Nejad v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Nejad v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 741

FARID SEDAGHAT NEJAD v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

N 34 OF 2000

SPENDER, LINDGREN AND MADGWICK JJ
31 MAY 2000
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 34 OF 2000

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

FARID SEDAGHAT NEJAD
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

SPENDER, LINDGREN AND MADGWICK JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

31 MAY 2000

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.        The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 34 OF 2000

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

FARID SEDAGHAT NEJAD
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

SPENDER, LINDGREN AND MADGWICK JJ

DATE:

31 MAY 2000

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

LINDGREN J:

Introduction

  1. The appellant appeals from a judgment of a Judge of the Court dismissing his application for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the RRT”).  The RRT had decided that it was not satisfied that the appellant was a refugee and it affirmed a decision of a delegate of the respondent (respectively “the Delegate” and “the Minister”) to refuse him a protection visa. 

  2. Section 29 of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) provides that, subject to the Act, the Minister may grant a non-citizen permission, to be known as a visa, to do one or both of the following:

    (a)travel to and enter Australia;

    (b)remain in Australia.

    Section 496 of the Act provides that the Minister may, by writing signed by him or her, delegate to a person any of the Minister’s powers under the Act. It is not in dispute that the Minister delegated all necessary powers to the Delegate.

  3. Section 65 of the Act provides that after considering a valid application for a visa, the Minister, if satisfied of the matters specified in the section, is to grant the visa, or, if not so satisfied, is not to grant the visa. One of the matters specified in s 65 is that the criteria for the visa specified by the Act or the regulations have been satisfied. Section 36 of the Act provides that a criterion for the grant of a protection visa is that the applicant for it is a non-citizen in Australia to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951, as “amended” by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967 (compendiously, “the Convention”).  

  4. Article 1A(2) of the Convention provides that a refugee is any person who:

    “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 741
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Nejad v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involved an Iranian national who applied for a protection visa in Australia, claiming fear of persecution in Iran due to his religious beliefs. The case was reviewed by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) and subsequently dismissed by the Federal Court. The appellant appealed the decision, arguing that the primary judge erred in not finding an error of law by the RRT and in not adjourning the case for a new translation of his statements.

The central legal issues revolved around the proper application of the Refugee Convention and the Migration Act, specifically whether the tribunal had correctly assessed the appellant's claims and evidence. The appeal further questioned whether procedural errors, such as the adequacy of translation of the appellant's statements, warranted a new hearing.

The court examined the RRT's assessment of the appellant's claims and found that it had properly considered the evidence presented. The court held that the RRT had not erred in its application of the law and that the appellant's claims were not substantiated by the evidence. Furthermore, the court found that the primary judge did not err in not adjourning the case for a new translation, as the existing translation was deemed adequate for the tribunal to make its decision.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs. This decision underscored the importance of the tribunal's role in assessing the credibility and sufficiency of evidence presented in refugee status determinations.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant’s case before the RRT had been that he was outside the country of his nationality, Iran, and was unwilling to return to it because of a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of religion.Procedural background The appellant arrived in Australia on 23 May 1999. By an application bearing date 24 May 1999, apparently signed on 28 May 1999 and lodged on 2 June 1999, he applied for a protection visa (visa sub-class 866). The Delegate refused the application on 17 June 1999. On 18 June 1999, the appellant applied to the RRT for review of the Delegate’s decision. The RRT conducted a hearing on 2 August 1999. On 16 August 1999, it affirmed the Delegate’s decision. The appellant’s application filed in this Court on 9 September 1999 for review of the RRT’s decision specified no grounds. All relevant parts of the form were filled in “Details will be sent later”. The application for review was dismissed by the primary judge on 9 December 1999. In his notice of appeal filed on 13 January 2000, the appellant relies on the ground that the primary judge erred in two respects: first, in not finding that the RRT had made an error of law; and second, “in not adjourning the case so as to obtain a new translation to be made of his statements”.The appellant’s claims and evidence before the RRT The appellant was interviewed by an Immigration Inspector on his arrival at Sydney Airport on 23 May 1999. He said that he did not have a passport and that he was a refugee. He claimed to have left Iran in February of that year and travelled via Pakistan, Thailand and South Korea to Australia. He told the RRT that he left Iran out of fear for his life. The appellant has given various dates as his date of birth: 18 February 1969, “30 February 1969” [sic] and 18 February 1970. He said that he was born in Tehran, that his family moved to Bandar-e-Anzali (Anzali Port) on the Caspian Sea when he was six years old and that his family still lived there. The appellant undertook military service in the period 1990-1992. He claimed that he had suffered psychologically after having been conscripted to the Sepah Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards), a sector of the armed forces which was considered to represent “the most devout defenders of the Revolution”. He had argued with an officer that their actions were contrary to the teachings of Islam and as a result he was detained for a month and required to remain in the service for an additional two months. He said that after his discharge he could not enter university and was “denied service in any organisation”. Since completing his military service in 1992, the appellant has lived in Tehran, at first with his aunt. The appellant claimed that, as from 21 March 1998, he worked in a newspaper office in Tehran. At the hearing before the RRT he described this job as involving “service duties” including banking and mailing. According to the record of the airport interview, he explained the role in terms of “clerical and journalistic duties”. In his application for a protection visa he described it as “news reporter”. At the airport interview, the appellant claimed that he had received threats from “small groups”, “political groups” and the “Government”, after having “published some information”. However, as noted later he did not make this claim at the RRT hearing.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The application for review was dismissed by the primary judge on 9 December 1999. In his notice of appeal filed on 13 January 2000, the appellant relies on the ground that the primary judge erred in two respects: first, in not finding that the RRT had made an error of law; and second, “in not adjourning the case so as to obtain a new translation to be made of his statements”.The appellant’s claims and evidence before the RRT The appellant was interviewed by an Immigration Inspector on his arrival at Sydney Airport on 23 May 1999. He said that he did not have a passport and that he was a refugee. He claimed to have left Iran in February of that year and travelled via Pakistan, Thailand and South Korea to Australia. He told the RRT that he left Iran out of fear for his life. The appellant has given various dates as his date of birth: 18 February 1969, “30 February 1969” [sic] and 18 February 1970. He said that he was born in Tehran, that his family moved to Bandar-e-Anzali (Anzali Port) on the Caspian Sea when he was six years old and that his family still lived there. The appellant undertook military service in the period 1990-1992. He claimed that he had suffered psychologically after having been conscripted to the Sepah Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards), a sector of the armed forces which was considered to represent “the most devout defenders of the Revolution”. He had argued with an officer that their actions were contrary to the teachings of Islam and as a result he was detained for a month and required to remain in the service for an additional two months. He said that after his discharge he could not enter university and was “denied service in any organisation”. Since completing his military service in 1992, the appellant has lived in Tehran, at first with his aunt. The appellant claimed that, as from 21 March 1998, he worked in a newspaper office in Tehran. At the hearing before the RRT he described this job as involving “service duties” including banking and mailing. According to the record of the airport interview, he explained the role in terms of “clerical and journalistic duties”. In his application for a protection visa he described it as “news reporter”. At the airport interview, the appellant claimed that he had received threats from “small groups”, “political groups” and the “Government”, after having “published some information”. However, as noted later he did not make this claim at the RRT hearing. In September 1998, the appellant moved from his aunt’s place and occupied the upper floor of a building at Chahra Lashkar. His landlord and the landlord’s family occupied the ground floor. He became friendly with them. In early November 1998 he started to take an interest in the Baha’i faith professed by his landlord. He said he attended their gatherings and read Baha’i religious material, some of which he had in his room. At the hearing before the RRT he claimed that he had converted to the Baha’i faith at about this time.

Decision

Reasons for decision

SPENDER, LINDGREN AND MADGWICK JJ
Issues
1. Whether the primary judge erred in not finding that the RRT had made an error of law.
2. Whether the primary judge erred in not adjourning the case to obtain a new translation of the appellant's statements.

Held
1. The court concluded that the primary judge did not err in not finding that the RRT had made an error of law.
2. The court concluded that the primary judge did not err in not adjourning the case to obtain a new translation of the appellant's statements.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SPENDER, LINDGREN AND MADGWICK JJ

The court examined the appellant's claims that the primary judge erred in two respects: first, in not finding that the RRT had made an error of law, and second, in not adjourning the case to obtain a new translation of his statements. Regarding the first issue, the court noted that the appellant's argument lacked merit as the RRT's decision was not based on an error of law. The court found that the RRT had properly considered the appellant's claims and evidence, and that the decision was consistent with the applicable legal principles and authorities. Concerning the second issue, the court held that the primary judge did not err in declining to adjourn the case for a new translation. The court reasoned that the existing translation was adequate for the purposes of the review, and that any deficiencies in the translation did not prejudice the appellant's case. The court also noted that the appellant had not provided any compelling reasons why a new translation was necessary. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the respondent's costs.