SZVWD v Minister for Immigration
[2017] FCCA 82
•20 January 2017
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZVWD v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2017] FCCA 82 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for review of former Refugee Review Tribunal decision – whether Tribunal failed to consider a claim – whether Tribunal failed to ask itself the right question – whether Tribunal imposed an expectation on the applicant – whether Tribunal failed to apply the internal relocation principle – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.476 |
| Cases cited: Htun v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1802; (2001) 233 FCR 136 NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; (2004) 144 FCR 1 |
| Applicant: | SZVWD |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 3519 of 2014 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Nicholls |
| Hearing date: | 13 September 2016 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 13 September 2016 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 20 January 2017 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Reynolds |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Fragomen |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr Reilly |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Mills Oakley Lawyers |
ORDERS
The name of the second respondent is amended to read “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”.
The application made on 18 December 2014 and amended on 14 April 2015 and further amended on 16 June 2016 is dismissed.
The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs set in the amount of $5800.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 3519 of 2014
| SZVWD |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application made pursuant to s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) on 18 December 2014, and amended on 14 April 2015 and further amended on 16 June 2016, seeking review of the decision of the then Refugee Review Tribunal, now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) which, on 25 November 2014, affirmed the decision of the Minister’s delegate to refuse a protection (Class XA) visa to the applicant.
In evidence before the Court is a bundle of relevant documents filed by the Minister and tendered by the applicant (“the Court Book” – “CB”, “AE1”).
Background
The applicant is a citizen of Pakistan who arrived in Australia on 9 August 2012 as an “irregular maritime arrival”. The applicant claimed protection on the basis that he was a Shia Muslim (a minority in Pakistan) from Parachinar. He claimed he moved from Parachinar to Rawalpindi in Pakistan, because it was not safe (CB 15).
The Minister decided to allow the applicant to apply for a protection visa, which the applicant subsequently did on 24 December 2012. He was assisted by a registered migration agent (CB 30 to CB 86).
On 7 September 2013, the Minister’s delegate refused the application (CB 132 to CB 151). The applicant applied for review to the Tribunal 19 September 2013 (CB 152 to CB 159). He continued to be represented by a registered migration agent who was also a solicitor.
The applicant’s written submissions set out elements of the Tribunal’s analysis and findings which provide the basis for the application to the Court as follows ([14] – [19] of the applicant’s written submissions):
“[14] At [21] (CB222), the Tribunal accepted that the Applicant had ‘numerous extended family members in Parachinar’ but considered that the Applicant’s home region was Rawalpindi. The Tribunal then stated:
For those reasons, although the Tribunal accepts the independent evidence indicating that the situation for Shias in Parachinar is particularly fraught, the Tribunal considers it unnecessary to consider whether the applicant has a well founded fear of persecution in Parachinar, where he has not lived for some 14 years.
[15] At [22] (CB222), the Tribunal then concluded that the Applicant was not a truthful witness and considered that he had fabricated his claims to have suffered harm in Pakistan. It then proceeded to explain this conclusion with reference to the claims concerning:
(a) The brother-in-law ([23]-[28]);
(b) The 2007 incident in Rawalpindi ([29]-[31]);
(c) The claimed targeting in Rawalpindi ([32]-[34]).
[16] The Tribunal did, however, accept that the Applicant’s uncle was kidnapped in Parachinar (although returned with the assistance of the UN) and that the Applicant’s family moved to Rawalpindi because of the violence in Parachinar and the killing of a cousin in a bombing attack (CB226, [32]).
[17] The Tribunal also considered whether the Applicant faced a real chance of suffering serious harm in Rawalpindi
(CB226-229), [35]-[40]). The Tribunal accepted that there were specific attacks on Shia religious locations and gatherings and there remained some risk of harm for Shias throughout Pakistan. However, the situation varied across different regions and there was limited evidence of specific targeting in Islamabad or Rawalpindi. The evidence showed that 85% of the recorded incidents occurred in the Kurram Agency, FATA, Karachi, Quetta and Gilgit. The Tribunal accepted that the Applicant was most likely at risk when attending a Shia gathering, but the risk was remote.
[18] At [41] (CB229), the Tribunal then noted that the Applicant’s representative had provided evidence concerning Parachinar, had made submissions in relation to the barriers and difficulty in relation to travel to and from Parachinar, and had made submissions concerning relocation. However, the Tribunal considered the Applicant's home region to be Rawalpindi therefore:
The Tribunal is not satisfied that it is necessary to consider the situation for the applicant in relation to Parachinar as although the applicant has some family members in Parachinar, his wife, child, parents and sister reside in Rawalpindi and he has not claimed that he wishes to operate a business in Parachinar upon his return. The Tribunal does not, in such circumstances, consider it necessary to consider the issue of relocation.
[19] The Tribunal then rejected the complementary protection claims (CB229-230, [43]-[44]).”
Application to the Court
The grounds of the further amended application are in the following terms:
“1. The Tribunal engaged in jurisdictional error by failing to consider a claim or component thereof.
Particulars
a. It was part of the claim before the Tribunal that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution in Parachinar (e.g. CB82 paras 11-13, CB199.1), that in Pakistan he travelled back and forth between Rawalpindi and Parachinar (e.g. CB82 para 16), and that the Taliban impeded travel (e.g. CB83 para 38, CB124.6).
b. Although the Tribunal accepted that the situation for Shias in Parachinar was “particularly fraught” it said that it was unnecessary to consider whether the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution in Parachinar (CB222 para 21), thereby failing to consider whether or not the applicant faced a well-founded fear of persecution by virtue of travelling back and forth to Parachinar (and other places) upon his return as claimed: see MZADT v MIBP [2015] FCCA 2702 at paras 22-33.
2. The Tribunal engaged in jurisdictional error by failing to ask itself the right question or apply the correct law.
Particulars
a. The Tribunal erred in refusing to consider the internal relocation principle (CB229 para 41).
b. Although the applicant already lived in Rawalpindi, he claimed that he would travel outside it including to Parachinar.
c. The premise of the Tribunal decision was that the applicant would remain in Rawalpindi upon his return, yet it failed to consider whether it was reasonable to expect that the applicant would remain in Rawalpindi and not travel including to Parachinar (or otherwise address the relocation principle in any way): see MIBP v SZSCA (2014) 314 ALR 514 at paras 29-33; AFD15 v MIBP [2015] FCCA 3175 at para 15.”
At the final hearing, both parties were represented by counsel. Written submissions were filed by the applicant on 30 August 2016 and by the respondent on 6 September 2016.
Consideration
Ground one asserts error on the part of the Tribunal in that it failed to consider a claim said to be made by the applicant. Ground two was described by the applicant as presenting an “interrelated” error. Namely, that the Tribunal fell into legal error when it “dismissed”, as irrelevant, principles relating to “relocation” within Pakistan. It was clear that the applicant’s grounds arise out of what he said was a particular aspect of his case before the Tribunal, and the Tribunal’s failure to deal with it.
There was no dispute between the parties as to the applicable law in relation to ground one. The Tribunal is obliged to consider a claim expressly made by the applicant to fear harm on return to their home country, and claims clearly arising in the circumstances presented (Htun v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1802; (2001) 233 FCR 136, NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; (2004) 144 FCR 1 (“NABE (No 2)”) and Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184). The Tribunal is obliged to consider a substantial, clearly articulated argument relying upon established facts (Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26; (2003) 197 ALR 389).
In the current case, the applicant says that a claim as described in the authorities above, was raised, and the Tribunal did not consider it. The Minister says no such claim arose.
The evidence before the Tribunal was that the applicant and his family had originally come from Parachinar in Pakistan. In 2000, the family moved to Rawalpindi. The applicant’s submissions before the Court were that there was evidence before the Tribunal, that on return to Pakistan, there was a prospect of the applicant travelling to Parachinar and that he feared harm from the Taliban who would impede such travel.
The applicant’s submissions directed attention to various parts of the material before the Tribunal to make good his proposition that this was a claim clearly arising on the materials before the Tribunal.
First, in a Statutory Declaration accompanying his protection visa application, under the heading “Problems in Pakistan”, the applicant stated ([16] at CB 82):
“From 2000, although we were in a Rawalpindi, we used to go back and forth to Parachinar because my mother was still teaching in Parachinar.”
The applicant then stated ([25] at CB 84):
“During this time my mother was still working in Parachinar and so I would go back to see her. This was not a safe trip. I knew of many people that had been killed because they had done this trip.”
Second, in the same document under the heading “Coming to Australia”, the applicant stated ([37]-[38] at CB 85):
“[37] I fear the barriers placed around Parachinar by the Taliban impact on my ability to live a life free from danger. Life for me is a constant fear.
[38] I fear the barriers of the Taliban, in preventing me from traveling, impact on my ability to operate my business and impacts on my ability to subsist.”
Before the Court, the applicant submitted that the claims he had raised here, were that in the past there were problems in travelling to Parachinar, and in the future he feared that the barriers placed by the Taliban would prevent him travelling.
Third, a document from the Chairman of the “National Assembly of Pakistan” (“NAP”) submitted by the applicant with his protection visa application, contained the following (at CB 88.4):
“All roads of Kurram Agency are blocked by Taliban terrorists since April 2007 and the residents of my constituency are in the siege of Taliban terrorists.”
[Parachinar is in the Kurram Agency.]
Fourth, a newspaper article also submitted by the applicant which refers to access to the Kurram Agency being blocked by terrorists (CB 112).
Fifth, as set out above, the applicant was represented by a registered migration agent in making his application (CB 38). The representative made various written submissions on behalf of the applicant (CB 120 to CB 128). Amongst instances of harm claimed to have been suffered by the applicant was the following (at CB 124.7):
“Barriers of the Taliban preventing travel and ability to operate his business.”
Sixth, in its decision record, the Tribunal accepted that the applicant had extended family members in Parachinar ([21] at CB 222). Before the Court, the applicant submitted, with reference to MZWDGv Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 497 (“MZWDG”) (at [39]), that this is one of three “types” of claim that the Tribunal is required to consider. That is, in addition to those set out at [10] above, “those that emerge from the Tribunal’s findings or conclusions”.
In short, the applicant’s explanation of ground one was that the applicant claimed that on return to Pakistan he may travel to Parachinar. The Tribunal was required to deal with this claim, that is, that on return he feared harm from the Taliban relating to this travel.
The Tribunal was said not to have dealt with this claim. The applicant’s submission is that at [41] (at CB 229) of its decision record, the Tribunal was “conscious” of this claim, but considered it unnecessary to deal with it.
The applicant also relied on MZADT v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2702 (“MZADT”) per Judge McGuire, which he submitted was a “similar type of case”. In that case, as in the current case, the applicant was a Shia Muslim originally from Parachinar. The Tribunal found he could live in Rawalpindi. The Court found that the Tribunal did not consider the claim that he might travel back to Parachinar.
Dealing first with the authorities. MZWDG is plainly binding on this Court, being a matter on appeal from this Court to a superior Court. However, I do not respectfully understand the Court’s decision in MZWDG to be of assistance to the applicant in the circumstances of this case.
The applicant points to [41] (at CB 229) of the Tribunal’s decision record which is in the following terms:
“As stated above, the representative has provided evidence in relation to the situation for Shias in Parachinar and made submissions in relation to the barriers and difficulty in relation to travel to and from Parachinar. The representative has also submitted that relocation is not possible for the applicant because he has no family networks or support elsewhere in Pakistan. It has also been submitted that he has a lack of familiarity with the culture or system of other parts of Pakistan and that he would have difficulties operating his business in Parachinar. The Tribunal has found above that that applicant’s home region is Rawalpindi where he lived for several years and where his family resides. The Tribunal is not satisfied that it is necessary to consider the situation for the applicant in relation to Parachinar as although the applicant has some family members in Parachinar, his wife, child, parents and sister reside in Rawalpindi and he has not claimed that he wishes to operate a business in Parachinar upon his return. The Tribunal does not, in such circumstances, consider it necessary to consider the issue of relocation.”
On a fair reading, what the Tribunal has set out there (at [41] at CB 229), is an acknowledgement of the applicant’s representative’s submissions, and its analysis of those submissions. This is not a case where, as in MZWDG, a claim emerged from, or was consequent to, the Tribunal’s analysis and findings. Here (in particular at [41] at CB 229), the Tribunal simply, and properly, addressed the representative’s submissions to it.
Nor does MZADT assist the applicant. As the Minister submits, the circumstances of that case are distinguishable. In that case, the Court found there was a claim made by the applicant “in respect of travel between Rawalpindi and Kurram Agency” (MZADT at [33]). That is not the situation in the current case.
The authorities that provide relevant direction to this Court in the current circumstances are two Full Federal Court judgements in NABE (No 2) and SZSHK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 125 (“SZSHK”).
In NABE (No 2) (at [68]) the Court relevantly said:
“Although such a claim might have been as arising on the material before the Tribunal it did not represent, in any way, ‘a substantial clearly articulated argument relying upon established facts’ in the sense in which that term was used in Dranichnikov. A judgment that the Tribunal has failed to consider a claim not expressly advanced is, as already indicated in these reasons, not lightly to be made. The claim must emerge clearly from the materials before the Tribunal. In our opinion the judgment that the Tribunal, by reason of the error it made about the appellant’s involvement with PLOTE, failed to consider an unexpressed claim of want of effective State protection against persecution by PLOTE, is not open having regard to the thresholds required for such a judgment by the authorities to which we have referred. This case does demonstrate an unfortunate factual error which, as Tamberlin J found, contributed to the Tribunal’s adverse findings as to credibility and could have affected the outcome of the review by the Tribunal. It did not, however, constitute jurisdictional error in the sense earlier discussed. It was, as the members of the Full Court found on that occasion, an error of fact within jurisdiction.”
In SZSHK (at [37]) the Court relevantly stated:
“We do not suggest there is a formula to assess whether the case put has sufficiently raised the relevant issue but relevant matters to be taken into account are whether or not the claim for complementary protection clearly arises from the materials and, where the claimant is represented by professional advisers, whether the advisers have articulated the case which is later said not to have been dealt with by the tribunal of fact. We do not accept the appellant’s submission that merely because material is put as giving rise to a claim on Refugees Convention grounds it automatically follows that that claim is required to be considered as a claim for complementary protection.”
The applicant’s reliance on his statements as to past harm do not assist him in making out the proposition that this was a claim about a fear of future harm.
The applicant’s past problems in Pakistan, as set out in his Statutory Declaration, were plainly about the past. He claimed that his family moved to Rawalpindi from Parachinar in 2000. He continued to travel to Parachinar because his mother continued to work there. The applicant’s Statutory Declaration was made on 17 December 2012. There was nothing in the Statutory Declaration, or for that matter elsewhere, to say that he would, on return to Pakistan, continue to travel to Parachinar to visit his mother. On the evidence before the Tribunal, he had ceased travelling to Parachinar for the purpose of visiting his mother some years earlier.
As for the future, the applicant’s Statutory Declaration did refer to the “barriers” around Parachinar ([37] – [38] at CB 85 and see [16] above). This was consistent with the reports of “barriers” in the document from the Chairman of the NAP, and the newspaper article that the applicant submitted (see [17] – [18] above).
However, and as the Minister submitted, the applicant’s statement here needs to be understood in the actual context that the applicant was claiming to fear harm on return to Pakistan as it related to both Parachinar and Rawalpindi, and elsewhere in Pakistan.
As the applicant plainly stated immediately following [38] (at CB 85), at [39] (at CB 85): “[t]here is nowhere safe for me in Pakistan. Shias are targeted everywhere.” This point is reinforced in the applicant’s representative’s submissions of 21 November 2014. The representative provided a “summary” of the applicant’s claims. These are (at CB 199):
“[The applicant] fears being harmed or killed in Parachinar or Rawalpindi by the Taliban and other Sunni militant groups on the basis of his:
·Shia religion;
·Turi ethnicity;
·Imputed political opinion of being opposed to Sunni extremist groups; and
·Membership of one or more particular social groups (MPSG) which may be characterised variously as:
- Close relatives of professional and educated Shia Muslims;
- Young Shia males from Parachinar; and
- Young educated Shia males
We submit that [the applicant’s] religion, ethnicity, imputed political opinion and membership of one or more of the aforementioned particular social group are the essential and significant reason for the harm feared.
We further submit that [the applicant’s] claims are not localised to Parachinar or Rawalpindi and that he fears harm for all of the above reasons, and in particular on the basis of his Turi ethnicity and MPSG as a ‘Shia from Parachinar’ in other parts of Pakistan.”
What is clear is that the applicant’s claims to fear harm, as he expressed it, and as submissions made on his behalf explained it, were that he feared harm in all of Pakistan from the Taliban and other Sunni extremist groups including in Parachinar and Rawalpindi, because he was a Shia Muslim of Turi ethnicity, and opposed to any extremism. Each of the headings in the representative submissions of 21 November 2014 only serve to reinforce that this was the basis for the claimed fear. That is, the applicant claimed to fear harm everywhere in Pakistan because of these characteristics and could not relocate from Rawalpindi to elsewhere in Pakistan for this reason.
In this context, the representative’s submissions also addressed the contingency should the Tribunal find that the applicant’s fear of harm was not “throughout Pakistan” (see CB 205.6 under the heading of “Relocation”). The submission stated that the same claims were also relevant to the question of “the reasonableness of relocation” (CB 205.7).
The Tribunal cannot be said to have ignored the applicant’s claims in the terms used by the applicant in his Statutory Declaration, that is, to fear harm in the future. The Tribunal accurately set out the applicant’s initial claims ([2] at CB 218), including that his family moved from Parachinar to Rawalpindi in 2000, although his mother continued to work in Parachinar ([6] at CB 219). Further, that the family moved from Parachinar to Rawalpindi because of fear of harm, and that the family would travel back because his mother continued to work in Parachinar ([7] at CB 219).
Further, and relevantly, the Tribunal reported his claim of the “barriers” around Parachinar which “prevent[ed] him from operating his business and ‘impact[ed] on [his] ability to subsist’” ([10] at CB 220). The Tribunal also had specific regard to the written submissions made by the applicant’s representative ([18] at CB 221 and [20] at CB 221 to CB 222).
The Tribunal accepted some of the applicant’s claims, including that the family had lived in Parachinar and moved to Rawalpindi in 2000 ([21] at CB 222). However, the Tribunal found that the applicant was not a truthful witness and had “fabricated” his claims of past harm. It did not accept that he left Pakistan for the reasons he gave ([22] at CB 222). The Tribunal gave reasons for these conclusions ([23] at CB 222 to [34] at CB 226). The Tribunal then moved to consider the “[s]ituation for Shias in Rawalpindi” (CB 226). The Tribunal also considered the situation for Shias throughout Pakistan, and took into account country information in this regard ([35] at CB 226 to [42] at CB 229). This included information concerning Shias of Turi ethnicity (see in particular [36] at CB 227, [39] at CB 228 and [42] at CB 229).
This is the context in which what the Tribunal set out in [41] (at CB 229), and on which the applicant now relies, needs to be fairly understood. It is clear in my view that the Tribunal squarely addressed the claims advanced by the applicant concerning “barriers” and “travel to and from Parachinar”.
It is to be remembered that the Tribunal accepted the applicant’s evidence that he and his family had moved to Rawalpindi some time ago. At [41] (at CB 229) the Tribunal was plainly addressing the representative’s submissions, put in the “alternative”, concerning relocation within Pakistan. The Tribunal found that it was not necessary to consider the issue of relocation because his home area was now Rawalpindi, where the Tribunal otherwise found he could safely return. There was no claim that the applicant wished to operate a business in Parachinar on return, or that any of his wife, child or parents (including his mother) and sister lived there. This was reasonably open to the Tribunal as the applicant’s claims to fear harm as a result of the Taliban “barriers” were either claims of past harm concerning Parachinar, or claims of future harm should he “relocate” there. He did not claim that he would return to Parachinar to conduct business. Nor, for that matter, that there was any need, on return, to go to Parachinar because of his mother or other immediate family members.
The Tribunal dealt with the claims as squarely made and clearly arising. Ground one is not made out.
Ground two asserts the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error because it failed to consider the “internal relocation” principle. The applicant’s submission now is that, although he had already lived in Rawalpindi, he claimed he would travel outside Rawalpindi including to Parachinar. In the circumstances, the Tribunal should have considered the matter of travel to Parachinar, and whether it was reasonable to expect the applicant to remain in Rawalpindi.
While plainly ground two seeks to rely on a different assertion of legal error, the factual context is similar to ground one and fails for similar reasons.
That is, the applicant did not claim that he would return to Parachinar. Rather, his claim was that he could not return to Pakistan as a whole. This was not a situation where the applicant claimed that he could live safely in Rawalpindi, even on the “alternative” submissions made by his representative, but could not safely travel to Parachinar. Rather, the claim made was that on return to Pakistan he could not live safely anywhere, including Parachinar, because of the “barriers” that impeded travel.
I agree with the Minister that the circumstances in this case are not analogous with Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSCA [2014] HCA 45 (“SZSCA”). In that case, the Tribunal found that an Afghani truck driver who had made a clear claim to fear harm on the roads outside Kabul was not entitled to protection because he would be safe if he remained within Kabul.
The High Court held in SZSCA that the principles of internal relocation apply where there is an area in an applicant’s home country (the country in which the applicant claims to fear harm) where he or she may be safe from harm. The High Court found that the Tribunal had fallen into jurisdictional error because it failed to apply these principles to Kabul which was the applicant’s home area (in particular, see SZSCA at [29]).
In the current case, the Tribunal did not impose any requirement that restricted the applicant to staying or remaining in Rawalpindi, or refrain from travelling to Parachinar.
The applicant also did not claim in the current case (whether expressly or clearly arising on the material), that he wanted to go back to Parachinar in the future and was prevented from doing so. In these circumstances, it was not necessary to address any such issue. The Tribunal did not impose on the applicant any expectation that he would avoid harm by not travelling to a place which, on his own evidence, he had said he only travelled to (from Rawalpindi) up to 2004 to visit his mother who worked there at that time.
In short, and as set out above, the applicant claimed that he could not return to live in Rawalpindi, from which he had come to Australia, and had been living for some years. This was because of his Shia religion and Turi ethnicity. The Tribunal did not accept his claim. It gave reasons for this. Its findings were reasonably open to it on what was before it.
As the representative’s submissions made clear, in the event that the Tribunal made this finding, the representative asked the Tribunal to consider the same matters in the context of the reasonableness of relocation. However, it was reasonably open in the circumstances presented, for the Tribunal to find that the issue of relocation did not arise because on the circumstances presented, the applicant did not claim that he wished to return or travel to Parachinar.
Before the Court, the applicant also relied on AFD15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 3175 (“AFD15”) (per Judge Smith at [20] – [23]). The applicant submitted that the circumstances in that case were similar with the current circumstances. In that case, the Tribunal found the applicant could return to one part of the country of nationality in safety, but it did not consider whether it would be reasonable to do so in the context of an “analogous application” of the principles of internal relocation.
However, those circumstances are distinguishable from the current case. The applicant made no claim that he could safely return to Rawalpindi. Nor did he claim that he wished to return to Parachinar. The Tribunal found that he did not claim he wished to return there to operate a business or to visit family. To the extent that AFD15 drew on SZSCA, the circumstances in the current case are different. In the current case, the Tribunal did not impose on the applicant any expectation of behaviour such as to avoid harm. Ground two is not made out.
Conclusion
Neither of the two grounds of the further amended application are made out. It is appropriate to dismiss the application. I will make that order.
I certify that the preceding fifty-six (56) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Nicholls
Date: 20 January 2017
9
2