Taffs v Porter

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

TAFFS & ANOR v PORTER & ANOR [2016] FCCA 1875
Catchwords:
BANKRUPTCY – Whether application within 60 day statutory time limit – relevant act, omission or decision – application made out of time – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss.116, 178

Cases cited:

Re Wong; Ex parte Wong v Donnelly and Others [1995] FCA 1466; (1995) 63 FCR 426; (1995) 131 ALR 180

Samootin v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2012] FCA 64
McIntosh v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2014] FCCA 2502
Heshmati v Paul Burness and Morgan Lane [2012] FMCA 884
Liprini v Pascoe as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Liprini [2012] FCA 886; (2012) 292 ALR 778
Kerr (Trustee), in the matter of Cross (Bankrupt) v Bechara [2015] FCA 284

First Applicant: JOHN HAMILTON TAFFS
Second Applicant: VALERIE JANE TAFFS
First Respondent: JASON PORTER
Second Respondent: PAUL WESTON
File Number: SYG 2945 of 2015
Judgment of: Judge Nicholls
Hearing date: Matter decided on the papers
Date of Last Submission: 19 April 2016
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 22 July 2016

REPRESENTATION

Solicitors for the Applicants: Parker & Kissane Solicitors
Solicitors for the Respondent: Gadens Lawyers

ORDERS

  1. The application made on 30 October 2015 is dismissed.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 2945 of 2015

JOHN HAMILTON TAFFS

First Applicant

VALERIE JANE TAFFS

Second Applicant

And

JASON PORTER

First Respondent

PAUL WESTON

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 30 October 2015 Mr John Hamilton Taffs and Mrs Valerie Jane Taffs (“the applicants”) made an application to this Court seeking an order pursuant to s.178(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (“the Act”), that the Trustees of their respective bankrupt estates, Jason Porter and Paul Weston in their professional capacity (“the Trustees”) give consent to the Financial Ombudsman Service’s (“FOS”) consideration of a dispute between them and the Commonwealth Bank of Australia. The applicants brought the application against Mr Jason Porter and Mr Paul Weston, in their capacity as Trustees for the applicants’ respective estates. In submissions, the applicants stated that they understood Mr Porter was no longer a Trustee, therefore were proceeding against Mr Weston (“the Trustee”) only.

Background

  1. On 23 November 2015 a Registrar referred the matter to a Judge of the Court and made orders concerning the filing of evidence and written submissions.  The matter first came for directions before me on 4 February 2016.

  2. The affidavits filed are:

    (1)The affidavit of John Hamilton Taffs, farm manager, made on 26 October 2015 with annexures (“JHT”).

    (2)The affidavit of Paul Gerrard Weston, registered trustee, made on 7 December 2015, and with reference to the bundle of exhibits (“PGW1”).

  3. Written submissions were filed for the applicants on 19 January 2016 (“AS1”) and for the respondent on 29 January 2016 (“RS1”).  The matter was set down for final hearing.  Prior to the hearing, the parties notified the Court that they had agreed that it was appropriate for the Court to determine the application “on the papers”.  The…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCCA 1875
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The parties to this proceeding were the applicants, Mr. and Mrs. Taffs, and the respondent, Mr. Porter. The dispute concerned the ownership of a parcel of land located at 145 Old Coast Road, Mandurah, Western Australia. The applicants sought to have a caveat lodged by the respondent removed from the title of the land. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the respondent had a caveatable interest in the land. Specifically, the Court was required to determine if the respondent had established a sufficient equitable interest in the property to justify the continued existence of the caveat. This involved an examination of the nature of the agreement between the parties and whether it created a proprietary right or merely a personal one.

In reaching its decision, the Court considered the principles governing the creation of equitable interests in land. It analysed the terms of the agreement between the parties, which involved the sale of the land by the applicants to the respondent. The Court found that the agreement, as evidenced by the documentation and the conduct of the parties, did not create a registrable interest or a sufficiently strong equitable interest to support the caveat. The Court applied the established legal principles that a mere contractual right, without more, does not typically constitute a caveatable interest.

Consequently, the Court ordered that the caveat lodged by the respondent be removed from the title of the land.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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