SZUGX v Minister for Immigration
[2015] FCCA 529
•18 March 2015
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZUGX v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2015] FCCA 529 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application seeking review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal affirming decision to refuse to grant applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa – no reviewable error – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa) |
| Kopalapillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 86 FCR 547 Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 |
| Applicant: | SZUGX |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 1150 of 2014 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Lloyd-Jones |
| Hearing date: | 11 February 2015 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 18 March 2015 |
REPRESENTATION
| The Applicant: | The Applicant appeared in person with a Punjabi interpreter |
| Solicitor for the First Respondent: | Mr M Glavac of Clayton Utz |
| The Second Respondent: | The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice |
ORDERS
The application filed on 29 April 2014 be dismissed.
The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 1150 of 2014
| SZUGX |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
This is an application filed in the Federal Circuit Court on 29 April 2014 under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the “Migration Act”), seeking judicial review of a decision of the second respondent, the Refugee Review Tribunal (the “Tribunal”), affirming the decision of a delegate of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the “Minister”), to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa. The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection visa on the basis that he was not a person to whom Australia had protection obligations under s.36 of the Migration Act.
The solicitors for the Minister filed a folder on 18 July 2014 which was indexed, labelled and paginated, containing all documents which may be relevant to the hearing. The volume of material provided is identified as the Court Book (“CB”) and has been marked as Exhibit “A”.
Background
In setting out the following background material I have quoted directly from the Court Book and submissions prepared by the Minister’s representatives. Where this information is extracted from the Court Book, each item contains a reference (CB) for that material. I have not made further attribution as this would make the summary unwieldy.
The applicant’s Protection visa application was refused by a delegate of the Minister on 2 January 2014 (CB 62-90). On 1 April 2014 the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate and determined that the applicant should not be granted a Protection visa because he did not satisfy the requirements of s.36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Migration Act (CB 106-116).
The applicant is a citizen of India (CB 2). He was granted a Student visa on 26 March 2009 and entered Australia on 13 April 2009. On 28 May 2013, the applicant voluntarily presented himself to Departmental officers and was granted a bridging visa on departure grounds which was valid until 18 June 2013. On 18 June 2013, the applicant applied for the Protection visa (CB 108 at [2]).
In his application for the Protection visa and his interview with the delegate, the applicant claimed to fear persecution in India because of his membership of a religious group called Dera Sacha Sauda (“DSS”) (CB 7-10, 76-77, 108 at [4]).
Tribunal's Decision
The applicant claimed that he became involved with DSS in 2008, and that his involvement with the group included attending Civil Hospital in Pathankol and questioning patients about their treatment (CB 110 at [14]-[15]). He explained his fear of persecution stemmed from his involvement with DSS in various ways, including a claim that in March 2008 the applicant and a group of other DSS followers were attacked by Sikhs opposed to DSS with swords, hockey sticks and big knives (CB 108 [4]).
The applicant eventually said, under questioning, that he had no involvement with DSS whilst in Australia. He explained that he was scared to be involved with DSS activities due to the Sikh population in Australia and that the Sikh anti-DSS group in India was in contact with his brother (CB 110 at [16]-[18]).
The applicant's Student visa was valid until 15 June 2011, but the applicant stayed in Australia and became an unlawful non-citizen. He claimed not to have worked in Australia since April 2010 or 2011 (CB 111 at [25]).
The Tribunal found "that the applicant was not a credible witness, and that he provided fabricated and contradictory evidence to the Tribunal" (CB 115 at [38]).
In relation to the contradictory evidence, the Tribunal found:
a)At CB 115 at [39] that "during the Tribunal hearing the applicant gave directly contradictory evidence about whether or not he was involved [with DSS in India], initially saying yes, then saying no, and then, after further questioning, saying that he was involved once or twice a week over a 6 to 7 months period by visiting a local hospital, surveying patients and reporting back to his bosses" (It has been held that it is appropriate to test an applicant's claims by asking questions relevant to their religious and political knowledge. See, for example, Nejad v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 741); and
b)At CB 115 at [42]) that "the applicant gave contradictory evidence as to whether he last worked in Australia in April 2010 or April 2011".
The Tribunal also found several parts of the applicant’s evidence to be fanciful, implausible or vague; namely:
a)At [40] of the Decision Record (CB 115) the Tribunal found it was fanciful that "the applicant would need to flee his country of origin due to his involvement with [DSS], and fear returning to India due to his involvement with DSS, but then not have any involvement with the organisation whilst in Australia";
b)At [40] of the Decision Record (CB 115) the Tribunal found the applicant's evidence that he did not become involved with DSS because he was scared and did not want trouble in Australia was not credible "in light of the freedom of religion practised in Australia and the relatively low number of Sikh people in Australia";
c)At [41] (CB 115) the Tribunal found the applicant’s evidence regarding his own financial support was implausible and fabricated, due to the incoherent and vague evidence given about his father’s use of that money for an operation ‘on his brain’ prior to his death three months after the applicant had travelled to Australia, and in light of the applicant’s overall lack of credibility;
d)At [42] (CB 115) the Tribunal found it would be unrealistic and implausible for the applicant not to know the surname of a person who he claimed had supported him financially during the last three years, despite being fluent in reading, writing and speaking English. The Tribunal noted that it was ‘only after persistent questioning by the Tribunal’ that the applicant gave the names of three people who had supported him financially; and
e)At [43] (CB 115) the Tribunal found the applicant’s genuine fear of serious harm or persecution was implausible given that he "delayed for a period in excess of four years in lodging a Protection visa." The Tribunal also took into consideration the applicant’s evidence that ‘he applied for a Protection visa in order to obtain work rights in Australia’, which undermined his claims to have applied because of his genuine fear of harm.
The Tribunal was not satisfied overall that the applicant had had any involvement with DSS either in India or Australia (CB 116 at [45]). Nor was the Tribunal satisfied that the applicant or any of his family members had been threatened or harmed due to the applicant's and/or anyone else's involvement with DSS (CB 116 at [45]). Accordingly, the Tribunal decided that the applicant was not someone to whom Australia owed protection obligations under s.36(2)(a) or s.36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act because he did not have a well-founded fear of persecution, nor was there a real risk that the applicant would suffer significant harm (CB 116 at [48]-[49]).
Current Proceedings
The grounds stated in the applicant's application for review of 29 April 2014 are as follows:
1. The Refugee Review Tribunal erred in its judgment that the applicant's evidence regarding his problems in India was fabricated and that he applied for a Protection visa for the purpose of work rights and staying in Australia; (“Ground 1”)
2. The Refugee Review Tribunal denied the applicant procedural fairness by reaching adverse conclusions that the applicant's claims were unrealistic, vague and implausible, because these conclusions were not obviously open to the Tribunal to make on the available material; (“Ground 2”)
3. The Refugee Review Tribunal erred in its judgment that due to the applicant's involvement with Dera Sasha Sauda or applicant and his immediate family members were not threatened, constituting a factual and legal error; (“Ground 3”)
4. The Refugee Review Tribunal failed to investigate the applicant's claim, specifically the grounds of his persecution in India. Therefore the RRT decision dated 01/04/2014 was affected by bias constituting jurisdictional error; (“Ground 4”) and
5. The Refugee Review Tribunal erred in its judgment that the applicant does not meet the refugee criterion according to UN Convention and the alternative criterion under Australian Migration Act and Migration Regulations accordingly RRT made legal error. (“Ground 5”).
The applicant was granted leave on 1 July 2014 to file and serve an amended application and any affidavit evidence by 15 October 2014. The applicant was also granted leave to file and serve an outline of written submissions fourteen days before the hearing. The applicant did not avail himself of the opportunity to file any further documentation.
Applicant’s Submissions
The applicant was invited to make oral submissions in support of his application at the hearing. He accepted the invitation and those submissions have been reproduced and addressed below.
Minister’s Submissions
In the Minister’s submission, for the reasons set out below, the grounds of review raised by the applicant invite impermissible merits review and fail to disclose any jurisdictional error; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang & Ors (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272.
Grounds 1, 2 and 3
By Grounds 1, 2 and 3 of the application the applicant impugns:
a)the particular finding that his problems in India were fabricated and that he applied for a Protection visa for the purpose of work rights and staying in Australia;
b)the general conclusion that the applicant's claims were unrealistic, vague and implausible; and
c)the particular finding that the applicant and his immediate family members were not threatened due to the applicant's involvement with DSS.
The Minister submits that these impugned adverse findings of fact by the Tribunal are findings of fact par excellence and were based upon the Tribunal's conclusion that the applicant was not a credible witness: Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 at [67].
The Tribunal is not required to accept uncritically any and all claims made by an applicant: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo & Anor (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 596. However, to the extent that the applicant contends that the Tribunal ought to have believed or accepted certain evidence, the Minister submits that it was open for the Tribunal to make the findings it did on the evidence before it: Kopalapillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 86 FCR 547 at 552. The Tribunal set out the findings that formed the basis of its assessment of the applicant's credibility in “direct and explicit terms” in its decision: W148/00A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 185 ALR 703 at [67].
To the extent that the applicant contends that the Tribunal failed to afford procedural fairness, the Minister submits that no alleged error of a procedural nature has been identified by the applicant. Accordingly, this ground should fail.
Ground 4
By Ground 4, the applicant alleges that the Tribunal failed to “investigate” the applicant's claims, specifically the grounds of his persecution in India. The contention is not further particularised.
The Minister submits that the Tribunal has no general duty to investigate, or in the appropriate terminology, “inquire”; rather, it has a duty to review: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI & Anor (2009) 259 ALR 429 at [25]. Although it is possible that “a failure to make an obvious inquiry about a critical fact, the existence of which is easily ascertained, could, in some circumstances, supply a sufficient link to the outcome to constitute a failure to review” (SZIAI (supra) at [25]), the Minister submits that these circumstances are not present in this case. There was nothing to indicate that any further inquiry by the Tribunal directed to the applicant's experiences in India could have yielded any useful result. The applicant has provided no evidence which would indicate to what issues the Tribunal should have directed further inquiry and what information might have been elicited from such further inquiry.
The Minister further submits that the Tribunal is not required to have rebutting evidence available to it before it can find that a particular factual assertion by an applicant has not been made out: see Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 451 per Beaumont J. It was therefore not required to make inquiries to procure evidence which cast doubt on the applicant's experiences in India before making its adverse findings, having soundly arrived at the conclusion that he was not a credible witness.
Ground 5
Ground 5 seeks to impugn the merits of the Tribunal's decision in the most general terms, and offers no particulars with respect to the Tribunal's alleged errors beyond the Applicant's disagreement with the Tribunal's conclusion. It is the Minister’s submission that this ground is not amenable to judicial review.
Consideration
At the hearing the applicant stated that he wished to address the issue of the DSS once more. He stated that the political situation in India is once again very bad and that there is a lot of violence surrounding it. It was explained to the applicant that the role of the Court is to determine whether there has been jurisdictional error in the decision of the Tribunal, and it is not the role of the Court to determine whether the applicant should be granted a visa or to determine the merits of the applicant’s protection claims. The applicant explained that three months after arriving in Australia his father passed away and he that there was a genuine reason why he could not return to India. The applicant stated that his account to the Tribunal was the truth.
The Court asked the applicant if he had read the Minister’s written submissions and if he had any comments to make. The applicant replied stating he had told the truth the whole time.
Grounds 1, 2 and 3 of the application seek to engage the Court in impermissible merits review. I note the Minister’s synopsis of the applicant’s grounds and agree with the Minister’s contention that the applicant has failed to identify any procedural error in the decision of the Tribunal.
Ground 1 contends that the Tribunal erred in its judgment that the applicant’s evidence regarding his problems in India are fabricated and that he applied for a Protection visa for work rights and to stay in Australia. At [38] of the Decision Record, the Tribunal stated:
38. … The Tribunal finds that the applicant was not a credible witness, and that he provided fabricated and contradictory evidence to the Tribunal. Overall the tribunal found the applicant’s evidence regarding his problems in India to be fabricated, and that the applicant applied for a Protection visa in order to obtain work rights and extend his stay in Australia.
(CB 115)
Ground 2 contends that the Tribunal denied the applicant procedural fairness by reaching adverse conclusions, not made on the known material, that the applicant’s claims were unrealistic, vague, implausible. At [42]-[44] of the Decision Record, the Tribunal stated:
42. … As raised during the hearing, the Tribunal finds it to be unrealistic and implausible that a person would support the applicant financially but he would not know her surname, despite his being fluent in reading, writing and speaking English.
43. The Tribunal also finds it implausible that the applicant had a genuine fear of serious harm or persecution considering that he delayed for a period in excess of four years in lodging a Protection Visa claim…
44. Applying this reasoning to the current case, the Tribunal finds it implausible that the applicant had a genuine fear when he delayed for so long in applying for a Protection Visa. The Tribunal has taken into account the applicant’s evidence that he was unaware that Protection visas were available, and/or that he did not know the process of applying for a Protection Visa. However, the Tribunal finds that if the applicant had been fearful he would have at least investigated such opportunities in Australia. The Tribunal has also taken into account the applicant’s evidence that he applied for a Protection Visa in order to obtain work rights in Australia, and finds that this undermines his claims to have applied because of genuine fear.
(CB 115-116)
Ground 3 contends that the Tribunal erred in its judgment in respect of the applicant’s claimed involvement with the DSS and as to whether the applicant’s family members had been threatened. At [40] and [45] of the Decision Record, the Tribunal stated:
40. In relation to fanciful evidence, Tribunal finds it fanciful that the applicant would need to flee his country of origin due to his involvement with Dera Sasha Sauda, and fear returning to India due to his involvement with Dera Sasha Sauda, but then not have any involvement with the organisation whilst in Australia. The Tribunal takes into account the applicant’s evidence that he was scared and did not want trouble in Australia, but does not find this to be credible in light of the freedom of religion practised in Australia and the relatively low number of Sikh people in Australia. The Tribunal instead finds that the applicant has not been involved with Dera Sasha Sauda in Australia or in India.
…
45. Overall the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant has had any involvement with Dera Sasha Sauda either in India or in Australia. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant and/or any members of his immediate or extended family have been threatened or harmed due to his or anyone else’s involvement with Dera Sasha Sauda. It follows that the Tribunal finds that the applicant does not have a well-founded fear of serious harm or persecution due to his involvement with Dera Sasha Sauda, or for any other Convention reason.
(CB 115-116)
It is apparent that Grounds 1, 2 and 3 of the application are propounded as complaints about the Tribunal’s conclusions. Being so, the applicant is seeking a review of the merits of the case. However, merits review is impermissible. In Wu Shan Liang (supra) their Honours Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ stated at 272:
… [A]ny court reviewing a decision upon refugee status must beware of turning a review of the reasons of the decision-maker upon proper principles into a reconsideration of the merits of the decision…
Ground 1 asserts that the Tribunal erred in finding that the applicant’s problems in India were fabricated and that the purpose for a Protection visa was gain work rights in Australia. The Tribunal’s adverse credibility finding and consequent rejection of the applicant’s claims are a matter for the Tribunal par excellence. In Durairajasingham (supra), his Honour McHugh J stated at [67]:
67. … [A] finding on credibility … is the function of the primary decision maker par excellence. If the primary decision maker has stated that he or she does not believe a particular witness, no detailed reasons need to be given as to why that particular witness was not believed. The Tribunal must give the reasons for its decision, not the sub-set of reasons why it accepted or rejected individual pieces of evidence.
I am satisfied that the Tribunal’s finding in this respect was open to it for the reasons it gave and on the material before it, and it discloses no error in its treatment of the applicant’s credibility: Kopalapillai (supra).
Ground 2 contends that the applicant was denied procedural fairness by the Tribunal as it reached adverse conclusions that the applicant’s claims were unrealistic, vague and implausible, and the conclusions the Tribunal arrived at were not open to the Tribunal to make. The Tribunal complied with its statutory obligations as set out in s.425 of the Migration Act by validly inviting the applicant to a hearing on 21 March 2014, which he attended and gave evidence in support of his claims (CB 100-105 at [10]-[31]). Further, the Tribunal’s decision also indicates that it discussed with the applicant at the hearing the determinative issues on the review, namely that his evidence (CB 109 at [14]; CB 110 at [18] and CB 111 at [22], in particular CB 112 at [28] and [30]) and the country information before it (CB 112 at [32]-[33]) were contradictory and undermined his claims. Further, the applicant did not provide any further evidence or submissions to the Tribunal (CB 103). There is no basis to find that the Tribunal breached its obligations under s.425 of the Migration Act by failing to ensure that the applicant was on notice of the determinative issues on the review: SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152. At [11] (CB 109) the Tribunal found:
11. The applicant affirmed that he was claiming protection on the grounds that he was a member of the Dera Sacha Sauda group in India, and he was not claiming under any other grounds.
(CB 109)
Also, as argued by the Minister, the Tribunal is not required to accept uncritically any and all claims made by the applicant: Guo (supra). The Tribunal was open to make the findings it did on the evidence it had before it: Kopalapillai (supra). There is nothing else apparent from the evidence before the Court that is indicative of a failure to afford procedural fairness on the part of the Tribunal. Consequently, this ground cannot be sustained.
Ground 3 asserts that the Tribunal erred in finding that the applicant and his immediately family were not threatened, despite his claimed involvement with DSS. The Tribunal found at [45] (CB 116):
45. Overall the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant has had any involvement with Dera Sasha Sauda either in India or in Australia. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant and or any members of his immediate or extended family have been threatened or harmed due to his or anyone else’s involvement with Dera Sasha Sauda. It follows that the Tribunal finds that the applicant does not have a well-founded fear of serious harm or persecution due to his involvement with Dera Sasha Sauda, or for any other Convention reason.
(CB 116)
The Court has before it solely the Court Book as evidence, with no transcript of the Tribunal hearing or any other affidavit evidence provided. On a fair reading of the Court Book, the applicant has made a number of references about the threat to his family, the first being in the application for the Protection visa, under the question “Have you experienced harm in that Country?”. The applicant answered at CB 8:
My family was threatened my (sic) the other religious group and they threatened me and my family that if I believe in the saint Baba Rahim Singh they will kill me and my family.
The next reference to the threat to his family is at CB 80, being the delegate’s decision. The delegate stated:
The applicant further claimed that his family was attacked and that his home was invaded by ten Sikhs in April 2008. However, the applicant has not provided any specific information as to the claimed attack on his family. He has not explained how he himself had been able to avoid the attack. The applicant had not provided a reasonable explanation as to why he did not mention this alleged attack on this brother and family in his written claims. No supporting evidence had been provided. The applicant’s claim remains an unsubstantiated assertion which I do not accept as true. I am not satisfied that the applicant’s family was attacked in April 2008 by a group of Sikhs as claimed.
(CB 80)
Then at [18] of the Decision Record, the Tribunal noted:
18. …The applicant responded by saying the Sikh anti-group had contact with his brother. The Tribunal asked when this had occurred, to which the applicant answered that it was all the time. The Tribunal asked the applicant to be more specific with his evidence, to which the applicant then said about six months ago. The applicant went on to say the Sikh anti-group approached his brother and asked about the applicant’s whereabouts.
(CB 110)
The excerpts detailed above at [37]-[39] appear to be the extent of the applicant’s evidence about threats to his family. In Guo (supra) his Honour Kirby J stated at 596:
[T]the mere fact that a person claims fear of persecution for reasons of political opinion does not establish either the genuineness of the asserted fear or that it is “well-founded” or that it is for reasons of political opinion. It remains for the Minister in the first place to be “satisfied” and, where that decision is adverse and a review is sought, for the applicant to persuade the reviewing decision-maker that all of the statutory elements are made out.
(footnote omitted)
This case differs from Guo (supra) in that the applicant in the current matter is claiming persecution on the grounds of religion. However, the principal remains pertinent. The fact that the applicant has made these claims to the Tribunal, and throughout the application process, does not mean that the Tribunal has to accept that claim. The applicant has not provided any documents or further evidence in support of his claims. There is no error demonstrated in the Tribunal’s approach in this respect.
Ground 4 contends that the Tribunal failed to investigate the applicant’s claim, specifically in respect of his claimed persecution in India. I agree with and adopt the submissions advanced by the Minister at [22]-[24] above. Despite the Tribunal not having a duty to investigate, but rather, a duty to review, the Tribunal did look further than the applicant’s evidence to determine his claim. In the Decision Record the Tribunal notes the country information at [32]-[33] (CB 112-114), with [33] specifically referring to DSS. The Court has the Court Book and no further evidence before it. It is apparent that the Tribunal took into consideration the applicant’s Protection visa application (CB 108 at [3]), the delegate’s interview and decision (CB 108 at [4]-[8]), and the country information, as mentioned above. The Tribunal made numerous inquiries of the applicant himself and put him on notice when it had issues with the applicant’s evidence. The applicant himself did not provide further submissions or documentation to the Tribunal. The applicant also did not direct the Tribunal to make further inquiries or indicate what information may be ascertained from such further inquiry, if undertaken. Accordingly, this ground cannot be sustained.
Ground 5 asserts that the Tribunal erred in its judgment that the applicant was not someone whom Australia owed protection obligations. In respect of the operation of the complementary protection provisions of the Migration Act (s.36(2)(aa)), the Tribunal in its Decision Record at [36] (CB 114) addressed the operation of the complementary protection criterion.
Since the Migration Amendment (Complementary Protection) Act 2011 (Cth) amended the Migration Act in March 2012, the Tribunal has been required to consider whether Australia has protection obligations to applicants for Protection visas under the complementary protection criterion. The applicant and those, if any, who are assisting him with his application in this Court are unlikely to be aware of the existence of this obligation in the Migration Act, but it was known to the Tribunal and the Tribunal has addressed this issue.
A convenient summary of these new provisions are contained in the then Bill’s Second Reading Speech which occurred on 24 February 2011. The new provisions establish a criteria to grant a Protection visa in circumstances that engage Australia’s non-refoulement obligations under the Human Rights treaties and other refugee conventions and is summarised as follows:
Australia will not return a person to a place where there is a real risk that a person will suffer particular types of significant harm contained in the relevant human rights treaties, namely:
- the arbitrarily deprivation of life;
- having the death penalty carried out;
- being subjected to torture;
-being subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or
- being subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.
(Hansard, 24 February 2011)
The claims advanced by the applicant to seek protection from persecution as described in the Refugees Convention were rejected by the Tribunal (see CB 116 at [45]-[47]) on the evidence before it that there is not a real chance the applicant will face Convention-based persecution. The Tribunal Member considered the alternative criterion for complementary protection. Ultimately, the Tribunal found that on the evidence before it was not satisfied there was a real risk that the applicant would be subjected to harm amounting to significant harm under the complementary protection criterion. On a fair reading no error is apparent in this respect.
Conclusion
None of the grounds of review contained in the application nor any oral submission made by the applicant at the hearing reveals any error of law on the part of the Tribunal. Further, on a fair reading of the Court Book and, particularly, the Tribunal’s Decision Record no error is apparent. Consequently, the application should be dismissed and the applicant ordered to pay the Minister’s costs.
I certify that the preceding forty-eight (48) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Lloyd-Jones
Associate:
Date: 18 March 2015
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