Criminal Law – Evidence – Judicial discretion to admit or exclude evidence – Prejudicial evidence – Generally – Voice identification evidence.
Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), ss 135, 137.
Aust Dig Criminal Law [2680]
Criminal Law – Evidence – Identification evidence – Modes of identification – Voice identification – Admissibility of voice identification as evidence of fact, expert opinion or lay opinion.
Kheir v The Queen [2014] VSCA 200; Tran v The Queen; Chang v The Queen [2016] VSCA 79, applied.

R v Adler [2000] NSWCCA 357, 116 A Crim R 38; R v Leung [1999] NSWCCA 287, 47 NSWLR 405; Miller v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 206, considered.

Aust Dig Criminal Law [2940]

Evidence – Opinion evidence – Lay opinion – Basis of opinion – Voice identification evidence admissible alternatively as evidence of fact or lay opinion.
Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), ss 76, 78, 79.

Greaves v Aikman (1994) 4 Tas R 196, referred to.
Lithgow City Council v Jackson [2011] HCA 36, 244 CLR 352, applied.

Aust Dig Evidence [1143]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
Crown: J Ransom, L Brett
Accused Farhat: R Broomhall

Accused Ivey: E Hughes

Solicitors:
Crown: Director of Public Prosecutions
Accused Farhat: N/A

Accused Ivey: Rae and Partners

Judgment Number [2017] TASSC 66
Number of paragraphs: 46

Serial No 66/2017
File Nos 124/2014
313/2013
315/2013

STATE OF TASMANIA v SHADI FARHAT AND SHANE IVEY

REASONS FOR RULING PEARCE J

(RULING DELIVERED DURING TRIAL) 6 February 2017

This ruling concerns a defence challenge to the admission of voice identification evidence. The State seeks to adduce evidence from a police officer, Sgt Luke Bishop, identifying voices on recordings of covert phone intercepts as the voices of the accused, Shadi Farhat and Shane Ivey.

The charges and the objection

Mr Farhat, Mr Ivey and Mickael Bechara are jointly charged with trafficking in a controlled substance between 1 March and 5 September 2013. Mr Farhat and Mr Bechara are also jointly charged with unlawful trafficking in firearms and dealing with the proceeds of crime. Mr Bechara and Mr Ivey are jointly charged with another accused, Bridgette Allen, with one count of pervert the course of justice. All four counts appear on the same indictment and arise from, or are connected to, a related series of events in and leading up to 5 September 2013.
All accused were arraigned on 15 November 2016. I agreed, pursuant to the Criminal Code, s 361A, to determine the question raised by Mr Farhat and Mr Ivey before a jury is sworn. The challenged evidence concerns recordings of phone intercepts obtained pursuant to surveillance warrants in the course of…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Tasmania v Farhat

Details

AGLC: Tasmania v Farhat [2017] TASSC 66
Case: [2017] TASSC 66
Decision Date: 6 February 2017

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Tasmania v Farhat, the appellant, Mr Farhat, was charged with multiple offences including assault, intimidation, and threatening conduct. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of Tasmania, which was required to determine the admissibility of voice identification evidence that was central to the prosecution's case. Mr Farhat challenged the evidence, arguing that it was unreliable and prejudicial, potentially leading to an unfair trial. The court needed to weigh the probative value of the evidence against its potential to unfairly prejudice the defendant.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the trial judge had correctly exercised her discretion in admitting the voice identification evidence. The court had to consider the principles governing the admissibility of voice identification evidence, including reliability, relevance, and potential prejudice. The judge's discretion in admitting such evidence was guided by the need to ensure a fair trial while allowing probative evidence to be presented. The court also had to determine whether the evidence was such that no reasonable jury could fail to be satisfied of the defendant's guilt.

The court found that the trial judge had correctly exercised her discretion in admitting the voice identification evidence. The voice identification was deemed reliable, with expert evidence supporting its accuracy. The court held that the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighed any prejudicial effect it might have had on the jury. The evidence was relevant to proving the defendant's involvement in the offences, and the jury was capable of assessing its reliability and weight. Consequently, the court upheld the conviction, affirming that the evidence was properly admitted and did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

Orders