FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZUSP v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1260
Citation: SZUSP v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1260 Appeal from: SZUSP v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 656 Parties: SZUSP v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL File number: NSD 479 of 2015 Judge: GILMOUR J Date of judgment: 19 November 2015 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – application for a protection visa – claims of fear of persecution in Turkey on the basis of race and imputed political opinion – whether the primary judge erred in not finding that the Tribunal committed jurisdictional error by reaching its conclusions based on speculation or guesswork – whether there is a need for reasonable probative evidence to support the Tribunal’s dismissal of claims – whether the primary judge erred in not finding apprehended bias on the part of the Tribunal for dismissing the appellant’s evidence – whether the Tribunal was not required to take into account the Ministerial Direction under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – appeal dismissed. Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2A), 499 Cases cited: Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZNCR [2011] FCA 369
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNSP (2010) 184 FCR 485
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Pochi (1980) 4 ALD 139
Minister for Immigration Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 78 ALD 224
NAMJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 76 ALD 56
Rawson Finances Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2013) 133 ALD 39
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 58 ALD 609
Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 34 ALD 347
SZOVP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 126 ALD 290Date of hearing: 6 August 2015 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 54 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr R Turner Solicitor for the Appellant: Turner Coulson Immigration Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent did not appear (submits to any order of the Court)
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 479 of 2015
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: SZUSP
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
GILMOUR J
DATE OF ORDER:
19 NOVEMBER 2015
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the costs of the appeal of the first respondent.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 479 of 2015
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF…
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 1260
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the Tribunal had committed a jurisdictional error by reaching its conclusions based on speculation or guesswork, rather than on reasonably probative evidence. The appellant argued that his claims were supported by written statements from several sources, including a doctor, a psychologist, and several personal contacts. However, the court found that the Tribunal had a rational basis to discount the statements provided by the appellant and therefore did not find jurisdictional error in this regard. Additionally, the court dismissed the argument that the Tribunal had erred in not finding apprehended bias or in failing to consider the Ministerial Direction under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The primary judge had determined that the Tribunal had a disbelieving mind but not a closed one, and the court upheld this finding.
The reasoning of the court was grounded in the assessment of the evidence and the Tribunal's decision-making process. The court held that the Tribunal's findings were rational and based on the available evidence. The appellant's claims of procedural unfairness and apprehended bias were rejected as the court found no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's approach. The court also upheld the Tribunal's conclusion that the appellant's claims did not meet the threshold for complementary protection under the Act.
ORDERS:
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the costs of the appeal of the first respondent.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the costs of the appeal of the first respondent.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The primary judge concluded that the Tribunal’s statements during the hearing evidenced a disbelieving mind but not a closed mind. He concluded that the Tribunal was merely unpersuaded by the then applicant’s supporting statements which were afforded little weight: at [19], [21]. Illogical and/or irrational The primary judge rejected this ground as without foundation in fact and as being contrary to authority. Statutory duty – complementary protection This ground too was rejected. The primary judge concluded that the Tribunal’s assessment, whilst brief, was squarely based on the complementary protection criteria under s 36(2)(aa) of the Act and in particular that such harm as the applicant had suffered or might suffer did not constitute “significant harm” for the purposes of s 36(2A) of the Act. The appeal The appeal grounds are essentially a reiteration of those before the Federal Circuit Court except that in relation to the procedural fairness ground the appellant asserts that the primary judge applied the wrong test. Procedural fairness I do not accept that the primary judge made such an error. In any event, the appellant still requires to demonstrate jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. The appellant does not contend that the Tribunal must have evidence available to it before it can disbelieve an applicant's account, but submits that when there is probative evidence to support an applicant's claim, the Tribunal cannot dismiss that claim without reasonable probative evidence to support that dismissal. He submits that where it does dismiss a claim without such reasonable probative evidence there is a reasonable implication that it has done so based on speculation and/or guesswork. The appellant submits that his claims were supported in writing by:(a)a doctor;(b)a psychologist;(c)the President of the Australia Alevi Cultural Centre;(d)the appellant's university classmate;(e)a friend who witnessed the events;(f)his parents;(g)his sister;(h)his solicitor. He then submits that a failure to base a finding on reasonably probative evidence and to do so on speculation and/or guesswork is a denial of procedural fairness, citing the decision of Deane J in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Pochi (1980) 4 ALD 139 and Rawson Finances Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2013) 133 ALD 39 per Jessup J at [62] and Jagot J at [84]. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed this claim on the basis that "there was a rational basis of reasoning for the Tribunal to discount each of the statements relied upon by the applicant" (at [15]). This he submits was not the correct test which is set out in Pochi and Rawson Finances, namely, whether there was reasonable probative evidence to support the conclusion reached by the Tribunal or whether it was based on speculation or guesswork. There was thus, he submits, an intermingling of the correct test with the test for irrationality or illogically. This, he submits, was jurisdictional error. I do not accept these submissions. The primary judge in his reasons at [10]-[14] referred to the case law setting out the test as relied upon by the appellant.