Tamawood Limited v Habitare Developments Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) (Receivers and Managers Appointed)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Tamawood Limited v Habitare Developments Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) (Receivers and Managers Appointed) [2011] FCA 1078

Citation: Tamawood Limited v Habitare Developments Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) (Receivers and Managers Appointed) [2011] FCA 1078
Related to: Tamawood Limited (ACN 010 954 499) v Habitare Developments Pty Ltd (ACN 122 935 497) [2009] FCA 364
Parties: TAMAWOOD LIMITED ACN 010 954 499 v HABITARE DEVELOPMENTS PTY LTD (ADMINISTRATORS APPOINTED) (RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS APPOINTED) ACN 122 935 497, BLOOMER CONSTRUCTIONS (QLD) PTY LTD ACN 071 344 100, PETER FREDERICK O'MARA, DAVID GAVIN JOHNSON, WAYNE NORMAN BLOOMER, HABITARE PTY LTD ACN 098 209 495, EIGHT MARCH PTY LTD ACN 099 315 787 (AS TRUSTEE OF THE EIGHT MARCH DISCRETIONARY TRUST), FIRST PRIORITY DEVELOPMENTS PTY LTD ACN 098 329 465, MONDO ARCHITECTS PTY LTD ACN 085 992 990 and RAYMOND JOHN MCDONALD SWEENEY
File number: NSD 2504 of 2007
Judge: COLLIER J
Date of judgment: 19 September 2011
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – reasons for interlocutory guillotine orders – length and complexity of proceedings – previous indulgences granted by Court in respect of compliance with orders – r 5.23 Federal Court Rules 2011 – failure to comply with orders of the Court – substantial delays in filing material necessary for trial – prejudice to other parties – no application to vacate trial dates – proximity to trial – principles of case management

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – voluntary administration of the first respondent pursuant to Pt 5.3A Corporations Act 2001 – leave granted pursuant to s 440D Corporations Act 2001 for applicant to proceed with principal proceedings against first respondent

Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) Pt 5.3A, s 440D
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 56
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 5.23, r 19
Cases cited: Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175 cited
Buckingham v Pan Laboratories (Australia) Pty Ltd (in liquidation) [2004] FCA 597 cited
Foxcroft v The Ink Group Ltd (1994) 15 ACSR 203 cited
Lenijamar Pty Ltd v AGC (Advances) Ltd (1990) 27 FCR 388 cited
Date of hearing: 13 September 2011
Date of order: 13 September 2011
Date of publication of reasons for orders 1, 2 and 3: 19 September 2011
Place: Brisbane
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 28
Counsel for the Applicant/Cross-Respondent: Mr R Alkadamani
Solicitor for the Applicant/Cross-Respondent: Castrission & Co
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr J Hughes of Allens Arthur Robinson
Counsel for the Second and Fifth Respondents: Mr J Dearn
Solicitor for the Second and Fifth Respondents: Romans & Romans Lawyers
Counsel for the Third, Fourth, Seventh and Eighth Respondents: Mr DLK Atkinson
Solicitor for the Third, Fourth, Seventh and Eighth Respondents: B2B Lawyers
Counsel for the Sixth Respondent/Cross-Claimant: Mr DLK Atkinson
Solicitor for the Sixth Respondent/Cross-Claimant: B2B Lawyers
Counsel for the Ninth Respondent/Cross-Respondent: Mr AM Musgrave
Solicitor for the Ninth Respondent/Cross-Respondent: Barry.Nilsson Lawyers
Counsel for the Third Party/Cross-Respondent: The First Third Party/Cross-Respondent did not appear

IN THE FEDERAL COURT…

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Details
Case
[2011] FCA 1078
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Tamawood Limited v Habitare Developments Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) (Receivers and Managers Appointed), the primary issue before the court was the enforcement of interlocutory guillotine orders and the implications of non-compliance with those orders. The court was required to address the length and complexity of the proceedings, which had spanned over four years and involved nine respondents with additional cross-claims. The key legal questions involved the application of Rule 5.23 of the Federal Court Rules 2011, which pertains to the dismissal of proceedings due to non-compliance, and the principles of case management.

The court found that the proceedings had been marked by significant delays and non-compliance with court orders, causing prejudice to other parties involved. Despite previous indulgences and extensions of time granted by the court, the parties had failed to adhere to the stipulated deadlines, leading to substantial delays in filing necessary material for trial. The court emphasized that while it strives to accommodate the needs of parties, it is not reasonable to extend its patience indefinitely. The court also highlighted the importance of timely resolution of claims and the impact of prolonged litigation on the judicial system and other litigants.

Based on these findings, the court issued specific orders requiring the first, third, fourth, sixth, seventh, and eighth respondents to file and serve their Defences and relevant affidavits by a specified deadline. Failure to comply with these orders would result in judgment being entered against these respondents. Additionally, the court dismissed the sixth respondent's cross-claim unless the necessary affidavits were filed by the same deadline. These orders reflect the court's commitment to enforcing compliance and ensuring that the litigation progresses in an expeditious and efficient manner.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The first, third, fourth, sixth, seventh and eighth respondents file and serve Defences to the Third Further Amended Statement of Claim and file and serve any affidavits upon which they rely in respect of those Defences by 4.00 pm on 20 September 2011.

2. In default of compliance with Order 1 of these Orders, judgment be entered against the first, third, fourth, sixth, seventh and eighth respondents in respect of the Further Amended Application and the Third Further Amended Statement of Claim.

3. The sixth respondent’s cross-claim (“the second cross-claim”) against Mondo Architects Pty Ltd (“the first cross-respondent”) and Raymond John McDonald Sweeney (“the second cross-respondent”) be dismissed unless the sixth respondent files and serves affidavits upon which it intends to rely in respect of the second cross-claim by 4.00 pm on 20 September 2011.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

However, in light of the serious impact on the position of the first, third, fourth, sixth, seventh and eighth respondents in this litigation arising from these particular orders I considered it appropriate to provide written reasons.Background These proceedings have been lengthy and complex. The original application was filed in this Court on 21 December 2007, almost four years ago. In summary, the applicant seeks relief for breach of copyright against numerous developers, builders and architects associated with housing development projects. During those four years the litigation has mushroomed such that there are now nine respondents to the application, and three cross-claims filed by a number of respondents (and third parties). No specific responsibility can be laid at the feet of any of the parties for the protracted nature of this litigation. However clearly there has been lethargy associated with the proceedings on all sides. This has been characterised by:·periods of time during which little activity has been apparent on the file;·repeated – and frequently consent – approaches to the Court to postpone compliance with orders; and·at least seven occasions on which the parties have approached the Court to vacate hearings (on 26 August 2008, 8 July 2009, 29 July 2009, 13 August 2009, 26 August 2009, 27 August 2009, 19 November 2009). By way of example:·On 24 September 2010 I ordered that the parties engage in mediation in Brisbane on or before 28 February 2011.·On 18 March 2011 the parties came before me again and it was clear that, for no satisfactory reason provided to the Court other than more delays in respect of preparation of the further amended application and a second further amended statement of claim, and delays in respect of discovery, the parties had not been to mediation as ordered notwithstanding the passage of 5 months.·On 18 March 2011 I ordered the parties to attend mediation on or before 30 June 2011.·Notwithstanding this extension of time to allow the parties to attend mediation the parties could still not comply with the Court’s order. On 11 April 2011 the parties communicated with Chambers, requesting that the Court order concerning mediation be varied by one day, and that mediation occur on or before 1 July 2011. A second example relates to the delays of the parties in filing cross-claims as reflected in the following orders:·Orders 7 and 8 of 13 August 2010 in which I gave leave to the first to eighth respondents to file and serve a cross-claim against the ninth respondent, and the ninth respondent to file and serve a cross-claim against the applicant.·Order 4 of 24 September 2010 requiring the relevant cross-claims to be filed and served by 26 November 2010.·Order 12 of 18 March 2011 extending the date for filing of the relevant cross-claims to 10 June 2011.·Order 8 of 12 July 2011 extending the date for filing of the cross-claim of the first to eight respondents against the ninth respondent and Raymond John Sweeney until 29 July 2011.·Extensive orders proposed by the parties on 28 July 2011 including Order 4 granting leave to the ninth respondent to file a cross-claim by 28 July 2011, and Order 10 ordering the first to eighth respondents’ cross-claim to be filed by 5 August 2011.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Atkinson for the third, fourth, sixth, seventh and eighth respondents submitted that there is no history of non-compliance by the third, fourth, sixth, seventh and eighth respondents in respect of previous orders of the Court; that the respondents have experienced financial difficulties as illustrated by the voluntary administration of the first respondent the day after extensive timetabling directions were made on 28 July 2011; that the respondents who are members of the Habitare Group are indebted to the ANZ Bank in excess of $30 million; and that those respondents are currently seeking funding in respect of this litigation. An affidavit prepared by the solicitor for those respondents, and tendered for identification in anticipation of filing, supported Mr Atkinson’s submissions (transcript 13 September 2011 p 20). Accordingly, Mr Atkinson sought an order from the Court allowing these respondents 14 days from 13 September 2011 to file both their Defences and material upon which they were relying (transcript 13 September 2011 p 10).Consideration Shutting a party out of litigation for non-compliance with orders is a step of the utmost seriousness. This is particularly so where no claim is made that the defaulting parties have a history of non-compliance with previous Court orders. However as Wilcox and Gummow JJ noted in Lenijamar Pty Ltd v AGC (Advances) Ltd (1990) 27 FCR 388, it may also be appropriate for the Court to make orders pursuant to what is now r 5.23 of the Rules in circumstances where, whatever the defaulting party’s state of mind or resources, the non-compliance is continuing and occasioning unnecessary delay, expense of other prejudice to the other party or parties. Earlier in this judgment I gave numerous examples of the delays in progressing these proceedings, and explained that in April this year I ordered that the matter be set down for trial. In my view, the passage of almost four years, during which the case has slowly grown in complexity but the appetite of the parties to go trial has been questionable, means that the time has well and truly passed for the matter to be determined in trial. It is not in the interests of the parties, or this Court, for the matter to continue to roll on indefinitely with ongoing and generous extensions of time for compliance. While the Court endeavours as a practical matter to accommodate the needs of parties and the vagaries of litigation, it is not reasonable that this patience be inexhaustible. The claims of the applicant and the various cross-claimants in this case require determination; further, it is appropriate from the perspective of the respondents that the claims against them be resolved. In addition, it is important in the context of case management in this Court that proceedings should go to trial as expeditiously as possible. As the High Court observed in Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175:92. Such management is now an accepted aspect of the system of civil justice administered by courts in Australia. It was recognised some time ago, by courts here and elsewhere in the common law world, that a different approach was required to tackle the problems of delay and cost in the litigation process. In its report in 2000, Managing Justice: A review of the federal civil justice system, the Australian Law Reform Commission noted that: “Over the last ten years Australian courts have become more active in monitoring and managing the conduct and progress of cases before them, from the time a matter is lodged to finalisation.”93. Rule 21(2)(b) indicates that the rules concerning civil litigation no longer are to be considered as directed only to the resolution of the dispute between the parties to a proceeding. The achievement of a just but timely and cost-effective resolution of a dispute has an effect upon the court and upon other litigants. In Sali v SPC Ltd Toohey and Gaudron JJ explained that case management reflected:“[t]he view that the conduct of litigation is not merely a matter for the parties but is also one for the court and the need to avoid disruptions in the court’s lists with consequent inconvenience to the court and prejudice to the interests of other litigants waiting to be heard ...”.