IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
QG7219 OF 1998
BETWEEN:
MAUREEN TERRY
APPLICANTAND:
OFFICIAL RECEIVER
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
COOPER J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 SEPTEMBER 1998
WHERE MADE:
BRISBANE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the application including reserved costs, if any, to be taxed if not agreed.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
QG7219 OF 1998
BETWEEN:
MAUREEN TERRY
APPLICANTAND:
OFFICIAL RECEIVER
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
COOPER J
DATE:
18 SEPTEMBER 1998
PLACE:
BRISBANE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application for costs by the applicant Maureen Terry consequent upon the setting aside, by consent, of a notice issued pursuant to s 139ZQ of the Bankruptcy Act (Cth) 1966 (“the Act”). The notice served called upon the applicant to pay a substantial sum of money in respect of an interest in jointly-owned property being transferred to her by her husband, the bankrupt, in circumstances in which it is said or it was alleged that the transfer was to avoid the consequences of the bankruptcy and so as to deprive the bankrupt’s estate of the interest in the property.
The affidavit material in support of the application includes material from Mrs Terry setting out the circumstances surrounding the transfer. Briefly put, they are that the property was acquired by her from her own funds, the bankrupt providing none of the purchase price such that it was treated as between the parties and, in equity, has been property held jointly by her as to her own interest and by the bankrupt on a resulting trust in favour of her, she being the sole provider of the purchaser funds and improvement funds. The solicitors for the applicant wrote to the Trustee outlining certain formal defects in respect of the notice and challenging the basis upon which it was asserted in the notice relied upon by the Trustee as entitling him to set aside the transaction as void as against him.
The material at that stage did not particularise the basis upon which Mrs Terry contended that she was not obliged to make any payment as called for in the notice. The solicitors for the Trustee, by letter of 4 June 1998 responded to the applicant’s solicitors’ facsimile of 1 June 1998 indicating that nothing had persuaded the writer that there were any substantive grounds to the objection to the notice. However, it concluded:
“Points 5 and 6 are noted, but unless you provide me with particulars by 5 pm on 5 June I shall be proceeding with my request to the Deputy Official Receiver to amend the notice issued pursuant to section 139QZ”.
The notice required payment be made to Mr Fletcher the Trustee, by 17 June 1998, and continued:
“Or if you satisfy William John Fletcher that such is not possible, you are required to have made by that date arrangements which…
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- AGLC
- Terry, Maureen v Official Receiver [1998] FCA 1341
- Case
- [1998] FCA 1341
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the statutory demand was validly issued and if there were grounds to set it aside. The court had to consider the statutory criteria under which a statutory demand could be challenged and whether any of these applied in the circumstances of this case. Specifically, the court examined whether the demand was issued for a genuine purpose, whether the amount claimed was undisputed, and if the applicant had a genuine defence to the claim.
The court found that the statutory demand was indeed validly issued and that there were no grounds to set it aside. The applicant did not provide sufficient evidence to support her claim that the demand was not issued for a genuine purpose or that she had a defence to the claim. The court concluded that the statutory demand met the necessary requirements under the relevant legislation and dismissed the applicant’s application to set it aside. The court also ordered that the respondent be compensated for the costs of the application, which were to be taxed if not agreed upon by the parties.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the application including reserved costs, if any, to be taxed if not agreed.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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