SZRTP v Minister for Immigration & Anor (No.2)
[2013] FCCA 711
•17 July 2013
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZRTP v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR (No.2) | [2013] FCCA 711 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application by the respondent Minister for costs following dismissal of substantive application – whether the Schedule to the Rules is a guide – costs order made in the sum sought. |
| Legislation: Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), rr.21.02, 21.10, 44.15 and Sch.1 |
| SZRTP v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2013] FCCA 449 Noble v Baldwin & Anor (No 2) [2011] FMCA 700 DZAAY, DZABD, DZABH and DZABJ v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2012] FMCA 744 Oshlack v Richmond River Council [1998] HCA 11; 193 CLR 72; 152 ALR 83; 72 ALJR 578 FMCA 744 Latoudis v Casey [1990] HCA 59; (1990) 170 CLR 534 SZQDZ v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 26 |
| Applicant: | SZRTP |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
| Second Respondent: | J BARTLETT, IN HER CAPACITY AS INDEPENDENT PROTECTION ASSESSMENT REVIEWER |
| File Number: | SYG 1920 of 2012 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Nicholls |
| Date of Last Submission: | 19 June 2013 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 17 July 2013 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr P Afshar |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Allens Linklaters |
| Appearing for the Respondents: | Mr O Jones |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Clayton Utz |
ORDERS
The name of the first respondent is amended to ‘Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship’.
The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs set in the amount of $13,750.00.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 1920 of 2012
| SZRTP |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
First Respondent
| J BARTLETT, IN HER CAPACITY AS INDEPENDENT PROTECTION ASSESSMENT REVIEWER |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Previously, the applicant sought review of the recommendation of Ms J Bartlett, in her capacity as Independent Protection Assessment Reviewer, to the respondent Minister that the applicant not be recognised as a person to whom Australia had protection obligations. On 5 June 2013, this Court made an order dismissing that application as ultimately amended (see SZRTP v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2013] FCCA 449 (“SZRTP”)). As the successful party, the Minister sought an order as to costs. He sought a sum fixed in the amount of $14,500.00. The Minister relied on the affidavit of Oliver Richard Jones, made on 4 June 2013, in support of that order.
At that time, it was unclear whether the applicant opposed the making of a costs order. However, what was clear was that the applicant objected to the amount sought. Leave was granted to both parties to file written submissions on the issue of costs. They did so. (The applicant continued to be represented by counsel in this regard.)
It is now clear that the applicant does not oppose the making of a costs order in favour of the Minister. As he says, the “real question before the Court now is the quantum of costs, and whether the Minister is entitled to the amount of costs that he seeks” ([4] of the applicant’s written submissions).
The applicant’s position is that he opposes the making of a cost order for an amount other than that set out in Pt.3 of Sch.1 to the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (“the Rules”) ([3] of the applicant’s written submissions). That is, an amount set at $6,646.00.
Both parties agree, at least, that this Court has discretion in the award of costs (s.79(3) of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act1999 (Cth) (“the FCC Act”), [5] of the applicant’s written submissions and [5] of the first respondent’s written submissions).
However, the parties appear to differ as to how that discretion is to be exercised. The Minister says the discretion is “unfettered”, but it must be “exercised judicially and in the context of the relevant Court rules” ([5] of the respondent’s written submissions and with reference to Noble v Baldwin & Anor (No.2) [2011] FMCA 700 (“Noble v Baldwin”) at [9] per Judge Barnes).
The applicant takes the view that ([9] of the applicant’s written submissions):
“notwithstanding the Court’s discretion in setting the quantum of costs payable in cases concerning general federal law, costs orders should be made in line with the usual orders made in refugee matters”.
I understood this submission to emanate from a reliance on the principle of “comity” in the Court’s approach to migration cases. For this proposition the applicant relies on DZAAY, DZABD, DZABH and DZABJ v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2012] FMCA 744 (“DZAAY”) at [25] – [26], [28] – [29], [33] – [38] and [40] per Judge Brown. The applicant then refers the Court to Pt.3 of Sch.1 to the Rules to arrive at the amount of $6,646.00.
Consideration
The starting point in this consideration is to note s.79(2) and (3) of the FCC Act. It is s.79 of the Act that gives the Court jurisdiction to make costs orders. Relevantly, s.79 provides:
“79 Costs
…
(2) The Federal Circuit Court of Australia or a Judge has jurisdiction to award costs in all proceedings before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (including proceedings dismissed for want of jurisdiction) other than proceedings in respect of which any other Act provides that costs must not be awarded.
(3) Except as provided by the Rules of Court or any other Act, the award of costs is in the discretion of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia or Judge.”
The jurisdiction conferred by s.79 is, as the Minister submits and with reference to Noble v Baldwin at [9] per Judge Barnes ([5] of the respondent’s written submissions):
“… an unfettered discretion … to award costs, provided such discretion is exercised judicially and in the context of the relevant court rules…”
[Footnotes omitted.]
Further, noting the reference in Noble v Baldwin to Oshlack v Richmond River Council [1998] HCA 11; 193 CLR 72; 152 ALR 83; 72 ALJR 578 (“Oshlack”), and the reference in Oschlack to Latoudis v Casey [1990] HCA 59; (1990) 170 CLR 534 (“Latoudis v Casey”), I have had regard to what McHugh J found in Oschlack (at [65]):
“Although the statutory discretion is broadly stated, it is not unqualified. It clearly cannot be exercised capriciously. Importantly, the discretion must be exercised judicially in accordance with established principle and factors directly connected with the litigation. In this manner, the law has gradually developed principles to guide the proper exercise of the discretion and, in some cases, to highlight extraneous considerations which, if taken into account, will cause the exercise of the discretion to miscarry. Consistent with the aim of justice, the law could not have developed otherwise. As Mason CJ said in Latoudis:
‘it does not follow that any attempt to formulate a principle or a guideline according to which the discretion should be exercised would constitute a fetter upon the discretion not intended by the legislature. Indeed, a refusal to formulate a principle or guideline can only lead to exercises of discretion which are seen to be inconsistent, a result which would not have been contemplated by the legislature with any degree of equanimity.’”
[Footnotes omitted.]
In particular, I relevantly, and respectfully, draw from Oshlack that the statutory discretion relevant in these proceedings (s.79 of the Act) cannot be exercised capriciously. Rather, the exercise of the discretion should be made in the context of the principles and guidelines formulated for this purpose. That is, as Judge Barnes noted in Noble v Baldwin, and with whom I respectfully agree, to exercise the discretion “in the context of the relevant Court rules” means to be guided by the Rules and to act judicially. Having regard to such “principles and guidelines” does not constitute a fetter on the discretion in s.79 of the Act.
The “relevant Court rules” on the issue of costs are set out in Pt.21 of the Court’s Rules (see further below in relation to r.44.15). They are, relevantly, as follows.
1)Rule 21.02(1) and (2):
“21.02 Order for costs
(1) An application for an order for costs may be made:
(a) at any stage in a proceeding; or
(b) within 28 days after a final decree or order is made; or
(c) within any further time allowed by the Court.
(2) In making an order for costs in a proceeding, the Court may:
(a) set the amount of the costs; or
(b) set the method by which the costs are to be calculated; or
(c) refer the costs for taxation under Part 40 of the Federal Court Rules or under Chapter 19 of the Family Law Rules; or
(d) set a time for payment of the costs, which may be before the proceeding is concluded.”
2)Rule 21.10:
“Costs and disbursements
Unless the Court otherwise orders, a party entitled to costs in a proceeding (other than a proceeding to which the Bankruptcy Act applies) is entitled to:
(a) costs in accordance with Parts 1 and 2 of Schedule 1; and
(b) disbursements properly incurred.
Note: For costs in a proceeding to which the Bankruptcy Act 1966 applies, see Part 13 of the Federal Circuit Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2006”
Further, I note that in Pt.44 of the Rules, dealing with “Proceedings under the Migration Act 1958”, r.44.15 addresses the matter of costs. Relevantly, r.44.15 provides that:
“Costs
(1) The Court may, in relation to a proceeding that is concluded, order that an unsuccessful party in the proceeding must pay the costs of a successful party in accordance with Division 1 of Part 3 of Schedule 1.
(2) Unless the Court otherwise orders, an applicant who files a notice of discontinuance of an application for an order to show cause is liable to pay a respondent's costs in accordance with Division 2 of Part 3 of Schedule 1.”
It is the applicant’s contention that this matter is not “under the Migration Act 1958” as it is not in relation to a “migration decision” (with reference to s.5(1) of the Act, which provides that a “‘migration decision’ means: (a) privative clause decision; or (b) a purported privative clause decision; or (c) a non-privative clause decision”) ([8] of the applicant’s written submissions). In support of this proposition the applicant also referred to DZAAY at [21] – [22]).
A difficulty for the applicant in this argument is that his application to the Court, and even as amended, was expressed to be an application for “…a remedy…granted in exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction under section 476 of the Migration Act 1958 in respect of a migration decision…”. This would tend to support the Minister’s position regarding the relevant application of the different parts of the Rules.
However, as was set out in DZAAY (at [21] – [22]) and noting the subsequent Full Federal Court judgment in SZQDZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 26 (at [31] – [45] per Keane CJ, Rares and Perram JJ), there is a strong argument in support of the proposition that Pt.21 of the Rules, not Pt.44, applies in these circumstances. The Minister’s submissions did not address this point.
In SZQDZ the Court found that the reviewer’s assessment and recommendation was not a “migration decision…because it was not a ‘decision’ for the purposes of the Act at all” ([31] of SZQDZ). The current case involved a similar assessment and recommendation in relation to a person who arrived in Australia by boat and sought asylum.
In light of SZQDZ, I accept that the relevant part of the Rules which should guide the Court in the current case is Pt.22, and in particular, r.21.02 and r.21.10 of the Rules.
In my view, r.21.02(1) and (2) of the Rules are reflective of, and emphasise, the Court’s unfettered discretion to make an order for costs. The focus of r.21.02 is on the Court’s discretion to award costs (r.21.02(1)) and to “set the amount of costs” (r.21.02(2)(a)).
At r.21.10, in my view, the focus is on the entitlement of a successful party to a quantum of costs (as set out in Pt.1 and Pt.2 of Sch.1 to the Rules). In that regard, the emphasis in r.21.10 is not on the Court’s direction, but rather on the “entitled” party to the proceedings.
It is here that one of the “principles”, or practices (as referred to in Oshlack), comes into play. That is, that a party successful in litigation should be able to recover some of the legal costs incurred in the proceedings. Rule 21.10 seeks to set the amount to which a party to a proceeding is entitled to recover in this Court (other than under the Federal Circuit Court (Bankruptcy) Rule 2006 (Cth)). That is, in accordance with what is set out at Pt.1 and Pt.2 of Sch.1 of the Rules.
However, the difficulty then arises that, despite referring the Court to Pt.21 of the Rules and relying on the relevant rules set out in that part, the applicant has sought an award of $6,646.00. That is, a sum provided for by Pt.3 of Sch.1, which clearly relates to r.44.15 of the Rules and “Proceedings under the Migration Act”. The applicant did not satisfactorily explain his approach, or reasoning, in this regard (see further below).
As best as I understood it, the applicant’s argument was that the principles of “comity” and “public policy” meant that costs should be awarded in “these kind of cases” as would be awarded in “other refugee cases”. That is, that although the applicant argued that this case was not in relation to a migration decision, that public policy concerns and the principle of comity, meant that the award of costs should be the same as in cases which did relate to migration decisions. That is, that Pt.3 of Sch.1 applied, despite the fact that the rules set out in Pt.21 of the Rules, not Pt.44, were applicable.
I note that, in written submissions in support of this approach, the applicant referred to, and relied on, DZAAY. In particular, [25] – [26], [28] – [29], [33] – [38] and [40] of that judgment. However, the reasoning in that case is not wholly supportive of the approach, seemingly, advanced by the applicant now.
DZAAY, as did this case, concerned applicants who were “offshore” arrivals. In those circumstances, Judge Brown held that the “applicable Rules of Court are set out in part 21” of the Rules ([23] of DZAAY). That is, he found that the proceedings were not under the Migration Act, but rather that they were “general federal law proceedings” ([27] of DZAAY). In light of the Full Federal Court’s judgment in SZQDZ, I respectfully agree with that proposition.
His Honour then went on to state that “Rule 21.10 creates a scale of costs by reference to the occurrence of fixed events”. His Honour was of the view that the scale “was designed to help achieve” the objects of the Court as set out in s.3(2) of the Federal Magistrates Act 2001 (Cth) (as it then was) and that, in light of that, regard should be had to the scale ([25] – [26] of DZAAY) .
His Honour went on to find that the ([27] of DZAAY):
“…fee allowable at the relevant time for these proceedings, in respect of a general federal law matter for opposing an application up to the completion of the first court day was fixed in the sum of $3,123.00.”
However, when regard is had to the Rules at the relevant time the approach adopted in DZAAY requires, with respect, greater scrutiny. The relevant rules are the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (as they then were) as at 13 December 2011 (when the costs order was made in DZAAY).
First, the proceedings in DZAAY were not in relation to a migration decision. Rather, his Honour found that the proceedings were “general federal law proceedings”. In light of that, the relevant part of the schedule to the Rules, was Pt.1 of Sch.1. In particular, the “general federal law amount” set out in Pt.1 of Sch.1.
At the relevant time, Pt.1 of Sch.1 provided that the “general federal law amount” applicable to “Initiating or opposing application up to completion of first Court day” (referred to in the schedule as “stage 1”) was $1,500.00 “plus: Court attendance”, which attracted a “Daily hearing fee”.
Part 1 of Sch.1 also provided that, for “Initiating or opposing application which includes interim orders (other than procedural orders) up to completion of first court day” (referred to in the schedule as “stage 1A”), a “lump sum” of $3,128.00 was applicable, “plus” a “Daily hearing fee”.
The relevant daily hearing fees, set out in Pt.1 of Sch.1 were:
“Daily hearing fee
Short mention … $255.00
Half-day hearing … $936.00
Full-day hearing … $1 873.00”
It is not clear from DZAAY which, if either, of these “stages” of Pt.1 his Honour had regard to. His Honour’s reasoning refers to the “fee allowable….for opposing an application up to the completion of the first court day”. That language is most in line with the language used in “stage 1” of Pt.1 of the schedule. However, if regard is had to “stage 1”, a sum of $3,123 cannot be arrived at (regardless of which “Daily hearing fee” is used). Similarly, a sum of $3,123 cannot be arrived at when regard is had to “stage 1A” of Pt.1 of Sch.1.
I note that, at the time of making his orders, Pt.2 of Sch.1 related to “Migration Proceedings” (that is, the equivalent of Pt.3 of Sch.1 in the Court’s current Rules). That part of the Schedule provided, at the relevant time, that “if the proceeding is concluded after the first court date for the proceeding and at or before the hearing under rule 44.12 or other interlocutory hearing” the sum of $3,123 was the applicable sum of costs. That is, the sum relevantly ordered in DZAAY.
In light of the above, it would appear that, while DZAAY referred to the matter being a “general federal law” matter, the costs order in that case was made with reference to that part of Sch.1 applicable to “Migration Proceedings”. The applicant has submitted that the approach adopted in DZAAY was on the basis of the principle of “comity” and public policy considerations. Further, the applicant has urged that the same approach be adopted in the current case
The public policy elements advanced in DZAAY appear to be based on the Minister’s capacity to recover costs from unsuccessful applicants and the public purse (dealt with elsewhere in this judgment) and the requirement that matters proceed “expeditiously” (DZAAY at [37]).
What is immediately apparent is that, as explained in the judgment to which this costs application relates (SZRTP) the applicant did not proceed expeditiously in the prosecution of his case. It is inappropriate in these circumstances that he should avoid paying an appropriate proportion of the Minister’s actual costs where his own conduct has increased the amount of those costs.
Further, I note that, one of the public policy reasons advanced in DZAAY was “the reality of these cases is that the Minister is unlikely to ever recoup these costs” ([39] of DZAAY). With respect, I cannot agree that that is a relevant consideration. In any event, that proposition makes assumptions about the “indigent” circumstances of the applicants concerned. With respect, the Court is in no position to make such assumptions without evidence. I certainly make no such assumption in the current proceedings in the absence of relevant evidence about the applicant.
In my view, none of these “public policy” considerations argue why Pt.3 of Sch.1, not Pt.1 of Sch.1, should apply in the current case. While they may be arguments advanced in favour of adopting a “fixed event costs” schedule, they are not arguments in support of whether a general federal law or a migration proceedings schedule should apply in the current case.
The only argument that I can see advanced in relation to that is the matter of “comity” which, for the reasons set out below, I do not accept.
In my respectful view, the matter of “comity” appears in DZAAY to be based on an assumption that in all cases in this cohort (involving refugee applicants) there is “a practice which is consistent with what occurs when the Minister is successful on judicial review” (DZAAY at [41]). That practice would (in light of what is set out above) appear to be the fixed scale amount set out in that part of the schedule relating to migration proceedings (Pt.2 of Sch.1 in DZAAY, which is the equivalent of Pt.3 of Sch.1 in the current Rules).
I respectfully do not agree with that assumption, to the extent that it relies on what is said to be what occurs in matters where the Minister is successful. I take the view that what occurs in such circumstances is dependent on, and derives from, the circumstances in the individual case. That is the “scale amount” is a matter for regard in that context.
I note that, like the applicant, the Minister referred the Court to Pt.3 of Sch.1 (that part relating to “Migration Proceedings”). However, unlike the applicant, the Minister’s position was that that part of the Schedule provided a useful guide, and that it was one of a “suite” of considerations for a Court in determining the sum of a cost order. That is, that the Court’s power is not “fettered” by the Rules and that, in the exercise of its discretion, the Court should have regard to the actual circumstances of the case. I agree.
Putting to one side, the unsatisfactory explanation as to why regard should be had to the part of the schedule relevant to Migration proceedings (Pt.3 of Sch.1), in any event, I do not accept that the Schedule (regardless of which part of the Schedule) is to be rigidly applied. In particular, I do not, respectfully, comprehend the reference in DZAAY (at [28]) to “fixed scale costs” to require that the Court rigidly apply what is set out in the Rules of the Court (relevantly, Sch.1 to the Rules). Nor, as was accepted by both parties, does the existence of such scales mean that the Court does not retain a discretion.
I take the view that the items set out in the relevant Schedule to the Rules are a guide to what may be generally considered to be reasonable in matters of this type. However, while the Schedule seeks to accommodate a number of scenarios (for example, a half day hearing or a full day hearing) it cannot be taken to cover the diversity and vagaries of each case in the relevant cohort of cases. The Court’s discretion should be exercised with reference to the actual circumstances presented in each case.
In my view, the Schedule sets out a guide as to what may be reasonable for the Court to have regard to as a touchstone (a “reality check” if you like) to its consideration. However, the Court’s consideration cannot ignore the circumstances of each individual case.
For matters where the respondent has been successful, regard should be had not necessarily to the “legal” work actually done, but the “legal” work properly and reasonably done to respond to the application made and to which, as in this case, the Minister was called upon to respond. Similarly, for successful applicants in matters of this type, in my view, regard should be had to the work properly and reasonably done in successfully prosecuting the application.
In this light, I have regard to the affidavit of Mr Jones and what is apparent from the material placed on the Court’s file.
In his submissions the applicant has not addressed the “alternative” position. That is, should the Court not accept his assertion that $6,646.00 is the appropriate amount to award as costs. This, in essence, leaves the Minister’s evidence, and his submissions relevant to this, “unchallenged” by the applicant.
In this light, I agree with the Minister that the amount sought ($14,500) is a reasonable amount, except for what immediately follows.
I note the Minister’s submissions in relation to [248] of the judgment (see [8] – [12] of the first respondent’s written submissions). That paragraph of SZRTP speaks for itself. While it is the case, as the Minister submits now, that additional written submissions were required because of the factors he refers to at [11] of his written submissions, what still remains is that, at least in part, those submissions were also required because of the omission of relevant material in the Court Book.
I agree with the Minister that the routine inclusion of large volumes of country information in the relevant Court Books in cases of this type is not necessary. However, that does not mean that no regard should be had by the Minister’s solicitors to that country information in compiling the Court Book. An assessment needs to be made as to what is relevant, in light of the grounds and arguments raised by the applicant.
In the current matter, even though the applicant’s case “evolved” over a number of iterations of his application and his arguments before the Court, it was tolerably clear from his application, as first drafted, that the matter of the geographical relationship between “Sange Shanda” and “Sange Masha” was an issue raised by the applicant (see the application of 5 September 2012 at ground one, particular (c) and ground two, particular (b)). A similar view can be taken in relation to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees report as was relevant to the population matter (see ground two, particular (c) of the application of 5 September 2012).
In all, the omission of these documents from the Court Book did necessitate, in part, additional work by the applicant. I am of the view that, in light of this, an amount of $750 should be deducted from the amount sought by the Minister. The Minister’s evidence was not clear as to actual amounts apportioned to each of the items of work done by his solicitors. However, based on what generally has been put forward in Mr Jones’ affidavit, and taking into account the fact that additional written submissions were only required in part because of the omission of the documents, I am of the view that $750 is a reasonable amount to deduct in light of the “omission”.
As for the remainder, the applicant is entitled, within the bounds of the relevant legal context and reasonableness, to manage the prosecution of his case in a manner of his choosing. In the current case, the applicant, with legal advice and representation, made various elections as to the conduct of his case. He cannot now complain where, as a result of his choices and conduct, the Minister was put to additional tasks to properly respond to the application he made. That must be said in light of the various iterations of his application, noting that his argument continued to “evolve” even during the course of the hearing.
It is in this light that the Minister’s application for costs, and relevantly the amount of the costs order he seeks, is to be understood. Having regard to the evidence before the Court and given the work required of the Minister’s legal representatives to properly respond to the application, I am of the view that $13,750 is a reasonable amount.
It is interesting, and coincidental, to note that had the applicant followed the “correct” path from Pt.21 (which he asserts is the relevant part of the Rules) to Sch.1, Pt.1 (and not Pt.3), he may have sought to approach this question of costs differently.
Regard to Pt.1 of Sch.1 reveals that, as against each of the individual items set out there, the Minister, if he had sought to rely on that part of the Schedule, would have contended for an amount to a level not far below the level for which he now contends (noting that, in his evidence, there is no actual amount, for example, for disbursements to which he is otherwise entitled).
That calculation may have been:
| Item and Description | Amount for a general federal law proceeding (including GST) |
| (1) “Initiating or opposing an application up to the completion of the first court date” | “Both: (a) $2,663.00; and (b) the daily hearing fee mentioned in item 13 that applied to the hearing.” |
| (6) “Preparation for final hearing – one day matter” | $5,988.00 |
| (9) “Final hearing costs for attendance of solicitor at hearing to take judgment and explain orders” | “Both: (a) $271.00; and (b) the daily hearing fee mentioned in item 13 that applies to the hearing.” |
| (12) “Advocacy loading” | “50% of the daily hearing fee mentioned in item 13 that applies to the hearing.” |
| (13) “Daily hearing fee” | “Either: (a) for a short mention - $271.00; or (b) for a half day hearing - $997.00; or (c) for a full day hearing - $1,994.00” |
TOTAL: | $10,688.50 |
| (14) “Disbursements – Court fees and other fees and payments to the extent that they have been reasonably incurred” | [Not claimed by the respondent Minister.] |
The “difference” between $10,688.50 (from the “scale”) and $13,750 (which I regard as reasonable in the circumstance) can be explained with reference to the “additions” to the “scale amount” of an amount for disbursements and an “additional” amount equivalent to the work done above what is contemplated in the Schedule commensurate with the manner in which the applicant chose to conduct his case.
It is appropriate that a costs order be made. The order should be made in the amount sought by the Minister, less $750. I will make that order set in the amount of $13,750.
I certify that the preceding sixty-two (62) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Nicholls
Associate:
Date: 17 July 2013
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