adduce evidence that could have contradicted its principal witness.

The court addressed the challenges of corroborating accomplice testimony, examining the extent to which circumstantial evidence could serve as corroboration. The court noted that while accomplice testimony needed corroboration, the extent and form this corroboration should take were open to interpretation, particularly in cases where direct evidence was limited. The court also examined the admissibility of hearsay statements made by alleged co*offenders, determining that such statements could be admissible if they were made in furtherance of the common unlawful purpose. The court further evaluated whether a Jones v Dunkel inference could be drawn from the prosecution's failure to adduce evidence that might have contradicted its principal witness. The court held that such an inference was generally inappropriate, as it was not for the court to speculate on what uncalled witnesses might have said.

The court ruled that the prosecution's failure to call certain witnesses or provide specific evidence did not warrant an adverse inference under the Jones v Dunkel principle. The court emphasised that it was not the role of the judge to question the prosecution's reasons for not calling a particular witness or to assess the sufficiency of the reasons provided. The court concluded that unless the prosecution's failure to call a witness was shown to be a breach of its duty to call all material witnesses, drawing an adverse inference was not appropriate. The court found that in the present case, the prosecution's decision not to call certain witnesses or provide specific evidence did not meet the threshold for such an inference. The court's reasoning underscored the limited scope of the Jones v Dunkel principle in criminal trials, particularly regarding the prosecution's discretion in selecting evidence to present.

The final orders of the court would have been determined based on the outcomes of these legal considerations. The court would have needed to decide whether the prosecution's case met the required standard of corroboration and the admissibility of the hearsay evidence. Additionally, the court would have assessed whether the failure to call certain witnesses warranted an adverse inference. The final orders would reflect these findings and could include a direction for a verdict of acquittal or a finding of guilt, depending on the court's determination of the evidence's sufficiency and admissibility.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Whether an adverse inference arises from the prosecution's failure to call certain evidence The defence asks me to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution (pursuant to Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298) by reason of its failure to lead evidence identifying the callers (or the subscribers of the relevant telephone numbers) in respect of the following two telephone calls: In the present trial there is not any evidence to indicate whether or not those calls were ever investigated. I also do not know whether any question concerning the identity of each caller or subscriber was asked of a relevant police witness at the preliminary hearing or the first trial. (However I assume that counsel would have informed me of this if it had occurred.) Notwithstanding this lack of evidence, the fact and significance of each telephone call would have been readily apparent to the defence upon close scrutiny of the depositions at any time over the past eight years. In all of these circumstances, the defence contends that I should draw a 'Jones v Dunkel' inference that the evidence in relation to each call would not have assisted the prosecution case. On the present state of the authorities, there is only limited scope for the application of the Jones v Dunkel principle in criminal trials. Because of the right to silence, it is usually inappropriate to draw an inference against an accused by reason of any failure to call evidence (RPS v The Queen (1999 ‑ 2000) 199 CLR 620, 632 ‑ 633). Similarly, any failure by the prosecution to call a witness will rarely justify a Jones v Dunkel inference. In Dyers v The Queen (2002) 210 CLR 285, Gaudron and Hayne JJ (with whom Kirby J agreed) held:[A]s a general rule, a trial judge should not direct the jury in a criminal trial that the prosecution would be expected to have called persons to give evidence other than those it did call as witnesses. It follows that, as a general rule, the judge should not direct the jury that they are entitled to infer that the evidence of those who were not called would not have assisted the prosecution. A direction not to speculate about what the person might have said should be given. Again, exceptions to these general rules will be rare and will arise only in cases where it is shown that the prosecution's failure to call the person in question was a breach of the prosecution's duty to call all material witnesses (291). The following 'deep-seated reasons' (as outlined in Dyers (295)) explain the underlying rationale for this general rule:As was held in R v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563 at 575, it is for the prosecution to decide what evidence it will adduce at trial. The trial judge may, but is not obliged to, question the prosecution in order to discover its reasons for declining to call a particular person, but the trial judge is not called upon to adjudicate the sufficiency of the reasons that the prosecution offers. Only if the trial judge has made such an inquiry and has been given answers considered by the judge to be unsatisfactory, would it seem that there would be any sufficient basis for a judge to tell the jury that it would have been reasonable to expect that the prosecution would call an identified person. There would then be real questions about whether, and how, the jury should be given the information put before the judge and then a further question about what directions the jury should be given in deciding for itself whether the prosecution could reasonably have been expected to call the person. Only when those questions had been answered would further directions of the kind contemplated by Jones v Dunkel have been open and they are not questions which arise in the present matter. Nor is it necessary to consider whether some direction of this kind can be given when a party, who has called a witness, does not ask questions of that witness about a particular topic (cf R v GEC (2001) 3 VR 334).

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established