SZWBK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZWBK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1020

Appeal from: SZWBK & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 434
File number: NSD 419 of 2017
Judge: LEE J
Date of judgment: 4 August 2017
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – application for judicial review of refusal to grant Protection (Class XA) Visa – application dismissed in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – appeal from primary judge’s decision

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application pursuant to r 36.75(1)(a)(i) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) to dismiss an appeal in the absence of the appellants – where application for adjournment on medical grounds made by the first appellant by letter sent to the Court on the morning of the appeal – where medical evidence unsatisfactory – where application for adjournment dismissed – where appeal does not have reasonable prospects of success – appeal dismissed with costs

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 36(2B)(a)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), rr 36.75(1)(a)(i), 36.75(2)

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954)

Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967)

Cases cited:

ALG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 560

MZYEZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 530

NAKX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1559

Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 108

SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 40; (2007) 233 CLR 18

SZWBK & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 434

Date of hearing: 4 August 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 36
Counsel for the Appellants: The Appellants did not appear
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent entered a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 419 of 2017
BETWEEN:

SZWBK

First Appellant

SZWBL

Second Appellant

SZWBM (and another named in the Schedule)

Third Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

LEE J

DATE OF ORDER:

4 AUGUST 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Pursuant to FCR 36.75(1)(a)(i), the appeal be dismissed.

2.The first, second and fourth appellants are to pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

LEE J:

A        INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an appeal from orders and judgment of the Federal Circuit Court made on 10 March 2017 which dismissed the appellants’ application for constitutional writs in respect of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) dated 8 January 2015. The…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 1020
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, SZWBK and others sought a judicial review of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection's refusal to grant them Protection (Class XA) Visas. The court was tasked with deciding whether the Tribunal's decision was legally sound and if the appellants had a reasonable prospect of success on appeal. The court also had to consider whether the appellants had provided sufficient grounds for an adjournment of the hearing due to the first appellant's alleged medical condition.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had erred in its decision to refuse the visas, and if the appellants' claims had any substantive merit. The court had to assess the sufficiency of the medical evidence provided to support the request for an adjournment. Additionally, the court needed to determine if the appellants' claims had reasonable prospects of success, given the primary judge's findings.

The court found that the Tribunal had not erred in its decision, as there was no obligation to specify a relocation place for the appellants. Furthermore, the first appellant's qualifications and work experience made him well-suited to find employment in major cities in Bangladesh. The court rejected the application for an adjournment due to the unsatisfactory nature of the medical evidence provided. The court concluded that the appeal lacked reasonable prospects of success, leading to the dismissal of the appeal with costs awarded to the Minister.

The court ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that the first, second, and fourth appellants pay the Minister's costs of the appeal. This decision was based on the court's preliminary review of the material, which did not indicate any appealable errors by the primary judge.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Pursuant to FCR 36.75(1)(a)(i), the appeal be dismissed.

2. The first, second and fourth appellants are to pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Fourthly, the appellants contend that the Tribunal failed to identify the place, where the appellants could relocate. There was no obligation on the Tribunal to specify a particular place for relocation. Moreover, as set out at [26] above, the Tribunal found that the first appellant’s qualifications and work experience would make him well placed to obtain employment in major cities in Bangladesh.D CONCLUSION & ORDERS I am conscious that I have not had the benefit of oral submissions on behalf of the appellants. Certainly, however, my review of the way the case has been put before the Court by the appellants leads me to conclude that it is difficult to see any substantive merit in the appeal. There was no reason for any of the appellants, including the first appellant, to think that the Court would not proceed to determine the matter today in the event that one or other of them was absent. I am satisfied that there is a basis to make the order which the Minister seeks pursuant to FCR 36.75(1)(a)(i), dismissing the appeal. I am fortified in this view by my conclusion that there is nothing, upon my preliminary review of the material, which indicates that the primary judge fell into appealable error, such that a reasonable prospect of success on the appeal is disclosed. In those circumstances, I am satisfied that I ought to dismiss the appeal with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

There are four appellants in this matter. The first appellant made specific claims to be owed protection (to which I will return below), and the second to fourth appellants relied on their membership of the first appellant’s family unit. The second appellant is the first appellant’s wife, and the third and fourth appellants are their sons (currently aged 14 and 31). In these circumstances, I also arranged for the matter to be called three times outside Court to see whether there would be an appearance by one of the other appellants. There was no appearance. Consideration The only basis upon which an adjournment is sought is as indicated in the Adjournment Request and the material provided therewith. No explanation was provided as to why the medical difficulties said to have been suffered by the first appellant were not communicated at an earlier time, given that the condition was apparently extant as long ago as 18 July 2017. Leaving that issue to one side, this case seems to be an example falling into the same category as considered by Lindgren J in NAKX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1559 and Pagone J in Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 108, that is, where a medical certificate is, on its face, quite unsatisfactory. The medical certificates do not purport to address the critical question of whether, and if so why, the relevant “medical condition” would prevent the first appellant from travelling to Court and participating effectively in the hearing. Like the position in NAKX and Singh, I do not accept, on the basis of the material provided, that the Delphically described “medical condition” would have prevented the first appellant from travelling to Court and participating effectively in the hearing. Even if I was wrong about this, there is no explanation as to why the first appellant could not have made the necessary arrangements to attend the hearing by telephone, nor is there any explanation as to why the other appellants have also not appeared. I agree, with respect, with what Pagone J said in Singh (at [2]), namely that: …what needs to be provided for a medical certificate to be meaningful is material that establishes why it is or how it is that the appellant suffering from a medical condition would be unfit for participation at a court hearing. The medical certificates provided by the first appellant are noticeably deficient in this regard. I do not regard the contents of the Adjournment Request as augmenting the content of the medical certificates in any meaningful way. Although the first appellant says his treating doctor has advised him to obtain “complete bedrest”, the medical certificates do not make that plain, nor is it evident why this would prevent participation by telephone; again, even if this is the case, there is no explanation as to why the condition could not have been brought to the attention of the Court at an earlier stage such that appropriate arrangements could then have been made.