Taylor v Hodgson - [2013] WASC 237

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CRIMINAL

CITATION: TAYLOR -v- HODGSON [2013] WASC 237

CORAM: ALLANSON J

HEARD: 10 JUNE 2013

DELIVERED : 21 JUNE 2013

FILE NO/S: SJA 1143 of 2012

BETWEEN: BRIAN DAVENPORT TAYLOR
Appellant
AND
PAUL RICHARD HODGSON
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction              :  MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram  :MAGISTRATE E C DEVRIES
File No  :GN 3063 of 2012

Catchwords:

Road traffic - Meaning of 'built-up area' - Amendment to prosecution notice during trial - No substantial miscarriage of justice

Legislation:

Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 14(2)
Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), s 132
Road Traffic Code 2000 (WA), reg 3, reg 11(2), reg 11(3)

Result:

Appeal dismissed

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant: In person
Respondent: Mr J Berson

Solicitors:

Appellant: In person
Respondent: State Solicitor for Western Australia

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Laurie [2011] HCA 2; (2011) 242 CLR 283
Busby v Burrow [2012] WASC 58
Chin v Legal Practice Board of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 110
Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; (2000) 201 CLR 488
Mitchell v Myers (1955) 57 WALR 49
Simpson v Department of Environment and Conservation [2011] WASC 206
Starling v Ostrowski [2001] WASCA 74; (2001) 24 WAR 61
Stead v State Government Insurance Commission [1986] HCA 54; (1986) 161 CLR 141
Tey v Carpenter [2011] WASC 263

ALLANSON J: On 27 April 2012, Mr Taylor was measured doing 61 km per hour on Boyd Street, Webberton. He was charged on a prosecution notice that alleged, before it was amended at trial:
Drove a vehicle, registered number GNG3250 on a road, namely Boyd Street within a speed zone, where the numerals on the restricted sign at the beginning of the speed zone indicated a speed of 50 kilometres per hour, drove said vehicle at a speed in excess of that shown on the restricted sign, namely 61 kilometres per hour.
Mr Taylor contested the charge in the Geraldton Magistrates Court. He did not dispute the speed alleged against him. But he believed that Boyd Street had a speed limit of 60 km per hour, and disputed that it is a built‑up area subject to a 50 km per hour limit. After trial he was found guilty, although not of the charge originally brought. At the end of the prosecution case, the magistrate amended the complaint to allege driving at 61 km per hour on a road within a built‑up area. Mr Taylor was convicted and fined for that offence.

The evidence

The prosecution called three witnesses.
The first was Darryl Stewart Peden, a police senior constable. He produced a video showing Boyd Street, although it was produced on 24 October 2012, approximately six months after the events charged. Constable Peden said, in‑chief, that there were now two new signs to remind drivers it was 50 km per hour in a built‑up area.
Mr Taylor cross‑examined. The witness agreed that the signs were…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Taylor v Hodgson

Details

AGLC: Taylor v Hodgson [2013] WASC 237
Case: [2013] WASC 237
Decision Date: 21 JUNE 2013

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Taylor versus Hodgson involved a prosecution of Taylor for a speeding offence, specifically exceeding the speed limit in a built-up area. The dispute arose over whether the location where Taylor was caught speeding was, in fact, a built-up area. This case was heard in the Magistrates' Court of Victoria. The court was tasked with determining the precise meaning of 'built-up area' as defined by statute and deciding if the prosecution could amend the notice during the trial.

The central legal issue was the interpretation of the term 'built-up area' within the context of the road traffic laws. Taylor argued that the location did not meet the statutory criteria for being considered a built-up area, thereby suggesting that the speed limit applicable should have been lower. The prosecution, on the other hand, contended that the amendment to the notice, clarifying the specific area, was permissible and did not prejudice Taylor's case. The court had to decide whether such an amendment could be made during the trial without causing a substantial miscarriage of justice.

The court examined the statutory definition of 'built-up area' and considered whether the amendment to the prosecution notice during the trial was appropriate and did not prejudice Taylor's defence. It was determined that the amendment did not introduce new matters or change the nature of the offence, and thus, it did not result in a substantial miscarriage of justice. Consequently, the court allowed the amendment, finding that the location indeed constituted a built-up area. As a result, Taylor was found guilty of the speeding offence.

The final orders of the court were that Taylor was found guilty of exceeding the speed limit in a built-up area, and a penalty was imposed. The court upheld the amendment to the prosecution notice, affirming that it did not prejudice Taylor's right to a fair trial.

Orders