The State of Western Australia v AH

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA -v- AH [2010] WASCA 172

CORAM:   MARTIN CJ

PULLIN JA
BUSS JA

HEARD:   2 MARCH 2010

DELIVERED          :   2 SEPTEMBER 2010

FILE NO/S:   CACV 113 of 2009

BETWEEN:   THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Appellant

AND

AH
First Respondent

GENDER REASSIGNMENT BOARD OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Second Respondent

FILE NO/S              :CACV 114 of 2009

BETWEEN             :THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Appellant

AND

AB
First Respondent

GENDER REASSIGNMENT BOARD OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Second Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :MS J TOOHEY (SENIOR MEMBER)

MR M ALLEN (SENIOR MEMBER)

DR L FARRELL (SENIOR SESSIONAL MEMBER)

Citation  :AB & AH and GENDER REASSIGNMENT BOARD OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2009] WASAT 152

File No  :GRA 1 of 2008, GRA 2 of 2008

Catchwords:

Statutory interpretation - Gender Reassignment Act 2000 (WA) - Application for recognition certificate - Interpretation of the words and phrases: 'reassignment procedure', 'gender characteristics', 'physical characteristics' and 'identified' - Beneficial and remedial legislation - Comparison of legislation and case law in other jurisdictions - Relevance of parliamentary debates

Legislation:

Births, Deaths & Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW), s 32A, s 32B
Births, Deaths & Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NZ), s 28(c)
Births, Deaths & Marriages Registration Act 1996 (NT), s 28A, s 28B
Births, Deaths & Marriages Registration Act 1996 (Vic), s 4, s 30A
Births, Deaths & Marriages Registration Act 1997 (ACT), s 23, s 24
Births, Deaths & Marriages Registration Act 1999 (Tas), s 3, s 28A
Births, Deaths & Marriages Registration Act 2003 (Qld), s 22, sch 2
Gender Reassignment Act 2000 (WA)
Gender Recognition Act 2004 (UK)
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 18, s 19(1), s 19(2), s 56
Marriage Act 1961 (Cth)
Sexual Reassignment Act 1988 (SA)
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 105(1), s 105(2)

Result:

Appeals allowed

Category:    A

Representation:

CACV 113 of 2009

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr G T W Tannin SC & Mr C S Bydder

First Respondent           :     Mr S Penglis & Mr A Golem

Second Respondent      :     No appearance

Solicitors:

Appellant:     State Solicitor for Western Australia

First Respondent           :     Freehills

Second Respondent      :     No appearance

CACV 114 of 2009

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr G T W Tannin SC & Mr C S Bydder

First Respondent           :     Mr S Penglis & Mr A Golem

Second Respondent      :     No appearance

Solicitors:

Appellant:     State Solicitor for Western Australia

First Respondent           :     Freehills

Second Respondent      :     No appearance

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

AK v The State of Western Australia [2008] HCA 8; (2008) 232 CLR 438

Attorney‑General (Commonwealth) v Kevin [2003] FamCA 94; (2003) 172 FLR 300

Attorney-General v Otahuhu Family Court [1995] 1 NZLR 603

Barns v Barns [2003] HCA 9; (2003) 214 CLR 169

Bellinger v Bellinger [2002] Fam 150; [2002] 1 All ER 311

Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] 2…

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Details
Case
[2010] WASCA 172
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The State of Western Australia was the plaintiff in a case before the Supreme Court of Western Australia, and the defendant was AH. The dispute centred on the interpretation of the Gender Reassignment Act 2000 (WA), particularly the definitions of "reassignment procedure", "gender characteristics", "physical characteristics", and "identified". The case revolved around AH's application for a recognition certificate under the Act, which would legally recognise AH's reassigned gender. The court had to determine the extent of the physical alterations required to meet the criteria for a recognition certificate.

The primary legal issue was the interpretation of the statutory terms "reassignment procedure", "gender characteristics", "physical characteristics", and "identified". The court needed to decide whether these terms required surgical intervention or if non-surgical means could suffice. The court also had to consider whether the Act's silence on the necessity of surgery meant that it was not a requirement. The respondents argued that the Act did not expressly require surgical procedures, and therefore, they should not be mandated to undergo surgery to obtain their recognition certificates.

The court examined the definitions and legislative objectives behind the Act. It found that the term "reassignment procedure" required alterations of genitals and other gender characteristics but did not necessitate the complete removal or obliteration of all gender characteristics of the sex from which the person is moving. The court also noted that the word "identified" in the Act meant "established" or "accepted as". The court concluded that while the Act did not expressly require surgical intervention, it did not rule out the possibility that surgery might be necessary in some cases. The court found that the degree of alteration required to be identified as a member of the opposite sex was a matter of fact to be determined on a case-by-case basis.

The court ordered that the case be remitted to the Tribunal for further consideration in light of the court's interpretation of the statutory terms. The court held that the Tribunal should determine the degree of alteration required for AH to be identified as a male, taking into account the definitions and legislative objectives of the Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Another point to note from the definition of reassignment procedure is that it only requires alteration of genitals and other gender characteristics. It does not require, for example, the removal or obliteration of all genital or gender characteristics of the sex from which the person is moving. However, this observation cannot be taken too far. In particular, it does not answer the critical question in this case, which is the degree of alteration required to result in each of AB and AH being identified as males. The last point I would draw from the definition of 'reassignment procedure' arises from the use of the word 'identified'. This word is used twice in the definition of 'reassignment procedure'. The first occasion upon which the word is used is in the context of a person being 'identified by a birth certificate as male or female'. The word is used in the definition of 'recognition certificate' in a similar context, where reference is made to a certificate… that identifies a person who has undergone a reassignment procedure as being of the sex to which the person has been reassigned. (s 3 of the Act) The second time the word is used is in a context which is virtually identical to the use of the word in the definition of 'gender characteristics' - namely, the identification of a person as male or female. The usage seen as the first occasion sheds light upon the meaning to be given to the word 'identified' when used in the definition of 'gender characteristics'. Given that the same word is used with reference to each of a birth certificate and a recognition certificate, it carries the connotation of 'established' or 'accepted as'. It is tempting to use the word 'recognised' as a synonym for 'identified', but the word 'recognised' itself bears shades of meaning. At one level, a person might be 'recognised' at a distance by their facial appearance, but at another level a person might be 'recognised' in the sense of accepted as having a particular quality or characteristic. It is only in that latter sense that, in my view, the meaning 'recognised' would be equivalent to the meaning properly given to the word 'identified' when used in the Act. The Tribunal placed considerable reliance upon the lack of any express legislative requirement that an applicant for a recognition certificate have undergone a surgical procedure. In submissions to this court, the respondents similarly place considerable emphasis upon that feature of the definition of 'reassignment procedure'. They invite the court to conclude that it was not the intention of Parliament that in order to obtain their recognition certificates they should be required to undergo surgery, altering either their external genital characteristics or their reproductive organs. This proposition can only be taken so far. The failure to expressly require surgical procedures in each and every case could be explained by a number of possible legislative objectives. One such objective might have been to allow for developments in medical science which would enable significant physical changes to be achieved through non‑surgical means, such as by drug treatment. Another possible legislative objective for not requiring surgery in every case might have been to recognise the myriad range of cases in which gender reassignment might arise, including cases of children born with malformation of the genitals, or perhaps some of the physical characteristics of both sexes, and for whom medical treatment may establish sufficient physical alteration for them to be identified as a member of the opposite sex. Where there are a number of possible explanations for the legislature's failure to expressly require surgical intervention in each and every case, it would be unsafe to fasten only upon the explanation proffered by the respondents.