Taylor v Attorney-General (Cth)

The case involved a private citizen, the plaintiff, seeking to commence criminal proceedings for an offence of crime against humanity under section 268.11 of the Criminal Code (Cth). The Attorney-General had refused to grant the written consent required by section 268.121(1) of the Criminal Code for proceedings under Division 268. The plaintiff contended that section 13(a) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), which generally permits any person to institute proceedings for commitment for trial for an indictable Commonwealth offence unless a contrary intention appears, allowed for such a private prosecution. The matter came before the High Court of Australia by way of a special case.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether section 268.121(2) of the Criminal Code, which states that an offence against Division 268 "may only be prosecuted in the name of the Attorney-General," expressed a contrary intention for the purposes of section 13(a) of the Crimes Act, thereby precluding a private prosecution. This question arose in the context of the plaintiff's attempt to prosecute an individual for alleged crimes against humanity.

A majority of the High Court determined that section 268.121(2) did indeed express a contrary intention, thereby precluding a private prosecution. The Court reasoned that the phrase "may only be prosecuted in the name of the Attorney-General" was a clear and unambiguous statutory command that limited the ability to prosecute such offences exclusively to the Attorney-General. This specific statutory language was found to override the general right to institute proceedings conferred by section 13(a) of the Crimes Act. The Court considered the legislative history and the plain meaning of the words used, concluding that the intention was to vest the exclusive power to prosecute offences under Division 268 in the Attorney-General.

The High Court answered the questions stated in the special case. The Court dismissed the plaintiff's amended application and ordered that the plaintiff bear the costs of the special case.