SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
No. 6002 of 2002
| GABOR TAMAS |
| Appellant |
| v. |
| VICTORIAN CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, HOUSING GUARANTEE FUND |
| Respondents |
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JUDGES: | ORMISTON, CALLAWAY and EAMES, JJ.A. | |
WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 25 June 2003 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 21 August 2003 | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2003] VSCA 113 | |
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Practice and procedure – Costs – Order for costs made by Tribunal against non-party – Whether power to make order – Whether company director was “the representative of a party” before Tribunal, although the company was represented by counsel and solicitor – Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998, ss.59, 62, 84, 89, 109, 143.
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| APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Appellant | Mr S.G. O’Bryan | Rossi, Ryan and Raniga |
| For the 2nd Respondent (O’Loughlin) | Mr W.T. Houghton, Q.C. | Coadys |
| For the 3rd Respondent (Housing Guarantee Fund) | Mr R.T.A. Waddell Mr A.D. Archer | Minter Ellison |
ORMISTON, J.A.:
Having had the advantage of reading the judgments which Callaway, J.A. and Eames, J.A., in particular, are about to give, I agree that the appeal should be allowed for the reasons stated by them.
Nevertheless I would add this. Although I agree that one may see from s.62 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 what persons are entitled to represent parties in proceedings before the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (“the Tribunal”), it may be that there could be persons other than those described in that section or formally designated pursuant to a provision in that section who may be “the representative” or one of the representatives of a party in a proceeding before the Tribunal. It is possible that persons do or may act as representatives of parties without their being formally “permitted or specified” by the Tribunal (see s.62(1)(c) of the Act) or likewise may act in a proceeding without obtaining a certificate of authority as contemplated by sub-s.(7) of s.62 of the Act. The critical matter, to my way of thinking, is that the person has conducted or otherwise acted in the proceeding as “the representative” of the party for that purpose and, as the other members of the Court have observed, that may mean that there are more than one person who might satisfy that description. What it does not include, unless they take on the role of representing the party in the proceeding, are officers, employees, agents or others authorised to act on behalf of a corporation or another person merely because they act or have acted at some time on its behalf for other purposes, albeit in connection with the proceeding, say by providing instructions or giving evidence.
I should be cautious about expressing any conclusions as to the extent to which purported representatives of a party may be found responsible for costs under s.109 of the Act because, after raising the position of solicitors, none of the parties appearing before this Court (which, of course, did not include the Tribunal…
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- Case
- [2003] VSCA 113
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether VCAT had the statutory power to order costs against non-parties and whether Tamas could be considered a representative of a party within the meaning of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998. The relevant sections of the Act were sections 59, 62, 84, 89, 109, and 143, which outline the powers and responsibilities of VCAT in various contexts, including the imposition of costs. The court also needed to consider the interpretation of "the representative of a party" and whether it included a company director in circumstances where the company was represented by legal professionals.
The court found that VCAT does have the power to order costs against non-parties under certain conditions, as outlined in the Act. The decision hinged on whether Tamas could be considered a representative of a party. The court concluded that Tamas, as the director of the company involved in the proceedings, could indeed be regarded as a representative of a party. Given this finding, the court upheld VCAT’s authority to order costs against Tamas. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, affirming VCAT's decision to impose costs.
No additional orders were made by the court beyond affirming the VCAT decision. The ruling reinforced the principle that VCAT can exercise its discretion to order costs against non-parties when they are deemed representatives of a party in the proceedings.
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