The Queen v Prasad Gorladenchearau - [2012] HCASL 102

THE QUEEN
v
PRASAD GORLADENCHEARAU
[2012] HCASL 102
M5/2012

The respondent pleaded guilty to offences arising out of a motor vehicle collision. Three persons suffered injury in the collision. One sustained traumatic brain injury, leaving her permanently incapacitated. The collision was caused by the respondent driving into a major intersection at an excessive speed through a red traffic light. He was significantly affected by alcohol at the time.
The sentencing judge (Judge Gullaci) imposed an overall sentence of six and a half years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of four years.
The respondent appealed against the severity of sentence to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Maxwell P, Ashley JA and Ross AJA). The Court was unanimous in holding that the sentence of five years imposed on the first count, which charged an offence of negligently causing serious injury, was manifestly excessive. Maxwell P came to this conclusion by reference to current Victorian sentencing practice. Ashley JA and Ross AJA in their joint reasons agreed that the sentence was manifestly excessive. Their Honours rested this conclusion more on the presence of a number of mitigating circumstances than on consideration of current sentencing practice.
The Crown applies for special leave to appeal. This Court should be slow to grant special leave against the unanimous holding of an intermediate court that a sentence is manifestly excessive. In this case the Crown seeks to challenge Maxwell P's approach to the significance of current sentencing practice in the appellate review of sentence. In circumstances in which that consideration was not prominent to the reasoning of the other two members of the Court, it is not appropriate to grant the leave that is sought.
The application is dismissed.
Pursuant to r 41.11.1 we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order dismissing the application.

J.D. Heydon
20 June 2012 V.M. Bell

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

AGLC: The Queen v Prasad Gorladenchearau [2012] HCASL 102
Case: [2012] HCASL 102
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involves the respondent, Prasad Gorladenchearau, who pleaded guilty to causing a motor vehicle collision that resulted in serious injuries to three individuals. One of the victims suffered a traumatic brain injury that left her permanently incapacitated. The incident occurred when the respondent drove into a major intersection at an excessive speed while under the influence of alcohol, disregarding a red traffic light. The sentencing judge, Judge Gullaci, imposed a sentence of six and a half years' imprisonment, with a non-parole period of four years. The respondent appealed against the severity of the sentence to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria. The Court of Appeal found the sentence of five years imposed on the first count, which charged the respondent with negligently causing serious injury, to be manifestly excessive. The decision was unanimous among the judges, with Maxwell P reaching the conclusion by reference to current Victorian sentencing practice, while Ashley JA and Ross AJA considered the presence of mitigating circumstances in their decision.

The primary legal issue in this case was whether the severity of the sentence imposed on the respondent was manifestly excessive. The Court of Appeal found that the sentence was indeed manifestly excessive, with differing reasoning among the judges. The Crown subsequently applied for special leave to appeal, seeking to challenge the Court of Appeal's consideration of current sentencing practice in its decision. The Court needed to determine whether the Crown's application for special leave should be granted, considering the unanimous holding of the intermediate court on the matter.

The Court dismissed the Crown's application for special leave, emphasising the importance of being cautious when granting special leave against the unanimous decision of an intermediate court that a sentence is manifestly excessive. The Court further noted that the consideration of current sentencing practice was not a prominent factor in the reasoning of two of the three judges on the Court of Appeal. Consequently, it was deemed inappropriate to grant the leave that was sought by the Crown. The Court's decision was based on the need to maintain consistency and respect the findings of the intermediate court, while also acknowledging the importance of the principle of finality in sentencing matters.

Orders