JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA -v- AH [2010] WASCA 172
CORAM: MARTIN CJ
PULLIN JA
BUSS JA
HEARD: 2 MARCH 2010
DELIVERED : 2 SEPTEMBER 2010
FILE NO/S: CACV 113 of 2009
BETWEEN: THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Appellant
AND
AH
First RespondentGENDER REASSIGNMENT BOARD OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Second Respondent
FILE NO/S :CACV 114 of 2009
BETWEEN :THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Appellant
AND
AB
First RespondentGENDER REASSIGNMENT BOARD OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Second Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :MS J TOOHEY (SENIOR MEMBER)
MR M ALLEN (SENIOR MEMBER)
DR L FARRELL (SENIOR SESSIONAL MEMBER)
Citation :AB & AH and GENDER REASSIGNMENT BOARD OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2009] WASAT 152
File No :GRA 1 of 2008, GRA 2 of 2008
Catchwords:
Statutory interpretation - Gender Reassignment Act 2000 (WA) - Application for recognition certificate - Interpretation of the words and phrases: 'reassignment procedure', 'gender characteristics', 'physical characteristics' and 'identified' - Beneficial and remedial legislation - Comparison of legislation and case law in other jurisdictions - Relevance of parliamentary debates
Legislation:
Births, Deaths & Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW), s 32A, s 32B
Births, Deaths & Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NZ), s 28(c)
Births, Deaths & Marriages Registration Act 1996 (NT), s 28A, s 28B
Births, Deaths & Marriages Registration Act 1996 (Vic), s 4, s 30A
Births, Deaths & Marriages Registration Act 1997 (ACT), s 23, s 24
Births, Deaths & Marriages Registration Act 1999 (Tas), s 3, s 28A
Births, Deaths & Marriages Registration Act 2003 (Qld), s 22, sch 2
Gender Reassignment Act 2000 (WA)
Gender Recognition Act 2004 (UK)
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 18, s 19(1), s 19(2), s 56
Marriage Act 1961 (Cth)
Sexual Reassignment Act 1988 (SA)
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 105(1), s 105(2)
Result:
Appeals allowed
Category: A
Representation:
CACV 113 of 2009
Counsel:
Appellant: Mr G T W Tannin SC & Mr C S Bydder
First Respondent : Mr S Penglis & Mr A Golem
Second Respondent : No appearance
Solicitors:
Appellant: State Solicitor for Western Australia
First Respondent : Freehills
Second Respondent : No appearance
CACV 114 of 2009
Counsel:
Appellant: Mr G T W Tannin SC & Mr C S Bydder
First Respondent : Mr S Penglis & Mr A Golem
Second Respondent : No appearance
Solicitors:
Appellant: State Solicitor for Western Australia
First Respondent : Freehills
Second Respondent : No appearance
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
AK v The State of Western Australia [2008] HCA 8; (2008) 232 CLR 438
Attorney‑General (Commonwealth) v Kevin [2003] FamCA 94; (2003) 172 FLR 300
Attorney-General v Otahuhu Family Court [1995] 1 NZLR 603
Barns v Barns [2003] HCA 9; (2003) 214 CLR 169
Bellinger v Bellinger [2002] Fam 150; [2002] 1 All ER 311
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- Case
- [2010] WASCA 172
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue was the interpretation of the statutory terms "reassignment procedure", "gender characteristics", "physical characteristics", and "identified". The court needed to decide whether these terms required surgical intervention or if non-surgical means could suffice. The court also had to consider whether the Act's silence on the necessity of surgery meant that it was not a requirement. The respondents argued that the Act did not expressly require surgical procedures, and therefore, they should not be mandated to undergo surgery to obtain their recognition certificates.
The court examined the definitions and legislative objectives behind the Act. It found that the term "reassignment procedure" required alterations of genitals and other gender characteristics but did not necessitate the complete removal or obliteration of all gender characteristics of the sex from which the person is moving. The court also noted that the word "identified" in the Act meant "established" or "accepted as". The court concluded that while the Act did not expressly require surgical intervention, it did not rule out the possibility that surgery might be necessary in some cases. The court found that the degree of alteration required to be identified as a member of the opposite sex was a matter of fact to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
The court ordered that the case be remitted to the Tribunal for further consideration in light of the court's interpretation of the statutory terms. The court held that the Tribunal should determine the degree of alteration required for AH to be identified as a male, taking into account the definitions and legislative objectives of the Act.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Another point to note from the definition of reassignment procedure is that it only requires alteration of genitals and other gender characteristics. It does not require, for example, the removal or obliteration of all genital or gender characteristics of the sex from which the person is moving. However, this observation cannot be taken too far. In particular, it does not answer the critical question in this case, which is the degree of alteration required to result in each of AB and AH being identified as males. The last point I would draw from the definition of 'reassignment procedure' arises from the use of the word 'identified'. This word is used twice in the definition of 'reassignment procedure'. The first occasion upon which the word is used is in the context of a person being 'identified by a birth certificate as male or female'. The word is used in the definition of 'recognition certificate' in a similar context, where reference is made to a certificate… that identifies a person who has undergone a reassignment procedure as being of the sex to which the person has been reassigned. (s 3 of the Act) The second time the word is used is in a context which is virtually identical to the use of the word in the definition of 'gender characteristics' - namely, the identification of a person as male or female. The usage seen as the first occasion sheds light upon the meaning to be given to the word 'identified' when used in the definition of 'gender characteristics'. Given that the same word is used with reference to each of a birth certificate and a recognition certificate, it carries the connotation of 'established' or 'accepted as'. It is tempting to use the word 'recognised' as a synonym for 'identified', but the word 'recognised' itself bears shades of meaning. At one level, a person might be 'recognised' at a distance by their facial appearance, but at another level a person might be 'recognised' in the sense of accepted as having a particular quality or characteristic. It is only in that latter sense that, in my view, the meaning 'recognised' would be equivalent to the meaning properly given to the word 'identified' when used in the Act. The Tribunal placed considerable reliance upon the lack of any express legislative requirement that an applicant for a recognition certificate have undergone a surgical procedure. In submissions to this court, the respondents similarly place considerable emphasis upon that feature of the definition of 'reassignment procedure'. They invite the court to conclude that it was not the intention of Parliament that in order to obtain their recognition certificates they should be required to undergo surgery, altering either their external genital characteristics or their reproductive organs. This proposition can only be taken so far. The failure to expressly require surgical procedures in each and every case could be explained by a number of possible legislative objectives. One such objective might have been to allow for developments in medical science which would enable significant physical changes to be achieved through non‑surgical means, such as by drug treatment. Another possible legislative objective for not requiring surgery in every case might have been to recognise the myriad range of cases in which gender reassignment might arise, including cases of children born with malformation of the genitals, or perhaps some of the physical characteristics of both sexes, and for whom medical treatment may establish sufficient physical alteration for them to be identified as a member of the opposite sex. Where there are a number of possible explanations for the legislature's failure to expressly require surgical intervention in each and every case, it would be unsafe to fasten only upon the explanation proffered by the respondents.