FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZUWM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 92
Appeal from: SZUWM & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2153 File number: NSD 1163 of 2015 Judge: FARRELL J Date of judgment: 15 February 2016 Catchwords MIGRATION – whether the Tribunal exercised its discretion to proceed to determine a review application unreasonably in circumstances where the appellants failed to attend the scheduled hearing – where the appellants’ migration agent was authorised to receive communications from the Tribunal – where the migration agent requested postponement of the scheduled hearing the day before because of illness of husband and wife – where postponement request attached medical certificate stating that the husband had a “medical condition” which made him “unfit for his normal work” and letter indicating that the wife had an appointment with a specialist in the afternoon of the scheduled date of the hearing – where reply fax from Tribunal to the appellants’ migration agent stated that the Tribunal had decided not to postpone the scheduled hearing and would proceed to determine the application in the absence of any further information from the appellants’ regarding the nature of their illnesses – whether discretion not to adjourn the hearing was exercised unreasonably– whether appellants denied procedural fairness – whether Tribunal made appropriate inquiries – whether invitation to attend hearing miscarried – consideration of ss 422B, 425, 426A and 427(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2), 422B, 425, 425A, 426A, 427(1)(b), 441A(5), 441C(5), Pt 7 Div 4 Cases cited: Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; [2003] HCA 22
Kaur v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCA 915
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 111 ALD 15; [2009] HCA 39
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNVW (2010) 183 FCR 575; [2010] FCAFC 41
NALQ v Minister for Immigration [2004] FCAFC 121
SZFDE v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2007) 232 CLR 189; [2007] HCA 35
SZJQP v Minister for Immigration [2007] FCA 1613
SZUWM & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2153
V120/00A v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2002) 116 FCR 576; [2002] FCA 264
Date of hearing: 15 February 2016 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 40 Counsel for the First Appellants: The first appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter Counsel for the Second and Third Appellants: The second and third appellants did not appear Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr P Knowles Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent submitted save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 1163 of 2015 BETWEEN: SZUWM
First Appellant
SZUWN
Second Appellant
SZUWO
Third Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read SZUWM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2016] FCA 92
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal exercised its discretion unreasonably in failing to order an adjournment of the hearing and whether it failed to take into account a relevant consideration, namely the husband's medical certificate, in exercising its discretion. The court found that the Tribunal was not under an obligation to seek clarification of the nature of the claimed illness, and it was appropriate that the inquiry was made with the appellants' migration agent. The court also found that the Tribunal's request for clarification was not evidence of bad faith or a closed mind, but rather an indication that the Tribunal gave active consideration to the request and that its mind remained open to persuasion as to whether a postponement should be granted.
The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the first and second appellants pay the first respondent's costs as agreed or taxed. The court found that the Tribunal did not exercise its discretionary power unreasonably and that it was reasonable for the Tribunal to seek clarification as to the nature of the husband and wife's illnesses in order to determine whether an adjournment should be granted. The court also found that the allegation that the Tribunal "exercised its discretionary power not in good faith" was raised for the first time in the husband’s written submissions and could not be made out.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The first and second appellants pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister did oppose leave being granted to the appellants to advance the third ground on the basis that it had not been relied on before the primary judge and if the point had been raised, the husband could have been cross-examined on it. The Minister also submitted that this ground had no reasonable prospect of success because there was no evidence that the wife and daughter were denied a hearing. At its highest, the evidence disclosed that the wife had a 15 minute appointment scheduled with a gynaecologist at 2.45 pm on 8 July 2014; that does not disclose a basis for why the wife could not attend and participate in a hearing scheduled for 10.00 am that same day. In any event the success of the wife and daughter’s applications (as members of the husband’s family unit) depended on the success of the husband’s application: see V120/00A v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2002) 116 FCR 576; [2002] FCA 264 at [53]-[61]. I accept these submissions and refuse the appellants leave to advance the third ground of appeal.CONSIDERATION The allegation that the Tribunal “exercised its discretionary power not in good faith” was raised for the first time in the husband’s written submissions. At various points in the written submissions, the husband suggests that the Tribunal “set its mind” against an adjournment because of the terms of the Tribunal’s letter of 7 July 2014. I do not accept that such an allegation can be made out. The primary judge did not err in finding that it was reasonable for the Tribunal to seek clarification as to the nature of the husband and wife’s illnesses in order to determine whether an adjournment should be granted. The request for further information is not evidence of bad faith or a closed mind but rather, as found by the primary judge, indicates that the Tribunal gave active consideration to the request and that its mind remained open to persuasion as to whether a postponement should be granted. It is unnecessary for me to decide whether the Tribunal was under an obligation to seek clarification of the nature of the claimed illness having regard to the decision of the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 111 ALD 15; [2009] HCA 39 at [25] because, as found by the primary judge, the Tribunal did in fact make an inquiry. The primary judge did not err in finding that it was appropriate that the inquiry was made with the appellants’ migration agent and that it would not have been appropriate for the Tribunal to contact either the doctors or the husband directly, for the reasons given in SZUWM at [41]-[42]; see [22] above. The request for clarification which the Tribunal did undertake was appropriately made through the appellants’ migration agent who had been appointed by the appellants as their authorised recipient for the purposes of communication with the Tribunal. Not only had the migration agent authored the letter requesting the postponement of the scheduled hearing but he expressly invited the Tribunal to contact him in the event that the Tribunal had any queries in relation to the request: see [8] above.