Talbot v Boyd Legal (A Firm) & Ors

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Talbot v Boyd Legal (A Firm) & Ors [2020] QSC 185

PARTIES:

AMANDA DIANNE TALBOT
(plaintiff)
v
BOYD LEGAL (A FIRM)

(first defendant)
and
ARNOLD BLOCH LEIBLER (A FIRM)
(second defendant)
and
BRIAN DAVID BARTLEY
(first third party)
and
PAUL WILLIAM GLEESON
(second third party)
and
WILLIAM FRANCIS BOYD AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF KENNETH TALBOT
(third third party)

FILE NO:

BS 641 of 2019

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application for the separate determination of questions under r 483 of the UCPR

ORIGINATING COURT: Supreme Court of Queensland at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

19 June 2020

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

2 June 2020

JUDGE:

Applegarth J

ORDERS:

1.   The application filed 14 May 2020 is dismissed.

2.    Subject to any submissions as to costs, the plaintiff pay the other parties’ costs of and incidental to the application to be assessed on the standard basis.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – SEPARATE DECISION OR DETERMINATION OF QUESTIONS AND CONSOLIDATION OF PROCEEDINGS – SEPARATE DECISION OR DETERMINATION – GENERALLY – where the plaintiff applies for separate determination of two questions, being whether certain documents on a “new will file” were subject to a valid claim of legal professional privilege, and if not, whether their production could have been compelled by reliance upon certain rules or the inherent jurisdiction of the Court – where the proposed questions concern two of many issues in a complex case – whether the same witness would be required to give contentious evidence at both a separate trial and a later trial of the remaining issues – whether a separate determination of the proposed questions would contribute to a saving of time and cost – whether a separate determination of the proposed questions would be just and convenient

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 414, r 483,
r 629, r 637

Advance Traders Pty Ltd v McNab Constructions Pty Ltd [2011] QSC 212, cited
AWB Ltd v Cole (2006) 152 FCR 382; [2006] FCA 571, cited
Balabel v Air-India
[1988] Ch 317, cited
Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd
(1999) 198 CLR 334; [1999] HCA 9, cited
Byrne v People Resourcing (Qld) Pty Ltd & Ors
[2014] QSC 39, cited
Carter Holt Harvey Wood Products Australia v Auspine Ltd
[2008] VSCA 59, cited
Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd
(2005) 225 ALR 266; [2005] FCA 1247, cited
Dalleagles Pty Ltd v Australian Securities Commission
(1991) 4 WAR 325, cited
DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Intertan Inc
(2003) 135 FCR 151; [2003] FCA 1191, cited
Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation
(1999) 201 CLR 49; [1999] HCA 67, cited
IOOF Holdings Ltd v Maurice Blackburn Pty Ltd
[2016] VSC 311, cited
New South Wales v Betfair Pty Ltd
(2009) 180 FCR 543; [2009] FCAFC 160, cited
Re Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd [1999] 1 Qd…

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Details
Case
[2020] QSC 185
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Talbot v Boyd Legal (A Firm) & Ors involved a dispute over the validity of legal professional privilege claims on certain documents and the compellability of their production. The dispute arose from the will of the late Ken Talbot, who had a complex estate involving multiple beneficiaries and substantial assets. The plaintiff, Amanda Talbot, sought a separate determination of two questions concerning the privilege claim and compellability, arguing that this would save time and cost in the proceedings. The court was required to decide whether a separate determination of these questions would be just and convenient under the relevant procedural rules. The court found that the proposed questions were not appropriate for separate determination as they involved significant factual and legal overlap, and the same witness, Mr Boyd, the solicitor, would likely give contentious evidence at both the separate trial and the later trial of the remaining issues. The court concluded that ordering a separate determination would not result in a saving of time and cost, but rather would likely complicate and delay the resolution of the real issues in dispute.

The legal issues before the court included whether the proposed questions were largely questions of law or involved contested factual issues, and whether a separate trial of the proposed questions would contribute to a saving of time and cost. The court considered the established principles for the use of separate determination procedures and noted that the plaintiff had not demonstrated that the separate determination of the proposed questions would result in a material saving in time and costs. The court also noted that a separate trial would probably lead to additional costs and delay, and that the resolution of the proposed questions would depend on the resolution of contested factual issues. The court found that the application for separate determination was not just and convenient and dismissed the application.

The court's reasoning was based on the likelihood that the same witness would give contentious evidence at both a separate trial and a later trial of the remaining issues, and the significant overlap in factual and legal issues at both stages of the hearing. The court found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated that it would be just and convenient to resolve the proposed questions without receiving evidence from Mr Boyd, and that ordering a separate determination of the proposed questions was not likely to result in a saving of time and cost. The court concluded that a separate trial would probably lead to additional costs and delay, and that the resolution of the proposed questions would depend on the resolution of contested factual issues. The court dismissed the application and ordered the plaintiff to pay the other parties' costs of and incidental to the application to be assessed on the standard basis.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application filed 14 May 2020 is dismissed.

2. Subject to any submissions as to costs, the plaintiff pay the other parties’ costs of and incidental to the application to be assessed on the standard basis.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons which follow, I have concluded that Mr Boyd is likely to be a witness whose evidence is relevant to the resolution of the issue of legal professional privilege and that his evidence in relation to that issue and his evidence at a subsequent trial is likely to be contentious. That is sufficient to dispose of the application. However, even if it was possible to resolve the proposed questions without receiving evidence from Mr Boyd, the plaintiff has not demonstrated that it would be just and convenient to do so in a separate trial. I conclude that ordering the separate determination of the proposed questions is not just and convenient, but is likely to complicate and delay the resolution of the real issues in dispute.Background Mr Ken Talbot died in a plane crash on 19 June 2010. He was survived by his wife (Amanda), two children (Liam and Courtney) from a previous marriage and two younger children (Alexandra and Claudia). These five family members were the beneficiaries of a testamentary trust created by his 2002 will. Mr Talbot’s estate was large and complex. His great wealth was the subject of a complex arrangement of companies and trusts, and included properties and investments in different parts of the world. A will had been executed by Mr Talbot on 29 November 2002 with the assistance of his long-term solicitor, Mr Boyd. The 2002 will appointed a Texas-based investment banker, Mr Bret, as the sole executor and trustee of Mr Talbot’s will. It also appointed two “International Friends” as well as the managing director of a major accounting firm in Brisbane and the managing partner of a major law firm in Brisbane as advisers. His sole executor was obliged to consult, and act in accordance with instructions from, the International Friends. The 2002 will made gifts to specific beneficiaries and distributed the residue of Mr Talbot’s estate with:(a)70 per cent to be held on the terms of the Talbot Estate Trust established by the will which allocated his five beneficiaries interests proportionately in the expectation that his wife, as the mother of Alexandra and Claudia, would make provision for them in her will as well as for her family. That was why he allocated a combined 52 per cent share in that trust to his wife, Alexandra and Claudia (18 per cent, 17 per cent and 17 per cent respectively) and 24 per cent each to Liam and Courtney; and(b)the remaining 30 per cent of the residue of his estate was to be held by the Talbot Foundation which he instructed his trustee and executor to establish as a permanent foundation, taking into account certain instructions. After 2002 Mr Talbot’s circumstances changed and continued to change as a result of the sale or acquisition of different properties and investments. This included the sale in about April 2008 of his interest in Macarthur Coal for approximately $860 million. The Talbot Family Foundation was established in about June 2008. In 2006 and 2007, Mr Boyd had reminded Mr Talbot in writing on three occasions that he needed to do something about getting his will updated. On 23 November 2007, Mr Boyd, on behalf of the first defendant, was retained by Mr Talbot and given instructions about a new will to replace the 2002 will. According to Mr Boyd, Mr Talbot instructed him that the portion of the estate to be held by the Talbot Estate Trust was to be split:(a)56 per cent to the plaintiff, leaving her to provide for Alexandra and Claudia;(b)22 per cent to Liam; and(c)22 per cent to Courtney.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Determination of a separate question at a preliminary trial is unlikely to be just and convenient where there is a significant overlap of factual and legal issues at both stages of the hearing. This is especially so if the same witnesses will need to be called at both hearings of the proceedings, or if the Court is asked to form a view as to the credibility of such witnesses.[16] Are the proposed questions largely questions of law which are unlikely to require any significant evidence to be adduced?[16]Reading at 280 [8].The first question The plaintiff submits that the issues in respect of which it seeks a separate determination are largely questions of law and are relatively discrete. The plaintiff submits that there is no risk that proceeding in accordance with r 483 will give rise to significant contested factual issues both at the time of the hearing of the preliminary questions and at the time of trial. She also submits that there is no risk that in so proceeding there will be a significant overlap between the evidence adduced on the hearing of the separate questions and at trial. In particular, there is said to be no risk that the Court may be required to form a view as to the credibility of witnesses who may give evidence at both stages of the hearing of the proceeding. In March, well before the application was filed, the solicitors for the second defendant advised the plaintiff’s solicitors that the proposed questions were not apt for separate determination. One of the reasons was that the purpose for which the documents were created can be established, not only from the face of the documents, but also from what was described as the “subjective evidence from the creator of the documents”. The plaintiff submits that this proposition is wrong as a matter of law and that the second defendant misconceived that Mr Boyd would need to be cross-examined at the hearing of the separate question. On the hearing of the application before me, the plaintiff submitted that no part of her application contemplated the need for Mr Boyd to be cross-examined at the hearing of the separate questions. Legal professional privilege attaches to confidential communications made for the dominant purpose of obtaining or giving legal advice or the provision of legal services including representation in court proceedings.[17] [17]Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49 at 64 [35], 73 [61]. Legal professional privilege does not attach to documents recording transactions, nor draft documents or other communications unless they expressly or by way of reasonable inference reveal the substance of the legal advice given.[18][18]AWB Ltd v Cole (2006) 152 FCR 382 at 417 [131] – [133]. A broad approach has been adopted in determining whether a communication is made for the purpose of obtaining or giving legal advice. In Balabel v Air-India,[19] Taylor LJ (with whom Parker LJ and Lord Donaldson MR agreed) said:“Those purposes have to be construed broadly. … In most solicitor and client relationships, especially where a transaction involves protracted dealings, advice may well be required or appropriate on matters great or small at various stages. There will be a continuum of communication and meetings between the solicitor and client … Where information is passed by the solicitor or client to the other as part of the continuum aimed at keeping both informed so that advice may be sought and given as required, privilege will attach. … Moreover, legal advice is not confined to telling the client the law; it must include advice as to what should prudently and sensibly be done in the circumstances.”[19][1988] Ch 317 at 330.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The possibility that the plaintiff might have applied (or still might seek leave to apply) to have those issues determined on a strike out application or a summary judgment application is not a reason to order that those questions be the subject of an order for separate determination pursuant to r 483. An order for the separate determination of those questions is not appropriate for the reasons which I have given, applying established principles in relation to the use of that procedure. An application to strike out presently unidentified parts of pleadings or to seek summary judgment is an even less appropriate process to determine the issues of legal professional privilege and compellability.Conclusion The question of legal professional privilege requires careful consideration of the purpose for which documents were created. Mr Boyd’s evidence about the purpose for which documents were created is likely to overlap with his evidence about what he did in carrying out his retainer in respect of a new will, and why he did what he did. The overlap is a consideration against ordering a separate determination. However, the concern is not simply with an overlap in evidence. It is that Mr Boyd’s evidence at both hearings is likely to be contentious. It is highly unsatisfactory that he should give contentious evidence at two separate trials, particularly about related and overlapping subjects. This is sufficient reason to dismiss the application. The second question also depends upon the resolution of contested factual issues. There are many other reasons why the application should be refused. The proposed questions do not capture the question of confidentiality and whether Mr Talbot’s executor was entitled to assert that the contents of the new will file were confidential. The plaintiff has not demonstrated that the separate determination of the proposed questions would likely result in a material saving in time and costs. Their resolution would depend upon the resolution of factual issues. The separate trial of the proposed questions would be unlikely to result in a substantial narrowing of the remaining issues for trial and a saving in time and costs. Instead, a separate trial would probably lead to additional costs and delay. I am not persuaded that the separate determination of the proposed questions has utility. I am not persuaded that it is just and convenient to order their separate determination. Orders I dismiss the application. Subject to further submissions, costs should follow the event. The first defendant and the second defendant successfully opposed the application. The second third party’s qualified support for the application was premised upon the plaintiff making good her argument that it was possible for the plaintiff to obtain a separate determination of the question of legal professional privilege by an analysis of the documents on the new will file. The plaintiff failed to establish this premise. In the circumstances, as between the plaintiff and the second third party, I consider that the plaintiff should also pay the second third party’s costs of and incidental to the application to be assessed on the standard basis. The first third party neither supported nor opposed the application. I consider that he should be compensated for his costs in considering the application and communicating his attitude to it.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined the principles of legal professional privilege, noting that such privilege does not attach to documents that merely record transactions or are draft documents unless they reveal the substance of legal advice. In this case, the plaintiff sought a separate determination of whether the documents on the "new will file" were subject to legal professional privilege and, if not, whether their production could be compelled. The court found that the evidence of Mr Boyd, the solicitor, would likely be contentious in both a separate trial and a later trial of the remaining issues, making a separate determination undesirable. Additionally, the court concluded that the separate determination of these questions would not result in a saving of time and costs, and would likely complicate and delay the resolution of the real issues in dispute. The court thus dismissed the application, emphasizing that the overlap of factual and legal issues and the contentious nature of the evidence were sufficient grounds to deny the separate determination.