Telstra Corporation Ltd v State of Queensland

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Telstra Corporation Ltd v State of Queensland [2013] FCA 1296

Citation: Telstra Corporation Ltd v State of Queensland [2013] FCA 1296
Parties: TELSTRA CORPORATION LTD (ACN 051 775 556) v THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND
File number: QUD 202 of 2012
Judge: RANGIAH J
Date of judgment: 3 December 2013
Corrigendum: 4 December 2013
Catchwords:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – respondent seeks declaration that applicant is obliged to comply with regulations pending the determination of their validity – whether there is irrebuttable presumption that  provisions of delegated legislation under challenge are valid unless and until declared invalid

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether applicant should have opportunity to call evidence to demonstrate the strength of its case for invalidity – whether declaration sought by the respondent is interlocutory or final – whether the Court should refuse the declaration in the exercise of its discretion

Legislation: Constitution s 109
Land Act 1994 (Qld)
Telecommunications Act1997 (Cth) cl 44 of Sch 3
Federal Court Rules 2011(Cth) r 30.01(1), 1.35
Land Regulation 2009 (Qld)
Cases cited: Castlemaine Tooheys Limited v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148 applied
Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540 followed
Ho v Grigor (2006) 151 FCR 236 followed
Hoffman-La Roche v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [1975] AC 295 applied
Leung v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 150 ALR 76 followed
Magman International Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1991) 32 FCR 1 followed
R v Wicks [1998] AC 92 applied
Warramunda Village Inc v Pryde (2002) 116 FCR 58 applied
Date of hearing: 30 October 2013
Date of last submissions: 30 October 2013
Place: Brisbane
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 40
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr P Hanks QC with Mr N Wood
Solicitor for the Applicant: King & Wood Mallesons
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr P Flanagan QC with Mr J Horton
Solicitor for the Respondent: Crown Law

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Telstra Corporation Ltd v State of Queensland [2013] FCA 1296

CORRIGENDUM

1.Paragraph 12 is amended by deleting the word “not” as it appears after the word “cannot”.

2.Paragraph 12 is amended by deleting the word “that” as it appears after the word “presumption”.

3.Paragraph 20 is amended by deleting the phrase “The duty of the Crown is to see” and replacing it with “The duty of the Crown to see”.

4.Paragraph 29 is amended by inserting the word “of” between the words “result” and “the non-compliance”.

5.Paragraph 30 is amended by deleting the word “injunction” and replacing it with the word “declaration”.

I certify that the preceding five (5) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Corrigendum to the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Rangiah.

Associate:

Dated: 4 December 2013


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

QUD 202 of 2012

BETWEEN:

TELSTRA CORPORATION LTD (ACN 051 775 556)
Applicant

AND:

THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND
Respondent

JUDGE:

RANGIAH J

DATE OF ORDER:

3…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 1296
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The present case involves Telstra Corporation Ltd, a telecommunications carrier, and the State of Queensland, where Telstra holds approximately 488 leases over State land under the Land Act 1994 (Qld). The dispute centres on the validity and application of the Land Regulation 2009 (Qld) which prescribes the rent rates for these leases. Telstra contends that the regulation requires it to pay more rent than holders of other types of leases, contrary to the provisions of the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth), and seeks a declaration that it is not obliged to comply with the regulation until its validity is determined. The State of Queensland, on the other hand, argues that Telstra is required to pay the prescribed rent and has brought an application for a declaration to this effect.

The primary legal issues before the court revolve around the validity and enforceability of the Land Regulation 2009 (Qld) in light of the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth). Specifically, the court must determine whether there is a presumption that the regulation is valid unless declared invalid by a competent court, whether Telstra should be allowed to present evidence to support its claim of invalidity, and whether the sought declaration is interlocutory or final in nature. Additionally, the court considers whether it should exercise its discretion to refuse the declaration based on the circumstances of the case.

The court examined the principle of legislative validity and the presumption of validity of delegated legislation, referencing the High Court’s decision in Castlemaine Tooheys Limited v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148. It noted that, while there is generally a presumption of validity, the balance of convenience may lead to a different outcome in certain circumstances. The court acknowledged the complexity of the application due to the form of relief sought by the State and found no compelling precedent supporting a declaration that Telstra must comply with the regulation pending the determination of its validity. The court concluded that the application for a declaration was inappropriate given the nature of the relief sought and the arguments presented.

The court found in favour of Telstra, determining that there is no irrebuttable presumption that the Land Regulation is valid unless declared invalid. It held that Telstra should have the opportunity to present evidence to support its claim of invalidity, and that the declaration sought by the State was interlocutory in nature. Ultimately, the court exercised its discretion to refuse the declaration, ruling that Telstra is not required to pay rent at the rates prescribed by the Land Regulation until the validity of the regulation is determined.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

The application presently before the Court is an application by the State seeking the following declaration:“A declaration that, pending determination of this proceeding, the Applicant is lawfully obliged to pay the Respondent rent on leases it holds under the Land Act 1994 (Qld) at the rates and in the amounts prescribed by the Land Regulation 2009 (Qld).”Background Telstra is the holder of about 488 leases over State land in Queensland issued pursuant to the Land Act 1994 (Qld). The Land Act provides that the rent for such a lease is the amount prescribed by regulation. The Land Regulation commenced on 1 July 2010. It prescribes particular categories of leases and the rent, or method of calculating the rent, for each category. Telstra’s leases fall into a prescribed category called “Communications Leases”. Telstra’s complaint is that provisions of the Land Regulation require it to pay more rent than the holders of “Business or Government Leases”. Clause 44 of Sch 3 of the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) provides, relevantly:44State and Territory laws that discriminate against carriers and users of carriage services(1) The following provisions have effect:(a)a law of a State or Territory has no effect to the extent to which the law discriminates, or would have the effect (whether direct or indirect) of discriminating, against a particular carrier, against a particular class of carriers, or against carriers generally;(b)without limiting paragraph (a), a person is not entitled to a right, privilege, immunity or benefit, and must not exercise a power, under a law of a State or Territory to the extent to which the law discriminates, or would have the effect (whether direct or indirect) of discriminating, against a particular carrier, against a particular class of carriers, or against carriers generally;(c)without limiting paragraph (a), a person is not required to comply with a law of a State or Territory to the extent to which the law discriminates, or would have the effect (whether direct or indirect) of discriminating, against a particular carrier, against a particular class of carriers, or against carriers generally. Telstra is a “carrier” within cl 44(1) of Sch 3. In the principal proceedings, Telstra pleads that the Land Regulation discriminates against it and other carriers because they are required to pay more rent than if they were not carriers. Telstra asserts that these provisions have no effect and are and have at all relevant times been invalid (in the sense of being ineffective or inoperative) by operation of cl 44(1) of the Telecommunications Act and s 109 of the Constitution. It asserts that it is not required to comply with those provisions and has not been required to so comply since their commencement on 1 July 2010. It also complains that it has, in the past, overpaid rent under the invalid provisions and seeks repayment of the overpaid amounts. Telstra has, for some time, refused to pay rent at the rates prescribed under the Land Regulation in respect of 438 of its leases, instead paying rent at a lower rate. The solicitors for Telstra have confirmed in correspondence that Telstra is refusing to pay rent at the prescribed rates in reliance upon cl 44(1)(a) and (c) of the Telecommunications Act. The State asserts in its cross-claim that Telstra owes it rent and penalty interest. The amount is said to be some $12.5 million at present.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The issues that fall to be decided are these:(a)whether there is an irrebuttable presumption that the provisions of the Land Regulation under challenge under cl 44(1) of the Telecommunications Act and s 109 of the Constitution are valid unless and until declared invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction;(b)whether Telstra should have the opportunity to call evidence to demonstrate the strength of its case that the relevant provisions of the Land Regulation are invalid, and whether such evidence could operate to avoid the making of the declaration sought by the State;(c)whether the declaration sought by the State is interlocutory or final;(d)whether the Court should refuse the declaration in the exercise of its discretion. Consideration The State was unable to cite any case in which a court has made a declaration to the effect that a party is required to comply with legislation pending the determination of its validity. The State did not explain why it sought a declaration rather than a mandatory interlocutory injunction. Much of the complexity involved in the present application results from the form of relief sought by the State. The State relies upon Castlemaine Tooheys Limited v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148 in support of its proposition that there is an irrebuttable presumption that delegated legislation is valid unless and until declared invalid. In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that South Australian legislation contravened s 92 of the Constitution and was invalid. The plaintiffs sought interlocutory injunctions restraining the State from enforcing the legislation against them. Mason ACJ (as his Honour was then) held at 155-156:In Canada the courts have taken the view that only in exceptional circumstances will an interlocutory injunction be granted to restrain enforcement of a statute challenged on constitutional grounds. In Morgentaler v Ackroyd (1983) 42 OR (2d) 659 at 668 Linden J said: “… the balance of convenience normally dictates that those who challenge the constitutional validity of laws must obey those laws pending the court's decision. If the law is eventually proclaimed unconstitutional, then it need no longer be complied with, but until that time, it must be respected and this court will not enjoin its enforcement. Such a course of action seems to be the best method of ensuring that our society will continue to respect the law at the same time as it is being challenged in an orderly way in the courts. This does not mean, however, that in exceptional circumstances this court is precluded from granting an interim injunction to prevent grave injustice, but that will be rare indeed.” …It may be that the last sentence in the passage quoted from Morgentaler v Ackroyd states the position too strongly against the plaintiff who seeks an interlocutory injunction in Australia. The decisions in this court to which I have already referred demonstrate that there are a variety of situations in which the court, on a proper balance of convenience, will restrain enforcement of a statute in aid of a plaintiff's constitutional right. In arriving at a balance of convenience the court will take into account the seriousness of the conduct enjoined by the statute and the damage to the public interest that may be caused by restraining its enforcement. And in some cases the balance of convenience may be affected by the court's perception or evaluation of the strength of the plaintiff's case for invalidity. But, subject to these qualifications there can be no reason to doubt the correctness of the general thrust of the comments in the passage which I have quoted. In the absence of compelling grounds, it is the duty of the court to respect, indeed, to defer to, the enactment of the legislature until that enactment is adjudged ultra vires.