FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZRTN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1156
Citation: SZRTN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1156 Appeal from: SZRTN v Minister for Immigration [2013] FCCA 583 Parties: SZRTN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL File number: NSD 1166 of 2013 Judge: FOSTER J Date of judgment: 6 November 2013 Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5(1), 36 and 91R(1) Cases cited: SZRTN v Minister for Immigration [2013] FCCA 583 related
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 applied
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB (2013) 210 FCR 505 appliedDate of hearing: 4 November 2013 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 70 Counsel for the Appellant:
The Appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent:
Mr P Knowles
Solicitor for the First Respondent:
DLA Piper Australia
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted save as to costs
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1166 of 2013
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: SZRTN
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
FOSTER J
DATE OF ORDER:
6 NOVEMBER 2013
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the first respondent be changed from “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship” to “Minister for Immigration and Border Protection”.
2.The appeal be dismissed.
3.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1166 of 2013
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: SZRTN
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
FOSTER J
DATE:
6 NOVEMBER 2013
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
By Notice of Appeal filed on 24 June 2013, the appellant appealed from a decision of a Judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia delivered on 21 June 2013 (SZRTN v Minister for Immigration [2013] FCCA 583) whereby the learned Circuit judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) dated 13 August 2012.
BACKGROUND
The appellant is a citizen of Samoa who was born in Vaimoso on 25 October 1981. In 1983, he and his family moved to New Zealand. Subsequently, his parents separated. On 17 April 1987, the appellant’s father brought him to Australia and left him to be raised by his uncle and aunt who, at the time, lived in a suburb of Sydney. The appellant was thereafter raised by his uncle and aunt in Sydney, his father having abandoned him and returned to New Zealand. The appellant came to Australia on a one-month visitor’s visa which expired…
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- Case
- [2013] FCA 1156
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal applied the correct standard of proof under section 36(2)(aa) of the Act and whether the Tribunal afforded the appellant procedural fairness by considering discrimination as an element of "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment." The court needed to determine if the Tribunal's findings were legally sound and whether there was any procedural irregularity that warranted a different outcome. The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection defended the Tribunal's decision, arguing that it correctly interpreted the statutory provisions and that there was no procedural error.
In dismissing the appeal, the court found that the Tribunal correctly applied the standard of "substantial grounds for believing" under section 36(2)(aa) of the Act and did not err in considering discrimination as a potential element of "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment." The court concluded that the Tribunal's findings were supported by the evidence and that there was no procedural unfairness. The court also noted that the appellant's prospects of success in the appeal were very weak and that denying the adjournment request was appropriate given the circumstances. As a result, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The name of the first respondent be changed from “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship” to “Minister for Immigration and Border Protection”.
2. The appeal be dismissed.
3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In his submissions to the Court at the hearing of the appeal, the Minister helpfully and accurately teased out the essence of the grounds of appeal relied upon by the appellant when he submitted that those grounds reflected the following complaints:(a)The Court below erred by finding that the Tribunal applied the correct test under s.36(2)(aa) of the Act. Specifically, it is claimed the Tribunal in considering the “substantial grounds for believing” in s.36(2)(aa) should have, but did not, apply a standard of “something less than the balance of probabilities” – cf. ground 2(c) of the Further Amended Application in the Court below (AB33).(b)The Court below erred by failing to find that the Tribunal failed to afford the Appellant procedural fairness by erroneously considering that discrimination was a element of “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment” in assessing whether the Appellant would face a real risk of significant harm if returned to Samoa – cf. Ground 1 of the Further Amended Application in the Court below (AB 33). CONSIDERATION The appellant is in detention at the Villawood Detention Centre. He attended the hearing of the appeal, having been brought to Court by security personnel from that facility. As I have already mentioned at [12] and [20] above, the appellant is illiterate. He cannot read or write. At the commencement of the hearing of his appeal, the appellant sought an adjournment. In support of that application, he presented a document dated 4 November 2013 and signed by him. It was entitled “Application for Adjournment”. I shall mark that document as Exhibit A in the appeal. The appellant sought an adjournment for the following reasons:(a)He said that he needed a legal representative to represent him and to prosecute his case because he was unable to do so, being uneducated and illiterate;(b)He said that he was unable to obtain any Legal Aid;(c)He said that he needed financial assistance in order to retain an appropriate lawyer. He needed time in order to secure the services of such a lawyer;(d)He said that his wife had just moved house and had given birth to their first daughter on 22 October 2013; and(e)He said that he had run out of funds and needed time to secure funds to retain an appropriate lawyer. The appellant also requested that I appoint a lawyer to represent him pro bono. While I had (and have) a great deal of sympathy for the appellant’s predicament, I refused the adjournment sought by him and informed him that I would give reasons for that refusal when delivering judgment in the appeal. My reasons for refusing the appellant’s application for adjournment may be briefly stated. First, his prospects in the appeal were considered by me to be very weak. Second, there was no guarantee that the appellant would secure appropriate legal representation any time soon (especially given his lack of funds). It appeared that his application for legal aid had been refused. Third, the appeal was fixed for hearing on 23 August 2013. That is now two and a half months ago. On 1 October 2013, the appellant requested that the hearing be vacated. On that occasion, I refused to vacate the hearing. In the circumstances, the appellant was on clear notice from 23 August 2013 (or 1 October 2013 at the latest) that the appeal would be going on.