SZTDH v Minister for Immigration - [2014] FCCA 175

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZTDH v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR

[2014] FCCA 175

Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Review of Refugee Review Tribunal decision – refusal of a protection visa – whether the Tribunal overlooked an integer of the applicant’s claims, breached s.425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) or failed to deal adequately with the issue of complementary protection considered – no jurisdictional error.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.25, 36, 414, 425

Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v AlphaonePty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576
Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration (2003) 197 ALR 389
Htun v Minister for Immigration (2001) 194 ALR 244
Plaintiff M61/2010 v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 243 CLR 319
Re Ruddock; Ex parte Applicant S154/2002 (2003) 201 ALR 437
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration (2006) 228 CLR 152
SZSHK v Minister for Immigration [2013] FCAFC 125
WZAQU v Minister for Immigration [2013] FCA 327

Applicant:

SZTDH

First Respondent:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

Second Respondent:

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

File Number:

SYG 1765 of 2013

Judgment of:

Judge Driver

Hearing date:

7 February 2014

Delivered at:

Sydney

Delivered on:

4 April 2014

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant:

Ms R Graycar

Solicitors for the Applicant:

Kinslor Prince Lawyers

Counsel for the Respondents:

Mr T Reilly

Solicitors for the Respondents:

Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

The application as amended on 7 February 2014 is dismissed.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 1765 of 2013

SZTDH

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction and background

This is an application to review a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (Tribunal). The decision was made on 27 June 2013. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
The applicant is from Fujian province in China and claimed to fear harm in China as a Roman Catholic. The following statement of background facts relating to the applicant’s protection claims and the decisions of the delegate and the Tribunal on them is derived from the applicant’s written submissions.
In his visa application[1], the applicant made the following claims[2]:
[1] Court Book (CB) 1-54
[2] see CB 16-18 for his statement
a)he was born in China in 1990 into a devout Roman Catholic family and was baptized on 15 November 1990;
b)he has attended gatherings of the underground Roman Catholic Church since he was about six years old, which activities were held at the homes of Church members;
c)he took confirmation on 15 August 2005;
d)while there are “patriotic catholic churches” in China, he would not attend such a church as it does not “obey the leadership of Pope”;
e)his grandfather was detained for 15 days in 2000, so far as the applicant can remember, while attending a retreat program;
f)while the applicant was away at school from 2003-2006, he attended an underground Catholic youth group on Saturdays and the gathering places had to be changed from time to time;
g)on the morning of 30 September 2006, police attended at one of those meetings and took a number of adult members to the police station, while those who were not detained (including the applicant) were warned about attending illegal underground church activities and their parents were contacted to take them home;
h)the applicant’s parents decided to send him to study in Australia to provide him with a “better studying environment and religious life” and he arrived on a student visa on 26 September 2007;
i)his parents were involved in secretly printing religious materials on behalf of the Church and those materials were then transported by his father who used his cargo ship to transport them from the island on which his family lived. During a spot check on 21 March 2008, the police discovered some of the documents and arrested his father and detained the ship. They also broke into the family’s warehouse and seized religious material and printing equipment. His father was released from detention on 3 June 2008, after payment of a fine of 30,000 yuan;
j)since coming to Australia, the applicant has attended St Dominic’s Church at Flemington where he attends Mass every Sunday and he is also a member of a Catholic youth group that meets in Ashfield on Friday nights, the Temple of Holy Spirit (THS).
In support of his application, the applicant provided a number of statements attesting to his participation in Church activities and in the THS[3]. He also provided a statement from the parish priest of Cheng Tou Parish, Fuqing City, dated 20 April 2012, attesting to the fact that the applicant was baptized on 15 November 1990, and confirmed on 15 August 2005[4].
[3] CB 33-47
[4] CB 36-37
The delegate of the Minister rejected the applicant’s claim for protection on 31 July 2013[5]. The delegate accepted that the applicant and his family are Catholics and “active, leading members of the Cheng Tou Parish, Catholic Church in the Archdiocese of Fuzhou, Fujian, and that the applicant had been baptized in 1990 and confirmed in 2005, and that he had maintained his practice of Catholicism since arriving in Australia”[6]. However, the delegate was not satisfied that there was a real chance of the applicant being persecuted for a Refugees Convention reason, and formed the view that the claimed instances of harm were “fabricated for the purposes of his protection visa application”[7]. The delegate also found that there was not a real risk that the applicant would be the subject of harm that would constitute “significant harm” for the purposes of complementary protection[8].
[5] CB 59-71
[6] CB 67
[7] CB 68-69
[8] CB 71
The applicant applied for review by the Tribunal on 15 August 2012[9] and was invited to attend the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments on 22 November 2012. The applicant attended the hearing on that day and was assisted by a Mandarin speaking interpreter[10].
[9] CB 72-80
[10] see CB 91-93
On 28 June 2013, the applicant was notified in writing that the decision under review had been affirmed and his application for review was unsuccessful[11].
[11] CB 94 ff

The Tribunal’s decision

In the course of affirming the delegate’s decision, the Tribunal found that the applicant is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China[12]; and that he “was in China and is in Australia a practising Catholic”[13].
[12] CB 106; reasons for decision (reasons) at [66]
[13] CB 106; [68]
However, the Tribunal:
a)did not accept that he left China because of a fear of harm based on his religion, nor that he resists returning to China for that reason[14]; and
b)found that he was not a truthful witness and had fabricated his claims concerning his parents’ involvement in secretly printing Christian material; the claim that his father’s ship was impounded and his parents arrested as a consequence; and the claim he made about his Catholic youth group being raided by police and some members being detained[15].
[14] CB 106, [69]
[15] CB 106-107 [69]
At [71][16], the Tribunal set out its reasons for so finding as follows:
a)the applicant had not provided any corroboration for any of the events he relied on in support of his claims[17];
b)although the applicant claimed that his parents had ceased involvement in the printing activities after the events of 2008, they had not ceased their religious activities and the Tribunal considered that it “would be reasonable to expect that there would be further incidents from June 2008 to the present consistent with the profile and presumed notoriety of the applicant’s family”[18];
c)the applicant did not experience any difficulty obtaining a passport or departing China: this suggested to the Tribunal neither haste in departing nor that he was of any adverse interest to the Chinese police or authorities[19]; and
d)the applicant’s behaviour in Australia does not demonstrate a genuine fear of persecution or a fear of returning to China, notably because of the delay in applying for a protection visa from the time he ceased studying in September 2008 to his application in April 2012.
[16] CB 107
[17] [71.a]
[18] CB 107 [71.b]
[19] CB 108 [71.c]
The Tribunal also found that for the same reasons, “there are no substantial grounds for believing that as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to China, there is a real risk that he will suffer significant harm”[20].
[20] CB 109 [75]
Thus the Tribunal rejected both the applicant’s claim for protection under the Refugees Convention[21] and his claim for complementary protection[22].
[21] Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Migration Act), s.36(2)(a)
[22] s.36(2)(aa)

The judicial review application

These proceedings began with a show cause application filed on 30 July 2013. The applicant now relies upon an amended application filed in court by leave on 7 February 2014. The grounds in that amended application are:
Ground One
In deciding to affirm the decision of the first respondent, the second respondent committed an error of law amounting to a jurisdictional error in failing to consider an integer of the applicant’s claim, specifically, that as a practising Catholic he feared religious persecution in People’s Republic of China (China).
Particulars of Ground One
1. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant was a practising Catholic in China and Australia (paragraph 68 second respondent’s decision). The applicant’s claim was that he was a member of the underground Roman Catholic Church in China and that the practice of his faith involved the sacrament of communion administered by a priest (paragraph 3 second respondent’s decision).
2. The Tribunal accepted country information that priests from the underground Catholic Church were arrested in Fujian province (paragraphs 61 and 62 of the second respondent’s decision).
3. However, having found that he was a practising Catholic, the Tribunal failed to address whether there was a real risk that the applicant would be unable to continue to practise his religion in China freely in the future and whether any such inability of the applicant to do so amounted to persecution.
Ground Two
The second respondent breached its obligation under s.425 of the Migration Act 1958
Particulars of Ground Two
1. The second respondent did not accept that the applicant had a genuine fear of persecution, inter alia because, while the applicant’s parents had ceased printing religious material, given they had not ceased their religious activities, “[i]t would be reasonable to expect that there would be further incidents from June 2008 to the present consistent with the profile and presumed notoriety of the applicant’s family” (Reasons, at para 71.b (CB 107)).
2. The second respondent did not put to the applicant the reason set out in para 71.b: the case put to the applicant was that any risk of harm to him on return was “non-existent” as his family had stopped printing religious materials and therefore the risk of harm to his parents had ceased (see Reasons for decision, para 59 (CB 105).
Ground Three
The second respondent committed a jurisdictional error in failing to consider the applicant’s claim for complementary protection separately from its consideration of the applicant’s claim for protection under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol (the Refugees Convention), thus failing to comply with its obligation under s.414 of the Act to review the decision of the first respondent.
Particulars of Ground Three
1. The second respondent accepted that the applicant was in China and Australia a practising Catholic (decision record para 68) but failed to assess whether the applicant would suffer significant harm in China as a practising Catholic.
In addition to the book of relevant documents filed on 16 August 2013, I have before me as evidence an affidavit by Joanne Jennifer Kinslor made on 16 January 2014, to which is annexed a transcript of the hearing conducted by the Tribunal on 22 November 2012.
Both parties made written and oral submissions.

Consideration

Ground 1 - failure to consider an integer of the applicant’s claim

By this ground, the applicant contends that the Tribunal failed to consider the key aspect of the applicant’s claim, specifically, that as a practising Roman Catholic, he feared religious persecution in China.
Counsel for the applicant set out the relevant legal principles in her submissions. It is now well accepted that a failure to have regard to a “clearly articulated argument” relying on established facts is a denial of procedural fairness[23].
[23] Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration (2003) 197 ALR 389 at [24]-[34] (Dranichnikov); Plaintiff M61/2010 v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 243 CLR 319 at [90]
As Flick J recently pointed out in WZAQU v Minister for Immigration[24] (WZAQU) at [10]:
Even where a claim falls short of being expressly raised, a decision-maker must consider every claim that clearly arises on the materials before it: NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263 at [58] to [61], 144 FCR 1 at 18-20 per Black CJ, French and Selway JJ. See also: SZRHH v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1424 at [31] to [32] per Buchanan J; MZYOI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 868 at [141] to [145], 130 ALD 256 at 278-279 per Dodds-Streeton J.
[24] [2013] FCA 327
The Tribunal is required to respond to a claim either articulated by a party before it, or one that squarely arises on the material before it[25] and failure to do so may constitute jurisdictional error[26].
[25] see Dranichnikov at [22]-[24]; NABE v Minister for Immigration (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1 (NABE) at [58]- [61]; and Htun and the Minister for Immigration (2001) 194 ALR 244 at [8]-[12]; [41]-[42] (Htun)
[26] Htun v Minister for Immigration (2001) 194 ALR 244 (Htun)
As Allsop J (as he then was) stated in his reasons for decision in Htun at [42]:
The requirement to review the decision under s 414 of the Act requires the Tribunal to consider the claims of the applicant. To make a decision without having considered all the claims is to fail to complete the exercise of jurisdiction embarked on. The claim or claims and its or their component integers are considerations made mandatorily relevant by the Act for consideration.
As the particulars set out in the amended application make clear, the gravamen of this claim is that the Tribunal had no hesitation finding that the applicant was a committed member of the Catholic Church, both in China and in Australia. The applicant’s claim was that he was a member of the underground Roman Catholic Church in China and that the practice of his faith involved the sacrament of communion administered by a priest[27]. The Tribunal also accepted country information that priests from the underground Catholic Church were arrested in Fujian province[28].
[27] CB 102; [43]
[28] CB 105-106; [61]-[62]
The applicant contends that his claim that he was not free to practise his Roman Catholic religion (as practised in the Rome affiliated underground Church in China) was not considered. The Minister contends that the claim was considered by the Tribunal which found at [74][29] that there is no real chance of the applicant facing religious persecution in China as a practising Catholic. In support of that finding, the Tribunal had regard to its factual findings that neither the applicant nor his parents had been subject to adverse attention by the authorities, and the country information concerning the situation in Fujian province for ordinary Catholics[30]. The Minister contends that the Tribunal’s findings are of sufficient generality to encompass whether the applicant worshipped in an underground Church or not and that the Tribunal’s findings were also of sufficient generality to encompass the possibility that the applicant might not be able to practise his religion freely in a way that would amount to persecution.
[29] CB 108
[30] CB 105-106 at [61]-[65]
It is clear that the Tribunal rejected the applicant’s claims of past harm being suffered by his family as a result of their religious activities. The Tribunal also tested whether the applicant belonged to the official registered Church rather than the underground Church[31].
[31] see CB 102-103 at [43]-[46] and see also the transcript at annexure A to the affidavit of Joanne Jennifer Kinslor at pages 8-10 and 18
I accept that the applicant unequivocally maintained his claim that he did not attend the official Church[32]. While the Tribunal expressed some doubt on that question at the Tribunal hearing[33] the Tribunal made no adverse finding on the applicant’s claimed faith and, on a fair reading of the decision, it must be concluded that the Tribunal accepted that the applicant was a genuine practising Roman Catholic. I also accept that it was necessary for the Tribunal, notwithstanding its rejection of the applicant’s claims of past harm, to make a forward looking assessment of whether the applicant faced a real risk of harm in China because of his Roman Catholic religion. That consideration needed to include consideration of whether the applicant would suffer harm amounting to persecution if he was unable to attend underground Church services presided over by a Roman Catholic priest.
[32] see transcript at page 9, lines 40-45
[33] transcript, page 18, line 39
Although the Tribunal’s reasoning on this question is very brief, it did give consideration both to the applicant’s claims of past harm and the risk of future harm. The assessment of the applicant’s claims of past harm is ultimately dealt with at [73] of the Tribunal’s reasons[34]:
The Tribunal therefore finds that the applicant does not have a genuine fear of persecution as a Catholic if he were to return to China.
[34] CB 108
The Tribunal dealt with its forward looking assessment of the risk of harm notwithstanding that finding at [74][35] where the Tribunal said:
Taking into consideration the independent information set out above concerning the circumstances in Fujian for ordinary Catholics, and having found that neither the applicant nor his parents have previously been the subject of adverse attention by the authorities, the Tribunal is satisfied that the chance of any harm to the applicant by reason of his religion is remote. Consequently, the Tribunal finds that there is no real chance that the applicant would face Convention-related persecution in the reasonably foreseeable future if he were to return to China.
[35] CB 108
It is significant that in that paragraph, the Tribunal took into consideration the independent country information referred to earlier in its reasons. The Tribunal put to the applicant at the hearing independent information that authorities in Fujian province are generally liberal in dealing with unregistered Churches[36]. While the country information referred to by the Tribunal at [61] of its reasons[37] included information that police and local officials have “sometimes” arrested underground Catholic priests, the Tribunal also noted at [63][38] that Mindong diocese in south eastern Fujian has an underground bishop who leads nearly 50 priests who serve approximately 97 per cent of the 70,000 registered Catholics in the diocese. In my view, based upon this information, it was open to the Tribunal to conclude that the risk of the applicant being unable to attend unregistered Church services presided over by a Roman Catholic priest in his home district in Fujian province was remote. I further take the view that the Tribunal’s conclusion at [74] should be read as encompassing that conclusion.
[36] recorded at [46] of the Tribunal decision, CB 103
[37] CB 105
[38] CB 106

It follows that the first ground fails.

Ground 2 – breach of s.425 of the Migration Act

The applicant asserts from the transcript (and the Tribunal’s reasons for decision) that the Tribunal did not put to the applicant the reason set out at [71.b] of its decision. Rather, he contends that the case put to him, and the case that he understood he was to meet, was that any risk of harm to him on return was “non-existent” as his parents had stopped printing religious materials and therefore the risk of harm to his parents had ceased[39]. At page 18 of the transcript, the Tribunal said to the applicant that the Church he attended:
may very well be an underground church, but that it only attracted the attention of the authorities when your parents set up religious printing arrangements, but once that ceased, then the government has not taken any adverse interest in your family’s church since, in which case, the risk to you, if you were to return to China, is nil.
[39] CB 105 [59]
On page 19, the Tribunal asked the applicant whether his parents had stopped printing religious material after the presses were confiscated to which he responded, “finished”. The applicant complains that at no time did the Tribunal raise with him any issue about the possible ongoing consequences of those former activities of his parents.
Thus, the applicant contends that the reason set out at [71.b] (that independently of the cessation of the publishing activities, the applicant’s parents could have been expected to have been the subject of adverse attention from the authorities, but were not) was not something that was put to him. He was thus unaware that that was an issue “arising in relation to the decision under review”.
Counsel for the applicant referred in her submissions to SZBEL v Minister for Immigration[40] (SZBEL), where the High Court noted that in determining what procedural fairness requires, the statutory framework is of critical importance[41]. Here, as in that case, the relevant statutory provision is s.425(1) by which the Tribunal is bound to invite the applicant to “appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review”. The High Court also referred with approval[42] to the passage in the reasons for decision of the Full Federal Court in Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v AlphaonePty Ltd[43] (Alphaone):
Where the exercise of a statutory power attracts the requirement for procedural fairness, a person likely to be affected by the decision is entitled to put information and submissions to the decision‑maker in support of an outcome that supports his or her interests. That entitlement extends to the right to rebut or qualify by further information, and comment by way of submission, upon adverse material from other sources which is put before the decision‑maker. It also extends to require the decision‑maker to identify to the person affected any issue critical to the decision which is not apparent from its nature or the terms of the statute under which it is made. The decision‑maker is required to advise of any adverse conclusion which has been arrived at which would not obviously be open on the known material.… (emphasis added)
[40] (2006) 228 CLR 152
[41] at [26]
[42] at [29]
[43] (1994) 49 FCR 576 at 591-592
At [32], the High Court also referred to the passage in Alphaone[44] where the Full Federal Court had stated that a fundamental aspect of the opportunity to be heard is that it would:
ordinarily require the party affected to be given the opportunity of ascertaining the relevant issues and to be informed of the nature and content of adverse material (emphasis also added by the High Court)
[44] at 590-591
The High Court in its judgment in SZBEL explored in some detail what is meant by the statutory reference to the “issues arising in relation to the decision under review”[45]. The Court noted that the issues were to be identified with more specificity than merely “is the applicant entitled to a protection visa”?[46] The fact that the Tribunal conducts a “review” means that it is not intended that the Tribunal consider afresh all aspects of an applicant’s case[47]: rather, “the Act assumes that issues can be identified as arising in relation to the decision under review”.
[45] at [33]-[35]
[46] at [39]-[40]
[47] at [40]
The applicant contends that in this case, just as in SZBEL, the Tribunal did not say anything to the applicant that would put him on notice that his account of his parents’ printing activities would lead the Tribunal to expect consequences independently of whether those activities had ceased. He contends that this deprived him of an opportunity to respond to that issue and perhaps satisfy the Tribunal about it. This is said to constitute a breach of s.425 of the Migration Act.
The Minister contends that the Tribunal had asked the applicant during the hearing whether his family had experienced any trouble after the March 2008 incident, and he had said they had not[48]. The Tribunal’s questioning during the hearing clearly expresses scepticism about the applicant’s claims, in such a way that it was apparent that all of his claims were in issue[49]. The Tribunal did not need to set out every detail of its ultimate reasoning process for the applicant at the hearing[50]. For both reasons counsel for the Minister submits that there can be no breach of s.425 in the Tribunal not specifically adverting to the reasoning ultimately employed at 71.b[51] during the hearing[52].
[48] CB 104 [50]
[49] eg CB 104-105 [57]
[50] Re Ruddock; Ex parte Applicant S154/2002 (2003) 201 ALR 437 (HCA) at [54]
[51] CB 107
[52] SZBEL v Minister for Immigration (2006) 228 CLR 152 at [47]-[48]
I prefer the Minister’s submissions on this issue. The applicant’s contentions, although arguable, are based on an exceedingly fine dissection of both the Tribunal’s reasons and the factual issues bearing upon those reasons. The applicant was on notice from the delegate’s decision that all of his claimed instances of past harm were regarded as having been fabricated for the purposes of his protection visa application[53]. The applicant could have been in no doubt, from the Tribunal hearing, that the essential and significant issue upon which the review would turn would be the credibility of his claims of past harm. A further essential and significant issue identified by the Tribunal at the hearing was the fact that (even if his claims were true) the applicant had not claimed any harm since 2008[54]. That would support a conclusion that the applicant was of no interest to the Chinese authorities. In my view, neither the requirements of procedural fairness under the general law, nor the requirements of s.425, required the Tribunal to go into the finer detail of its reasoning process at the hearing.
[53] CB 68-69
[54] See for example transcript at page 14, lines 27-33
I reject Ground 2.

Ground 3 – Failure to consider the applicant’s claim for complementary protection

This ground is related to, though separate from, Ground One in that it also involves the Tribunal’s alleged failure to consider the consequences to the applicant about his commitment to Catholicism in the context of available information that members and priests of the underground Catholic Church continue to experience harm by virtue of the fact that worship in that Church is not supported by the state.
In this case, the applicant contends that the Tribunal failed to address whether, as a result of the applicant’s commitment to the underground Catholic Church, there were substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia, there was a real risk that he would suffer significant harm. Instead, the Tribunal, having not accepted the incidents of harm that he relied on in support of his claim, but having accepted his claim to be a committed Christian, allegedly failed to consider whether that would give rise to a real risk of significant harm. Rather, the Tribunal merely indicated in a brief passage[55] that “[f]or the same reasons” as it found the applicant was not entitled to a visa on the basis of the Refugees Convention, there were not substantial grounds for believing that there was a real risk that he would suffer significant harm if returned to China.
[55] CB 109; [75]
While it is not necessarily an error to reject a claim for complementary protection “for the same reasons” as rejecting a claim for refugee protection[56], it will be an error if the central element of the refugees claim (which here, is said by the applicant to be the lack of freedom to practise his religion and the potential consequences of doing so) was not itself considered.
[56] cf SZSHK v Minister for Immigration [2013] FCAFC 125
The Minister contends that the Tribunal was entitled to have regard to its previous findings when considering whether the applicant satisfied the complementary protection provisions and that a fair reading of the Tribunal’s reasons supports the conclusion that the Tribunal had found that there was not a real chance of the applicant suffering persecution on account of his religious practice in China. On that basis of reasoning, there was therefore no factual basis for the Tribunal to find there could be a real chance of the applicant suffering “significant harm” as defined in ss.25 and 36(2A) of the Migration Act.
I also prefer the Minister’s submissions on this issue. While the Tribunal’s consideration of complementary protection was startlingly brief at [75][57] of its reasons, on a fair reading, having disposed of the applicant’s refugee claims, there was nothing left to consider in relation to complementary protection. The applicant’s claims of past harm had all been rejected as fabrications. The Tribunal, on a fair reading, had reasoned that the applicant would not be prevented from practising his religion in Fujian province in China and it necessarily followed that he would not suffer significant harm by following that religious practice. It can safely be assumed by the brevity of the Tribunal’s reasons that the Tribunal did not consider it necessary to ask itself whether an impediment on free religious practice could be “significant harm” in relation to complementary protection.
[57] CB 109

Conclusion

The applicant has failed to establish that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error in its decision. The decision is therefore a privative clause decision and the application must be dismissed. I will so order.
I will hear the parties as to costs.

I certify that the preceding forty-five (45) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Driver

Associate:

Date: 4 April 2014