McIntosh v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

McINTOSH v THE OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY [2014] FCCA 2502
Catchwords:
BANKRUPTCY – Trustee – review of decision – election to prosecute or discontinue bankrupt’s proceedings – where application to appeal trustee decision not made within 60 days – whether 60 day time limit can be enlarged.

Legislation:  

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss.30, 60, 178

Heshmati v Paul Burness and Morgan Lane as Trustees of the Bankrupt Estate of Bijan Heshmati [2012] FMCA 884
Sarkis v Moussa [2013] FCA 373
Applicant: MORAY MCINTOSH
Respondent: THE OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY
File Number: BRG 713 of 2014
Judgment of: Judge Burnett
Hearing date: 22 October 2014
Date of Last Submission: 22 October 2014
Delivered at: Brisbane
Delivered on: 22 October 2014

REPRESENTATION

The applicant appeared on his own behalf.
Solicitors for the Respondent: Hynes Legal

ORDERS

  1. That the interim application of the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy filed on 11 September 2014 be allowed.

  2. That the application filed in the Federal Court on 1 July 2014 (QUD 349/14) and transferred to the Federal Circuit Court by order made 31 July 2014 be dismissed.

  3. That the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to each application which, if not agreed, shall be taxed on the standard basis. Such costs to be paid from the bankrupt estate with priority afforded to costs, pursuant to s.109(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA

AT BRISBANE

BRG 713 of 2014

MORAY MCINTOSH

Applicant

And

THE OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Ex tempore)

  1. In this application, the respondent, the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, seeks interim orders in respect of paragraph 1(a) of its application filed 11 September. It seeks determination of the question of whether or not the applicant became aware of its decision to elect to discontinue certain proceedings, pursuant to s.60(3) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (“the Act”), outside 60 days from making his application for a review, pursuant to s.178 of the Bankruptcy Act (supra).

  2. The applicant is a bankrupt who was subject to a sequestration order made on 19 February 2014.  One of the assets the bankrupt claims in his estate is a chose in action, being certain Supreme Court proceedings, which were filed in the Supreme Court of Queensland and bear file number 118/14 in the Townsville Registry.  It is a claim by the applicant against Christopher Roland Bath, who was an employee at all material times of the Suncorp Metway Bank.  It claims against him for damages for misrepresentation in the course of Bath applying to the Suncorp Metway for the purpose of obtaining a loan from that bank on behalf of the bankrupt and his wife, who is now deceased.  The damages claim is for a sum of $1.056 million. 

  3. These proceedings are in part related to earlier proceedings between Mr McIntosh and his late wife and Suncorp Bank, which were resolved in a judgment delivered in the Supreme Court on 19 September 2013,…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCCA 2502
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

McIntosh (the applicant) sought to set aside a statutory demand issued by the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (the respondent). The dispute concerned whether the applicant had a "genuine dispute" about the existence of the debt claimed in the statutory demand, which was based on a judgment debt arising from a previous proceeding. The matter was heard in the Federal Court of Australia.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the applicant had established a "genuine dispute" regarding the existence of the debt for the purposes of setting aside the statutory demand under section 459H of the *Corporations Act 2001* (Cth). This required the Court to consider whether the grounds raised by the applicant constituted a substantial question of fact or law that ought to be tried.

Judge Burnett found that the applicant had failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute. The applicant's arguments relied on allegations of fraud and misrepresentation in the underlying judgment, which had already been litigated and dismissed in prior proceedings. The Court held that these matters were res judicata and could not be relitigated in the context of a statutory demand application. The principles of issue estoppel and cause of action estoppel prevented the applicant from raising these defences again. The Court reiterated that a statutory demand proceeding is not a forum for re-examining concluded litigation.

The application to set aside the statutory demand was dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Moray McIntosh, a bankrupt, filed a claim against Christopher Roland Bath, a former employee of Suncorp Metway Bank, in the Supreme Court of Queensland. The claim sought $1.056 million in damages for alleged misrepresentation during the process of obtaining a loan from Suncorp Metway Bank. This claim was filed after an earlier claim against Suncorp Metway Bank, which McIntosh had lost, was dismissed in a judgment delivered on 19 September 2013. McIntosh's claim against Bath was premised on new evidence that he believed supported his allegations. The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, who was administering McIntosh's estate, received correspondence from Clayton Utz, representing Suncorp Metway Bank, urging the trustee to discontinue McIntosh's proceedings against Bath, as they were without merit and likely to be struck out.

Upon receiving this correspondence, the Official Trustee sent a letter to McIntosh on 11 March 2014, informing him of the stay on the proceedings under section 60(2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 and his obligation to elect within 28 days to either prosecute or discontinue the claim under section 60(3) of the Act. McIntosh responded on 13 March 2014, outlining his belief that the evidence supported his claim and that he would secure the necessary funds to proceed with the case. However, on 17 March 2014, the Official Trustee decided to discontinue the proceedings, citing McIntosh's lack of funds and legal advice, as well as the dismissal of previous proceedings.

On 15 May 2014, McIntosh applied to the Federal Court for a review of the Official Trustee's decision. This application was dismissed due to McIntosh's non-appearance at the hearing, despite the application being arguably within the 60-day statutory period. McIntosh subsequently filed a fresh application on 1 July 2014, which was outside the 60-day period. The Official Trustee sought interim orders to address whether McIntosh's later application could be considered, given the statutory 60-day limitation for seeking review under section 178 of the Act.

The matter came before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia as an application for review of a decision made by the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy. The applicant, Moray McIntosh, is a bankrupt who was subject to a sequestration order made on 19 February 2014. McIntosh sought to challenge the Official Trustee's decision to discontinue certain Supreme Court proceedings that McIntosh had filed against Christopher Roland Bath, an employee of Suncorp Metway Bank. The proceedings sought damages for misrepresentation by Bath in the context of a loan application made on behalf of McIntosh and his late wife. McIntosh filed his initial application for review of the trustee's decision on 15 May 2014, which was dismissed due to his non-appearance. Instead of seeking to set aside the dismissal, McIntosh filed a fresh application on 1 July 2014. The Official Trustee then filed an interim application on 11 September 2014, seeking to enforce the 60-day time limit for such applications under section 178(2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). This application was heard on 22 October 2014. Key procedural steps include the initial application filed on 15 May 2014, its dismissal, the subsequent fresh application filed on 1 July 2014, and the interim application filed by the Official Trustee on 11 September 2014.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Is the 60-day time limit for making an application under s.178 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) an absolute one that cannot be extended by the court?
2. Did the applicant become aware of the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy's decision to discontinue certain proceedings within 60 days of the decision being made?
3. If the applicant did not become aware of the decision within 60 days, is the application made on 1 July 2014 still within the 60-day time limit?
4. Should the application made on 1 July 2014 be dismissed due to being outside the 60-day time limit?
5. Are the costs of the interim application filed by the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy on 11 September 2014 to be paid by the applicant?
6. Should the costs of the application filed on 1 July 2014 be paid by the applicant?

Held
1. The 60-day time limit for making an application under s.178 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) is an absolute one that cannot be extended by the court. The court concluded that the time limit is absolute and cannot be extended, based on the language of the Act and the reasoning in Heshmati v Paul Burness and Morgan Lane as Trustees of the Bankrupt Estate of Bijan Heshmati.
2. The applicant did not become aware of the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy's decision to discontinue certain proceedings within 60 days of the decision being made. The court found that the applicant did not become aware of the decision within 60 days.
3. If the applicant did not become aware of the decision within 60 days, the application made on 1 July 2014 is still outside the 60-day time limit. The court concluded that since the applicant did not become aware of the decision within 60 days, the application made on 1 July 2014 is still outside the 60-day time limit.
4. The application made on 1 July 2014 should be dismissed due to being outside the 60-day time limit. The court concluded that since the application was made outside the 60-day time limit, it must be dismissed.
5. The costs of the interim application filed by the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy on 11 September 2014 are to be paid by the applicant. The court ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the interim application.
6. The costs of the application filed on 1 July 2014 are to be paid by the applicant. The court ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the application filed on 1 July 2014.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court in McIntosh v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy addressed several key issues regarding the 60-day time limit for making an application under s.178 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). Firstly, the court confirmed that the 60-day time limit is absolute and cannot be extended by the court. This was established in the case of Heshmati v Paul Burness and Morgan Lane as Trustees of the Bankrupt Estate of Bijan Heshmati [2012] FMCA 884, where Driver FM concluded that the limitation period was not one that could be extended by the Court. The court in McIntosh further reinforced this principle, noting the imperative language of the section and the potential for significant disruption to the administration of bankrupt estates if the time limit could be extended.

Secondly, the court had to determine whether the applicant became aware of the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy's decision to discontinue certain proceedings within 60 days of the decision being made. The applicant argued that he was not aware of the decision until after the 60-day period had expired. However, the court found that the applicant had received correspondence from the Official Trustee on 17 March 2014, which outlined the decision to discontinue the proceedings. Given that the applicant filed his application on 1 July 2014, it was clear that the application was well outside the 60-day time limit.

Thirdly, because the applicant did not become aware of the decision within 60 days, the application made on 1 July 2014 was outside the 60-day time limit. The court confirmed that the 60-day period was mandatory and could not be extended, even in the absence of awareness by the applicant. This interpretation was consistent with the observations made by Farrell J in Sarkis v Moussa [2013] FCA 373, where it was noted that the 60-day period was one which was not capable of being enlarged.

Fourthly, given that the application made on 1 July 2014 was outside the 60-day time limit, the court had to decide whether it should be dismissed. The court concluded that because the application had no prospects of success due to the expired time limit, it should be dismissed. The court also dismissed the application for interim orders filed on 11 September 2014 because there was no utility in proceeding with the principal application.

Finally, the court addressed the issue of costs. It ordered that the costs of the interim application filed by the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy on 11 September 2014, as well as the costs of the application filed on 1 July 2014, be paid by the applicant. These costs were to be assessed on the standard basis and paid from the bankrupt estate, with priority given to the trustee's costs. The court's decision to award costs was based on the principle that the applicant's applications were without merit and had no reasonable prospects of success.

In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that the 60-day time limit for making an application under s.178 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) is absolute and cannot be extended by the court, even if the applicant was not aware of the decision within that period. Any application made outside this time limit is without merit and will be dismissed. Furthermore, costs will be awarded to the respondent if the application is found to be without merit.