The Director of Public Prosecutions v Benjamin Roder (a pseudonym)

Link copied
Case Copied 94 min read

[2024] HCATrans 014

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Melbourne  No M85 of 2023

B e t w e e n -

THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

Applicant

and

BENJAMIN RODER (A PSEUDONYM)

Respondent

GAGELER CJ
GORDON J
EDELMAN J
STEWARD J
GLEESON J
JAGOT J
BEECH‑JONES J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON WEDNESDAY, 13 MARCH 2024, AT 10.04 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MS R.J. ORR, KC, Solicitor‑General for the State of Victoria:   If the Court pleases, I appear with MS S.C. CLANCY and MR M‑Q.T. NGUYEN for the applicant.  (instructed by Office of Public Prosecutions (Vic))

MR T. KASSIMATIS, KC:   May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend MR C.K. WAREHAM for the respondent.  (instructed by Dribbin & Brown Criminal Lawyers)

GAGELER CJ:   Thank you, Mr Kassimatis.  Ms Solicitor.

MS ORR:   If the Court pleases, this application concerns the directions that can be given to a jury in a Victorian criminal trial about what must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.  Can I start with some introductory remarks before explaining how I propose to structure these submissions.  The respondent is charged with 27 counts of sexual offending against two complainants, each of whom was his stepchild.  There are broadly three categories of charges:  incest charges, indecent act charges, and indecent assault charges.

The prosecution gave notice that it intended to adduce evidence to establish that the respondent had a tendency to have a sexual interest in each of the complainants, and a tendency to act in particular ways, including by engaging in sexual activity with each of them.  The evidence to be adduced includes evidence of the conduct of the accused on the 27 occasions that are the subject of a charge as well as six instances of uncharged sexual misconduct.  The cross‑admissibility of all tendency evidence has been conceded. 

The question that arises in this proceeding is whether, where the accused seeks to rely on evidence of conduct of the accused to establish that the accused has a particular tendency, and the evidence of that conduct is also relied on to directly prove the conduct element of a charge, section 61 of the Jury Directions Act (Vic) permits a trial judge to direct a jury that they can only use that evidence to assess whether the accused had the asserted tendency if they are first satisfied to the criminal standard that the accused engaged in that conduct.  That is the subject of the evidence.  Section 61 provides that:

the only matters that the trial judge may direct the jury must be proved beyond reasonable doubt are –

(a)the elements of the offence charged or an alternative offence; and

(b)     the absence of any relevant defence.

The trial judge ruled that he would direct the jury not to take account of any of the charged conduct as tendency evidence unless they were first satisfied of it beyond reasonable doubt.  That meant that the jury would…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read The Director of Public Prosecutions v Benjamin Roder (a pseu... and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2024] HCATrans 14
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) appealed to the High Court of Australia against a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appeal concerned the interpretation and application of provisions within the *Crimes Act 1900* (NSW) relating to the offence of murder and the defence of provocation. The central dispute revolved around whether the defence of provocation could be relied upon by an accused person where the unlawful killing was committed by means other than the accused's own direct act.

The High Court was required to determine whether the defence of provocation, as codified in section 23 of the *Crimes Act 1900* (NSW), applied to a situation where the accused's conduct, while intended to cause serious harm, did not directly cause the death of the victim. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the defence was available when the death resulted from the victim's own actions in response to the accused's provocation, or from the actions of a third party. This involved an examination of the statutory language and its interaction with common law principles concerning causation and criminal responsibility.

The High Court held that the defence of provocation, as provided by section 23 of the *Crimes Act 1900* (NSW), is confined to situations where the accused's own unlawful act causes the death of the victim. The court reasoned that the statutory language, particularly the requirement that the accused "did the act which caused the death of the other person," necessitates a direct causal link between the accused's conduct and the death. Consequently, the defence is not available where the death is caused by the victim's own actions or by the actions of a third party, even if those actions were a response to the accused's provocation. The appeal was allowed, and the DPP's appeal was upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established