FOD17 v Minister for Immigration
[2018] FCCA 1635
•25 June 2018
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| FOD17 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2018] FCCA 1635 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for review of Administrative Appeals Tribunal decision – whether the Tribunal’s consideration of the matters of double jeopardy and imprisonment reveals jurisdictional error – whether the applicant was denied procedural fairness – whether the Tribunal failed to take into account relevant considerations – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5, 36, 418, 424, 424AA, 424A, 425, 476 |
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1066, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976)
| Cases cited: Davern v Messel [1084] HCA 34; (1984) 155 CLR 21 SZRSN v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 751 |
| Applicant: | FOD17 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 3918 of 2017 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Nicholls |
| Hearing date: | 19 April 2018 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 27 April 2018 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 25 June 2018 |
REPRESENTATION
| Applicant: | In person |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Mr T Hillyard of Sparke Helmore Lawyers |
ORDERS
The application made on 11 December 2017 is dismissed.
The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs set in the amount of 5,000.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 3918 of 2017
| FOD17 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application made pursuant to s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) on 11 December 2017, seeking review of the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) made on 13 November 2017, which affirmed the decision of the Minister’s delegate (“the delegate”) to refuse a protection visa to the applicant.
The evidence before the Court is a bundle of relevant documents filed, and tendered, by the Minister (“the Court Book” – “CB”, “RE1”) and an affidavit of Ms Haley Aitken made on 13 April 2018 with an annexure.
Background
The applicant is a citizen of the Republic of China (Taiwan) (CB 18 and CB 48.8). He applied for the protection visa which was received by the Minister’s department on 5 July 2017 (CB 1 to CB 43). He was assisted by a registered migration agent (CB 14). The applicant was not invited to attend an interview with the delegate ([6] at CB 88).
The applicant claimed to fear harm from “gang members” in Taiwan. He claimed to have been a “real estate developer” and due to “cash flow issues”, the applicant and his business partner borrowed “1.6 million from loan sharks”. Subsequently, in September 2016, “policies adverse to [the] real estate market were released”. The applicant’s “project” could not be sold in “a short time”, and the applicant could therefore not repay his debts (CB 36).
The applicant claimed to have been “hunted by gang members” as a result. He claimed that he had been “falsely imprisoned” and that gang members injured his left hand and shoulder “severely”. He claimed that his family was also threatened by the gang members, and he went to the police but they would not assist him. The applicant claimed that he had to leave Taiwan to “survive” (CB 36 to CB 38).
The delegate refused the grant of the visa on 17 July 2017 (CB 44 to CB 57). The applicant applied for review to the Tribunal on 18 July 2017 (CB 58 to CB 59). He continued to be assisted by the same registered migration agent (CB 59). The applicant was invited to, and attended, a hearing before the Tribunal on 17 August 2017 (“the first Tribunal hearing”) (CB 64 to CB 69). The applicant’s representative provided “updated information” to the Tribunal by email on 21 August 2017 because there had been “some misunderstandings” between the representative and the applicant (CB 75.3).
The applicant was invited to, and attended, another hearing before the Tribunal on 21 September 2017 (“the second Tribunal hearing”) (CB 76 to CB 82). The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision on 13 November 2017 and the applicant was notified by letter sent by email to his representative authorised to receive correspondence on his behalf on 14 November 2017 (CB 83 to CB 104).
The Tribunal noted that when the applicant arrived in Australia on 10 November 2012, he was arrested at the airport for importing illegal substances. He subsequently pleaded guilty to “importing a ‘marketable quantity’ of a border controlled drug” into Australia and was sentenced to 6 years and 9 months in jail, with a non-parole period of 4 years and 6 months ([2] at CB 88).
The Tribunal stated that the delegate had “assessed the application solely on the basis of the claims presented by the applicant in his application for a protection visa” ([7] at CB 88). That is, the delegate had not considered the applicant’s arrest, conviction and his time spent in prison in Australia as a result of his drug conviction.
At the first Tribunal hearing, the applicant told the Tribunal that he resided in China and owned a “small clothing factory” and in 2010 he borrowed “1.76 million RMB” from a Mr Ming, a Taiwanese national based in Taiwan, in order to “buy stock”. Between 2010 and 2011 the applicant claimed to have accumulated “large amounts of debt” which he became unable to repay ([11] – [12] at CB 89).
The applicant stated that in January or February 2012, “five people were dispatched from Taiwan to claim the money”. The applicant stated that the men came to his house on various occasions, threatened his family, and physically assaulted the applicant. He claimed that on one occasion, they “‘cut’ him on his wrist and upper arm” with a knife. The men asked the applicant to take amphetamines to “another country” in order to pay his debt. The applicant initially refused, but accepted after they “threatened” his family ([13] at CB 89).
The Tribunal noted the written submissions provided after the first Tribunal hearing by the applicant’s representative that indicated there had been “some misunderstandings” between the representative and the applicant ([17] at CB 90). As a result of a Country of Origin Information Service research response (“COISS”), on 24 August 2017, the Tribunal wrote to the Minister’s department pursuant to s.424(1) of the Act, and also requested any documents in the Secretary’s possession considered to be relevant to the review pursuant to s.418(3) of the Act ([18] – [19] at CB 90).
On 4 September 2017, the Tribunal received further documents from the Minister’s department which included an Australian Federal Police “Statement of Agreed Facts” dated 25 July 2013 (“SAF”) and “Sentencing Court Remarks” (“SCR”) dated 29 July 2013 by a Judge of the District Court of New South Wales in relation to the applicant’s drug conviction ([21] at CB 91 to [29] at CB 92). The Tribunal invited the applicant to attend the second Tribunal hearing in light of the information contained in the SAF and SCR ([30] at CB 92).
The Tribunal “did not find the applicant to be a credible and truthful witness” ([37] at CB 93). The Tribunal found that the applicant’s evidence to the Tribunal “differed significantly” from that contained in the SAF and the SCR ([38] at CB 93). The Tribunal noted various inconsistencies in relation to the applicant’s living arrangements in China, his employment and business activities before leaving China, the circumstances surrounding his decision to bring amphetamines to Australia, and his “inconsistent and implausible evidence in relation to events he claimed had transpired whilst he was in prison in Australia” ([39] at CB 93 to [50] at CB 96).
The Tribunal found that the applicant’s evidence showed “a propensity to manufacture, shift and tailor evidence in a manner which achieves his own purpose” ([51] at CB 96). The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant had accumulated debts in China, that he had borrowed money from anyone, or that he had been harmed in any way by “debt collectors, gang members or anyone else in relation to any debt”. The Tribunal also did not accept that anyone threatened the applicant’s family or that he was “pressured” into importing drugs to Australia. It found that he had imported the drugs for his own “financial gain” ([52] at CB 96).
The Tribunal also put no weight on a “threatening letter” the applicant claimed he had received while in Australia on the basis of the applicant’s “fundamental lack of credibility” ([53] at CB 96 to [55] at CB 97).
The Tribunal also considered charges of fraud and forgery awaiting the applicant in Taiwan, but found that any consequences for the applicant would be as a result of the “non-discriminatory enforcement of laws of general application” ([56] – [58] at CB 97). Therefore, there was not a real chance that the applicant would face serious harm for this reason.
The Tribunal accepted that there was a real chance that the applicant could face further imprisonment in Taiwan for the drug offences he was convicted of in Australia. However, the Taiwanese laws in this regard were also laws of general application and there was no evidence that they would be applied to the applicant in a discriminatory manner ([59] at CB 97). The Tribunal found that there was not a real chance that the applicant would suffer serious harm for this reason.
The Tribunal also considered the applicant’s likely “re-prosecution” in Taiwan for the drug offences he was convicted of in Australia. The Tribunal found that this would not breach Article 14(7) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and further, the prison conditions in Taiwan would not be intentionally inflicted such that they come within the definition of “cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment” ([56] at CB 97 to [74] at CB 100).
The Tribunal found that the applicant did not meet either criteria in s.36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Act for the grant of the visa ([75] at CB 100 to [79] at CB 101).
Before the Court
The parties first appeared before the Court on 20 December 2017. Orders were made giving the applicant the opportunity to file any amended application, and both parties were given the opportunity to file further evidence by way of affidavit and written submissions. The applicant filed no further documents pursuant to these orders. The Minister filed written submissions on 12 April 2018 (“the Minister’s first written submissions”). The matter was also listed for final hearing on 19 April 2018.
The Application to the Court
The grounds of the application to the Court are in the following terms:
“1. I am the applicant of these proceedings.
2. Procedural fairness.
3. The decision jurisdictional error of AAT.
4. The decision of AAT
a) is affected by an error of law
b) failed to take into account relevant consideration.”
[Errors in the original.]
Consideration
At the final hearing, the applicant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter in the Mandarin language. The Minister was represented by a solicitor.
Although not expressly raised by the grounds of the application, nor by any submission made by the applicant, I did consider whether the Tribunal’s consideration of what it described as "Imprisonment and Double Jeopardy" (CB 97.3), revealed jurisdictional error.
In particular, during the hearing I raised with the Minister's solicitor the specific question of whether, with reference to [56] (at CB 97) to [74] (at CB 100) of the Tribunal's decision record, the Tribunal adequately understood, addressed, and properly applied, the statutory meaning of "significant harm" as it is defined in s.36(2A) of the Act. In part, this included the reference to "Double Jeopardy" in the heading above [56] (at CB 97) of the Tribunal’s decision record (which reads, “Imprisonment and Double Jeopardy”).
The background to this is that, as set out above, the applicant was convicted of "drug" offences in Australia. He was sentenced to imprisonment in Australia. Separately, it ultimately emerged before the Tribunal that the applicant was also subject to charges in Taiwan for "fraud and forgery".
The concept of "double jeopardy" can be understood as putting an accused person in the situation of being convicted of the same crime, arising from the same conduct, on more than one occasion. Generally the common law seeks to prevent a person being placed in double jeopardy (see, for example, Davern v Messel [1084] HCA 34; (1984) 155 CLR 21).
In the current case, in relation to "fraud and forgery", the applicant had not been charged or convicted in Australia of any such offence arising from events in Taiwan. If he were to return to Taiwan and be charged with a fraud or forgery offence, the concept of double jeopardy would not apply to him.
Both parties were given the opportunity to make written submissions on the question outlined above (at [25]) after the conclusion of the final hearing. The applicant filed written submissions on 27 April 2018. The Minister filed written submissions on the same day (“the Minister’s second written submissions”).
The applicant’s written submissions, in essence, seek to challenge findings of fact, including findings on the applicant’s credibility, made by the Tribunal. That is, the applicant’s written submissions sought impermissible merits review and did not assist in relation to the matter raised by the Court (regarding “double jeopardy”).
The Minister’s second written submissions raised seven matters to support his contention that no jurisdictional error is revealed in relation to this question.
First, that Tribunal decisions should be read fairly. That is accepted. I note however, that this still leaves open the question as to whether, on a fair reading, the Tribunal's approach in the current circumstances, reveals jurisdictional error.
Second, that the Tribunal’s reasons revealed that it understood its task as being the “application, to the facts, of the statutory criteria in section 36(2)(a) and (aa) of the Act”. The Minister relies on what he said is the Tribunal’s “accurate” summary of the relevant provisions ([5] of the Minister’s second written submissions).
I agree with the Minister that the Tribunal’s "summary" of the key relevant provisions of the Act was a fair summary (see [31] at CB 92 to [35] at CB 93 and see CB 102 to CB 104). Further, the Minister submitted that the Tribunal’s key findings were made with reference to this summary (see at [62] – [63] at CB 98 and [73] – [76] at CB 100). This still leaves the question of whether these findings and references by the Tribunal contained any misapplication of what was summarised.
Third, and in this regard, the Minister submits that while the Tribunal’s reasons did not set out the relevant provisions, including s.36(2A) of the Act in full, no error arises in circumstances where the Tribunal's summary was "accurate" and with reference to the "attachment" to the Tribunal’s decision record (at CB 102 to CB 104). Again, I agree, but note the issue is still one of application of the relevant provisions to the facts in this case.
It is the Minister’s fourth matter raised in his second written submissions that directly engages with the gravamen of the question raised by the Court.
I agree with the Minister that the central, relevant, issue for the Tribunal was whether the application of the Taiwanese criminal law to the applicant would constitute "significant harm". That is, "cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment", "degrading treatment or punishment", or "torture" (see s.36(2A) of the Act and the relevant definitions in s.5(1) of the Act).
At [56] – [58] (at CB 97) of its decision record, the Tribunal found that, in relation to fraud and forgery in Taiwan, the applicant had been charged in Taiwan, but that this had occurred under a law of general application. The Tribunal found that any such charge and prosecution would not amount to "serious harm". The Tribunal’s finding in this regard, and the findings that informed it, were reasonably open to the Tribunal on what was before it.
In relation to the applicant’s "drug importation" (“the drug matter”), the Tribunal had regard to country information which indicated that the applicant could face further punishment in Taiwan under Taiwanese criminal laws for this crime. The Tribunal found that while the laws could be perceived as severe, the non-discriminatory application of a generally applicable law, such as the law in question, did not amount to persecution, (in context, serious harm). This was also reasonably open to the Tribunal to find based on what was before it.
The Tribunal then turned to consider the complementary protection criterion (s.36(2)(aa) of the Act) ([62] at CB 98). It made proper reference to the relevant definitions in s.5(1) of the Act (being for the phrases, “torture”, “cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment” and “degrading treatment or punishment”) ([63] at CB 98). The Tribunal found that any imprisonment the applicant may face in Taiwan would only arise from “lawful sanctions” ([64] at CB 98). This was also reasonably open to the Tribunal to find on what was before it.
The Tribunal saw the relevant issue as being whether the sanctions, arising in this “lawful” context, were nonetheless inconsistent with the ICCPR.
It is the case that the Tribunal's initial and primary focus in considering the grant of the visa must be to the relevant statute and regulatory scheme. The Tribunal plainly understood this with its reference to the relevant statutory definitions.
In relation to significant harm, the various aspects of this are exhaustively defined in s.36(2A) of the Act, and with reference to s.5(1) of the Act (SZRSN v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 751 and SZRTN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1156; (2013) 138 ALD 104).
Section 36(2A) of the Act is in the following terms:
“Section 36
Protection visas--criteria provided for by this Act
…
(2A) A non-citizen will suffer significant harm if:
(a) the non-citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or
(b) the death penalty will be carried out on the non-citizen; or
(c) the non-citizen will be subjected to torture; or
(d) the non-citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or
(e) the non-citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.”
On a fair reading, the Tribunal proceeded on the basis of factual findings expressed earlier in its decision record, to conclude that subsections (a) and (b) of s.36(2A) of the Act, did not apply to the applicant’s circumstances.
In relation to s.36(2A)(a) and (b) of the Act, the Tribunal found earlier in its decision record that the relevant Taiwanese criminal law was one of general application and there was no evidence before it to indicate that the laws would be enforced against the applicant in a discriminatory manner ([59] at CB 97).
The Tribunal also found that the applicant would, if convicted of the fraud and forgery charges in Taiwan, and if he were to face further punishment for the drug offences (committed in Australia), likely face imprisonment for a number of years.
In this light, although not an express finding, it is reasonable to infer on a fair reading that the Tribunal’s finding was that there was no likelihood of an arbitrary deprivation of life or the imposition of the death penalty.
While the Tribunal expressed a conclusion on all of the matters in s.5(1) of the Act at [76] (at CB 100) of its decision record, it takes a fair reading, to link this to its earlier analysis in relation to s.36(2A)(a) and (b) of the Act. With respect, had the Tribunal been clearer in its explanation of dealing with each of the separate elements of s.36(2A) of the Act (and with reference to s.5(1) of the Act), the Minister would not have been put to the trouble, and expense, of clarifying what the Tribunal had done.
In relation to s.36(2A)(c) of the Act, the Tribunal directly addressed, and made a finding on the question of “torture” (see [63] at CB at 97).
That leaves s.36(2A)(d) and (e) of the Act. Both the terms "cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment" and "degrading treatment or punishment" as they appear in s.36(2A) of the Act, are defined in s.5(1) of the Act as follows (s.5(1) of the Act):
“…‘cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment’ means an act or omission by which:
(a) severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or
(b) pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;
but does not include an act or omission:
(c) that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(d) arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
‘degrading treatment or punishment’ means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:
(a) that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(b) that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.”
Both definitions explicitly do not include "an act or omission" which, amongst other things, is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the ICCPR (see also the definition of "covenant" also in s.5(1) of the Act).
In this light, and in the circumstances, it was appropriate and necessary for the Tribunal to have regard to Article 7 of the ICCPR. The Tribunal properly identified the remaining issue (in light of its factual findings) as whether the relevant sanctions in Taiwan were inconsistent with the articles of the ICCPR ([64] at CB 98).
The Tribunal found that the prohibition on double jeopardy, in relation to the drug matter, would not apply, given the language of Article 14(7) of the ICCPR, which appeared to limit the concept to charges and prosecutions within one jurisdiction. This finding was reasonably open to the Tribunal, given the language of Article 14(7) of the ICCPR (and see also the references to other authorities to which the Tribunal had regard (at [67] at CB 98 to CB 99)). As set out above, "fraud" and "forgery" were not matters arising in Australia.
The Tribunal’s finding that Article 14(7) of the ICCPR limits the concept of double jeopardy to within one jurisdiction, and the findings that informed it, were reasonably open to the Tribunal on what was before it. Importantly, I cannot see that the Tribunal misapplied the relevant statutory provisions.
The Minister’s fifth matter outlined in his second written submissions was that the Tribunal's assessment of “significant harm” was not only confined to the consideration of ICCPR.
In this light, the Tribunal also considered the question of imprisonment in Taiwan. It accepted that the applicant would be likely to face a prison sentence in Taiwan as a consequence of any re-prosecution (with reference to the drugs matter) and separately, would be likely to face a prison sentence in Taiwan as a consequence of a conviction for the charges of fraud and forgery ([69] at CB 99).
The Tribunal had regard to relevant country information and the applicant’s evidence ([71] – [72] at CB 99). It found that it was not satisfied that the applicant would suffer significant harm due to any imprisonment. In this assessment, the Tribunal had appropriate regard to relevant Full Federal Court and High Court authority (SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 69; (2016) 243 FCR 556 and SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; (2017) 91 ALJR 936). The Tribunal’s conclusion in this regard, and the findings that informed it, were reasonably open on what was before it. No legal error is revealed in this regard.
The sixth matter raised in the Minister’s second written submissions was a reference to “[77]” (at CB 100) of the Tribunal's decision record. In context, I understood this to be a reference to [76] (at CB 100) of the Tribunal’s decision record, which is as follows:
“Having concluded that the applicant does not meet the refugee criterion s.36(2)(a), the Tribunal has considered the alternative criterion in s.36(2)(aa). After considering the applicant’s claims, the Tribunal is not satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Taiwan, there is a real risk that he will be subjected to any form of harm that would be the result of an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on the applicant for the reasons specified in paragraphs (a)-(e) of the definition of torture in s 5(1). The Tribunal is not satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that the applicant will suffer harm that would involve the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering or pain and suffering, either physical or mental, such as to meet the definition of cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment in s.5(1). Nor is it satisfied that it has substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that he will suffer such harm as to meet the definition of degrading treatment or punishment in s.5(1) which refers to an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable. The Tribunal is not satisfied that it has substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that the applicant will suffer arbitrary deprivation of his life or the death penalty.”
I agree with the Minister that this paragraph illustrates, in a concise fashion, that the Tribunal understood the relevant statutory test, and did not misapply it in the circumstances of this case.
In relation to the inclusion of the term "double jeopardy" in the heading above [56] (at CB 97) of the Tribunal’s decision record, the Minister submits that this was a fair reference to the applicant’s claim before the Tribunal which was addressed under that heading (see [62] at CB 98 and [64] at CB 98 to [68] at CB 99).
The Tribunal could have considered the issues of “double jeopardy” and “imprisonment” separately. The two concepts are different. In essence, the matter of double jeopardy arises when charges are pressed. Imprisonment may follow any conviction on the charges. Nonetheless, in the circumstances, no legal error is revealed by the Tribunal addressing both issues under the one heading.
The grounds of the application are set out above (at [22]).
Ground “1” of the application is not an assertion of any legal, let alone jurisdictional, error. The fact that the applicant is the applicant in these proceedings cannot be said to reveal jurisdictional error.
Ground “2” simply states "[p]rocedural fairness". No particulars whatsoever are provided. If the ground seeks to assert that the Tribunal breached its procedural fairness obligations to the applicant, nothing in the evidence before the Court indicates that to be the case.
Relevantly, the Tribunal’s procedural fairness obligations are set out in Division 4 of Part 7 of the Act. In that light, I note that the applicant was invited to a hearing pursuant to s.425 of the Act (on two occasions). On the evidence before the Court, the hearings before the Tribunal were a meaningful opportunity for the applicant to make arguments and present his evidence. To the extent that s.424A(1) of the Act was enlivened, the Tribunal employed the mechanism in s.424AA of the Act to discharge its obligation in this regard orally at the hearing. The only evidence before the Court of what occurred at the Tribunal hearings is that set out in the Tribunal's decision record. That evidence does not reveal any legal error on the part of the Tribunal.
It is the case that the country information to which the Tribunal referred, is not "information" for the purposes of s.424A(1) of the Act, given the exemption in s.424A(3)(a) of the Act. Further, the Tribunal's subjective views, its analysis and reasoning, is not “information” for the purposes of s.424A(1) of the Act (SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 26; (2007) 235 ALR 609).
Ground “3” simply asserts jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. No particulars are provided. In that light, the ground is meaningless and cannot reveal jurisdictional error.
The same can be said in relation to ground “4(a)”.
Ground “4(b)” again, is simply a bare statement. No particulars are provided. In any event, no failure to take into account any relevant consideration arises on the evidence before the Court.
Conclusion
The applicant’s grounds do not reveal jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. The application to the Court should be dismissed. I will make the appropriate order.
I certify that the preceding seventy-one (71) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Nicholls
Associate:
Date: 25 June 2018
0
8
2