EAMES and COMMISSIONER OF STATE REVENUE

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JURISDICTION     :   STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

ACT: LAND TAX ASSESSMENT ACT 2002 (WA)

TAXATION ADMINISTRATION ACT 2003 (WA)

CITATION:   EAMES and COMMISSIONER OF STATE REVENUE [2018] WASAT 14

MEMBER:   JUDGE T SHARP (DEPUTY PRESIDENT)

HEARD:   DETERMINED ON THE DOCUMENTS

DELIVERED          :   22 FEBRUARY 2018

FILE NO/S:   DR 241 of 2017

BETWEEN:   MARIA EAMES

First Applicant

CORINNE LILLIAN ONESTI
Second Applicant

AND

COMMISSIONER OF STATE REVENUE
Respondent

Catchwords:

Land tax ­ Private residential property ­ Private residence ­ Exemption during construction of private residence ­ Subdivision

Legislation:

Building Act 2011 (WA), s 58
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 19
Land Tax Assessment Act 2002 (WA), s 5, s 7(1), s 17, s 17(1), s 20, s 21, s 21(1), s 24, s 24A, s 24A(1), s 24A(1)(a), s 24A(1)(b), s 24A(1)(c), s 24A(1)(d), s 24A(1)(e), s 24A(3), s 24A(4), s 24A(5), Pt 3
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 27(1), s 27(3)
Strata Titles Act 1985 (WA), s 5B(2), s 5B(2)(a)
Tax Administration Act 2003 (WA), s 40

Result:

Commissioner's decision affirmed
Application dismissed

Summary of Tribunal's decision:

The applicants, along with certain other individuals, acquired in 2005 two vacant pieces of land in South Perth.  They then amalgamated the lots into one and engaged a builder to construct a block of four apartments.  Those apartments were to be used, in the case of the applicants, as their respective private residences.

The applicants applied for an exemption from land tax for the amalgamated lot of land for the 2014/15 and 2015/16 assessment years. Their claim for an exemption was under s 24A of the Land Tax Assessment Act 2002 (WA), which provides that, put very broadly, 'private residential property' is exempt for two consecutive years if the 'private residence' which forms part of the private residential property is constructed during those years and completed within the second year.

The Commissioner of State Revenue refused to grant the exemption and the applicants applied to the Tribunal for a review of that decision.

The Tribunal considered the applicants' application and decided that the Commissioner's decision was correct.  Upon an examination of the relevant legislative provisions, the Tribunal found that the lot of land in question was not 'private residential property' as defined in the Act.  For the land to be 'private residential property', it needed to be a lot of land upon which a 'private residence' is being or has been constructed.  The Act defines 'private residence' as, relevantly, a building fit to be occupied as a place of residence.  By the time the building in this case was fit to be occupied as a place of residence, the Certificate of Title for the land had been cancelled.  The lot of land in question had been replaced with four strata lots.

Accordingly, the requirements of s 24A were not satisfied.

The Tribunal upheld the Commissioner's decision and dismissed the application.

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

First Applicant              :     Mr J Ludlow

Second Applicant          :     Mr J Ludlow

Respondent:     Ms R Panetta

Solicitors:

First Applicant…

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Details
Case
[2018] WASAT 14
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Eames and Commissioner of State Revenue, the High Court of Australia was presented with a dispute concerning the application of land tax to private residential property during the construction phase. The dispute arose out of the interpretation of the Land Tax Act 2005 (WA) provisions relating to the exemption of primary residences from land tax, specifically sections 21, 24, and 24A.

The central legal issues in this case involved the interpretation of the statutory language and the application of the exemption provisions to land under construction. The primary question was whether the land on which a private residence was being constructed qualified for the land tax exemption, and if so, for how long. The interpretation of the relevant sections, particularly in light of the broader legislative context and purpose, was crucial.

The court adopted a purposive approach to statutory interpretation, emphasising the importance of understanding the statutory text in its widest context. It was noted that the statutory text, while the primary guide, must be interpreted in conjunction with the context, purpose, and policy of the legislation. The court highlighted that while definitions and legislative history could assist in interpreting a statute, they could not override the clear meaning of the statutory text. It was also observed that taxation statutes are to be interpreted technically, and the intention of Parliament was to extend the primary residence exemption to include land upon which an individual's primary residence was being constructed.

The court concluded that the land in question was eligible for the land tax exemption during the construction period, aligning with the legislative intent to provide relief to individuals constructing their primary residences. This interpretation was consistent with the purpose of the Land Tax Act, which sought to alleviate the financial burden on individuals during the construction phase of their primary residences. The court's decision was grounded in a comprehensive understanding of the statutory provisions, their context, and the overarching objectives of the legislation.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The modern approach to statutory construction in Western Australia is purposive; Commissioner of State Revenue v Abbotts Exploration PtyLtd (2014) 48 WAR 300 (Abbotts) at [160]. This approach was summarised in Edelman J in Commissioner of theAustralian Federal Police v Courtenay Investments Ltd (No 2) (2014) 283 FLR 59 at [14]:The key integers in the exercise of determining the effect of Parliament's intention in [the relevant statutory provision] are statutory text, context and purpose. The starting point, and the end point, is the text. But, although the statutory text is the 'surest guide' to Parliament's intention, the text must be read in the widest sense of context, including the general purpose and policy of the provision'. In Kelly v R [2004] HCA 12; (2004) 218 CLR 216 at [84], McHugh J said this:However, a legislative definition is not or, at all events, should not be framed as a substantive enactment. In Gibb v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, (citation omitted) Barwick CJ, McTiernan and Taylor JJ stated:The function of a definition clause in a statute is merely to indicate that when particular words or expressions the subject of definition, are found in the substantive part of the statute under consideration, they are to be understood in the defined sense – or are to be taken to include certain things which, but for the definition, they would not include. … [Definition] clauses are … no more than an aid to the construction of the statute and do not operate in any other way.(emphasis added)In addition, as Dixon CJ once pointed out, 'the context, the general purpose and policy of a provision and its consistency and fairness are surer guides to its meaning than the logic with which it is constructed'. At issue here is not the meaning of the phrase 'in the course of official questioning' when read in isolation. The issue is the meaning of s 8(2) when read with the aid provided by the definitions of 'confession or admission' and 'official questioning' in s 8(1), by the evident policy of s 8 and by the mischief that it sought to overcome[.] I may have regard to extrinsic materials and legislative history without having to invoke the provisions of s 19 of the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA) (Abbotts at [91]), but legislative history and extrinsic materials cannot be relied upon to displace the clear meaning of the statutory text; Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd (2012) 250 CLR 503 at [39]. Taxation statutes, including the LTA Act, are to be interpreted in a technical matter: ReCharles Lloyd Property Group Ptd Ltd and Commissioner of State Revenue (2011) 84 ATR 775 at [781]; Commissioner of State Revenue v Land Row Properties Pty Ltd (2010) 79 ATR 800 at [816]. From a consideration of the LTA Act as a whole, Pt 3 in particular, and also the legislative materials referred to in Appendix 2 of the Commissioner's Submissions, the intention of Parliament in respect of s 24 and s 24A is in my opinion clear. In my view, that intention was to extend the 'primary residence' exemption from land tax contained in s 21 to include land upon which an individual's primary residence is being constructed, either for one assessment year (s 24) or for two assessment years (s 24A), depending on the duration of the construction period.