[2022] HCATrans 199
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M26 of 2022
B e t w e e n -
STEPHEN THALER
Applicant
and
COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
GORDON J
EDELMAN J
GLEESON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA AND BY VIDEO CONNECTION
ON FRIDAY, 11 NOVEMBER 2022, AT 12.30 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
GORDON J: In accordance with the protocol for remote hearings, I will announce the appearances of the parties.
MR D. SHAVIN, KC appears with MS C.I. CUNLIFFE for the applicant. (instructed by Allens)
MS S.J. GODDARD, SC appears with MR H.P.T. BEVAN, SC and MR G.S‑C. TSANG for the respondent. (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
GORDON J: Yes, Mr Shavin.
MR SHAVIN: If the Court pleases. This application arises out of a patent application by Dr Thaler by an invention made by an artificial intelligence, which he has called DABUS. It was created, programmed and owned by him. Although any person may apply for a patent, the Commissioner of Patents deemed the application lapsed because Dr Thaler, the applicant, did not nominate a human inventor. Dr Thaler was required to nominate an inventor by reason of regulation 3.2C(2)(aa) of the Patents Regulations, and the Court will find a copy of that at application book pages 107 to 108.
An appeal to the Federal Court was allowed by Justice Beach, the Full Federal Court overturned that decision. This application is brought seeking leave to appeal from the decision of the Full Federal Court. It will determine whether inventions invented by artificial intelligence are patent‑eligible subject matter. This case turns on the meaning of the word “inventor”. “Inventor” is not defined in the Patents Act. Section 15(1)(a) does not purport to be and is not a definition of the term “inventor”. It simply defines a class of inventors that may be granted a patent, and that class is a class of inventors who is a person ‑ ‑ ‑
EDELMAN J: Mr Shavin, do you accept that an assumption underlying section 15 is that every invention must have an inventor?
MR SHAVIN: Yes.
EDELMAN J: Was it common ground below that the applicant was not the inventor?
MR SHAVIN: Yes. The applicant says he was not the inventor ‑ ‑ ‑
GORDON J: So, Mr Shavin, your answer to that question, is that because he chose to, in effect, prepare and file his application in a particular way?
MR SHAVIN: Yes, although Dr Thaler says that the machine was the inventor. He programmed the computer but he said that the way in which the computer was programmed is it acted independently in its selection of subject matter and in its generation of the invention. So, he says that he truly was not the inventor, but DABUS, the artificial intelligence, he says was the proper inventor.
EDELMAN J: It may be, though, that the binary possibilities that your submission sets up, which…
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- Case
- [2022] HCATrans 199
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before Gleeson J was whether an artificial intelligence (AI) system, specifically a device named DABUS, could be considered an "inventor" for the purposes of the *Patents Act 1990* (Cth). This required the Court to interpret the meaning of "inventor" within the statutory framework of Australian patent law.
Gleeson J reasoned that the *Patents Act* defines an inventor as a person who invents. The ordinary meaning of "person" in Australian law, particularly in legislation, refers to a natural person. While the Act does not explicitly exclude non-natural persons, the consistent use of "person" and "individual" throughout the *Patents Act* and related legislation, as well as established legal principles, indicated that an inventor must be a natural person. The Court found no basis to depart from this ordinary meaning, nor did it find that the Act contemplated or provided for the inventorship of an AI.
Consequently, Gleeson J dismissed the application, upholding the Commissioner's decision that DABUS, as an AI, could not be recognised as an inventor under the *Patents Act 1990* (Cth).
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