The Queen v Christopher Scott Gibbs - [2004] ACTSC 63

THE QUEEN v CHRISTOPHER SCOTT GIBBS [2004] ACTSC 63 (29 JULY 2004)

EVIDENCE – coincidence rule – ss 98, 101 Evidence Act 1995 – probative value of evidence – prejudicial effect – dangers of improbability reasoning and circularity of reasoning.
EVIDENCE – coincidence evidence – similar facts – whether evidence of one incident admissible in relation to another – whether offences charged are ‘substantially and relevantly similar’ – probative value of the evidence does not substantially outweigh the prejudicial effect.

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 98, s 101, s 116, s 137

Evidence Regulations, reg 6

J D Heydon, Cross on Evidence, 6^th Aust ed, Butterworths, Sydney, vol 1

Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461

R v Ellis [2003] NSWCCA 319, unreported, 5 November 2003

W v R (2001) 189 ALR 633

Australian Law Reform Commission, Interim Report 26, Vol 1

Director of Public Prosecutions v Boardman [1975] AC 421

Piragoff, Similar Fact Evidence, Carswell, Toronto (1981) 171

Odgers, Uniform Evidence Law, 5^th ed, Law Book Co, Sydney

R v Blackledge [1965] VR 397

R v Vaitos (1981) 4 A Crim R 238

R v John W [1998] 2 Cr App R 289

R v Delgado-Guerra [2002] 2 Qd R 384

R v McGranaghan [1995] 1 Cr App R 559

R v Downey [1995] 1 Cr App R 547

Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573

Perry v The Queen (1982) 150 CLR 580

No. SCC 102 of 2003

Judge: Gray J
Supreme Court of the ACT

Date: 29 July 2004

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE  )
  )  No. SCC 102 of 2003
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY  )

THE QUEEN
against
CHRISTOPHER SCOTT GIBBS

RULING ON VOIR DIRE

Judge:  Gray J
Date:  29 July 2004
Place:  Canberra

THE COURT RULES THAT:

The evidence as to one count is not admissible in aid of proof of the other.

The accused is charged by indictment with two counts involving an act of indecency, one alleging the commission of the offence on 9 January 2003 and the other on 15 February 2003. In one case the complainant was aged 22 years and in the other 14 years. The accused sought that the counts be severed and tried separately. The prosecution takes the view that the evidence on one count is admissible on the other because of the improbability of the events occurring coincidentally (the coincidence rule ss 98, 101 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (the Evidence Act)). Accordingly, a ruling was sought on the voir dire by the parties as to the admissibility of the evidence on one of the counts to the other on the basis that if I held a preliminary view that evidence on one count was not admissible on the other, the prosecution would sever the counts on the indictment.

The proposed evidence in respect of each count

In accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act, a notice of intention to adduce coincidence evidence was given in accordance…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading The Queen v Christopher Scott Gibbs

Details

AGLC: The Queen v Christopher Scott Gibbs [2004] ACTSC 63
Case: [2004] ACTSC 63
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Queen brought charges against Christopher Scott Gibbs for two counts of indecent acts committed against two complainants on separate occasions. The court ruled on a voir dire concerning the admissibility of evidence relating to one count being used in relation to the other. The court had to determine whether the coincidence rule applied under ss 98 and 101 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), which governs the admissibility of coincidence evidence. The accused sought a severance of the counts on the indictment, while the prosecution argued that the evidence of one count should be admissible in relation to the other due to the improbability of the events occurring coincidentally.

The court considered whether the events were substantially and relevantly similar and whether the circumstances in which they occurred were substantially similar. The court found that while there were similarities between the two incidents, there were also significant differences. The court concluded that the evidence did not have sufficient probative force to prove that Gibbs was involved in either of the incidents. Furthermore, the court found that the evidence could lead to prejudicial effects, including the risk of improbability reasoning and circularity of reasoning. The court held that the prejudicial effects outweighed the probative value of the evidence, and therefore, the evidence on one count was not admissible in aid of proof of the other. The court will hear counsel further as to the course that the matter should now take.

Orders