Taylor v Commissioner of Police

Link copied
Case Copied 27 min read

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Taylor v Commissioner of Police [2022] QDC 101

PARTIES:

SUELLEN JAN TAYLOR

(appellant)

v

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

(respondent)

FILE NO:

BD 3224/20

DIVISION:

Criminal

PROCEEDING:

Appeal – Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s 222

ORIGINATING COURT:

Magistrates Court of Queensland at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

13 May 2022

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

21 April 2022

JUDGE:

Loury QC DCJ

ORDER:

1.   The appeal is allowed;

2.   The conviction is set aside;

3.   The complaint of common assault is dismissed;

4.   I order the respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the trial, in the amount of $1500.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL – OFFNCES AGAINST THE PERSON – ASSAULT – CONSENT – where the learned Magistrate did not give consideration to whether the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the complainant did not consent to the application of force – whether the complainant’s actions before and during the meeting with the appellant suggests that she impliedly gave her consent to the application of force

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL – CRIMINAL LIABILITY – DEFENCES – PROVOCATION – whether the complainant’s conduct, although not unlawful, could constitute a wrongful act or insult under section 268(1) of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) – whether the phrase “wrongful act or insult” was intended to be confined to unlawful acts – whether the prosecution proved that the appellant was not acting under provocation

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL – PARTICULARS OF CHARGE – where there is a material discrepancy between the offence particularised and the evidence which the learned Magistrate found proved the offence – where there is an injustice in letting the verdict stand as the appellant had no notice of the case which the learned Magistrate found

LEGISLATION:

Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 268(1), s 268(3), s 269(1)

Justices Act 1886 (Qld), s 158, s 158A(2), s 225(3), s 232(4)

CASES:

Oxer v Grant (Supreme Court of Western Australia, SJA 1065 of 1994, unreported judgment of White J, 3 November 1994)

Rex v Nakayama [1912] St R Qd 287

Roche v The Queen [1988] WAR 278

APPEARANCES:

R Pearce for the appellant

S Poplawski (solicitor) for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Gatenby Criminal Lawyers for the appellant

Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent

Introduction

  1. On 30 October 2020 in the Brisbane Magistrates Court, the appellant was acquitted of a charge of stealing and convicted of common assault.  She appeals her conviction on the charge of common assault on three grounds:

    1.the learned Magistrate erred in not concluding the complainant had consented to the application of force, and that the appellant had therefore committed no offence;

    2.the learned Magistrate erred in law and acted contrary to the evidence in concluding that the complainant’s actions cannot enliven the defence of provocation;

    3.the learned Magistrate erred in convicting on a basis contrary to that particularised (added at the hearing of the appeal). 

    The nature of the appeal

  2. The appeal is pursuant to s 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld) and is by…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Taylor v Commissioner of Police and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2022] QDC 101
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Taylor v Commissioner of Police involved an appeal against the conviction of the appellant, Ms Taylor, for the offence of common assault against Ms Thelma Anderson. The dispute arose from an incident that occurred on 23 January 2020 in the lobby of the Gambaro Hotel, where Ms Anderson met Ms Taylor to return a partial refund for storage fees. The altercation began when Ms Taylor noticed that Ms Anderson was filming her and subsequently grabbed the phone from Ms Anderson, leading to a physical confrontation. The learned Magistrate convicted Ms Taylor of common assault but acquitted her of the charge of stealing. Ms Taylor appealed the conviction on the grounds that the Magistrate did not consider whether Ms Anderson had consented to the application of force, that the Magistrate failed to consider whether Ms Anderson's actions constituted a wrongful act or insult under the Criminal Code, and that there was a discrepancy between the charge and the evidence presented.

The legal issues before the court were whether the Magistrate correctly determined that Ms Anderson had consented to the application of force, whether Ms Anderson's filming constituted a wrongful act or insult, and whether the charge accurately reflected the evidence. The court noted that the concept of consent in the context of assault includes implied consent and that such consent could be inferred from the circumstances. The court also examined whether Ms Anderson's filming of Ms Taylor constituted a wrongful act or insult under the Criminal Code. Furthermore, the court considered whether the particulars of the charge matched the evidence upon which the Magistrate based the conviction.

The court found that the Magistrate failed to consider whether Ms Anderson had impliedly consented to the application of force. The court held that Ms Anderson's actions before and during the meeting with Ms Taylor suggested that she had acquiesced to the event and should have been taken to have consented to the application of force. Additionally, the court determined that Ms Anderson's filming of Ms Taylor did not constitute a wrongful act or insult as it was an action she was legally entitled to undertake. The court also found that there was a material discrepancy between the offence particularised and the evidence which the Magistrate found proved the offence. Consequently, the court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, dismissed the complaint of common assault, and ordered the respondent to pay the appellant’s costs of the trial in the amount of $1500.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed;

2. The conviction is set aside;

3. The complaint of common assault is dismissed;

4. I order the respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the trial, in the amount of $1500.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The appeal is pursuant to s 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld) and is by way of rehearing. Such an appeal requires the court to conduct a real review of the evidence and the learned Magistrate’s decision and make its own determination giving due deference and placing a good deal of weight on the Magistrate’s view to determine whether the learned Magistrate has erred in fact or in law.[1] In Lee v Lee[2] a majority of the High Court said: “A court of appeal is bound to conduct a “real review” of the evidence given at first instance and of the judge's reasons for judgment to determine whether the trial judge has erred in fact or law. Appellate restraint with respect to interference with a trial judge's findings unless they are “glaringly improbable” or “contrary to compelling inferences” is as to factual findings which are likely to have been affected by impressions about the credibility and reliability of witnesses formed by the trial judge as a result of seeing and hearing them give their evidence. It includes findings of secondary facts which are based on a combination of these impressions and other inferences from primary facts. Thereafter, “in general an appellate court is in as good a position as the trial judge to decide on the proper inference to be drawn from facts which are undisputed or which, having been disputed, are established by the findings of the trial judge.” (footnotes omitted) [1]Robinson Helicopter Co Inc v McDermott [2016] HCA 22; (2016) 90 ALJR 679, 686 [43].[2] (2019) 266 CLR 129, 148-9 [55].The evidence at trial The complainant, Ms Thelma Anderson was a removalist. She met with the appellant by arrangement in the lobby of the Gambaro Hotel at around 12:10 pm on 23 January 2020. The purpose of the meeting was for Ms Anderson to give to Ms Taylor $200 which was intended to be a refund for storage fees Ms Taylor had paid to Ms Anderson to store her furniture. Ms Anderson’s evidence as to what occurred in the lobby was as follows: “We just introduced and then Suzi sort of said, you know, she started to talk about for what reason I was there and I said I’m here to just give you this money can I – and then Suzi turned over her right shoulder and saw someone videoing her and then with that she screamed out “Someone’s videoing me. Stop them from doing that” and then with that she got up and proceeded over to the person that was filming her.” “She went over to that other person and was screaming at him to stop filming, dah, dah, dah, and I was standing back and I had my phone up and she sort of turned back to walk to me, hit the phone out of my hand, hit me and with that we scrambled to the floor to find my phone and then I never saw her after that.” Ms Anderson went on to say that Ms Taylor picked up her phone. She never saw the phone again. The only evidence relevant to the issue of consent was as follows:Did you do anything that showed her that you – you know, you were trying to fight with her or -? - no, not at all. I mean, not at all. I wasn’t there to fight. I mean, not exactly how I conduct myself nor my business. I was simply there to give Suzi a partial refund and a voucher. That’s all I went there for. So did you not indicate anyway or by your conduct that you were prepared to -? – No --argue or fight with her? – Not at all.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The camera footage from the Gambaro Hotel does not contain sound. It depicts the same sequence of events from a different angle. The learned Magistrate’s decision The learned Magistrate found that Ms Taylor snatched the phone from Ms Anderson but considered that the evidence did not establish that at the time of doing so that Ms Taylor had an intention to permanently deprive Ms Anderson of the phone. She found the appellant not guilty of the charge of stealing. The learned Magistrate noted that the prosecution had opened their case on the charge of common assault on the basis that Ms Taylor pushed Ms Anderson to the shoulder. She said that she considered that the actions of Ms Taylor in grabbing the phone from Ms Anderson’s hand as she was filming was an application of force sufficient to constitute an assault. She went on to consider whether Ms Anderson had provoked that assault. She said that she did not consider that the filming by Ms Anderson of Ms Taylor was a wrongful act. She said that it was an action she was entitled to undertake and one that was not unlawful. The learned Magistrate further found that Ms Taylor was aware that Ms Anderson was filming her and she had implored others to assist her in stopping Ms Anderson from filming her. When no assistance was provided she grabbed the phone. The learned Magistrate said that the filming of Ms Taylor “cannot be considered a wrongful act”. She then proceeded to convict the appellant of the charge of common assault. As to the argument that the offensive words used by Ms Anderson to Ms Taylor referring to her as a “fucking cunt” were provocative, the learned Magistrate found that there was a lapse of time between the remarks and the confrontation that occurred such that they were too remote in time to be considered provocative. Before turning to sentence the learned Magistrate made some findings relevant to sentence. Relevantly, she found that Ms Anderson set up the meeting for the purpose of there being filming. She considered that what flowed from that would not be unexpected. During her sentencing remarks she again referred to, what she considered to be, the expectation of Ms Anderson in meeting Ms Taylor at the hotel. She said that Ms Taylor reacted in a way that “might have been entirely predicted”. Ground 1 The appellant contends that implicit in the findings that the learned Magistrate made, that what occurred between Ms Anderson and Ms Taylor was predictable or not unexpected, is a conclusion that Ms Anderson acquiesced to the event and should have been taken to have consented to the relevant application of force. Reliance is placed on a statement of McPherson J in Horan v Ferguson:[3]“It is scarcely possible to restrict the word ‘consent’ in s. 245 to a consent that is conveyed in express words. It plainly includes consent that is tacit or implied. Just as the absence of consent may be inferred from circumstances, so too equally its presence may be inferred. …What is, however, essential to the concept of assault as defined in s. 245 is that it should take place ‘without consent’ whether express, tacit, or inferred from the circumstances.” [3](1995) 2 Qd R 490, 495.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established