SZTDC v Minister for Immigration

[2014] FCCA 759

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZTDC v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2014] FCCA 759

Catchwords:

MIGRATION – Application to review decision of Refugee Review Tribunal – no jurisdictional error. 

Legislation:
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.65

Abebe v The Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510; [1999] HCA 14
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 83 ALJR 1123; [2009] HCA 39
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611; [2010] HCA 16
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNSP and Another (2010) 184 FCR 485; [2010] FCAFC 50
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNVW and Another (2010) 183 FCR 575; [2010] FCAFC 41
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT and Another (2013) 212 FCR 99; [2013] FCA 317
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parteDurairajasingham (2000) 74 ALJR 405; [2000] HCA 1
SZATG v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 215 ALR 358; [2004] FCA 1595
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs and Another (2006) 228 CLR 152; [2006] HCA 63
SZOOR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and Another (2012) 202 FCR 1; [2012] FCAFC 58

Applicant: SZTDC

First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

Second Respondent: REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

File Number: SYG 1741 of 2013

Judgment of: Judge Barnes

Hearing date: 26 March 2014

Delivered at: Sydney

Delivered on: 26 March 2014

REPRESENTATION

Applicant: In person

Solicitors for the Respondents: DLA Piper Australia

ORDERS

1. The application is dismissed.

2. The Applicant pay the costs of the First Respondent fixed in the sum of $4,100.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AT SYDNEY

SYG 1741 of 2013

SZTDC

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Revised from transcript)

1. This is an application for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal dated 27 June 2013.  The Tribunal affirmed a decision of the delegate of the First Respondent not to grant the Applicant a protection visa.

2. The Applicant arrived in Australia in December 2011 and applied for protection in February 2012.  His application was refused and he sought review by the Tribunal.  The Applicant attended a Tribunal hearing.  The only evidence before the Court of what occurred in the Tribunal hearing is the limited account that appears in the Tribunal reasons for decision.

3. In support of his claims the Applicant provided to the Department a number of items of evidence, in particular pages from his passport, an ID card from the Indian Income Tax Department, a letter said to be from Bappa Paul (President of a Dharmanagar Youth Congress Committee), a medical report and an Indian Youth Congress ID card valid until February 2011.

4. In its reasons for decision the Tribunal summarised the claims made by the Applicant and referred to the documents that he had provided.  In essence the Applicant claimed that he was a member of the Youth Congress of Tripura, that he had been “heavily involved in various activities of Congress Party” and that he had been targeted by the members of the ruling Communist Party of India (Marxist) (the CPI(M)).

5. The Applicant claimed that CPI(M) members wanted to kill him and that they had attacked him in August 2011.  He claimed that he tried to complain to the police, but they did not take his case and that he also contacted “higher authority of [his] party” but that they could do nothing because they were not in power in his state.  He also claimed that he had been attacked on two other occasions and given an ultimatum and that to escape and save his life he left the country.  He claimed CPI(M) members thought that if he continued his activities they would “lose next election” (which was in March 2013).  He claimed to fear CPI(M) party members and their associates and that as the Congress Party was not in power in Tripura it could not save him. 

6. The Tribunal recorded that at the hearing the Applicant was given two weeks to provide photographs showing his involvement in political activities in India and advised that the Tribunal would consider anything he provided before the decision was written.  He did not provide any further material to the Tribunal.

7. The Tribunal stated that a number of inconsistencies (which it detailed) led it to find that the Applicant was not a credible witness.  It had regard to the fact that the Applicant’s Indian Youth Congress membership card stated that it was valid until 28 February 2011.  Moreover the Applicant had told the delegate that he did not renew his membership after he went into hiding (in January 2011).  However according to the certification by the President of the relevant Youth Congress, the Applicant was elected “G.S” in 2011 and claimed he was attacked in August and September 2011 when, as the Tribunal pointed out, he was not a member of the Youth Congress and when he claimed that he had returned to his home town after hiding in various locations in India from January 2011. 

8. The Tribunal found that the Applicant’s account at the hearing of the first time he was attacked in August 2011 was inconsistent with his claims that he had been in hiding earlier in 2011, initially in Pune and then in other places he specified in the northeast of India.  The Tribunal set out the details of the claims the Applicant made at the hearing about the alleged attack, including his claim that he had gone to help his father in the shop, had closed the shop and was returning home alone about midnight and was attacked.  The Tribunal found that for the Applicant “[t]o be assisting his father in his business and then setting off to his home from that place of business, [wa]s inconsistent with [the Applicant’s] claims to have to hide from those pursuing him”.

9. The Tribunal also had regard to inconsistencies in the Applicant’s claims about his circumstances while undertaking his Bachelors degree in Pune from 2006 – 2010, in particular as to whether he went home to study to save his father money, given that he also claimed that he had paid rent in advance in Pune.  It also found that his explanation of homesickness was inconsistent with his evidence about his past study in Pune at boarding school from the age of 13.

10. In addition, the Tribunal found that the Applicant’s claim in his application that his occupation or profession was “looking after his father’s business” was inconsistent with his claims that he had been in hiding from January 2011 and that he fled India to avoid being attacked and killed.  It also referred to inconsistencies in the Applicant’s claims about having to rely on financial support from his father because he was unemployed in Australia, and his evidence at the hearing that “his father had sold his house to finance the applicant’s trip to Australia and had nothing left and that the applicant was financing himself in Australia because his visa allowed him to work fulltime”.

11. The Tribunal found that the Applicant’s evidence about members of his family being tortured and constantly threatened was inconsistent with his evidence that they continued to live in their home until his father sold it before the Applicant came to Australia and then that they continued to live in their hometown in a rented house.  The Tribunal took into account the Applicant’s claims at the hearing that the family were living with another family and that they were protected because there were people around.  However it was of the view that if his family could be protected in that fashion it did not understand why the Applicant could not also be so protected.

12. The Tribunal considered the Applicant’s detailed evidence about hiding in India from January 2011, being found after 50 days in Pune, and then hiding in various specified places for particular periods before returning home.  However it found his evidence about the details of where he had allegedly been in hiding in India was inconsistent with the fact that he had claimed in his application that he had travelled to Bangladesh for a month from February to March 2011 and to Thailand from 28 July 2011 to 4 August 2011 “to visit”. 

13. The Tribunal found that the Applicant was not a credible witness because of the inconsistencies in his evidence. 

14. The Tribunal considered the supporting documentation in relation to the Applicant’s claims.  It gave little weight to the medical report which the Applicant agreed was dated 18 August 2011.  It referred to the fact that although the report was in English, the handwriting was difficult to read and it was unclear whether the injury recorded was to the Applicant’s hand or to his head.  While the report referred to investigation of either right hand or right head x-ray and “BCG” and to the prescription of various medications, the Tribunal gave it little weight in circumstances where it was not clear what the injury was and the document was silent as to causation.

15. In addition, the Tribunal considered but gave little weight to the letter claiming to be from the President of the Dharmanagar Youth Congress.  It acknowledged that the letter supported aspects of the Applicant’s claims, stated he was a member from 2009, was elected “G.S” in 2011, that he worked very well for the party, was attacked by anti-Congress persons on 15 August 2011 before an election and was told to leave the state or he would be killed.  The letter also claimed that “they” warned the Applicant’s parents and sister, that they attacked the Applicant three times on the road at night and that to save his life he left the country.

16. However the Tribunal had regard to the fact that while the letter claimed that the Applicant was elected “G.S” in 2011, he did not renew his membership after February 2011 and that this was inconsistent with an active ongoing role as General Secretary.  In addition it took into account the fact that the letter claimed he was attacked when he was no longer a member and had not worked actively for the Youth Congress since the election in October 2010.  The Tribunal also found that the fact that the Applicant’s family continued to live in their hometown protected by people around them was inconsistent with the claims that they had been threatened and tortured.

17. For these reasons the Tribunal was “not satisfied that the applicant was the “G.S” in 2011, or worked very well for the party, or that he was ever an active member of the Youth Congress”.  It was not satisfied he would be active in the Youth Congress if he returned to India.

18. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the Applicant or any member of his family had been threatened or harmed by members of the CPI(M) at any time, that he had had to hide in India to avoid being threatened or harmed or that he would be threatened or harmed by the CPI(M) or any of their related groups if he returned to India.  It was not satisfied there was a real chance he would suffer serious harm in the reasonably foreseeable future if he returned to India.  It was not satisfied that the Applicant met either the Refugees Convention or the complementary protection criterion.

19. The Applicant sought review of the Tribunal decision by application filed in this Court on 26 July 2013.  There are five grounds in the application.  The Applicant did not file an amended application.  Nor did he take the opportunity afforded by directions to file a transcript of the Tribunal hearing or any further evidence.  He did not file written submissions. 

20. The Applicant was given the opportunity in the hearing today to explain the basis for each of the grounds on which he relied.  However when given that opportunity he consistently took issue with the merits of the Tribunal decision.  He repeated aspects of the basis on which he claimed to fear persecution in India.  He also repeated aspects of his claimed involvement with the Congress Party and his claimed fear of the CPI(M).  It became apparent that in essence the Applicant took issue with the merits of the Tribunal decision and did not agree with the Tribunal’s findings and conclusions rejecting the credibility of his claims.  As I endeavoured to explain to the Applicant on a number of occasions, this Court does not have jurisdiction to review the merits of the Tribunal decision. 

21. The first ground is that the Tribunal “erred in assessing [the Applicant’s] situation in relation to ‘persecution’ and ‘fear of life’”.  The Applicant disagrees with the Tribunal’s findings and conclusions in this respect.  However credibility findings are a matter for the Tribunal.  Its findings in that respect were open to it on the material before it for the reasons which it gave (Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parteDurairajasingham (2000) 74 ALJR 405; [2000] HCA 1). The fact that the Tribunal did not accept the Applicant’s claims does not of itself establish jurisdictional error.

22. Insofar as such a claim may be taken as impliedly raising a suggestion that there was some irrationality, illogicality or unreasonableness in the Tribunal reasons for decision, the threshold for irrationality and illogicality considered in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611; [2010] HCA 16 is high. As Crennan and Bell JJ pointed out (at [130]) in the context of the Tribunal’s decision-making, illogicality or irrationality sufficient to give rise to jurisdictional error must mean that the decision to which the Tribunal came in relation to whether it was satisfied that the Applicant met the criteria for the visa for which he applied was one at which no rational or logical decision-maker could arrive on the same evidence.

23. Their Honours pointed out that not every lapse of logic will give rise to jurisdictional error and that a court should be slow, although not unwilling, to interfere in an appropriate case.  Their Honours relevantly went on to state (at [131]) that: 

    If probative evidence can give rise to different processes of reasoning and if logical or rational or reasonable minds might differ in respect of the conclusions to be drawn from that evidence, a decision cannot be said by a reviewing court to be illogical or irrational or unreasonable, simply because one conclusion has been preferred to another possible conclusion.

24. As Rares J pointed out in SZOOR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and Another (2012) 202 FCR 1; [2012] FCAFC 58 (at [15]):

    The approach to irrationality or illogicality dictated by the authorities in the High Court appears to be that even if the decision-maker’s articulation of how and why he or she went from the facts to the decision is not rational or logical, if someone else could have done so on the evidence, the decision is not one that will be set aside. It is only if no decision-maker could have followed that path, and despite the reasons given by the actual decision-maker, that the decision will be found to have been made by reason of a jurisdictional error.  

    (Also see McKerracher J at [85]). 

25. The general issues that the Applicant raises about the Tribunal’s conclusions and findings are not such as to establish that the decision was one which no rational or logical decision maker could have arrived at on the same evidence.  As indicated, this Court does not have jurisdiction to review the merits of the Tribunal decision.

26. Insofar as the Applicant submitted that the Tribunal failed to consider the documents that he provided in support of his claims, there are circumstances in which a Tribunal may fall into error in failing to consider corroborative evidence, as discussed by Robertson J in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT and Another (2013) 212 FCR 99; [2013] FCA 317. However this is not such a case.

27. In this case the Tribunal considered the corroborative evidence provided by the Applicant, but for reasons which it gave, determined to give little weight to such evidence, in particular the medical report and the letter from the President of the Dharmanagar Youth Congress Committee.  It did not simply reject those documents outright as fraudulent, as the Applicant appeared to suggest.  Rather, the Tribunal weighed the corroborative evidence in light of its other findings and reached conclusions in that respect.  It is well-established that the weight to be accorded to evidence is a matter for the Tribunal.  It has not been established that the Tribunal erred in that regard.  Moreover, as pointed out by North and Lander JJ in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNSP and Another (2010) 184 FCR 485; [2010] FCAFC 50 at [37]:

    …the RRT does not act irrationally, and thereby fall into jurisdictional error, by first making an assessment of the applicant’s credit and then giving attention to the corroborative evidence.

28. This is not a case in which the Tribunal refused to consider potentially corroborative evidence.  Rather, the Tribunal was clearly of the opinion that the evidence was not of sufficient weight to allow a finding that the Applicant was a credible witness notwithstanding the inconsistencies in his evidence about which the Tribunal had expressed concern.  No jurisdictional error is established on this basis.

29. The Applicant submitted that he gave the Tribunal all the evidence but that it did not consider his evidence.  Insofar as this relates to corroborative evidence, such claim is not made out.  Insofar as it is contended that the Tribunal failed to consider “all of his points”, the Applicant appeared to be taking issue with the fact that in its reasons for decision the Tribunal did not refer to every element of his evidence or set out in full what he said at the hearing.  In particular, the applicant claimed that he had told the Tribunal that he unsuccessfully sought protection in Bangladesh and Thailand and that this was not considered.

30. There is no transcript of the Tribunal hearing in evidence before the Court.  It is not apparent on the material before the Court that the Tribunal failed to consider any integer of the Applicant’s claims to fear persecution.  The Tribunal is not obliged to refer in its reasons for decision to every item of the evidence before it.  It was aware of the Applicant’s claims that he travelled to Bangladesh and Thailand, to which it did refer.  It was also aware that in his original application he recorded that he made those trips “to visit”.  The relevance of those visits, from the Tribunal’s perspective, was the inconsistency of his evidence of travel to those countries in early 2011 with his evidence that he had been in hiding in various places in India from January 2011 before returning home.

31. Insofar as it is intended to be contended that the Tribunal failed to consider an integer of the Applicant’s claims raised orally at the Tribunal hearing, the Applicant has not identified any such asserted claim.  There is no evidence before the Court to establish that the Applicant did make some claim at the hearing to fear persecution or significant harm that was not considered by the Tribunal.

32. Ground one and the issues raised in relation to that ground do not establish jurisdictional error. 

33. Ground two is that the Tribunal “effectively misconstrued the political involvement in which [the Applicant] was persecuted by the ruling CPI(M)”.  As explained by the Applicant in oral submissions, rather than an allegation of a misunderstanding, this alleged “misconstruction” is a challenge to the conclusions of the Tribunal.  In that respect it seeks impermissible merits review.

34. As indicated, the fact that the Applicant disagrees with the Tribunal’s findings about his involvement in the Congress Party and his claims about what occurred in the past in India as well as his claimed fears about the future, is not of itself demonstrative of jurisdictional error.  Moreover there is nothing in the evidence before the Court to support any claim that the Tribunal misconstrued and in that sense misunderstood any integer of the Applicant’s claim such that it could be said that it failed to consider an integer of the Applicant’s claims.

1. Insofar as the Applicant appeared to contend that the Tribunal was obliged to accept his claims in the absence of some evidence obtained by the Tribunal in order to rebut his claims, it is for an Applicant to advance whatever evidence or argument he wishes to advance in support of his claims.  The Tribunal must then decide whether such claim is made out (Abebe v The Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510; [1999] HCA 14). The function of the Tribunal is to respond to the claim that the Applicant advances. The Tribunal is not required to consider a case that is not expressly made or does not arise clearly on the material before it. It was for the Applicant to put forward information and materials on which he relied to support his claims. Insofar as he did this, the Tribunal considered such claims. The Tribunal is not in the position of a contradictor. It is not required to accept uncritically any claims or allegations made by an Applicant. In particular, it is not required to accept a claim merely because positive evidence to the contrary is absent (see the summary of relevant authorities in SZATG v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 215 ALR 358; [2004] FCA 1595). Nor, insofar as this may be suggested, is the Tribunal bound under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to press an Applicant to call further evidence on an issue or to adjourn the hearing to enable him to do so or to seek out such evidence itself (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNVW and Another (2010) 183 FCR 575; [2010] FCAFC 41 per Keane CJ at [22]).

2. It is well-established that s.65 of the Migration Act requires the Tribunal to refuse the visa if not affirmatively satisfied that the criteria for the visa in question have been satisfied. It does not require the visa to be granted in the absence of an adverse finding.

3. Insofar as the Applicant suggested that the Tribunal was under an obligation to make inquiries, there are a number of difficulties that face such contention.  The circumstances in which a decision will be invalid for failure to inquire are limited.  The duty imposed on the Tribunal under the Act is a duty to review.  While, as pointed out by the majority judgment in the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 83 ALJR 1123; [2009] HCA 39 at [25], a failure to make an obvious inquiry about a critical fact the existence of which is easily ascertained could in some circumstances supply a sufficient link to the outcome to constitute a failure to review, it has not been established that these were such circumstances.

4. Contrary to the Applicant’s contention the Tribunal was not under an obligation to make inquiries as to whether or not the documents provided were originals.  The Tribunal made no adverse finding about whether his documents were originals. 

5. If this is a claim about whether the Applicant had the opportunity to put material before the Tribunal it is apparent from the Tribunal’s (admittedly brief) account of the hearing that the Applicant was given the opportunity to provide further evidence after the hearing.  He did not take that opportunity. 

6. As indicated, in circumstances where it is for an Applicant to establish his claims, it was not for the Tribunal to engage in an active investigation in India either as to the general political circumstances or as to the particular situation of the Applicant.  The contentions of the Applicant in this respect misunderstand the function and role of the Tribunal and do not establish jurisdictional error. 

7. It has not been established that there was a critical fact the existence of which was easily ascertained such as to give rise to a duty to inquire.  Nor is there any evidence to suggest that the Applicant asked or the Tribunal undertook to make any such inquiries.  Ground two and the associated claims do not establish jurisdictional error.

8. Ground three is that the Tribunal “failed to assess the political situation as to CPI(M)’s aggression towards Congress member to establish exclusive political supremacy in the State Tripura”.  However the Tribunal understood the claims that the Applicant made in this respect as summarised in its outline of his claims.  It rejected such claims for the reasons which it gave.  In these circumstances, having rejected the basis on which the Applicant made those claims, it was not necessary for the Tribunal to go on to consider in detail the political situation in the Applicant’s home state as between the CPI(M) and the Congress Party.  There was no obligation on the Tribunal to make inquiries about the political supremacy or aggression of the CPI(M) as contended by the Applicant, given the findings that it made.

9. Insofar as the Applicant appeared to suggest that the Tribunal erred in its “assessment” of the political situation, it is not clear whether the Applicant was taking issue with an aspect of the delegate’s decision or with what may or may not have been discussed at the Tribunal hearing.  There is no transcript of the Tribunal hearing in evidence before the Court.  In any event, the Tribunal did not engage in such assessment in its reasons.  There is nothing to establish that the Tribunal erred in failing to assess the political situation in the manner contended in ground three. 

10. Ground four is somewhat difficult to understand.  It is that the Tribunal “erred to differentiate the justice system in Federal and State arena to protect Citizens as to their political and cultural association”.  I asked the Applicant what part of the Tribunal decision was addressed under this ground.  He was not able to explain.  He took issue generally with the fact that the Tribunal had not accepted his claims for protection, as well as with particular aspects of its rejection of his claimed involvement in the Congress Party.  When I asked again what he meant by the ground, he repeated aspects of his claims and took issue with the merits of the Tribunal decision. 

11. Insofar as this ground takes issue with the factual conclusions drawn by the Tribunal with respect to the Applicant’s claims, the Applicant seeks impermissible merits review.  No jurisdictional error is established on this basis.

12. Ground five is that the Tribunal erred by not assessing the Applicant’s current situation as to his “right to life” and “Australia’s protection obligations under the Refugees Convention”.  If the Applicant intended to allege that the Tribunal did not consider his claim that he would be killed by the CPI(M) in India, such claim was clearly considered by the Tribunal.  The Tribunal rejected this claim for the reasons which it gave.  The Applicant’s factual disagreement with the conclusions reached by the Tribunal does not establish an error of law amounting to a jurisdictional error. 

13. Insofar as there is some suggestion that the Tribunal failed to consider Australia’s protection obligations under the Refugees Convention, contrary to any such suggestion the Tribunal clearly outlined and considered the Refugee Convention criterion and also considered the complementary protection criterion.  No jurisdictional error is established on this basis. 

14. The Applicant reiterated in this context his claim that the Tribunal did not accept his evidence.  That issue has been discussed above.  He also submitted that the Tribunal said that the political situation was “ok” in India.  He was not able to identify any part of the Tribunal decision in which such an approach was taken.  The Tribunal did not make such a finding.  Insofar as this concern relates to the delegate’s decision, that decision is not the subject of review in these proceedings.

15. At the conclusion of his primary submissions, the Applicant reiterated that in his view the Tribunal’s main mistake was that the Tribunal did not make inquiries and that the Tribunal did not itself get any evidence and undertake an investigation.  As indicated, such contentions are not indicative of jurisdictional error in the circumstances of this case.  The Applicant’s factual disagreement with the Tribunal’s conclusions does not give rise to jurisdictional error.  The suggestion that the Tribunal should have cross-checked the evidence that the Applicant provided echoes the claim that the Tribunal should have made inquiries.  However on the evidence before the Court no such duty arose.

16. Insofar as the Applicant appeared to contend that the Tribunal should have asked further questions of him in respect of his claims about what occurred in India, the only evidence of what occurred in the interview with the delegate and at the Tribunal hearing are the accounts in the delegate’s decision and the Tribunal’s decision.  There is nothing in those accounts to indicate that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error.  In particular, in the absence of a transcript, despite the very brief account of what occurred at the hearing it has not been established that the Tribunal failed to raise dispositive issues with the Applicant (SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs and Another (2006) 228 CLR 152; [2006] HCA 63). Beyond this, it is for an applicant to put claims and evidence before the Tribunal and in this case the Applicant had the opportunity to provide material to the Tribunal throughout the review, including after the hearing.

17. As discussed above, the Applicant took issue with the response of the Tribunal to his claims that he had unsuccessfully applied for protection in Bangladesh and Thailand.  There is no evidence to support any claims in this respect as to what occurred in the Tribunal hearing.  The Applicant’s general concerns do not suggest possible jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal in relation to consideration of the integers of the Applicant’s claims.

18. Having regard to the grounds in the application and the matters raised by the Applicant in oral submissions, it has not been established that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error.

19. Finally, insofar as the Applicant asked the Court to grant him a protection visa, as I indicated to him the Court does not have power to do this.  He appeared to raise humanitarian issues or issues about changed or further circumstances in India.  These may be matters that he can raise with the Minister for Immigration but they are not matters which go to show jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.  As no jurisdictional error has been established, the application must be dismissed with costs. 

I certify that the preceding fifty-three (53) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Barnes

Associate: 

Date:  22 April 2014