FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZWCR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 472
ORDERS
NSD 1638 of 2016 BETWEEN: SZWCR
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
FLICK J
DATE OF ORDER:
10 MAY 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Appellant’s mother be appointed pursuant to r 9.63 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) as the litigation representative of the Appellant.
2.Pursuant to r 1.34 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), compliance with such other rules relating to the appointment of the mother as the litigation representative be dispensed with.
3. The appeal is dismissed.
4.The Appellant’s mother, as the litigation representative of the Appellant, is to…
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 472
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had denied procedural fairness by not properly considering the Appellant’s claims, specifically whether the Tribunal had predetermined the outcome or failed to genuinely consider the Appellant's claims. The Appellant argued that the Tribunal's failure to address his claims about the difficulties in obtaining a hukou and the potential harm he faced due to his social group amounted to a denial of procedural fairness. The court had to determine if the Tribunal's findings and reasoning demonstrated an open and fair consideration of the Appellant’s claims.
In dismissing the appeal, the court found that the Tribunal had indeed given proper and genuine consideration to the Appellant's claims. The court noted that the Tribunal had canvassed issues with the Appellant’s parents during the hearing and had provided an opportunity for further submissions. The Tribunal concluded that the Appellant’s parents would be able to obtain household registration for the child by paying a compensation fee, and that there was no real chance of the Appellant suffering serious harm due to his social group. The court held that the Appellant's argument that the Tribunal had predetermined the outcome was inconsistent with the Tribunal’s thorough consideration of the evidence and findings. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed with costs awarded against the Appellant's mother, who was appointed as his litigation representative.
The court's orders included appointing the Appellant’s mother as his litigation representative, dispensing with certain procedural requirements for this appointment, dismissing the appeal, and ordering the Appellant’s mother to pay the costs of the First Respondent. The court emphasised that the Tribunal had adequately considered the Appellant’s claims, thereby avoiding any denial of procedural fairness.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Appellant’s mother be appointed pursuant to r 9.63 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) as the litigation representative of the Appellant.
2. Pursuant to r 1.34 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), compliance with such other rules relating to the appointment of the mother as the litigation representative be dispensed with.
3. The appeal is dismissed.
4. The Appellant’s mother, as the litigation representative of the Appellant, is to pay the costs of the First Respondent.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appeal is to be dismissed with costs. None of the Grounds of Appeal have been made out.The failure to give proper consideration to claims made Difficulties that have been repeatedly expressed in respect to the expression “proper, genuine and realistic consideration” giving rise to the temptation for a court considering whether jurisdictional error has been exposed to impermissibly descend into merits review can presently be left to one side: Swift v SAS Trustee Corporation [2010] NSWCA 182 at [45], (2010) 6 ASTLR 339 at 351 to 352 per Basten JA (Allsop P agreeing); Torbey Investments Corporated Pty Ltd v Ferrara [2017] NSWCA 9 at [67] per Basten JA (McColl JA and Simpson JA agreeing). On any view of the Tribunal’s reasons it gave proper and adequate consideration to each of the claims now identified on behalf of the Appellant. The manner in which the first challenge was sought to be advanced before this Court seemed to vacillate and be (with respect) inconsistent with findings made by the Tribunal. The Tribunal found that:·the parents would be able to obtain household registration for the child following the payment of a “social compensation fee”; and that ·it was not satisfied that there was any real chance that the Appellant would suffer serious harm by reason of being a member of a social group being “black children” or “children without a hukou”.These findings, as set forth by the Tribunal in its reasons for decision, are expressed as follows:[29] The amount of the compensation fee, as discussed above, is determined on the basis of a number of factors. The Tribunal is satisfied that the Family planning laws from Fujian and the evidence in relation to its implementation indicate that when a child is born in breach of China’s family planning laws that a compensation fee will become payable. The Tribunal is satisfied that the evidence also indicates that upon payment of the compensation fee to the relevant authorities that a child is then issued with a hukou and included on the household registration of his family. The Tribunal finds, therefore, that the applicant’s parents will be able to obtain household registration for [the Applicant] following the payment of the social compensation fee. Accordingly, the Tribunal is not satisfied that there is a real chance that the applicant will suffer serious harm because he is unable to obtain a hukou. The Tribunal is not satisfied, therefore, having considered the applicant’s circumstances individually and cumulatively, that he will suffer serious harm as a result of the breach of China’s family planning laws. Therefore, the Tribunal is not satisfied that there is a real chance that the applicant will suffer serious harm for reasons of his particular social group of “black children” or “children without a hukou”, as posited by the representative, or any other formulation of particular social group. Given the finding of the Tribunal that a “hukou” could be obtained and that there was no claim that the family did not have the resources to obtain one, the first Ground of Appeal (however expressed) is without substance. It is rejected.