FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Telstra Corporation Ltd v State of Queensland [2013] FCA 1296
Citation: Telstra Corporation Ltd v State of Queensland [2013] FCA 1296 Parties: TELSTRA CORPORATION LTD (ACN 051 775 556) v THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND File number: QUD 202 of 2012 Judge: RANGIAH J Date of judgment: 3 December 2013 Corrigendum: 4 December 2013 Catchwords: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – respondent seeks declaration that applicant is obliged to comply with regulations pending the determination of their validity – whether there is irrebuttable presumption that provisions of delegated legislation under challenge are valid unless and until declared invalid
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether applicant should have opportunity to call evidence to demonstrate the strength of its case for invalidity – whether declaration sought by the respondent is interlocutory or final – whether the Court should refuse the declaration in the exercise of its discretion
Legislation: Constitution s 109
Land Act 1994 (Qld)
Telecommunications Act1997 (Cth) cl 44 of Sch 3
Federal Court Rules 2011(Cth) r 30.01(1), 1.35
Land Regulation 2009 (Qld)Cases cited: Castlemaine Tooheys Limited v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148 applied
Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540 followed
Ho v Grigor (2006) 151 FCR 236 followed
Hoffman-La Roche v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [1975] AC 295 applied
Leung v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 150 ALR 76 followed
Magman International Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1991) 32 FCR 1 followed
R v Wicks [1998] AC 92 applied
Warramunda Village Inc v Pryde (2002) 116 FCR 58 appliedDate of hearing: 30 October 2013 Date of last submissions: 30 October 2013 Place: Brisbane Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 40 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr P Hanks QC with Mr N Wood Solicitor for the Applicant: King & Wood Mallesons Counsel for the Respondent: Mr P Flanagan QC with Mr J Horton Solicitor for the Respondent: Crown Law FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Telstra Corporation Ltd v State of Queensland [2013] FCA 1296
CORRIGENDUM
1.Paragraph 12 is amended by deleting the word “not” as it appears after the word “cannot”.
2.Paragraph 12 is amended by deleting the word “that” as it appears after the word “presumption”.
3.Paragraph 20 is amended by deleting the phrase “The duty of the Crown is to see” and replacing it with “The duty of the Crown to see”.
4.Paragraph 29 is amended by inserting the word “of” between the words “result” and “the non-compliance”.
5.Paragraph 30 is amended by deleting the word “injunction” and replacing it with the word “declaration”.
I certify that the preceding five (5) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Corrigendum to the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Rangiah. Associate:
Dated: 4 December 2013
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
QUD 202 of 2012
BETWEEN: TELSTRA CORPORATION LTD (ACN 051 775 556)
ApplicantAND: THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND
Respondent
JUDGE:
RANGIAH J
DATE OF ORDER:
3…
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- Case
- [2013] FCA 1296
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court revolve around the validity and enforceability of the Land Regulation 2009 (Qld) in light of the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth). Specifically, the court must determine whether there is a presumption that the regulation is valid unless declared invalid by a competent court, whether Telstra should be allowed to present evidence to support its claim of invalidity, and whether the sought declaration is interlocutory or final in nature. Additionally, the court considers whether it should exercise its discretion to refuse the declaration based on the circumstances of the case.
The court examined the principle of legislative validity and the presumption of validity of delegated legislation, referencing the High Court’s decision in Castlemaine Tooheys Limited v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148. It noted that, while there is generally a presumption of validity, the balance of convenience may lead to a different outcome in certain circumstances. The court acknowledged the complexity of the application due to the form of relief sought by the State and found no compelling precedent supporting a declaration that Telstra must comply with the regulation pending the determination of its validity. The court concluded that the application for a declaration was inappropriate given the nature of the relief sought and the arguments presented.
The court found in favour of Telstra, determining that there is no irrebuttable presumption that the Land Regulation is valid unless declared invalid. It held that Telstra should have the opportunity to present evidence to support its claim of invalidity, and that the declaration sought by the State was interlocutory in nature. Ultimately, the court exercised its discretion to refuse the declaration, ruling that Telstra is not required to pay rent at the rates prescribed by the Land Regulation until the validity of the regulation is determined.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The issues that fall to be decided are these:(a)whether there is an irrebuttable presumption that the provisions of the Land Regulation under challenge under cl 44(1) of the Telecommunications Act and s 109 of the Constitution are valid unless and until declared invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction;(b)whether Telstra should have the opportunity to call evidence to demonstrate the strength of its case that the relevant provisions of the Land Regulation are invalid, and whether such evidence could operate to avoid the making of the declaration sought by the State;(c)whether the declaration sought by the State is interlocutory or final;(d)whether the Court should refuse the declaration in the exercise of its discretion. Consideration The State was unable to cite any case in which a court has made a declaration to the effect that a party is required to comply with legislation pending the determination of its validity. The State did not explain why it sought a declaration rather than a mandatory interlocutory injunction. Much of the complexity involved in the present application results from the form of relief sought by the State. The State relies upon Castlemaine Tooheys Limited v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148 in support of its proposition that there is an irrebuttable presumption that delegated legislation is valid unless and until declared invalid. In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that South Australian legislation contravened s 92 of the Constitution and was invalid. The plaintiffs sought interlocutory injunctions restraining the State from enforcing the legislation against them. Mason ACJ (as his Honour was then) held at 155-156:In Canada the courts have taken the view that only in exceptional circumstances will an interlocutory injunction be granted to restrain enforcement of a statute challenged on constitutional grounds. In Morgentaler v Ackroyd (1983) 42 OR (2d) 659 at 668 Linden J said: “… the balance of convenience normally dictates that those who challenge the constitutional validity of laws must obey those laws pending the court's decision. If the law is eventually proclaimed unconstitutional, then it need no longer be complied with, but until that time, it must be respected and this court will not enjoin its enforcement. Such a course of action seems to be the best method of ensuring that our society will continue to respect the law at the same time as it is being challenged in an orderly way in the courts. This does not mean, however, that in exceptional circumstances this court is precluded from granting an interim injunction to prevent grave injustice, but that will be rare indeed.” …It may be that the last sentence in the passage quoted from Morgentaler v Ackroyd states the position too strongly against the plaintiff who seeks an interlocutory injunction in Australia. The decisions in this court to which I have already referred demonstrate that there are a variety of situations in which the court, on a proper balance of convenience, will restrain enforcement of a statute in aid of a plaintiff's constitutional right. In arriving at a balance of convenience the court will take into account the seriousness of the conduct enjoined by the statute and the damage to the public interest that may be caused by restraining its enforcement. And in some cases the balance of convenience may be affected by the court's perception or evaluation of the strength of the plaintiff's case for invalidity. But, subject to these qualifications there can be no reason to doubt the correctness of the general thrust of the comments in the passage which I have quoted. In the absence of compelling grounds, it is the duty of the court to respect, indeed, to defer to, the enactment of the legislature until that enactment is adjudged ultra vires.