SZTEN v Refugee Review Tribunal

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZTEN v REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL & ANOR [2013] FCCA 2100

MIGRATION – Refugee Review Tribunal.

PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – Whether an extension of time should be granted pursuant to s.477 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether it is necessary in the interests of justice to extend time in light of delay of 196 days in seeking judicial review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal – whether grounds of the applicant’s application have raised an arguable case – unsatisfactory explanation for delay – insufficient prospects of success – application refused.

Legislation:
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36, 417, 477
Cases cited:
SZSJD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2013] FCCA 1414
Re Commonwealth of Australia; Ex Parte Marks (2000) 177 ALR 491
Applicant: SZTEN
First Respondent: REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
File Number: SYG 1878 of 2013
Judgment of: Judge Emmett
Hearing date: 8 November 2013
Date of Last Submission: 8 November 2013
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 8 November 2013

REPRESENTATION

Solicitor for the Respondents: Mr Adrian Joel
(Adrian Joel & Co)
Solicitor for the Respondents: Ms Louise Buchanan
(Australian Government Solicitors)
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 1878 of 2013

SZTEN

Applicant

And

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

First Respondent

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

Second Respondent

EX TEMPORE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application for an extension of time pursuant to s.477 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) brought by the applicant in circumstances where his application for judicial review, filed 12 August 2013, was filed more than 35 days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed.

  2. Section 477 of the Act is as follows:

    “Time limits on applications to the Federal Circuit Court

    (1) An application to the Federal Circuit Court for a remedy to be granted in exercise of the court's original jurisdiction under section 476 in relation to a migration decision must be made to the court within 35 days of the date of the migration decision.

    (2)  The Federal Circuit Court may, by order, extend that 35 day period as the Federal Circuit Court considers appropriate if:

(a)  an application for that order has been made in writing to the Federal Circuit Court specifying why the applicant considers that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order; and

(b)  the Federal Circuit Court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order.

(3)  In this section:

‘date of the migration decision’ means:

(a)  in the case of a migration decision made under subsection 43(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 -the date of the written decision under that subsection; or

(b)  in the case of a written migration decision made by the Migration Review Tribunal or the Refugee Review Tribunal--the date of the written statement under subsection 368(1)…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCCA 2100
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application by SZTEN for an extension of time to seek judicial review of a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal. The applicant sought to quash the Tribunal's decision, which had been made approximately 17 months prior to the filing of the application for relief in the Federal Court.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether an extension of time should be granted to allow the applicant to seek relief against the Tribunal's decision. This required the Court to consider the principles governing the grant of extensions of time for seeking constitutional or prerogative writs, particularly in circumstances where there has been a significant delay in commencing proceedings.

Emmett J, applying the principles articulated by McHugh J in *Re Commonwealth of Australia; Ex Parte Marks*, held that an extension of time can only be granted if it is necessary to do justice between the parties. This involves considering the history of the matter, the conduct of the parties, the nature of the litigation, and the consequences of granting or refusing the extension. Crucially, for applications seeking to quash decisions of public bodies, the public interest in bringing litigation to an end is a significant factor. His Honour noted that a delay of 17 months, without any conduct by the respondent contributing to the delay, made it difficult to see how an extension could be granted, especially given that the applicant had knowledge of the decision. The Court also affirmed that an applicant's inability to obtain favourable legal advice is not a ground for extending time, as it suggests a lack of an arguable case and infringes upon the public interest in the finality of decisions. Consequently, the Court found that the applicant had no arguable case for relief and that the respondent had a vested right to retain the decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The relevant principles are referred to in Re Commonwealth of Australia; Ex Parte Marks (2000) 177 ALR 491, in which McHugh J stated at [15]-[17] as follows:“15. An extension of time for seeking relief against a decision or judgment can only be granted if it is necessary to do justice between the parties. That means that it is necessary to have regard to the history of the matter, the conduct of both parties, the nature of the litigation and the consequences for the parties of a grant or refusal of the extension. Where an applicant seeks the issue of the constitutional or prerogative writs, a further factor must be considered. Those writs are directed at the acts or decisions of public bodies or officials, and the public interest requires that there be an end to litigation about the efficacy of such acts or decisions. In that respect, the present case, although important to the applicant, is not as important as many other cases. Nevertheless, the applicant is seeking the quashing of a decision of the AIRC made 17 months before he filed his application for relief in this Court.16. Independently of the merits of the case, I find it difficult to see how a person who, with knowledge of the decision, delays 17 months before seeking relief could ever be granted an extension of time to quash such a decision unless some conduct of the respondent or the public body or official had brought about the delay. As the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council said in Ratnam v Cumarasamy, "[t]he rules of court must prima facie be obeyed". The time for seeking certiorari is six times, and the time for seeking mandamus is twice, the period in which an application for special leave to appeal to this Court can be brought against a judgment or decision. The periods for applying for certiorari and mandamus give a person affected by an adverse decision or judgment ample time in which to commence proceedings in this Court. In all but very exceptional cases, they should be rigidly applied when, as here, more than one year has elapsed between the decision and the commencement of proceedings in this Court.17. An applicant's inability to obtain favourable legal advice is not a ground for extending the time for seeking mandamus or the ancillary writ of certiorari. Upon the expiry of the time for the issue of a constitutional writ against a decision or judgment, the respondent has a vested right to retain the judgment or decision. Its rights should not be dependent on whether the applicant can at some future time obtain a favourable legal opinion that he or she has an arguable case. In addition, the efficacy of public acts, decisions and judgments cannot be the hostage of an applicant's search for favourable legal advice. In all but exceptional cases, the inability of an applicant to obtain favourable advice within the two month period for mandamus and the six month period for certiorari is a strong indicator that he or she has no case for relief. That is the case here. The applicant has no arguable case for relief. If it should turn out that, by reason of negligent advice, an applicant was deprived of the right to quash a decision or to have it made or to have some duty carried out, the applicant will have his or her remedy against the lawyer or lawyers concerned.”(emphasis added)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established