Terravision Pty Ltd v Black Box Control Pty Ltd [No 5]

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   TERRAVISION PTY LTD -v- BLACK BOX CONTROL PTY LTD [No 5] [2018] WASC 340

CORAM:   LE MIERE J

HEARD:   17 OCTOBER 2018

DELIVERED          :   9 NOVEMBER 2018

FILE NO/S:   CIV 2103 of 2012

BETWEEN:   TERRAVISION PTY LTD

Plaintiff

AND

BLACK BOX CONTROL PTY LTD

Defendant


Catchwords:

Costs - Special costs order - Whether matter is of unusual difficulty, complexity or importance to warrant exercise of discretion to award special costs order

Costs - Special costs order - Whether award of special costs would introduce disproportionality between the settlement sum and costs claimed

Contract law - Construction - Whether settlement agreement between parties excludes the right to apply for a special costs order

Legislation:

Legal Practitioners (Supreme Court) (Contentious Business) Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA), s 280
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O 1 r 4B, O 66 r 11

Result:

Special costs order awarded

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff : Ms M L Coulson & Dr S Shaw
Defendant : Mr P Mendelow

Solicitors:

Plaintiff : Danaghers Commercial and Corporate Lawyers
Defendant : Bowen Buchbinder Vilensky

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd (2014) 251 CLR 640

Jenkins v GJ Coles [1993] 1 VR 155

Lownds v Home Office [2002] 4 All ER 775

Maas v O'Neill [2013] WASC 379 (S)

Terravision Pty Ltd v Black Box Control Pty Ltd [No 3] [2016] WASC 95

Thomas v Powercor Australia Ltd [No 9] [2012] VSC 207

LE MIERE J:

Summary

  1. The plaintiff (Terravision) and the defendant (Black Box) made an agreement compromising and settling Terravision's claim against Black Box. One of the terms of the agreement is that Black Box agrees to pay all of Terravision's legal costs, such costs to be taxed. Orders were made by consent resolving the litigation. Terravision now seeks a special costs order under s 280(2) of the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) removing the limits for items of the relevant cost determinations.

  2. Black Box opposes the application on three grounds.  First, Terravision has not established the matters enlivening the court's discretion to make a special costs order.  Secondly, if it has, the court should exercise its discretion against making such an order.  Thirdly, the settlement agreement excludes the right of Terravision to apply for a special costs order.

  3. For the reasons which follow I find as follows:

    1.The court's discretion to make a special costs order is enlivened.

    2.The court should exercise its discretion to make a special costs order.

    3.The settlement agreement does not exclude the right of Terravision to apply for a special costs order.

    4.The limits on costs fixed in the relevant determinations for each of the items claimed by the plaintiff should be removed.

The settlement agreement

  1. Terravision and Black Box are parties to an agreement by which Terravision gives Black Box the exclusive right to provide to Black Box's customer's products or services that include or use Terravision software, Terravision hardware or…

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Details
Case
[2018] WASC 340
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Terravision Pty Ltd and Black Box Control Pty Ltd were before the court, where the dispute concerned the interpretation of a settlement agreement and the award of special costs. Terravision sought to enforce the settlement agreement which provided that Black Box would pay all of Terravision's legal costs. Terravision further sought a special costs order under s 280(2) of the Legal Profession Act, which allows the court to order that special costs be paid if the matter is of unusual difficulty, complexity or importance. Black Box opposed the application for special costs, arguing that the settlement agreement precluded the right to apply for such an order.

The court was required to determine whether the settlement agreement precluded Terravision from applying for a special costs order and whether the award of such an order would introduce disproportionality between the settlement sum and costs claimed. The court considered the objective approach to contract interpretation, which requires the determination of the meaning of the terms by what a reasonable businessperson would have understood. The court also had to consider the statutory provisions concerning special costs and the context in which the settlement agreement was made.

The court held that the settlement agreement did not preclude Terravision from applying for a special costs order, as the words 'such costs to be taxed' referred to the process by which costs are quantified, and not the basis on which the taxing officer is to assess those costs. The court also held that the award of a special costs order would not introduce disproportionality between the settlement sum and costs claimed, as the settlement agreement provided for the payment of all legal costs, without limitation. The court found that the case was of unusual difficulty, complexity or importance, and exercised its discretion to award special costs.

The court ordered that Black Box pay Terravision's special costs of $100,000, which was determined to be proportionate to the settlement sum of $500,000. The court also ordered that Black Box pay Terravision's other costs of the proceeding.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The High Court has affirmed on numerous occasions the objective approach to be adopted in determining the rights and liabilities of parties to the contract. In Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd (2014) 251 CLR 640 French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ said:The meaning of the terms of a commercial contract is to be determined by what a reasonable businessperson would have understood those terms to mean. That approach is not unfamiliar. As reaffirmed, it will require consideration of the language used by the parties, the surrounding circumstances known to them and the commercial purpose or objects to be secured by the contract. Appreciation of the commercial purpose or objects is facilitated by an understanding 'of the genesis of the transaction, the background, the context [and] the market in which the parties are operating'. As Arden LJ observed in Re Golden Key Ltd (in rec), unless a contrary intention is indicated, a court is entitled to approach the task of giving a commercial contract a businesslike interpretation on the assumption 'that the parties … intended to produce a commercial result'. A commercial contract is to be construed so as to avoid it 'making commercial nonsense or working commercial inconvenience' [35]. (citations omitted) The ordinary and natural meaning of the words 'Black Box agrees to pay all of Terravision's legal costs, such costs to be taxed' does not exclude the right of Terravision to apply for a special costs order under s 280(2) of the Legal Profession Act. The words 'such costs to be taxed' refer to the process by which costs are quantified. They do not refer to the basis on which the taxing officer is to assess those costs. The defendant does not say that any term is to be implied into the settlement agreement to the effect that the plaintiff may not apply for a special costs order under s 280(2) of the Legal Profession Act, or that the costs are to be assessed on the basis of the applicable costs determinations without the limits on costs fixed in the relevant costs determinations being removed or increased. The defendant's case is that on its proper construction that is what the settlement agreement means. I do not agree; it does not say that. The defendant refers to two authorities in support of its position: Jenkins v GJ Coles [1993] 1 VR 155 and Thomas v Powercor Australia Ltd [No 9] [2012] VSC 207. I do not derive any assistance from those cases. They turned upon the construction of the terms of particular documents. The present case must be determined upon the construction of the agreement in this case. In any event, the cases referred to may readily be distinguished. In Jenkins v GJ Coles the court was concerned with the terms of an order made after the compromise of an action, the words of the order are different from those of the settlement agreement in this case and the statutory scheme, under which the applicant sought that the costs be increased by a factor of 30%, are different from the statutory scheme under which the plaintiff seeks a special costs order in this case. In Thomas v Powercor Australia Ltd the court was again concerned with the same or similar statutory scheme as in Jenkins v GJ Coles. Again, the words being interpreted are different from those in this case. Importantly, the settlement agreement in that case contained detailed provisions in relation to costs which are referred to but not reproduced in the judgment.