SZRTN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZRTN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1156

Citation: SZRTN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1156
Appeal from: SZRTN v Minister for Immigration [2013] FCCA 583
Parties: SZRTN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 1166 of 2013
Judge: FOSTER J
Date of judgment: 6 November 2013
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5(1), 36 and 91R(1)
Cases cited: SZRTN v Minister for Immigration [2013] FCCA 583 related
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 applied
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB (2013) 210 FCR 505 applied
Date of hearing: 4 November 2013
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 70

Counsel for the Appellant:

The Appellant appeared in person

Counsel for the First Respondent:

Mr P Knowles

Solicitor for the First Respondent:

DLA Piper Australia

Solicitor for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted save as to costs

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1166 of 2013

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZRTN
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE OF ORDER:

6 NOVEMBER 2013

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the first respondent be changed from “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship” to “Minister for Immigration and Border Protection”.

2.The appeal be dismissed.

3.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal.   

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1166 of 2013

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZRTN
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE:

6 NOVEMBER 2013

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. By Notice of Appeal filed on 24 June 2013, the appellant appealed from a decision of a Judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia delivered on 21 June 2013 (SZRTN v Minister for Immigration [2013] FCCA 583) whereby the learned Circuit judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) dated 13 August 2012. 

    BACKGROUND

  2. The appellant is a citizen of Samoa who was born in Vaimoso on 25 October 1981.  In 1983, he and his family moved to New Zealand.  Subsequently, his parents separated.  On 17 April 1987, the appellant’s father brought him to Australia and left him to be raised by his uncle and aunt who, at the time, lived in a suburb of Sydney.  The appellant was thereafter raised by his uncle and aunt in Sydney, his father having abandoned him and returned to New Zealand.  The appellant came to Australia on a one-month visitor’s visa which expired…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 1156
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SZRTN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved an appeal against a decision by the Tribunal affirming the delegate's decision to deny the appellant a protection visa. The appellant, who was detained at the Villawood Detention Centre and illiterate, argued that he faced a real risk of significant harm if returned to Samoa, including discrimination in employment and access to essential services. The Tribunal had considered these claims but found that the appellant did not meet the criteria for a protection visa under the Migration Act. The appellant appealed the decision, arguing that the Tribunal incorrectly applied the standard of "substantial grounds for believing" and that it had not afforded him procedural fairness by considering discrimination as a form of "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment."

The legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal applied the correct standard of proof under section 36(2)(aa) of the Act and whether the Tribunal afforded the appellant procedural fairness by considering discrimination as an element of "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment." The court needed to determine if the Tribunal's findings were legally sound and whether there was any procedural irregularity that warranted a different outcome. The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection defended the Tribunal's decision, arguing that it correctly interpreted the statutory provisions and that there was no procedural error.

In dismissing the appeal, the court found that the Tribunal correctly applied the standard of "substantial grounds for believing" under section 36(2)(aa) of the Act and did not err in considering discrimination as a potential element of "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment." The court concluded that the Tribunal's findings were supported by the evidence and that there was no procedural unfairness. The court also noted that the appellant's prospects of success in the appeal were very weak and that denying the adjournment request was appropriate given the circumstances. As a result, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The name of the first respondent be changed from “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship” to “Minister for Immigration and Border Protection”.

2. The appeal be dismissed.

3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 11 July 2012, the appellant lodged an Application for Review of the delegate’s decision in the Tribunal.THE DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL By a decision dated 13 August 2012, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant a protection visa to the appellant. At [5]–[15] of its Decision Record, the Tribunal addressed the criterion laid down in the Act for a protection visa (as to which see s 36(2)(a)). At [16]–[18], the Tribunal described the complementary protection criterion provided for in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. At those paragraphs, the Tribunal said:16.If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of a protection visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia to whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s.36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’).17.‘Significant harm’ for these purposes is exhaustively defined in s.36(2A): s.5(1). A person will suffer significant harm if he or she will be arbitrarily deprived of their life, or the death penalty will be carried out on the person; or the person will be subjected to torture; or to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or to degrading treatment or punishment. ‘Cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment’, ‘degrading treatment or punishment’, and ‘torture’, are further defined in s.5(1) of the Act. 18.There are certain circumstances in which there is taken not to be a real risk that an applicant will suffer significant harm in a country. These arise where it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm; where the applicant could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm; or where the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the applicant personally: s.36(2B) of the Act. At [19]–[48], the Tribunal summarised the appellant’s claims. In particular, at [28]–[29], the Tribunal recorded the fact that the appellant’s representative had submitted that, should the appellant be found not to satisfy the definition of a refugee, there were substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of his removal from Australia, there was a real risk that he would suffer significant harm within the meaning of s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. It was submitted that this would occur because the appellant would be subjected to severe discrimination in employment and in accessing essential services such as health care and education with the consequence that his ability to subsist would be threatened. It was said that these consequences were appropriately characterised as constituting “cruel or inhuman treatment” or “degrading treatment” sufficient to engage Australia’s complementary protection obligations.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In his submissions to the Court at the hearing of the appeal, the Minister helpfully and accurately teased out the essence of the grounds of appeal relied upon by the appellant when he submitted that those grounds reflected the following complaints:(a)The Court below erred by finding that the Tribunal applied the correct test under s.36(2)(aa) of the Act. Specifically, it is claimed the Tribunal in considering the “substantial grounds for believing” in s.36(2)(aa) should have, but did not, apply a standard of “something less than the balance of probabilities” – cf. ground 2(c) of the Further Amended Application in the Court below (AB33).(b)The Court below erred by failing to find that the Tribunal failed to afford the Appellant procedural fairness by erroneously considering that discrimination was a element of “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment” in assessing whether the Appellant would face a real risk of significant harm if returned to Samoa – cf. Ground 1 of the Further Amended Application in the Court below (AB 33). CONSIDERATION The appellant is in detention at the Villawood Detention Centre. He attended the hearing of the appeal, having been brought to Court by security personnel from that facility. As I have already mentioned at [12] and [20] above, the appellant is illiterate. He cannot read or write. At the commencement of the hearing of his appeal, the appellant sought an adjournment. In support of that application, he presented a document dated 4 November 2013 and signed by him. It was entitled “Application for Adjournment”. I shall mark that document as Exhibit A in the appeal. The appellant sought an adjournment for the following reasons:(a)He said that he needed a legal representative to represent him and to prosecute his case because he was unable to do so, being uneducated and illiterate;(b)He said that he was unable to obtain any Legal Aid;(c)He said that he needed financial assistance in order to retain an appropriate lawyer. He needed time in order to secure the services of such a lawyer;(d)He said that his wife had just moved house and had given birth to their first daughter on 22 October 2013; and(e)He said that he had run out of funds and needed time to secure funds to retain an appropriate lawyer. The appellant also requested that I appoint a lawyer to represent him pro bono. While I had (and have) a great deal of sympathy for the appellant’s predicament, I refused the adjournment sought by him and informed him that I would give reasons for that refusal when delivering judgment in the appeal. My reasons for refusing the appellant’s application for adjournment may be briefly stated. First, his prospects in the appeal were considered by me to be very weak. Second, there was no guarantee that the appellant would secure appropriate legal representation any time soon (especially given his lack of funds). It appeared that his application for legal aid had been refused. Third, the appeal was fixed for hearing on 23 August 2013. That is now two and a half months ago. On 1 October 2013, the appellant requested that the hearing be vacated. On that occasion, I refused to vacate the hearing. In the circumstances, the appellant was on clear notice from 23 August 2013 (or 1 October 2013 at the latest) that the appeal would be going on.