FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZWAU v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2015] FCCA 199 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Refugee Review Tribunal – whether the correct test under s.91R was applied – whether the Tribunal failed to consider an integer of the applicant’s claim – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954) Immigration and Emigration Act of 1948 (Sri Lanka) Migration Act 1958 |
| Applicant: | SZWAU |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 209 of 2015 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Street |
| Hearing date: | 29 January 2015 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 29 January 2015 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 29 January 2015 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr S. Prince |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | N/A |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Ms L. Buchanan |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Australian Government Solicitor |
ORDERS
The application for leave be refused
The proceedings are dismissed.
The Applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT AT SYDNEY |
SYG 209 of 2015
| SZWAU |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application within the Court’s jurisdiction under s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 in respect of the conferral through s.77 of the Constitution of the original jurisdiction in relation to migration decisions as the High Court of Australia has under s.75(v) of the Constitution. In this case, the Tribunal delivered a decision on 20 August 2014. An application for extension of time was required under s.477 of the Act as these proceedings commenced on 28 January 2015 in circumstances where a notice of intention to remove from Australia had been issued in respect of the applicant to take effect today on 29 January 2015.
The Court has heard the injunction application and the leave application concurrently. The grounds advanced of alleged jurisdictional error which are as follows.
1. The Reviewer has applied the wrong test pursuant to section 91R(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and/or asked itself the wrong question.
By undergoing a qualitative assessment of the nature and degree of the harm experienced by the applicant when being questioned and investigated by the authorities at the airport, the Reviewer failed to apply the test of serious harm pursuant to s91R(2)(a), and thereby fell into jurisdictional error; WZAPN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 947 at [30] and [45].
Counsel for the applicant, Mr Prince, identified a further ground to the effect that there was a jurisdictional error by the Tribunal by reason of the failure…
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- Case
- [2015] FCCA 199
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the Tribunal's decision was affected by jurisdictional error, specifically concerning its consideration of the applicant's second ground of appeal and the proper application of the test under section 91R(2)(a). This required the Court to determine how human rights should be considered in the context of statutory interpretation, particularly when those rights might be impacted by immigration laws and potential detention. The Court also had to consider whether a previous decision, WZAPN, was binding on the present case.
Judge Street, applying the reasoning from *MZAPO v The Minister* [2015] FCCA 96, held that human rights are not superior to the rule of law. The Court affirmed that the Australian Constitution is founded on the supremacy of the rule of law, referencing the High Court's decision in *Plaintiff S 157/2002 v Commonwealth* (2003) 211 CLR 476, which underscored the constitutional entrenchment of judicial review. The Court reasoned that a valid law, appropriate and adapted to a legitimate object, would not constitute a threat to liberty within the meaning of section 91R(2)(a). Consequently, the Court found that the construction principle suggested by the applicant, which equated any detention under a general law with a threat to liberty, was contrary to the constitutional principle of the supremacy of the rule of law and was therefore not binding. The Court distinguished the present case from WZAPN on both grounds of alleged error.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
For the reasons given by this Court earlier in MZAPO v The Minister [2015] FCCA 96, it is a fundamental misconception to treat human rights as if they were above the rule of law. The Australian Constitution is based on the supremacy of the rule of law, and when one comes to construing the Migration Act, the High Court in Plaintiff S 157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476 at para.103 said as follows:103. Finally, the issues decided in these proceedings are not merely issues of a technical kind involving the interpretation of the contested provisions of the Act. The Act must be read in the context of the operation of s 75 of the Constitution. That section, and specifically s 75(v), introduces into the Constitution of the Commonwealth an entrenched minimum provision of judicial review. There was no precise equivalent to s 75(v) in either of the Constitutions of the United States of America or Canada. The provision of the constitutional writs and the conferral upon this Court of an irremovable jurisdiction to issue them to an officer of the Commonwealth constitutes a textual reinforcement for what Dixon J said about the significance of the rule of law for the Constitution in Australian Communist Party v The Commonwealth. In that case, his Honour stated that the Constitution:"is an instrument framed in accordance with many traditional conceptions, to some of which it gives effect, as, for example, in separating the judicial power from other functions of government, others of which are simply assumed. Among these I think that it may fairly be said that the rule of law forms an assumption." (emphasis added) That decision, in my opinion, reinforces the approach that one would not readily construe a statute as if it was elevating human rights above the rule of law. In my opinion, a valid law that is appropriate and adapted to a legitimate object, which is in essence what has been found by the Tribunal in this case in respect of the potential detention that may flow from the Immigration and Emigration Act of 1948 of the applicant and which is appropriate and adapted to a legitimate object for the benefit of the people of that State, would not be something that constitutes a threat to liberty within s.91R(2)(a). Nor did the Tribunal find that general law was applied inhumanely. Mr Prince put that this Court was bound by the decision of WZAPN and that this Court was wrong in the decision of MZAPO and that the Tribunal’s reasons failed to properly consider the second ground and could not be read as if that test had been properly considered. For the reasons I have given, I am not persuaded that there is a construction principle identified in WZAPN that is binding in relation to s.91R(2)(a) in the present case. For the reasons I have given, it can be distinguished on both grounds of alleged error. Further, to the extent that there is a construction principle identified that equates the threat to liberty as if it were a right to liberty, that construction principle, in my opinion, is contrary to the principle entrenched in the Australian Constitution, as to the supremacy of the rule of law. The constructive principle that any detention pursuant to a general law is a threat to liberty would be purporting to elevate, in my opinion, a human right above the rule of law. In my opinion that would be adopting a construction principle that would is inconsistent with what was said by the High Court of Australia in Plaintiff S 157/2002 v Commonwealth referred to above, which is binding on this Court.