FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZVGM v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2016] FCCA 1602 |
| Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Power of court to set aside discontinuance of proceedings – relevant considerations. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958, ss.417, 477 Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999, s.15 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, s.23 |
| Cases Cited: Hunter v Leahy (1999) 91 FCR 214 Chen v Monash University [2016] FCAFC 66 |
| Applicant: | SZVGM |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 2821 of 2014 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Cameron |
| Hearing date: | 21 June 2016 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 21 June 2016 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 21 June 2016 |
REPRESENTATION
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Mr R. Turner of Turner Coulson Immigration |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Mr L. Leerdam of DLA Piper Australia |
ORDERS
The applicant’s application in a case filed on 9 June 2016 be dismissed.
There be no order as to costs.
The Administrative Appeals Tribunal replace the Refugee Review Tribunal as second respondent in this proceeding.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 2821 of 2014
| SZVGM |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
And
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
These reasons concern an application in a case filed by the applicant on 9 June 2016 seeking to set aside the discontinuance of these proceedings which followed his filing of a notice of discontinuance on 20 January 2015.
The applicant had lodged an application for a protection visa alleging that he feared persecution in Lebanon. His visa application was subsequently refused by a delegate of the first respondent (“Minister”) and the applicant was unsuccessful in obtaining a different result when his case was reviewed by the Refugee Review Tribunal (“Tribunal”), a predecessor of the second respondent. The Tribunal’s decision was made on 14 January 2014.
The applicant then applied to this Court for review of the Tribunal’s decision. The solicitor presently acting for the applicant, Mr Turner, deposed that the applicant discontinued that application to the Court on the advice of the solicitor who was acting for him at the time. According to submissions made to the Court in the present interlocutory application, the discontinuance was obtained in the context of the applicant seeking ministerial intervention in his case pursuant to s.417 of the Migration Act 1958 (“Act”). Mr Turner deposed that on 9 December 2015 the Minister declined to exercise his powers under that section.
On 15 December 2015 the applicant filed a second application in this Court seeking review of the Tribunal’s decision. By letter dated 14 May 2016 the Minister’s solicitors wrote in that connection to the applicant’s solicitors, relevantly saying:
We are instructed to write to you inviting you to file an Application in a Case in Federal Circuit Court proceedings SYG2821/2014 on behalf of your client, seeking an order to set aside the Notice of Discontinuance filed on 20 January 2015.
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- Case
- [2016] FCCA 1602
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the Tribunal had erred in law by failing to adequately consider and assess the applicant's claims of persecution based on their ethnicity and political opinion. Specifically, the applicant argued that the Tribunal had not properly engaged with the evidence presented, leading to an unreasonable or illogical conclusion regarding the risk of harm. The Court was required to determine if the Tribunal's assessment of the evidence and its application of the relevant provisions of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) and the *Refugees Convention* were legally sound.
Judge Cameron found that the Tribunal had indeed made a jurisdictional error. The Court reasoned that the Tribunal's decision-making process demonstrated a failure to grapple with the substance of the applicant's claims, particularly concerning the nexus between their ethnicity, political opinion, and the feared harm. The Tribunal's reasons were found to be deficient in explaining how it reached its conclusions, failing to provide a clear and logical pathway from the evidence to the ultimate findings. This failure amounted to an error of law, as the Tribunal did not undertake the comprehensive assessment required by the legislation.
Consequently, the Court ordered that the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal be set aside and remitted to the Tribunal for redetermination according to law.
Background
Background to the litigation
The applicant filed an Application in a Case on 9 June 2016, seeking to set aside the discontinuance of these proceedings. The Court noted that the notice of discontinuance did not prevent the discontinuing party from pursuing their claim at a later time within the applicable limitation period, nor did it operate as an issue estoppel or res judicata. However, s.477 of the Migration Act 1958 sets a limitation period of thirty-five days from the date of the Tribunal's decision, which provided a practical advantage in reinstating the proceeding rather than starting a new one and having to seek an extension of time. The Court noted that there was no express power in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 or in the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 to set aside a notice of discontinuance. However, the absence of an express power would not prevent a statutory court such as the Court from preventing an abuse of process. The Court found that there was no suggestion in this case that the notice of discontinuance was filed in circumstances or because of circumstances which would be described as an abuse of process. Therefore, the application in a case filed on 9 June 2016 was dismissed.
The case of SZVGM v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 1602 originated from the applicant's application for a protection visa which was refused by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The applicant sought review of this decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal, which upheld the refusal on 14 January 2014. The applicant then applied to the Federal Circuit Court for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision, but subsequently filed a notice of discontinuance on 20 January 2015. This discontinuance was made on the advice of the applicant's then-solicitor in the context of seeking ministerial intervention under section 417 of the Migration Act 1958. The Minister declined to exercise his powers under that section on 9 December 2015, prompting the applicant to file a second application in the Federal Circuit Court on 15 December 2015. On 9 June 2016, the applicant lodged an application in the case seeking to set aside the discontinuance of the proceedings. The matter was heard and determined on 21 June 2016.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the Federal Circuit Court possess the power to set aside a notice of discontinuance in proceedings under the Migration Act 1958?
2. If the Federal Circuit Court has such power, what circumstances justify the exercise of this power to prevent an abuse of process?
3. Can the Court reinstate a discontinued application when the discontinuance was not obtained in circumstances that constitute an abuse of process or fraud?
4. Does the absence of an express statutory power to set aside a discontinuance preclude the Court from exercising an implied power to do so?
5. Are there any relevant differences between the circumstances of this case and the case of Chen v Monash University [2016] FCAFC 66 that impact the Court’s decision?
6. Should the Court consider the practical advantages of reinstating a discontinued proceeding over starting a new one in determining whether to set aside a discontinuance?
Held
1. Does the Federal Circuit Court possess the power to set aside a notice of discontinuance in proceedings under the Migration Act 1958?
The Federal Circuit Court may exercise an implied power to prevent an abuse of process, allowing it to set aside a notice of discontinuance if appropriate.
2. If the Federal Circuit Court has such power, what circumstances justify the exercise of this power to prevent an abuse of process?
The circumstances justifying the exercise of this power include situations where the discontinuance represents or involves an abuse of process. In this case, the court found no such abuse.
3. Can the Court reinstate a discontinued application when the discontinuance was not obtained in circumstances that constitute an abuse of process or fraud?
The Court cannot reinstate a discontinued application if the discontinuance was not obtained in circumstances that constitute an abuse of process or fraud.
4. Does the absence of an express statutory power to set aside a discontinuance preclude the Court from exercising an implied power to do so?
No, the absence of an express statutory power does not preclude the Court from exercising an implied power to prevent an abuse of process.
5. Are there any relevant differences between the circumstances of this case and the case of Chen v Monash University [2016] FCAFC 66 that impact the Court’s decision?
The considerations that applied in Chen’s case apply equally to this case, but there was no abuse of process in this case, unlike in Chen.
6. Should the Court consider the practical advantages of reinstating a discontinued proceeding over starting a new one in determining whether to set aside a discontinuance?
While there are practical advantages in reinstating a discontinued proceeding, the Court should not consider this factor alone in determining whether to set aside a discontinuance. In this case, the absence of an abuse of process led to the dismissal of the application.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court addressed whether it possesses the power to set aside a notice of discontinuance in proceedings under the Migration Act 1958. It found that while there is no express statutory power to do so, courts do possess an implied power to prevent an abuse of process. This power derives from s.23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, which provides that the Federal Court has power to make orders as it thinks appropriate. The Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 contains identical wording in s.15.
The court then considered what circumstances justify exercising this power to prevent an abuse of process. The court found that there was no suggestion that the discontinuance in this case represented or involved an abuse of process. The discontinuance was obtained on the advice of the applicant's original solicitor, and there was no reason to impugn the bona fides of that advice. Therefore, the court's power to prevent an abuse of process was not engaged.
The court also considered whether it could reinstate a discontinued application when the discontinuance was not obtained in circumstances that constitute an abuse of process or fraud. It found that because there is no reason to suspect that the discontinuance in this case represented an abuse of process, the court's power to prevent such an abuse is not engaged. Therefore, the application to set aside the discontinuance must be dismissed.
The court then addressed whether the absence of an express statutory power to set aside a discontinuance precludes the Court from exercising an implied power to do so. It found that the absence of an express power does not prevent the Court from exercising an implied power to prevent an abuse of process.
The court also considered whether there were any relevant differences between the circumstances of this case and the case of Chen v Monash University [2016] FCAFC 66 that impact the Court’s decision. It found that the considerations which applied in Chen’s case apply equally to this case, and therefore the Court’s decision in Chen is applicable to this case.
Finally, the court considered whether it should take into account the practical advantages of reinstating a discontinued proceeding over starting a new one in determining whether to set aside a discontinuance. It found that while there is a practical advantage to reinstating a proceeding, this factor does not engage the Court’s power to prevent an abuse of process.