SZSJD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZSJD v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION & ANOR [2013] FCCA 1414

Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Refugee Review Tribunal.

PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – Whether an extension of time should be granted pursuant to s.477 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether it is necessary in the interests of justice to extend time – delay of more than 400 days – whether applicant’s explanation is satisfactory – whether grounds of application raised an arguable case – unsatisfactory explanation – insufficient prospects of success – application refused.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36, 477

SZSFK v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2013] FCCA 7
Re Commonwealth of Australia; Ex Parte Marks (2000) 177 ALR 491
Applicant: SZSJD
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG 1719 of 2013
Judgment of: Judge Emmett
Hearing date: 19 September 2013
Date of Last Submission: 19 September 2013
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 6 December 2013

REPRESENTATION

Solicitor for the Applicant:

Adrian Joel

(Adrian Joel & Co)

Solicitor for the Respondent: Bernadette Rayment
(Sparke Helmore)

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AT SYDNEY

SYG 1719 of 2013

SZSJD

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicant seeks an order pursuant to s.477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) that time be extended to him to seek judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the RRT”), dated 1 May 2012.  The application to this Court seeking judicial review of that decision was made on 25 July 2013.

  2. Section 477 of the Act provides that an application to this Court for judicial review of a decision of the RRT be made within 35 days of the date of the decision of the RRT. Any such application should have been filed by 5 June 2012.

  3. Section 477(2) of the Act provides discretion to the Court to extend that 35-day period if the Court considers that it is necessary, in the interest of the administration of justice, to make such an order.

  4. In support of the applicant’s application this morning, the applicant’s solicitor, Mr Joel, read affidavits of the applicant and himself, affirmed 20 July 2013 and 22 July 2013 respectively. The affidavit of the applicant, inter alia, provided a brief history of his application for a protection visa, which commenced on 25 October 2010. Mr Joel’s affidavit annexed a copy of the RRT decision record.

  5. The applicant deposed that his application for protection was refused by a delegate of the first respondent (“the Delegate”) on 24 June 2011, and that the decision of the RRT to affirm the Delegate’s decision was made on 1 May 2012.  The applicant also acknowledged that he was aware that his previous solicitor had filed an application for judicial review on 7 December 2012, and that that application was subsequently withdrawn on 19 March 2013.

  6. It is common ground…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCCA 1414
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter came before Judge Emmett of the Federal Court of Australia concerning an application by SZSJD for an extension of time to seek judicial review of a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal. The applicant sought to challenge the Tribunal's decision, which had been made more than 400 days prior to the filing of the application for an extension of time.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether an extension of time should be granted pursuant to section 477 of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth). This required the Court to determine whether it was necessary in the interests of justice to grant the extension, considering the applicant's explanation for the significant delay, the grounds of the application, and the prospects of success.

In reaching his decision, Judge Emmett referred to the principles articulated by McHugh J in *Re Commonwealth of Australia; Ex Parte Marks*. His Honour emphasised that an extension of time can only be granted if it is necessary to do justice between the parties, requiring consideration of the history of the matter, the conduct of the parties, the nature of the litigation, and the consequences of granting or refusing the extension. Crucially, for applications seeking prerogative writs against public bodies, the public interest in bringing litigation to an end is a significant factor. Judge Emmett found the applicant's explanation for the delay to be unsatisfactory and concluded that the grounds raised did not present an arguable case, noting that an inability to obtain favourable legal advice is generally not a sufficient ground for an extension, and can be an indicator of a weak case.

Consequently, Judge Emmett refused the application for an extension of time.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The relevant principles are referred to in Re Commonwealth of Australia; Ex Parte Marks (2000) 177 ALR 491, in which McHugh J stated at [15]-[17] as follows:“15. An extension of time for seeking relief against a decision or judgment can only be granted if it is necessary to do justice between the parties. That means that it is necessary to have regard to the history of the matter, the conduct of both parties, the nature of the litigation and the consequences for the parties of a grant or refusal of the extension. Where an applicant seeks the issue of the constitutional or prerogative writs, a further factor must be considered. Those writs are directed at the acts or decisions of public bodies or officials, and the public interest requires that there be an end to litigation about the efficacy of such acts or decisions. In that respect, the present case, although important to the applicant, is not as important as many other cases. Nevertheless, the applicant is seeking the quashing of a decision of the AIRC made 17 months before he filed his application for relief in this Court.16. Independently of the merits of the case, I find it difficult to see how a person who, with knowledge of the decision, delays 17 months before seeking relief could ever be granted an extension of time to quash such a decision unless some conduct of the respondent or the public body or official had brought about the delay. As the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council said in Ratnam v Cumarasamy, "[t]he rules of court must prima facie be obeyed". The time for seeking certiorari is six times, and the time for seeking mandamus is twice, the period in which an application for special leave to appeal to this Court can be brought against a judgment or decision. The periods for applying for certiorari and mandamus give a person affected by an adverse decision or judgment ample time in which to commence proceedings in this Court. In all but very exceptional cases, they should be rigidly applied when, as here, more than one year has elapsed between the decision and the commencement of proceedings in this Court.17. An applicant's inability to obtain favourable legal advice is not a ground for extending the time for seeking mandamus or the ancillary writ of certiorari. Upon the expiry of the time for the issue of a constitutional writ against a decision or judgment, the respondent has a vested right to retain the judgment or decision. Its rights should not be dependent on whether the applicant can at some future time obtain a favourable legal opinion that he or she has an arguable case. In addition, the efficacy of public acts, decisions and judgments cannot be the hostage of an applicant's search for favourable legal advice. In all but exceptional cases, the inability of an applicant to obtain favourable advice within the two month period for mandamus and the six month period for certiorari is a strong indicator that he or she has no case for relief. That is the case here. The applicant has no arguable case for relief. If it should turn out that, by reason of negligent advice, an applicant was deprived of the right to quash a decision or to have it made or to have some duty carried out, the applicant will have his or her remedy against the lawyer or lawyers concerned.”(emphasis added)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established