SZWBS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZWBS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2018] FCA 1779

Appeal from: SZWBS v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCCA 1874
File number: NSD 1092 of 2018
Judge: RARES  J
Date of judgment: 14 November 2018
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 91R

Immigrants and Emigrants Act, Sri Lanka

Cases cited: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZAPN (2015) 254 CLR 610
Date of hearing: 14 November 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 35
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr G Foster
Solicitor for the Appellant: Sentil Solicitor & Barrister
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms C Saunders of DLA Piper Australia
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1092 of 2018
BETWEEN:

SZWBS

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES  J

DATE OF ORDER:

14 NOVEMBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs in the sum of $2300.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

RARES J:

  1. This is an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court to refuse the appellant Constitutional writ relief in respect of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal made on 13 January 2015 to affirm the decision of the Minister’s delegate made on 9 August 2013 to refuse to grant the appellant a protection visa: SZWBS v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCCA 1874.

    Background

  2. The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka who applied for a protection visa in November 2012.  Relevantly, he claimed to fear persecution for reasons of first, his religion, as a Tamil Hindu, by Sinhalese and other Buddhists based on his activities as an active member of a famous temple complex in Sri Lanka near where he lived and had a shop, and, secondly, because, as a failed asylum seeker, he faced a real chance of persecution or significant harm if he were returned to Sri Lanka so as to engage Australia’s protection obligations under s 36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). It is not necessary to deal with the appellant’s other claims because of the way in which he has, through his counsel, confined his grounds of appeal from the decision of the trial judge.

  3. The appellant claimed that Buddhist monks and their supporters interrupted Hindu religious festivals at the temple at which he generally attended in 2009, 2010 and 2011.  He claimed that, in the last incident in 2011, the festival had been interrupted by supporters of a Minister in the Sri Lankan government, Mervyn Silva, who verbally abused the Hindu worshippers, including the appellant, and that he had been severely beaten.  He claimed that this conflict occurred because the Buddhists objected…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1779
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SZWBS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection concerned the appeal of the appellant, a failed asylum seeker, against the Tribunal's decision that his return to Sri Lanka would not amount to significant harm within the meaning of section 36(2A) of the Act. The appellant argued that he would be detained and investigated upon his return, which he claimed would constitute significant harm. The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, represented by the second respondent, argued that the appellant's claims were without merit. The matter was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, presided over by Justice Bromberg.

The primary legal issues in the case were whether the Tribunal had correctly applied the test for determining whether the appellant would face significant harm upon his return to Sri Lanka and if the Tribunal had misapplied the test in considering the failed asylum seeker claim. The appellant contended that the Tribunal had failed to consider whether he had a well-founded fear of persecution arising from his return, leading to jurisdictional error. Additionally, the appellant argued that his likely detention and investigation upon return would amount to significant harm.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal had correctly applied the test for determining significant harm and the failed asylum seeker claim. The court held that the Tribunal's finding that the appellant's likely detention on his return to Sri Lanka was the result of the non-discriminatory enforcement of a law of general application did not amount to significant harm. The court also rejected the appellant's argument that the Tribunal had misapplied the test in considering the failed asylum seeker claim, finding that the Tribunal had clearly found that there was no real chance in the foreseeable future that the appellant would face harm for reasons of his religion were he to return to Sri Lanka. The court found that the Tribunal had applied the correct test in accordance with Article 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant pay the first respondent's costs in the sum of $2300. The entry of orders was dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs in the sum of $2300.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In my opinion, the Tribunal’s finding that the appellant’s likely detention on his return to Sri Lanka as a failed asylum seeker and being subsequently investigated, monitored and possibly fined was the result of the non-discriminatory enforcement of a law of general application, namely, the Immigrants and Emigrants Act of Sri Lanka, which criminalised illegal departure of every Sri Lankan, regardless of his or her motivations. The Tribunal also found for similar reasons that those circumstances did not amount to significant harm within the meaning of s 36(2A) of the Act, relevantly because such treatment would not be cruel or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. For these reasons, I am satisfied that there is no substance in the second ground.Conclusion Accordingly, the appeal must be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Secondly, he argued that the Tribunal had misapplied the test in considering the failed asylum seeker claim. He contended that the correct test was not whether he would be detained for more than several days, but whether or not he had a well-founded fear of persecution arising from his return so that the Tribunal had fallen into jurisdictional error.Consideration I reject ground one. In my opinion, the Tribunal, contrary to the judge’s finding that its reasoning was not pellucid, clearly found that there was no real chance in the foreseeable future that the appellant would face harm for reasons of his religion were he to return to Sri Lanka. The Tribunal found that based on the 2014 DFAT report, there was little official discrimination on the basis of religion and that most members of religious groups in Sri Lanka were able to practice their faith unmolested, unless those persons proselytised or carried out “unethical conversions”. And, because there was no evidence that the appellant fell into the latter category, there was not a real chance that he would be persecuted for reasons of his religion were he to return to Sri Lanka. In my opinion, there is no substance in the appellant’s contention that the Tribunal made any jurisdictional error in the way in which it approached and evaluated the question whether he faced such a real chance of persecution. The Tribunal applied the correct test in Art 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention as set out in [8] of its reasons. Ground two, likewise, is without substance. The Tribunal found that the way in which the appellant would be processed on his return to Sri Lanka as a failed asylum seeker, based on the country information in the DFAT reports, would involve him being detained on return and subsequently investigated, monitored and possibly fined as a result of the non-discriminatory enforcement of a law of general application. The Tribunal considered all of the country information to which it referred, including the most up-to-date 2014 DFAT report and the submissions made by the appellant’s migration agent. At no point in the argument before me did counsel for the appellant suggest that there was anything in the submissions made to the Tribunal by his migration agent that it was bound, but failed, to take into account that could have produced any different result. Indeed, counsel did not refer at all to anything in those submissions that might have supported the argument that the Tribunal somehow erred in having regard to statements in the November 2012 DFAT report. The Minister contended that, to the extent that the argument that the appellant’s submissions today went outside ground two in the court below, which the notice of appeal repeated, the appellant needed leave, but added that, in any event, the ground had no merit. I would not have granted leave if the argument on ground two extended beyond what was raised below, but I think that the argument fell within the ground. However, in any event, the attack on the Tribunal’s reasons was hopeless because of the decision in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZAPN (2015) 254 CLR 610. French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ held, in respect of the application of s 91R(2)(a) of the Act (which was in force when the Tribunal made its decision) to the treatment of failed Sri Lanka asylum seekers who were returned from Australia (at 254 CLR 627 to 628 [45] and 629-630 [51]-[52]):…in light of the collocation of threats to life and liberty in s 91R(2)(a), that the question of whether a risk of the loss of liberty constitutes “serious harm” for the purposes of s 91R(1)(b) requires a qualitative judgment. This qualitative judgment will include an evaluation of the nature and gravity of the loss of liberty. Whether the likelihood of detention in any case rises to the level of serious harm instanced by s 91R(2)(a) is a question which invites a consideration of the circumstances and consequences of that detention.…It is also noteworthy that s 91R(2)(b) lists “significant physical harassment” as an instance of serious harm. Temporary detentions of a person fall naturally within the description of physical harassment, and so readily within s 91R(2)(b). Because that is so, it is unnecessary to engage in the awkward shoehorning of cases of harassment involving episodes of temporary detention into s 91R(2)(a) in order to give effect to Australia’s obligations under the Convention. Moreover, to treat any detention as falling within s 91R(2)(a) rather than s 91R(2)(b) would deprive s 91R(2)(b) of much of the operation it could be expected to have. Further, a determination whether temporary detention amounts to significant physical harassment obviously requires a decision-maker to consider the gravity and frequency of the incidents in which harassment is said to have occurred: that task is indisputably one of fact and degree. It may be said in a given case that the risk of physical harassment involving detention is so severe as to be properly described as a threat to the life or liberty of a person. But to say that is to acknowledge, emphatically, that the question is a matter of fact and degree dependent upon the circumstances of the detention.Considerations derived from the context in which s 91R emerged, and is required to operate, support the conclusion that the application of s 91R(2)(a) for the purposes of s 91R(1)(b) requires an evaluation of the likely circumstances of the loss of liberty feared by the claimant. (emphasis in original)